

**FOOD AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON**

Washington, D.C.: The most formidable non-military weapon in the U.S. armory to emerge in recent years is the nation's surplus production of food and feed grains. But, as with all new and untested weapons, its nature and power remains imperfectly understood and U.S. government officials are still groping on how to effectively use it.

Two recent multi-million-dollar grain deals with Poland and the Soviet Union clearly point up this lack of strategy by the Reagan Administration on how to use American "agripower" to support our foreign policy objectives.

In the highly explosive Polish food crisis, for example, the decision was made to provide the bankrupt Communist government with low-interest credit to purchase U.S. corn and feed grains without seeking a single concession.


President Reagan and his advisers rejected a proposal linking the new credits and grain sales to the Polish government's acceptance of the demand of Solidarity, the free labor movement in Poland, for a role in the production and distribution of food in that strife-torn country.

Supporters of Solidarity contend that this linkage would give the Polish labor movement some real power to shape events in that country while expanding the activities of the freedom movement there.

This year's disastrous Soviet harvest was the third in a row. This means that Soviet leaders would have to withdraw the eight million tons of grain from their "war ready reserve" if the Reagan Administration hadn't agreed to bail them out. They already have contracted for nearly all the other surplus grain in the world.

All of these developments would seem to indicate that it is time for Congress to review the Reagan Administration's policy of grain sales to the Soviet Union and Poland to see who they are actually helping.

The public outcry to opposition to this unwise action was deafening. I shared the concerns of my constituents and testified before the House Post Office Committee,



# Washington Report

A column by Rep. James T. Broyhill

The American public has been hearing a good deal about the U.S. Postal Service this year, but unfortunately, what we have been hearing has not been all good.

We have been faced with the threat of a postal strike. We have seen the postage rates increased to eighteen cents. We have heard stories of postal "training centers" supported at taxpayers' expense.

The possibility of an expanded, nine-digit zip code looms ahead. The possibility of another postal increase has been suggested.

And the most discouraging notion of all is the suggestion that as many as 10,000 small post offices should be closed as a means of reducing federal spending. Needless to say, that unwise action would have a very unfair impact on rural states such as North Carolina in which the citizens rely so heavily on the local post office.

The report that small post offices would have to be closed arose during recent deliberations on the legislation to enact the mandated budget cuts. The small post office closing idea is partially attributable to some political maneuvering -- individuals threatening the termination of one vital service or another as a means of achieving bargaining power in the high-stakes budget process. The idea is also attributable in some measure to the efforts of earnest but misguided individuals who are trying to examine all areas of the postal budget and see where reductions can be made.

The small post office closing story may sound familiar. Six years ago, the Postal Service attempted to implement a wide-scale program of post office closings. Many of the targeted post offices were in North Carolina; some were in the 10th District.

During negotiations on the budget cut bill, a provision calling for small post office closing as a budget savings was dropped from consideration. Later, Congressman Paul Simon drafted an amendment to the Postal appropriations bill to emphasize Congress' intent that the Postal Service stick to the orderly process it has devised man Simon in his efforts.

urging that action be forestalled on any plan to terminate small, rural post offices. Later, at least 50 members of Congress brought suit against the Postmaster General so that an orderly and fair plan was devised to be used in the event that any post offices had to be closed.

As a result, the Postal Service did formulate a plan which sets strict criteria against which any postal closing must be measured. For example, if there is a proposed postal closing, it is required that the community viewpoint be solicited and taken into account, that notice be given to the community prior to the closing, and that the potential savings which are projected be measured.

I am encouraged by two recent congressional efforts aimed at ensuring the Postal Service continue its commitment to this plan.

Through the efforts of Congress and the American public, I am hopeful that the Postal Service will recognize the need for efficient, equitable and sound management practices. Such practices, most assuredly, do not encompass widespread closure of local post offices.

As I noted back in 1976 when this controversy first arose, there are few institutions as important to the community as the local post office. Nothing can serve more to unite a community than an efficient post office system. Nothing can serve more to disintegrate a community than to take away one of its living symbols, the post office.

## MONEY TALKS

Ironically, some of the most lopsided distributions of assets are seen among some of the wealthiest people. I often see portfolios, brought to me for analysis, that are 85% in property, or oil, or cattle, or stocks, or a business. That's living dangerously.

There is so much uncertainty ahead, in a world now able to electronically communicate changes in financial factors so quickly that your fortune and future can turn from bright to bleak in minutes, if you are heavily placed in only 1 or 2 areas. Risks just now, at this moment in history, are acute from regions not always a part of your scene. Examples: debt structure (govt, biz, personal) is reaching the danger point, where too much disinflation could prevent the payment of debt. The USSR poses a threat to our freedom. Civil disorders erupt increasingly which affect investment areas and lifestyle and often life itself. The military aspect, by the way, can dramatically alter inflation/commodities/stocks and suddenly make certain rare metals of great value, or render certain investment companies worth less if their raw materials abroad are cut off.

Diversification seeks to spread risks. Two other aspects of diversity are: geographic and currency. To have all assets in a single country must be unwise. Some think the US will again be the arsenal of democracy as it was in WWII. But history rarely repeats as to place or person, mainly with respect to human nature. My favorite global resident put it this way over lunch last week: "The US has a lot going for it but the big drawbacks are: 1. It is the only country in the world subject to a 1st strike (nuclear). 2. Its economic strength is tied to the dollar. The dollar's strength is based on faith, not convertible assets. If that faith is eroded (as it was in the 70's), great upheaval could result. 3. It is the only nation in the world in danger of a major race war or confrontation from its fast-growing, disenchanting, volatile, often hostile black population."

My friend's reasons may not be sufficient to make an American move, but they give justification for a partial diversification of his assets between several countries. Then there's the aspect of diversification dealing with currencies. Most of us just now have a majority of our assets in dollars or dollar-denominated items. That's fine. Today. But it wasn't fine for about 10 years in the late 60's and early 70's. And perhaps it won't be again. We have to remain on constant guard duty, looking for signs that it's time to slowly (or maybe quickly) move into a spread of currencies again, and maybe mostly out of dollars again. Just as US B52 bombers remain in the sky 24 hours a day, we have to remain at-the-ready in case of a major currency eruption.

—International Harry Schultz Letter  
Xebex, P.O. Box 134, Princeton, N.J. 08540

Jonathon Hefferlin: JCI "Real news" Letter thinks "The \$8.20-\$8.30 silver bottom looks good, but gold will probably go lower, rally in August, then drop again — providing the Fed continues this monetary policy. The Saudis' buying 2 tonnes of gold daily is not enough to counter the bear market." (525 W. Manchester Blvd., Inglewood, CA 90301, \$50)

Larry Williams, Professional Timing Service, expects a major upmove to begin in the stock market this fall — "The best buy point of the last 6-7 years." Gold may rally from the \$388 level, up to \$460-\$480, but not to new highs. It may be years before we have another gold bull market, he says. (Box 7483, Missoula, MT 59807, \$150)

### Defty-nitions

**Darling:** A popular form of address used in speaking to a person of the opposite sex whose name you cannot at the moment recall.

**Bathing beach:** A salt-water nudist camp.

**America:** A nation in which a truck driver can become an editor, if he's willing to make the financial sacrifice.

Nothing doth more hurt in a state, than that cunning men pass for wise.  
—Francis Bacon

The planted axiom of the liberal establishment in America is that the Reagan administration has no "foreign policy." If that sounds just a little too vague, then the formulation is tightened to allege that the United States has no "foreign policy doctrine." A doctrine is here defined as the organizing idea in behalf of which you are prepared to do something which is unpleasant tactically, but justified strategically. When, for instance, we went to considerable pain and expense to transport supplies by air to West Berlin in 1948, we did so in the name of a doctrine. It was called "containment," and its principal architect was George Kennan. It said that no communist offensive against territory not already under communist dominion would be tolerated, and in the name of that doctrine we went to war in Korea. And, 15 years later, in Vietnam.

We pulled out of Vietnam with a piece of paper that read, roughly, like the piece of paper we got from the North Koreans at Panmunjon, with this critical difference: We left a few divisions in South Korea, just in case the North Koreans followed natural communist inclinations to break inconvenient treaties. In South Vietnam, we left nobody. And when the North Vietnamese in 1975 struck again, Congress -- the Senate in particular -- fiddled. It was a requiem for a lost doctrine. Sir Robert Thompson had written a book called "No exit from Vietnam." It proved prophetic.

Now, American liberal leaders want a doctrine. But there is a new qualification for a satisfactory foreign policy doctrine. It must not come with any heavy responsibilities attached to it.

You will find, if you sniff about, that our lost doctrine comes down, really, to almost any conjugation of: disarmament. If Ronald Reagan were tomorrow to give a speech saying that he would reduce our atomic potential by 10 percent per year, meanwhile

**"In South Vietnam we left nobody, and when the North Vietnamese in 1975 struck again, Congress - the Senate in particular - fiddled."**

sending a team of foreign policy negotiators to persuade the Soviet Union to do the same, you would wake to the exultant sounds of crashing cymbals and exploding sky-rockets. We would have found a "doctrine."

That is the kind of doctrine that, in Europe, is winning the hearts and minds of such as Willy Brandt, the etiolated remains of the mayor of Berlin who in 1948 gave back yell for yell to the easterly gale. He has just returned from a visit to Moscow where, apparently with a straight face, Brezhnev talked to him about the desirability of a nuclear-free "north zone." Norway and

Denmark are members of NATO and pledged to the common defense. However, there are no on-sight nuclear bombs in those countries, and there is no known way to instruct Soviet missiles, now aimed at the heart of Europe, that they must not travel north.

But the idea is infectious, and Mr. Brandt, whose title is president, Socialists International, to the conspicuous discomfiture of the leader of his own party, Mr. Schmidt, is going around Europe asking in effect for creeping unilateral disarmament. The target date for all peace offensives, East and West, is the fall of

# William F. Buckley, Jr.'s "ON THE RIGHT"



1983. It is then that we are scheduled to deploy our Euromissiles -- absent the removal of the Soviet SS 20s. People will say that Willy Brandt, unlike Ronald Reagan, has a "doctrine."

Granted, Mr. Reagan has a lot of joinerwork to attend to. His lifting of the agricultural sanctions against the Soviet Union had the effect of a de jure recognition of invasion of Afghanistan. The fortification of Pakistan appears untied to any settled notion of how to arrest a reasserted Soviet offensive in the area. Israel, under Mr. Begin, threatens the structure of the Camp David accords. Our cordiality to China is unrequited.

But these are loose ends. On the basic questions, there is no doubt in the mind of the president, and therefore none in the minds of the men who govern the Kremlin. It is that the United States is not going to disarm under the auspices of Helsinki-type covenants, which are traded in the international market alongside Confederate money. That is a steady step toward a doctrine: The Soviet Union must deal in disarmament with the hard currency of missiles withdrawn, sites inspected, ambitions renounced. That is an improvement over yesterday's doctrine, which was suited only for speeches delivered at the United Nations.