

from the common Enemy." I answer no, treat us like your brethren; treat us like equals—give us our due and proper weight in the political scale of our Country and you will find, that the smallest cheese-paring of the rights of the meanest Citizen, or the proudest but just claims of the most powerful States in the Union, will be sustained by no portion of the United States, with more vigour, or at greater hazard than by New-England. But might I not with propriety reverse this interrogatory—will Virginia now desert Massachusetts?—a large portion of our territory is, and has been, for some time in possession of the Enemy—What sensibility has Virginia discovered at this event?—Has all her ancient sympathy for us evaporated?—What interest has the general government manifested in it?—Should as the grave were both of them, until the expulsion of the latter became palpable to the touch, when nearly three years after the commencement of the war and when admitting the possession of the seaboard carrier with the jurisdiction of the interior—she had not probably, exclusively of the guard of the depot of Prisoners at Pittsfield, of her regular troops in all Massachusetts more than in the proportion of one Soldier for ten thousand acres of her territory under the control of the enemy, she offered in the bitterness of derision, to furnish men which she had not, and could not get, except from among ourselves, if we would provide means to pay and support them, on an expedition which common sense demonstrated, with the means she possessed, or rather the entire absence of them, to be both impracticable and absurd—and all this too, after we had stated the narrow situation of our finances, and requested payment for the expenses we had already incurred for the general safety, and protection, by the service of our Militia—and received insult added to injury for our answer, by being told, that our expenses should not be allowed us, but that if we had any money to lend, the general government were willing to receive it.—"We asked for bread, and they gave us a stone."

But you tell us, that under certain events—you will exclude our tonnage and manufactures from your ports and harbours—a policy you think under such events, much more obvious, than that which induced the states of the South to consent to discriminating duties in favor of American tonnage, and the merchandise imported in it, at the infancy of the government. This subject even abstractly considered merits attention.

The discriminating duties imposed by the government among its earliest measures were ostensibly, and I believe honestly and intentionally designed, to protect and encourage American navigation—to which they have always been considered by Southern men as a boon beyond all price, and to judge from the reiterations of this topic as affording a fair, and full compensation, for any and all the disadvantages which the Constitution might, would, could, or should, produce to the Eastern people in any other respect.

As this opinion, even out of the Southern States, has attached to it a good deal of popularity, and as to a certain extent I have heretofore been one of its disciples, if I should succeed to shew you in few words, that it has in reality (common opinion to the contrary notwithstanding) been of very little service to us, and that possibly hereafter it may become even worse than useless, and then proffer it to you to part, as an off-set for something else, you will admit at least in this instance, that I do not follow the example of the worthy fraternity of Rag-fair, or St. Bartholomews, and cry up those articles most highly, which I am most willing to part with.

So far as the discriminating duties afford any evidence of concession, or conciliation towards Northern interests, we will acknowledge it most gratefully and respectfully—and scarcely suffer ourselves even by remembrance to apply the remark of Junius to the fair defender of the Duke of Bedford, to those who were willing to accord them—but it should now be understood that the past throws no light upon what would have been the effect of these discriminating duties, under other circumstances than those in which we have been placed, nor on what will be the operation after the occurrence of a general peace.—It is true we have been the carriers of your produce for the past twenty years—but let it be also remembered, that during the same time our transatlantic trade has been scarcely an object of attention or

regard to the principal powers of Europe, otherwise than as it has presented a tempting bait for the gratification of their avarice and lust of plunder—for during nearly the whole of the same period, those nations have been in a state of war or turmoil—with many of their governments overturned, and most of their colonial and commercial establishments broken down—thus situated the celerity of our vessels—our vicinity—our qualified neutrality—our favorable rates of insurance, and the capital & active enterprise of our citizens must for the period I have mentioned, have secured to us the carrying of your produce with, or without the discriminating duties—on the recurrence of a general peace, the question alone can be fairly tested, whether those duties would importantly protect and secure a preference for our own ships, even in our own harbors?—probably they may not—for can it be imagined that the principal navigating Powers of Europe, especially Great Britain and France, will not on their part, impose countervailing duties on American tonnage, and merchandise imported in American vessels, so as completely to neutralize the discriminating duties in the United States?—Most unquestionably they will, and the discrimination must be here abandoned, or give rise to another ridiculous Custom-house system of warfare in which as experience has invariably demonstrated, we should either come off second best, or the trade be stopped altogether,—for the bulk of our commodities compared with the small volume of their representative value in European manufactures, requiring relatively to the former not more than one ship to twenty, would give so decided an advantage to our opponents as very speedily to terminate this contest.—The discriminating duties must therefore in all probability, cease from a regard to our own interest at no very distant period after a general peace, and the carrying trade be left open, as all other trades should be, to the fair competition of intelligence, economy, and industry, on which terms we are I believe in the Northern States, fully able to meet it.

We are also informed, when we complain of the representation of three fifths of your slaves—that it is our duty to be dumb, and open not our mouths, that "it is one of the articles of the compact—it is a compromise between the States, and this is the master key which unlocks all its difficulties,"—and will not this key, my good Sir, suit any other wards in the lock than those which appertain to Virginia?—who is the dominant power in the Union? Unquestionably Virginia—what did we compromise the representation on slaves for? undoubtedly for a general protection for our rights, and our commerce, and for the promotion of the common welfare, and for our defence—have these objects been secured to us—or have the former been completely blasted and destroyed, and the latter grossly abandoned and neglected?—and are we then, a sovereign State, at least for certain purposes, to be chained down to the mere technical forms of a contract, and to be compelled to fulfil it on our part to the letter, even to the point of flesh, (take not a drop of blood with it, I beseech you, the bond does not provide for it,) while the other contracting party openly sets it at defiance, and not only violates its engagements to provide for our protection, but even subtracts from us the little ability we had to furnish such protection for ourselves?

As a Statesman and Logician, you must I think answer no, and that we cannot be so unequally bound; I will therefore not waste your time by a discussion, on the nature of contracts—of the equity of a avoiding them, from want of consideration—want of reciprocity—or from a preference to pay the penalty rather than fulfil the promise; and because any such argument however elaborate would be worse than idle where no empire exists, to decree and enforce a judgement between the parties litigant. And that no such tribunals, or could exist, you will readily admit, when you recollect that this question was adjudicated, either on a review, fifteen or sixteen years since by the enlightened Legislature of your own State, who solemnly resolved, "that the States themselves," (that is, each State at its peril,) "are the rightful judges in the last resort, whether the bargain made has been pursued or violated—that there can be no tribunal above their authority—and that the admission of any other construction, would be a direct subversion of the rights specified, or recognized under all the State Constitutions, as well as a plain denial of

the principles upon which our independence was established."

You next pourtray, with a pencil always vivid, and generally dipped in the colors of the rain-bow, a sombre picture of the situation of New-England in case of a division of the Union, which in some degree I am willing to admit; but did I not relict at this topic—abstain from it in conversation, and almost interdict it to my thoughts, it would require no great effort of fancy, to present some objects which would still further fill up the back ground of this canvas, and whose operation would not have a New-England limit—they would not however, I can most truly assure you, include among them, that which would first obtrude itself upon a southern imagination—for should such an event as that to which I now refer, ever take place, and of which I rejoice to say, I have never seen any strong grounds of apprehension, you may be most fully persuaded, there is no occurrence within the circle of Domestic Casualties, or Misfortunes that would so soon excite the sympathy, and call forth the exertions of the best men, and of the great Body of the People of New-England for your relief and assistance.—It may be sufficient to say, that in a country such as ours, the moral of a military force is infinitely greater than its common physical power, and I have fondly wished to believe that N. England men in a just cause, contending for their rights and their fire-sides, and rallying round the mountain Nymph the object of their earthly adoration, would be invincible, and if this be a delusion, I will however still press it to my heart, and endeavor to live in the hope that it will only die with me.

[To be concluded in our next.]

FROM NEW-ORLEANS.

Copy of a letter from Major General Jackson to the Secretary of War—dated

Camp, 4 miles below Orleans, }
24th January, 1815.

Sir,—During the days of the 6th and 7th, the enemy had been actively employed in making preparations for an attack on my lines. With infinite labor they had succeeded on the night of the 7th in getting their boats across from the lake to the river, by widening and deepening the canal on which they had effected their disembarkation. It had not been in my power to impede these operations by a general attack added to other reasons, the nature of the troops under my command, mostly militia, rendered it too hazardous to attempt extensive offensive movements in an open country, against a numerous and well-disciplined army. Although my forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, my strength had received very little addition; a small portion only of that detachment being provided with arms. Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, I took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defend the object he had in view. Gen. Morgan with the Orleans contingent, the Louisiana militia and a strong detachment of the Kentucky troops, occupied an entrenched camp on the opposite side of the river, protected by strong batteries on the bank, erected and superintended by Commodore Patterson.

In my encampment every thing was ready for action, when early on the morning of the 8th, the enemy after throwing a heavy shower of bombs and Congreve rockets, advanced their columns on my right and left, to storm my entrenchments. I cannot speak sufficiently in praise of the firmness and deliberation with which my whole line received their approach—more could not have been expected from veterans inured to war. For an hour, the fire of the small arms was as incessant and severe as can be imagined. The artillery too, directed by officers who displayed equal skill and courage, did great execution. Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the greatest credit. Twice the column which approached me on my left, was repulsed by the troops of Gen. Carroll, those of Gen. Coffee, and a division of the Kentucky militia, and twice they formed again and renewed the assault. At length, however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion from the field, leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion, cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed, wounded and prisoners. Upwards of 300 have already been delivered over for burial; & my men are still engaged in picking them up within my lines, and carrying them to the point where the enemy are to receive them. This is in

addition to the dead and wounded whom the enemy have been enabled to carry from the field, during and since the action, and to these who have since died of the wounds they received. We have taken about 500 prisoners, upwards of 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally. My loss has not exceeded, and I believe has not amounted to ten killed and as many wounded. The entire destruction of the enemy's army was now inevitable, had it not been for an unfortunate occurrence which at this moment took place on the other side of the river. Simultaneous with his advance upon my lines, he had thrown over in his boats a considerable force to the other side of the river. These having landed, were hardy enough to advance against the works of Gen. Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with a confidence approaching its certainty, the Kentucky reinforcements in whom so much reliance had been placed, ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces; and thus yielding to the enemy that most fortunate position. The batteries which had rendered me, for many days the most important service, though bravely defended, were of course now abandoned; not, however until the guns had been spiked.

This unfortunate rout had totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on this side the river. It became therefore an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible. For this object, all the means in my power, which I could with any safety use, were immediately put in preparation. Perhaps, however, it was owing somewhat to another cause that I succeeded even beyond my expectations. In negotiating the terms of a temporary suspension of hostilities to enable the enemy to bury their dead and provide for their wounded, I had required certain propositions to be acceded to as a basis; among which this was one—that although hostilities should cease on this side the river until 12 o'clock of this day, yet it was not to be understood that they should cease on the other side; but that no reinforcements should be sent across by either army until the expiration of that day. His excellency, Maj. Gen. Lambert begged time to consider of those propositions until 10 o'clock of to-day, and in the meantime recrossed his troops. I need not tell you with how much eagerness I immediately regained possession of the position he had thus hastily quitted.

The enemy having concentrated his forces, may again attempt to drive me from my position by storm. Whenever he does, I have no doubt my men will act with their usual firmness, and sustain a character now become dear to them.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ANDREW JACKSON,
Maj. Gen. Com'dg.

Head Quarters, left Bank of the Mississippi,

5 miles below N. Orleans, Jan. 10.
SIR—I have the honor to make the following report of the killed, wounded and prisoners taken at the battle at Larond's Plantation, on the left bank of the Mississippi, on the night of the 3d December, 1814, seven miles below N. Orleans.

I have the honor to be, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

H. P. HAYNE,
Major Gen. Andrew Jackson,
Commanding the Army of the Mississippi.

Copy of a letter from Major General Jackson, to the Secretary of War, dated,

Head Quarters, 7th Military District, Camp, 4 miles below New Orleans, January 13 1815.

SIR—At such a crisis, I conceive it my duty to keep you constantly advised of my situation.

On the 10th inst. I forward you an account of the bold attempt made by the enemy on the morning of the 8th to take possession of works by storm, and of the severe repulse which he met with.—That report having been sent by the mail which crossed the Lake, may possibly have miscarried; for which reason, I think it the more necessary briefly to repeat the substance of it.

Early on the morning of the 8th, the enemy, having been actively employed the two preceding days in making preparations for a storm, advanced in two strong columns on my

right and left.—They were received however, with a firmness which, it seems, they little expected and which defeated all their hopes. My men, undisturbed by their approach, which indeed they had long anxiously wished for opened upon them a fire so deliberate and certain as rendered their scaling ladders and facines, as well as their more direct implements of warfare, perfectly useless. For upwards of an hour it was continued with a briskness of which there have been but few instances, perhaps, in any country. In justice to the enemy it must be said, they withstood it as long as could have been expected from the most determined bravery. At length, however, when all prospect of success became hopeless, they fled in confusion from the field—leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. Their loss was immense. I had at first computed it at 1500; but it is since ascertained to have been much greater. Upon information, which is believed to be correct, Col. Haynes the Inspector General reports it to be in the total 2600. His report I enclosed you. My loss was inconsiderable; being only seven killed and six wounded. Such a disproportion in loss when we consider the number and the kind of troops engaged, must, I know, excite astonishment, and may not, every where, be fully credited; yet I am perfectly satisfied that the account is not exaggerated on the one part, nor underrated on the other.

The enemy having hastily quitted a post which they had gained possession of, on the other side of the river, and we having immediately returned to it; both armies at present occupy their former position. Whether, after the severe losses he has sustained, the enemy is preparing to return to his shipping, or to make still mightier efforts to attain his first object, I do not pretend to determine. It becomes me to act as though the latter were his intention. One thing, however, seems certain, that if he still calculates on effecting what he has hitherto been unable to accomplish, he must expect considerable reinforcements; as the force with which he landed must undoubtedly be diminished by at least 3000. Besides the loss which he sustained on the night of the 23d ult. which is estimated at 400, he cannot have suffered less between that period and the morning of the 8th instant, than 300—having, within that time, been repulsed in two general attempts to drive us from our position, and there having been continually cannonading and skirmishing, during the whole of it. Yet he is still able to shew a very formidable force.

There is little doubt that the commanding general, sir Edward Pakenham was killed in the action of the 8th; and that majors general Kean & Gibbs were badly wounded.

Whenever a more leisure moment shall occur, I will take the liberty to make out and forward you a more circumstantial account of the several actions, and particularly that of the 8th, in doing which my chief motive will be to render justice to those brave men I have the honor to command, and who have so remarkably distinguished themselves.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
ANDREW JACKSON,
Major General Commanding.

P. S. A correct list of my killed and wounded will be forwarded you by the Adjutant General.

Head Quarters Left Bank of the Mississippi,

5 miles below New-Orleans, Jan. 13.
SIR—I have the honor to make the following report of the killed, wounded and prisoners, taken at the battle at Mac Rallie's plantation, on the left Bank of the Mississippi, on the morning of the 8th January 1815 and 5 miles below the city of New Orleans.

Killed 700
Wounded 1100
Prisoners taken, 1 Major, 4 Captains, 11 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 433 Non Commissioned Officers and privates, making a Grand Total of 2800.
I have the honor to be, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

A. P. HAYNE,
Inspector General,
Major General Andrew Jackson,
Commanding the Army of the Mississippi.

Copies of Private letters.
Camp 4 miles from New-Orleans, January 5.

"In the afternoon after the battle, the enemy sent a flag of truce, for the purpose of burying their dead; gen. Jackson gave them until 12 o'clock next day, but that not being long enough for them to bury them, they were allowed until 4 o'clock. Since Sunday, both armies have re-

* See Mr. Monroe's letter to the Governor of N. Y. 17, 1814 printed in the public papers.