

shing by precipitancy. The war will not hastily remove the orders in council. It is the principles of the orders, rather than their effect of which we complain. The trade to France which they interdict is of little consequence to the country. An annual amount is less than three millions of dollars, and you find it operated with duties so excessive, and restricted to such articles of exchange, that even if enjoyed in safety, it would be productive of little profit to individuals or to the nation. If, however, you declare war at this time, you lose the trade to Great Britain and her dependencies, equal to thirty-five millions a year, without gaining the paltry trade with France. The laws of war will operate still more extensively than the orders in council; and though no doubt we shall gratify the emperor of France, we shall enjoy little commerce with his dominions. As it regards, therefore our interest, it is found in protracting the present state of affairs. Some gentlemen considered that the honor of the nation called for immediate hostilities. It is admitted that a country is bound to defend its honor, nor can its interest be well separated from its honor. But what honor can you acquire by going to war in your present unprepared and feeble state? In respect to nations their glory and their success, are nearly allied. A vanquished nation gains no honor, however just its cause may be. You have certainly no force prepared to enter Canada. Your army is still to be formed. It is to be found on paper but not in the field. With militia no invasion of a foreign territory can be contemplated. They are not bound to pass your frontiers, and desirous they cannot be to shed their blood, in order to add by conquest to the unwieldy territories of the United States. Is it on the ocean that we are to look for laurels, with twenty ships opposed to a thousand? The most desperate courage cannot command success against such fearful odds. The loss of our navy and of our commerce must be the consequences of the war upon the ocean, and is this the honor gentlemen are so impatient to enjoy?

There was reason to believe that Britain would feel the war only through its restrictive effects. At this moment especially, she stood in need of our produce as well as our market. The embargo and non-importation, which denied her both, were undoubtedly felt. The objection to them was their re-action upon ourselves. The great question was, whether we did not inflict upon ourselves a deeper wound than upon our adversary. If such were the case, it was a strange mode of retaliating. But if this be the edge of war which is to wound the enemy—had we not better retain our present condition? The war is not necessary to execute the restrictive system; and if restriction be the chief effect of war, had we not better bear with the evils of this system, than involve ourselves at the same time in the calamities of war?

Mr. B. said his motion was recommended by the strong consideration that by postponing the declaration of war we could lose nothing, and certainly would gain a great deal. Hostilities would be suspended during the present year. In the mean time, you will be employed in raising and disciplining your army and in providing the munitions of war—your vessels, property, and seamen may be brought home, and you have the chance of propitious events which may interpose.

England at this moment is in a convulsed and distracted state. Tumults, little short of insurrection, have happened in different parts of the kingdom. The present ministry held their places by a very precarious tenure. The real disposition, and intentions of the prince regent are not distinctly and certainly known. The prince may be forced to yield to the popular sentiment.—We had lately seen the corporation of London come forward with an address against the orders in council. This body had always had great weight in the kingdom, especially in giving an impulse and direction to popular opinion. Let us wait the operation of these domestic causes. A little patience, and triumph may be secured to us, by the people of England themselves without bloodshed. The minister had already receded one step. He had suffered the orders to go to a committee. It would be difficult, against the strong current of sentiment which prevailed, for him to recover his former ground.

At the same time, if we cast our eyes on the continent of Europe, we see every thing in commotion; armies of unparalleled numbers taking the field—A crisis of vast magnitude existed, which might terminate in the subjection of all Europe to the power of Buonaparte. If however, the emperor of Russia should avoid the shock and tamely yield to the continental system of his adversary, the effect of this decision of the ports of all Europe to the British trade, could not fail to be sensibly felt by that power, and to create new inducements upon her part, to cultivate friendship and peace with the U. States.

At the same time gentlemen would call to mind the unsettled state of affairs

between this country and France. The principle of impartial and equal conduct as to the belligerents was avowed by all, and he had as yet met with no one who hesitated to declare, that if France refused redress for the wrongs she had done us, the same course ought to be taken in relation to her as to England. It was alleged that negotiation was still pending between the United States and France, and at present we were bound to abstain from acts of hostility as to her. This doubtful state of affairs as to that power was a strong reason for delay. A few months will necessarily realize or disappoint the expectations which are entertained. It could not be the intention of gentlemen to propitiate the emperor, and to secure a treaty by means of a war with England. This would be purchasing his friendship at the expense of our honor, as well as of our blood and treasure. Before we break with England, we ought to know upon what terms we stand with France. If France will concede nothing, in order to induce us to enter into the war, what are we to expect when she is no longer expecting our aid, but we are standing in need of her assistance, to carry on the contest.—In vain then will we ask for redress, and indemnity for seizures and spoliations.—Let us wait and see what she will do before we throw ourselves into his scale—afterwards it will be too late.

The Wasp will return before November, and what is now doubtful with some, will then be certain with all. Some gentlemen were looking for the return of this vessel each succeeding day. But for his part he was too well instructed in arrangements by the history of the Hornet, to expect to see the Wasp for some months after the time announced for her arrival. In February, the government gave out that the Hornet was daily expected and with a passage of twenty days she did not arrive for three months after. She was detained by the very cause which will detain the Wasp, waiting for a treaty. If she waits for a treaty, which is to indemnify us for the losses sustained under the plundering decree of Rambouillet, which some gentlemen flatter themselves with the expectation of being granted by imperial justice, it is much to be dreaded she will never revisit the American shores. Do you expect that Buonaparte will restore the booty he has seized? As well might you expect that the grays will surrender its prey.

If, as was said, indemnity for spoliations was to be the basis of amicable relations with France, sure he was, that we need not wait for the intelligence the Wasp might bring. Or, if you expect a commercial treaty, which is to give activity to your commerce, by opening the ports of France to your trade, it is a decision which time will dissipate, and under which we ought not to act. He knew the source of this delusion. It grew out of the letter of Mr. Barlow, our minister to France, to Mr. Granger, postmaster general. The letter he understood, was dated about the 16th of February, with an endorsement of the 3d of March. Mr. Barlow expressed the expectation of forming a commercial treaty with the French government, and the Hornet was detained for the purpose of carrying it.—He believed that the country was most grossly deceived and imposed upon by this letter of Mr. Barlow. That gentleman never entertained the opinion which the letter expressed. He knew and was entirely satisfied at the time when he wrote the letter, that a treaty which was to open the ports of France to this country was impracticable. Mr. B. said he spoke not on the ground of presumption, nor of any slight evidence. He had seen a letter of Mr. Barlow to Mr. Latrobe, of which he held an extract in his hand, which was dated on the 29th of February, which in very eloquent terms, on the strongest grounds, expressed an opinion that no commercial arrangement would be entered into by the French government. He would read the extract to the senate. [Mr. B. here read the following extract of a letter to Mr. Latrobe, dated the 29th of February, 1812.]

"The expectations of yourself and my friends on my doings here are too high I fear to be realized. It is very difficult to produce a change in a system combined with so many circumstances of vengeance and of other strong passions arrayed against an enemy, as is the anti-commercial system of Napoleon. Argument and eloquence have but little power in the case. That old fashioned goddess whom artists represent with bandaged eyes and a pair of scales has still less to do.—And if you suppose me, with half of these capable of overturning a decision which the cries of twenty commercial cities going to decay, and the united voice of all the wise and honest men of this nation have not been able to shake or scarcely modify, I can only wish, and that with little hope, that you may not be disappointed."

This letter was written after the letter

to Mr. Granger, which gave the assurances of a commercial treaty, and only three days before the postscript endorsed on the letter which alleged the detention of the Hornet to be in order to send the treaty to this country. It did not belong to him to account for the contradiction between the letters; poets might be entitled to indulgences when even writing prose, which were denied to the rest of the world; but it was his purpose in reading the extract of Mr. Barlow's letter, not only to avail himself of the authority of the minister, but of what he valued more, of the weight of the reasons assigned in the letter, for not expecting a commercial arrangement with France. He would repeat in the language of the letter, if the cries of twenty commercial cities going to decay, and the united voice of all the wise and honest men of the nation had not been able to shake or scarcely modify the anti-commercial system of Napoleon, what was to be expected from the negotiation of an American minister? For his part, he expected nothing but false promises and delusive hopes.

Can you expect that Napoleon will relax his anti-commercial system in favor of your commerce, when you see him bring into the field 500,000 men, and ready to hazard the imperial crown, in order to compel Russia to adopt and enforce the same system? To indulge the expectation was to make ourselves the sport of the most visionary hope. The Wasp would bring us duplicates of the dispatches which had been received by the Hornet, and protracted hope would at last sink in despair.—He thought, however, that those gentlemen who still kept expectation alive, that France would do us justice and grant us commercial favors, under the weight of doubt, which must depress their hopes, ought to wait for the ultimate intelligence which was to determine our relations with France and show us more clearly the course which our interest or our honor required, that we should take in relation to Great Britain.

Sir, said Mr. B. before I sit down I will call the attention of the senate to another ground for postponement, which can never be safely overlooked or neglected in a government like that of the United States; This war is not to be supported by the men only who declare it; its weight will fall upon the great body of the people, and they are to sustain its pressure. Can you maintain the war without the general support of the people? The public sentiment is not at present known on the subject. The people have never yet believed us serious in our intention of making war against Great Britain. Let us wait till we can have a full and distinct expression of their opinion. Are you not afraid that opinion is against the war? And if so, are you hardy enough to make war? Do you forget your origin, that you are creatures of the people's favor? That it is their power which you are exercising, and that you have no strength of your own? He must be little instructed in the nature or history of our government, who supposes that a war can be long supported against the will of the people. The constitution makes the general will, the basis of the government.—That will, upon all occasions, must be consulted—and must be obeyed. You may commence the war against the will of the people; but how long can you exercise the powers of government against their will? He knew well that some gentlemen calculated much from the war spirit. That war spirit was at most but the ebullition of the passions; short-lived in its nature, as are all the passions.

Taxes and privations will soon extinguish it, and you will have to settle your account with a nation in their sober senses. If, unfortunately the spirit of war should inflame the party passions to madness, and the people should be willing to sacrifice the country to support a party, then indeed might ministers calculate upon holding their power. But can we foresee the consequences of thus inflaming the furious passions of a whole people? Have you a saving power in the constitution, which shall bring us out of the mad struggle, an entire nation? Our constitution was designed for peace and protection, but not for offensive war. Its great aim was to preserve among ourselves the principles of civil and political liberty. So cautiously in many cases have the abuses of public authority been guarded against, that the salutary exercise of power has been denied. Against a foreign power with a united people, it may not be deficient in energy; but divided among ourselves, it is without force. It possesses no saving principle if the north become arrayed against the south. And if the course of things should lead to this conflict, we should have felt only the recollection of having lived under a common government. What is there to ensure us against this dreadful event? If the northern states conceive their interest sacrificed, and find their sufferings disregarded, will they long yield to an authority which has not power to control them?

The authority of the government once successfully resisted, it is afterwards dispensed, and there is an end to the constitution and of the union. With any nation at any time, war is a hazardous experiment with our government.—In peace we have experienced its blessings. We have seen ourselves, under it, one of the most happy and flourishing people on the earth. Greatly is it to be dreaded, that the frail bark will not endure the storm of intestine division and of foreign war. Upon a question of doubtful expedience, you are about to hazard the existence of the union. Can the senate be exempt at this moment from the most awful impressions? How great is our trust and our responsibility? The destiny of millions depends upon our decision! Shall we make it hastily? I pray God to relieve us from the infatuation of such blind precipitancy, and I call upon you while yet it is not too late, while yet you are standing upon the brink of the precipice, to pause solemnly, before you take the final, fatal step which may plunge the nation into an abyss of inevitable ruin.

Foreign Intelligence.

REVOCATION of the ORDERS IN COUNCIL.

Supplement to the London Gazette.

At the Court at Carlton House, on the 23d day of June, present, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent in Council:

WHEREAS His Royal Highness the Prince Regent was pleased to declare in the name and on behalf of his Majesty, on the 21st of April 1812, "that if at any time hereafter the Berlin and Milan decrees shall, by some authentic act of the French government, publicly promulgated, be absolutely and unconditionally repealed, then, and from thence, the Order in Council of the 7th of January, 1807, and the Order in Council of the 26th of April, 1809, shall, without any further order be, and the same are hereby declared from thenceforth to be wholly and absolutely revoked." And whereas the charge des affaires of the United States of America, resident at this court, did, on the 21st day of May last, transmit to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, one of his Majesty's principal secretaries of state, a copy of a certain instrument, then, for the first time, communicated to this court, purporting to be a decree passed by the government of France, on the 28th day of April, 1811, by which the decrees of Berlin and Milan are declared to be definitely no longer in force in regard to American vessels.

And whereas his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, although he cannot consider the tenor of the said instrument as satisfying the conditions set forth in the said Order of the 21st of April last, upon which the said Orders were to cease and determine, is nevertheless disposed, on his part, to take such measures as may tend to re-establish the intercourse between neutral and belligerent nations, upon its accustomed principles, his royal highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of his Majesty's Privy Council, to order and declare, that the Order in Council bearing date the 7th day of January, 1807, and the Order in Council bearing date the 26th of April, 1809, be revoked, so far as may regard American vessels and their cargoes, being American property, from the 1st day of August next.

But whereas by certain acts of the government of the United States of America, all British armed vessels are excluded from the harbors and waters of the said United States, the armed vessels of France being permitted to enter therein, and the commercial intercourse between G. Britain and the United States, is interdicted, the commercial intercourse between France and the said United States, having been restored; his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is pleased hereby further to declare, in the name and on the behalf of his Majesty, that if the government of the said United States shall not, as soon as may be after this order shall have been duly notified by his Majesty's minister in America to the said government, revoke or cause to be revoked the said acts, this present order shall, in that case, after eleven days notice signified by his Majesty's minister in America, to the said government, be thenceforth null and of no effect.

It is further ordered and declared, that all American vessels and their cargoes, being American property, that shall have been captured subsequent to the 28th of May last, for a breach of the aforesaid orders in council alone, and which shall not have been actually condemned before the date of this order, and that all ships and cargoes as aforesaid, that shall henceforth be captured under the said orders, prior to the 1st day of August next, shall not be proceeded against to condemnation, until further orders, but shall, in the event of this order not becoming null and of no effect, in the case aforesaid, be forthwith liberated and restored, subject to such reasonable expenses on the part of the captors, as shall have been justly incurred.