

## WILMINGTON GAZETTE.

VOLUME X.

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## Foreign News.

IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.  
HOUSE OF LORDS.

April 23.

On the motion of lord Holland, the bill for regulating the intercourse between the United States and the British colonies, was ordered to be read a second time tomorrow evening.

## HOUSE OF COMMONS.

April 23.

Lord Henry Petty gave notice, that he would propose to the House, in a Committee of supply, that a sum of money be granted to the family of Lord Nelson.

## MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY.

On motion of Mr. Secretary Fox, the order of the day was read for taking into consideration his Majesty's most gracious Message. The Message was then read.

Mr. Secretary Fox rose, and spoke to the following effect: "I am sure it is impossible that the Message we have now heard read, can fail to excite the strongest sensation in every temper and disposition of mind which can exist in this House. In the first place, when we hear it stated that his Majesty had abstained from appealing to his British subjects, on account of the violence and injustice which had been done to him in the seizure of his Electoral dominions, it is impossible not to feel grateful for that kindness and mildness which his Majesty has always shewn to the subjects of his realm. It was with the most extreme reluctance that he could consent to involve them in war upon any ground, that was not immediately and directly connected with British interests—After the sentiment of gratitude to his Majesty for this tender consideration of his subjects of this kingdom, the next feeling which must be strongly excited by the Message, is a feeling of just indignation at the Court of Prussia. I hope that every Member, while he feels this just indignation, will, at the same time, perceive the propriety of uniting the most vigorous measures with a language temperate and moderate, and which does not violate that respect which had been always considered due to crowned heads, and ought not, in the present times, to be departed from. Indeed, to describe justly the measures which have been adopted by the Court of Prussia against this country, they cannot be called the measures of the King of Prussia, for that Sovereign is known to be of a mild and pacific disposition; nor could they be called the measures of his Ministers, for no Ministers could freely advise a proceeding so violent and injurious to the interests of that Monarch. The measures must be considered such as his Prussian Majesty had been induced to adopt, from the pernicious counsels of the enemies of this country. Had it been my object to condemn, in the strongest terms, the decision of the Prussian Cabinet, I might have thought it necessary to lay some additional papers on the table, but that not being my object, I have moved but for few. More would have been unnecessary, as it was not my wish to give the strongest possible colouring to the accusation that the Message contains. If we are to understand those proceedings which have terminated in an outrage, unprecedented in the history of Europe, it will be necessary to view the transaction a little earlier. The origin of this proceeding is to be traced to the Convention concluded at Vienna, on the 15th of December, between Count Haugwitz and the French Emperor; but when it is considered what was the situation of Prussia at the time that its Sovereign concluded the treaty with France, it must be recollected, that its means of negotiation were still greater than what it derived from its own resources, or its own armies. The armies of Prussia were unusually numerous and respectable; but was it on them alone that the king of Prussia relied, when he was negotiating with France? Certainly it was not. He had a strong additional support, which gave weight to his negotiations. The Emperor of Russia, after he had left Austerlitz, gave the whole direction of the Russian troops that remained in Germany, to the command of the King of Prussia. This country too had promised him a powerful assistance by pecuniary supplies, if he should be driven to a war with France. These were the means he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations; and how did he apply those means? Why, to seize a part of the territories of one of those powers which had been supporting him in that rank and situation, which enabled him to conclude his

treaty. (*Loud cries of hear! hear!*) After this treaty was signed, a considerable difficulty remained in the execution of it. This difficulty proceeded, in a great measure, from the just scruples of the king of Prussia, who perceived that it would be very hard to prevail upon his Britannic Majesty to ratify such a treaty, and who therefore, felt that his title would be so bad as to make the acquisition of Hanover, under these circumstances, a poor equivalent for those provinces that he was obliged to give up to France. He felt, besides, that upon no principle of justice could he pretend to take it on other terms from those which France herself had held it on and therefore, at first, he did not pretend to take Hanover absolutely, but with the power of restoring it. France, in the meantime, pressed for the cession of Anspach and Bayreuth. What then did the king of Prussia do? Certainly he could not expect that the French government would be able to negotiate between him and his Britannic Majesty, that he should be allowed to retain Hanover, and therefore he finally resolved to seize it without the consent of his Majesty, and under the pretence of an equivalent for Anspach, Bayreuth, and those provinces which were ceded to France. It cannot then be said, that this treaty, and the proceedings which followed it, were altogether the effects of fear, for what was the necessity under which his Prussian Majesty was placed? Was it merely the necessity of ceding Anspach and Bayreuth? This might have been a considerable misfortune, yet it was one which might be justified by necessity. But the sort of necessity claimed by the king of Prussia is different; he says, "Because I have lost Anspach and Bayreuth, I therefore feel myself under the necessity of seizing the dominions of some third power, not only of a third power, but of one that from all times, and by every circumstance, I was bound to respect." This is the sort of necessity claimed by the Prussian court, and it is this which makes the case of Prussia much worse than any other nation in Europe. As for Spain, (I do not wish to revive the differences of opinion with respect to the Spanish war) but Spain, I say, would comply no further with the wishes of our enemies, than by giving a sum of money. Holland and other powers have been, from terror, obliged to make cessions of territory to France, but no other power has been compelled, by terror, to commit robberies or spoliations on its neighbours. (*A cry of hear! hear!*) It is in this that the case of Prussia stands distinguished from that of all other nations. We cannot help looking, with some degree of pity and contempt, on a power that can allege that it is reduced to such a necessity. It would be, in itself, a considerable humiliation or degradation to Prussia, to be obliged to give up those provinces to which it was so much attached, and which had been called "The Cradle of the House of Brandenburg." The degradation of this cession was still more increased by the conduct of the people of Anspach, who entreated their Sovereign not to abandon them. Instead of lessening the ignominy of the cession, it was a great increase of dishonour, to sell a brave and loyal people for what was called an equivalent: it was an union of every thing that was contemptible in ferocity with every thing that was odious in rapacity. (*Cries of hear! hear!*) On the 27th of January an official letter was written from Baron Hardenberg to Mr. Jackson, expressly stating it to be the intention of his Prussian Majesty to take possession of Hanover only until the conclusion of peace between England and France. In the answer to his letter, his Majesty expresses his firm reliance on the declaration of his Prussian Majesty, but wishes the terms to be more explicit. The language that Prussia held at that time to our Court, was the same she then held to Russia and every other Court with which she was connected by the relations of friendship.—Soon after this, the convention with France appeared, and then the Court of Prussia wished to represent the measures taken with regard to Hanover, as in a manner dictated by France. They would have it supposed, that it was rather an object of French than of Prussian ambition, that they should be possessed of Hanover. At first, they endeavoured to represent to the government of this country, that it was more for our interest that Hanover should be occupied by Prussian than by French troops, and their argument was this, "If we have it, the ports may be still open to your commerce, or at least your manufactures may have a passage

through our territory." This hope was, however, now entirely cut off, and M. de Sculenburg, in his manifesto professes to take the country as a present from France, which she had won, and held by the right of conquest. No example could be found in all the histories of war, and no mention had never been made by the writers on the law of nations, of any power having a right to receive as a present a country occupied during a war, by one of the belligerent powers, but not ceded by the other. The House must therefore see to what extremity we are now reduced. It would be idle to say that a war with Prussia would not be a calamity. It is impossible but that it must be a calamity to this country to have the number of its enemies increased. It is also a painful consideration to think that there is no mode of returning this calamity on the aggressors, which will not in some degree fall also on the neutral and friendly nations and even ourselves. The House will, however, feel that there are occasions in which a manifestation of our principles & of our resentment become necessary, altho' attended with the calamities inseparable from war. If such an outrage as this were passed over, might not every other nation in Europe, and particularly those who have less power to resist than Prussia, say to us, "we wish as much as you that the power of France could be restrained, but you see our situation, and the great power of France, to which we are exposed. What are we to do?" If this question were put to me, I should answer, that powers in that situation must save themselves as well as they can, and even make cessions, if they are insisted upon.—If Prussia should allege that she was in that state of comparative weakness, that she was obliged to cede Anspach and Bayreuth; however, his Majesty might lament the necessity or the accession of strength his enemies derived from the acquisition, still he would not have attempted to oppose it, or make the slightest remonstrance on the occasion. But when that power shall say, "I am not only obliged to make cessions, but I am also obliged to make war with you," then the question becomes very different, and his Majesty is under the necessity of considering it in a very different light. Although I, for one, am not inclined to look very favourably on the present situation of this country, nor to feel so sanguinely as some other gentlemen, yet I think, that upon the present occasion, we should make a signal example of the court of Prussia; and whatever principles theorists may lay down without restoring the balance of Europe, I think we shall do more to restore the found and true principles that ought to prevail in Europe, by shewing the world, in this instance, that this country will not abandon her herself, nor consent that they shall be departed from by other nations in their transactions with her. I consider that the power of the country consists, in a great measure, in the known justice of its principles, in its moderation and forbearance; but if the court of Berlin chuse to depart from the principles of justice, and to act hostilely to this country, it must take the consequence. I believe it has as yet gained nothing by its injustice. Hanover, desolated as it was first by French armies, and afterwards in a still greater degree by Prussian armies, can add little or nothing to the revenues of Prussia, neither can it, in its present situation, increase her military strength. The king of Prussia has been given a mere nominal possession of that country; but so far from being strengthened by this present from France, he is only the more completely vanquished & subdued. Austria was forced, by the fortune of war, to cede many of her provinces. Other nations have also been obliged to make similar concessions; but none of them had, like Prussia, been reduced to that lowest state of degradation, to consent to become the ministers of the injustice and rapacity of a power. By the command of France, Prussia was obliged to shut the ports of Hanover against our ships, and what was the possession which France allowed her to keep of Hanover? She has sent general Barbot to reside in that country as a military superintendent, to see that every thing be done there according to the pleasure of France.—There are many other instances of the manner in which Prussia is now treated by France. In several transactions, respecting the possession of Eden and Werdon, and several little villages almost too inconsiderable to name, Prussia is treated with as little respect as she deserves. (*Cries of hear! hear!*) The French appear constantly to treat Prussia

as a country that it is impossible to make a treaty or agreement with; and in this respect, it is very likely, they are in the right. (*Hear! hear!*) In our conduct upon this occasion, we shall have avoided a great evil, and done some good. We shall avoid the giving the sanction of this country to the spoliations which have been committed on the continent. We shall avoid the imputation of being indifferent to the fate of his Majesty's foreign possessions, which would be a heavy imputation, even, if it were supposed that their security was not immediately connected with the interests of this country; but above all, we shall avoid the giving our sanction to that principle which has been lately adopted, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, in the way of equivalents, and under the pretext of convenience and mutual accommodation.—The wildest schemes that ever were before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundation of all established governments as this new practice. If we are to make exchanges let us exchange those things which are the proper subjects of exchange; let us give a field for a field, or let us exchange its flock, its oxen and its sheep; but let us not consider the people of a country or the subjects of a state, as matter for exchange or barter. There must be in every nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no nation can subsist. This principle then of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the foundation of every government and the existence of every nation. I had therefore great pleasure in presenting the note delivered to me by Mr. Jacobi, which expressed that no consideration or convenience of mutual accommodation, much less an equivalent, should ever induce his Majesty to forget the exemplary fidelity & attachment of his Hanoverian subjects, or consent to the alienation of the electorate. I do not know that it is necessary to make any further observations; but before I sit down, I must state, that there can be no doubt but that the shutting the ports of Prussia to British vessels alone, is most clearly and unquestionably an act of hostility against this country. Mr. Fox then concluded by moving an address of thanks to his Majesty, which (as usual) was an echo of the message.

## FRENCH EXPOSE.

## FROM THE PARIS MONITEUR.

PARIS, April 18.

"England has declared war against Prussia. All the king's ships have received orders to attack the Prussian vessels, and letters of marque have been issued to privateers. Is this a just proceeding on the part of the English government? Is it a public one? These are questions which it is not our intention to examine. It is sufficient for us to discover, that this measure is advantageous to France; that one of its first consequences will be to shut the north against the English trade—and there is little wisdom on the part of England, in acting so towards a considerable power, whom she forces into a nearer connexion with France; and when she determines to remove from her councils the agents and the influence of England. France and Prussia united, can, if they please shut the Sound. If England had learned how to accommodate her policy to circumstances, she would have maintained her party and her creatures in credit in Berlin. She would have rendered the blockade of the ports of the north less severe; she would have, in fact, preserved the advantage which she derives from the Prussian flag; for commerce has occasion for intermediate agents between the merchant and the consumer. But, however it may be, we cannot consider this new political event but as tending to accelerate peace; for assuredly, Prussia is neither a weak enemy for England, nor a weak ally for France. We know that there are persons who accustom themselves with difficulty to the idea of these connexions between France and Prussia, but they do not see the hesitation which was first manifested by the latter cabinet, depending upon temporary circumstances which have neither altered the principles of the king, nor those of his most faithful and intelligent servants. If there were any thing which gave offence to France, it could only be imputed to a frantic minister, who was told to England, who was formerly in her service, and who quitted it for reasons which the dignity of this paper will not allow us to mention. It, perhaps, may be supposed, that England in the new circumstances in which she finds herself with regard to Prussia, had no medium left her, and could not avoid declaring war. But the occupation of Hanover, by Prussia, was the only means of preventing the French from returning to that con-