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CHARLOTTE, .V. C. Tl'ESV.il', ,MAY 30, 1826.
[NO. 85.
PUBI.ISIIED WEEKLT
By LEAlL EL
*T TUUKE D0LLAH9 A TKAU, I'AII) IN ADVASCE.
»'!»
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and charged accordingly.
. \Ye))ster’s
Iath( Mouse of Kepresentatives, on the subject
of Uie Mission to PaiiaiTia ; tlie amendment to
the resolution reported by the Committee of
Voveign delations, offered by MXane, be*
ing then under consideration.
Mr. Chairman': 1 am not ambitious of
empiitiyii*!^ il'is discussion. On tin* con
trary, it is my anxious wish to confine
the debate, so far as 1 partake in it, to
the real and material iuesiions before
os.
Our judgment of things is liable,
doubilfsh, to be aflVcied by our opinions
of men. U would be afl’cctation in me,
or in any one, to claim an exemption
from this possibility of bias. I can say,
however, ‘ that it has been my sittcere
purpose to consider and discuss the pre
sent subject with ihe single view offnid-
iiip^ out what duly it devolves upon uie,
as a member of the House of Rrepresen-
taii\fs. If any thing has diverted me
fi )in that sole aim, it has been against
niy int« iiiion.
I think, sir, that there are two ques-
ticiM-», anti two only, for our decision.—
TiiC first is, whetlier the House of Repre-
seniativcs will assume the responsibility
of wiH(holding the ordinary appropria
tion, for carrying into effect an Executive
measure, which the Executive Depait-
jnent hasconstuuted ? The second, whe
ther, ifii w'll not withhold tin* appro
priation, it will yet take the respori''ii)ili-
ty of interposing, with its own opinions,
directions or instructions, as to the man
ner in which this particular Executive
measure shall be conducted?
1 am certainly, in the negative, on both
these propositions. I am neither will
ing to refuse the appropriation, nor am
I willing to limit or restrain the discre
tion of the Executive, beforehand, as to
terests. We are, by so voting, no more
respopible for the manner in which the
negotiation shall be conducted, than we
are for the manner in which one of the
Heads of Department may discharge the
duties of his office.
On the other hand, if we withhold the
ordinary means, we do incur, a heavy re
sponsibility. We interfere to prevent
the action of the Government according
to constitutional forms and provisions.—
It ought constantly to be remembered
that our whole power, in the cuse, is
merely incidental. It is only because
public ministers must huve salaries, like
other ofiicers, and because no salaries
responsibility with other branches of the . coftrse of policy which the House itself
Government. The President cannot pro- will not ultimately approve. IJut that i'-
perly act, and we cannot properly give I something entirely (lifferent from tlie
our advice, as to the manner in whicli he present suggestion. Here it is proposed
shall discharge his duties. He cannot' to decide by our vote, what shall be di.>>-
shifi the responsibility from himself} and , cussed by pai^ticular ministers already
we cannot assume it. Such a course, j appointed, when they shall meet the min-
sir, would confound all that is distinct.in | isters of tlie other powers. This is nui
the constitutional assignment of our re
spective functions. It would break down
all known divisions’ of power, and pul
an end to all just responsibility. If the
President were to receive directions or
advice from us, in things pertaining to
the duties of his own office, what becomes
of his responsibility to us and to the Se
can be paid, but by our vote, that the sub- j nate ? We hold the impeaching power.
ject is referred to us at all. The Consti
tuiion vests the power of appointment in
the President dwd Senate ; the law gives
to the President even the power of fixing
the amount of salary, within certain
limits ; and the only question here, is up
on the appropriation. There ih no doubt
that we have the power, if we see fit to
exercise it, to break up tlie mission, by
withholding the salaries; we liave pow
er also to break up the Court, by with
holding the salai ies cf the Judges, or to
break up the office of President, by with
holding the salary provided for it by law.
All these things, it is true, we have tiie
povver lo do, since wc hold the keys of
the Treasury. But, then, can we right-
fuily exercise this power f Tlu* gentle
man from Pennsylvania,(Mr. Buchanan,)
with whom I have gfeal pleasure in con
curring on this part of the case, while I
regret that I differ with him on others,
We are to bring him to tri.d in any case
of mal-administration. 'I'he Senate ure
to judge him by the cun^utntioa Sc laws;
and it must be singular, itK.!e*'(l, if, when
such occasion should u' ise, tlie party ac
cused should have the means of shelter
ing himself under tlu; advice or opinions
oi his accusers. Nothing can be more
ijicorrect, or more dangerous, tiian this
pledging the House, befoielviiid, to any
opinion, as to the manner of disc hat ging
Executive du ies.
But, sir, I see no evidence whatever,
that the President has ask d us to take
this measure upon ourselves, or to di
vide the responsibilit) of it with him. I
see no such invitation or req'iest. 'I'iie
Senatv having concu'Ted in the niissiou,
the President has sent a nicssage retjue'^i-
ing the appropriation, in t'le u muiI and
common form. Another message i> sent
in answer lo a call of tl\e House, coinmu-
has placed thi^ question in a point of I nicating the corres;jondence, and setting
view which cannoi be improved. These
officers do, indeed, already exist. They
are public ministers. If they were to
negotiate a treaty, and the Senate should
ratify it, it would become a law of the
land, whether we voted their salaries or
not. This shows that the Constitution
never contemplated that the House of
Hepresentalivi-s should act a part in ori-
gin'aiing negotiations, or concluding trea-
lies.
I know’, sir, it is a useless lal)our to
discuss the kind of j)ower which this
House thus incidentally holds in these-
cases. Men will differ in that particular;
and as the forms of public business and of
the constitution are such, ihat ihe power
may be exercised by this House, there
will always be some, or always may bo
! some, who feel inclin,ed to exercise it.—
For myself, I feel bound not to step out
forth the objects of the mission. It is
contended that by this message, he asks
our advice, or refers the subject to our
opinion. I do not so understand it. Our
concurrence, he says, ijy luaking the ap
propriation, is subject to our fVee deter
mination. Doul)iless it is so. If we de
termine at all we s'.iall determine freely ;
and I lie n'.ess tge does no moi’e tlian leave
lo ourselves 'o decide how far we feel
general expression of opinion. It is
particular direction, or a special insliut-
lion. Its operation is limited to the con
duct of particular men on a paiticular
occasion. Such a thing, sir, is wholl\
unprecedented ir. our history. When the
House proceeds, in the accustomed way,
by general resolution, its sentiments ap
ply, as far as exj)ressed, to all public u-
gents and on all occasions. They ap))W
to ihe whole course of policy, and mns'
necessarily be felt every where. Bu' li’
we proceed by way of direction lo pai
ticular ministers, we must direct them
all. In short, we ?uusl ourselves furnish,
in all cases, diplomatic instructions.
Wo now propose to prescribe what out
minisiers siiall discuss, and what they
shall not discuss at Panama. But thert
is no subject coming up for discussioi
there, which might not also be propose^)
for discussion either here or ift Mexico,
or the Capital of Coloml)ia. If we direct
what our ministers at Panama shall oi-
.shall nut say on l!ie subject of Mr. Mon
roe’s det Iaration,for example, why should
wt-not |)roceed to say also what our oili
er inini-.lers i;broad, or our Se rotary at
home shall say on the same subjt ri ?
There is precisely llie same reason fui oii,
as for the olhej. The conrst of the House,
bithetio, sir, has not been such. It h;n
exi>ressed its opinions, when it deemed
pro|)er to express them at all, on greai,
leading questions, by resolution and in a
general form. These general opinions,
being thus made known, have doubtless
always had, and such expressions of o-
pinion doubtless always will have, their
effect. This is the practice of the Gov
ernment. It is a salutary practice; but
if we carry it further, or rather, if we
ourselves bound, either to sup[)ort or to , a very different practice, and
thwart the Lxei utive departinent in the . undert;tke to prescribe to our public min
isters wluU liitv shall not discuss
exercise of ils duties. 'I here is no mes
sage, no docnmeut, no communication
the matiner in which il shall licrlorm itSi i .
• . .. .• *, , • I OI my own sphere, and neitherlo exercise
own aprropriate constitutional duiies.— ^ . r i ■ l i
. .{ 1111, • nor control any auihoruy, of which the
And, sir, those ol us who hold theseopin- ... .. . • . i 'j i j i
. , . r, ■ I constiiuiion has intended to lodge the
ions have the advantage of being on the i ^ . n i • •
. ■ , c . 1 r.- uncontrolled exercise in other
common highway OI our national ijolilics. . , •
.i' . hands. Cases ol extreme necessity, in
vV e propose nolluni!; new : we suggest no ... , ... .
, ' * 1, . .1 „ r which a regard to pul)lic safety is to be
chan»>e; we adhere to ihe unilorm prac- . i ' i ' i
, I . ,1. , ^be supreme law, or rather to take
tice of ihe governiiwnt, as 1 understand' , •. i .in i . • i
it, I. om i.s origin, h is for U.osc, m. tl,c, j.’'-*" '“7>
o.h,-,- hand, who ui e i„ fuvor of either, 1 f"''”'7, precclem fui- such a as the
ei'both, of the proposiiions, to show us!'“'"."K cases, will anienilmeul pi o|>o»r(l liy tlit gentleman
the coeenl reasons which „comme,.d ;K™"'”'!>«!> of our fro,n Delaware. N.,„e-.vhi, h 1 thh.k an-
their adoption. I'he duty is on them to j . alogous has been cited. 1 he resolution
satisfy the House and the country lhatj Mr. Chairman, I have a hal)itual and t ol the House, some years ago, on the
there is someriiing in the present occa-jy ^he opinions of i subject of tlie slave trade, is a |)recedcni
aion which calls for such an extraordina-j gentleman from Delaware ; I can say i the other way. A committee had report-
ry and unprecedented interference. j with truth, that he is the last man in llie j ed that in oi’der to put an end lo the
The President and Senate have insli-i from whom I sliould have looked j slave trade, a mutual right of search
tuted a public mission, for the purpose of i
treating with foreign Statef). Tlie Con-!‘’'’oni whom I should have expected to
siivuiion gives to the President the pow-| lu-ar some ol the reasons which Jie has
er t)f appointing, wilh the consent of the! gi't'n support. He sa\s, tliat, in
Senate, Embassadors and other public "Kitter, the source Irom u hich the
ministers. Such appointment is, there-1 "’^’iisure springs should have no inhuence
fore, a clear and unquestionaI)Ie exerci=.e ' '’. ith us whaiever. I do not comprehend
of Executive power. It is, indeed, less > ? and I cannot but think ihe lionora-
connec ted with the apjiropriate duties ofl gentlemun has bern surprisi.
take upon ourselves that which, in my
lo us, which asks tor our concurrence, judgment, does not at all belong to us. I
otherwise than as w e shall manifest it by see no more propriel) in our deciding
making the ap|)ro|)riation. now, in .what manner these ministers
Undoul)tediy, sir, the President would ^ shall discharge their duty, than there
be glad lo know thui ihe .neasure met the j would have been in our prescribing to
approbation of the Il>aise. He must be ; tlie President and Senate what persons
aware, unquestiona!)iy, that all leading ! ought to have been appointed ministers,
measures mainly depend fjt success on • An honorable member from V^irginia,
the suppon of Coiigress. Still ihere is s[)oke some day* ago (Mr. Rives,)
no evidence iiiai on this occasion he has | farther than the member
sought to throw off responsibibility from ■ f,.om Delaware. He maintains, that we
himself, or that he desires (jI us to be an-{ diiiinguish between the various ob-
sweral)le ior any thing heyoncl the tlis-> contemplate(l by the Executive in
charge ol our ow'n constituMonal duties. I j the .proposed negotiation; and adopt
have already said, sir, ihai I know of no j some and reject others. And this high
delicate, and im|jortant trust, the gentle
man deduces simply from our power lb
withhold the ministers’ salaries. The
process of the gentleman’s argument ap
[H’ars to me as singular as ils conclusion
He founds himself on the legal maxim.
this House, than almost any ol'herExecn-1 t-xp'-t'ssioii which does not cwiuey
tive act; because the office of a pu!)lic i^measure conies f rom
minister is not created by any statute or, it, then,
law of our own Ciovtrnmenl. It exists we are
open (jiH S'ion Itjr us ; as li it
under the law of nations, and is recognis
ed as existing by our Cotihiitution.—
The acts of Congress indeed limit the
salaries of pul)lic ministers: but tlu-y do
no more. Every ihing el-.e in regard to
the appointment of public miiiisiers.
their numbers, tiie time of iheir appuinl-
incnt, and the negotiations contei;ipl,i:i d
in such appointments, is uiattei for Kxe-
cutive discreiion. Every new upptjint-
incnt to supply vacancies in existing
Tnissions, is under the same authority.—
There are, indeed, v. iuit we commonly
term standing miKsions, so known in the
practice of the governiurnt, butihev are
not mcde so by any law. All missions
>est on the same ground. Now the (iiies-
tion in, whether the Pr‘sideni ami Se
nate, having created this mis-.ioi!, nr, in
other words, having appointed ihe minis
ters, in the exercise of their undoubted
conslitutional power, this House wili
♦;ike upon itself tlie responsil)iIity of ilc-
feating its obitcts, and rendering this ex
ercise of Executive pov/er void :
By voting the salaries, in the ordinary
Vay, we assuine, as it seems to me, no
responsibility whatever. We inercl}
^yeinpower anoth«r branch of tlie go\-
^rnnient to discharge its own ajipropriuti
duties, in that mode which seuns lo it-
^If more condiicivc to the public in
to considf'r it us etuirely an
'.ere a le
gislative ineasiiie origiiKiiing witlioiir-
si'Ues.^ In cieeicling whether v.c will
enai)le the execuiivi' lo exerc ise his own
duties, are we to ri.nsiilt i' wl'.elher we
should have exercised tlteni in t!ie same
ua) ourselves ^ And ifue diiViT ;n (;piii-
ion' with ihe i'resicient and I'jcnaie, are we
on tluit uecoiinl to rt im e i!ie ord;!iary
gociatioii. But this oj)inion was not iti-
coi poi ated as the g.entleman now propos
es to incorporate )iis amendment, into
I'le resuhiiion of the House. Tl»e reso
lution only declared, in general terms,
tiiat the President be requested to enter
iiptjii sue h negoiiations w iih other powers
into an I as iie nii.L'J'.t deem expedient, for the ef-
hisll’ectua! aindition of tlie .M'rican slave
trade. It is singular enough, and may
serve as an admonition on tat* present oc
casion, tliat a negotia'ion having been
c(jn( huled, in ccjiilormity !o t!'e opinions
xnicssed, not, inch ed, by the House, but
i)\ l!ie coinmittri',tiie ti’eaty, w hen laid be
fore !h*‘ Senate, w.isre|ected by thall)ody.
'i’iie ler.ian from Delaw are liiniself
sa\ s, thal the constii ntimial responsibilil)
pe;!:‘.ins ah>ne to tin I^xeua'ive depart
ment ; and tiiat none (j'he:' has ’o do u ith
ii, its a (.nblic nicasufe. Tiiese adiiiis-
meansr, I think not ; nnh ss we mean to j sions seeiii to im: to conelude the (jues-
say that we will exercise ourselves, all j tion ; :.nanse, in the lirst place, if tiie
the powers of the Cloveriiment. conslit'Jlional responsi!)ilii y ap])e: tains
H,u the ^.,■ntle^,an an;„cs tl.at al- lo the I’resi.lenl, he .ievolve
„eh a cnrse would i " ^
resent c vse i ;'Ia e, 1 se»> no prool ol any inten-
the “iTMdent has especially refe,,Td'ti»' l'> devolve il on u
m;;tler to our opinion, that he has tlirou ti
though, geiK'rally.
ntjl be pn>per, yet
in
off’, oraiteinpted lo thrcMv ofl’, 1,is own
constitutional .esponsibiliiv; ur, at least,
ihut he proposes to di\ideil withns;
ihal he requesis ;or ad\ice, and thai wc,
ha\itig referr.'d tl.al reiinesl lo t!ie Co'u-
mittee on I’oi-eiirn .AlVairs, ha'-e now j\-
I tion ou In', part, so lo devolve it on
eve’i if he had the power.
Mr. (Chairman: I will here take occa-
siun, in order to prevent niisai)prehen-
sion, to o!>sei'\ t', ihat no one is nioi e con
vinced than I am. that it is the right of
this House, and of.en ils duty, to express
ils gc'Jieia! opinion in regai d to questions
cei\edlVom iliarComnuttee ihcir Report | of foreign policy. Nothing, certainly, is
(I,I more [ir.ipcr. 1 have concurred in such
Sir, this iqipears to me a very mistak-| proceeilings, and :.m ready to do so ag:un.
of the suf)iert ; b;il if 11 v.eie ali.C'n liiose .^reat sn!>jects, for inslanci-,
w hicli form llic leading lopics in ’’i;- dis
cussion, it is tiot or.iy tl.e ri,glit the
Jl)U'>e lo express its opinion*', rnil 1 ihink
( tl V K'W
I
—if our advice and opinion had ’bus'
leeii a .kecl, it would not alter the line (d
ur du'\. We cannui lake, thoegh it
•.vere oflered. any sh .r I'xecutive du
ty. Wc c:it:uu'.’divide ihcir owti p,-opt*r
il its duty
t.j do so, if it sliould ihiak
that he who has the power to give, may
annex whatever condition or qualification
to the gift he chooses. This maxim,sir,
would be applicable to the present case,
if wf were the sovereigns of the country;
if all power were in our hands; if the
public money were entirely our own ; if
our appropriation of il were mere grace
and favor ; and if there were no restraints
upon us, but our own sovereign will and
pleasure^ But the argumeni totally for
gets that we are ourselves but pul)lic a-
genis ; that our |)ower over ihe Treasury
is but that of stewards over a trust-furid;
that we have nothing lo give, and there
fore no gifts lo limit, or (jualify ; that il
is as much our duty to api>ropriate to
j)roper objects, as to withhold appropri
ations from such as are improj)er; and
that it ia as clearly our duty to approj)ri-
ale in a proper ancl conslitulional manner,
as to appro|)iiate at all.
The sam»“ lionoralile member advanced
another idea, in w hich I cannot concur.
He d(;es not admit that coniidence is lo
be repoied in ihe Executive, on the [)res-
enl Ol casion, iiecause coniidence, he ar
gues, implies ordy, that not knoxk ing our
selves wlial will be done in a given case
Ijy (jthers, we trust to those who are to
act in it, that they will act right; and as
we know tlie course likely lobe pu-sued
in regard to this subject by the Execu
tive, ccMifiilentr can have no place. This
seems a singular noiion of (onlidence ; it/
certainly is ikjI my noti(;n of that confi-'
detice v/hich the constitution re()uiresJ
one branch of the (iovernmenl lo repo^
in another. The President is not afur
agent, but, like ourselves, th^ agent
of the People. They liave^, ,,sled lo
his hands liie proper (luti^^f,|- ,j|'.
lice ; and we ai'e !iol to takp ihose luties
»ul ot his own hands, troflu ()|)iiii(jii
ofour ov... tiiat we should It^L'CUte them
belter o't;sci’>es.
is due iVoiu
'1 he contf^J^
hich
jiuvstiinv :t. :!,er;c]'al: the E.'iccu
in us to the Execu^iivf^aiid from
itive. US is RQtJ personal, but
official. It has nothing to do with 'ndi*
idual likings or dislikings ; but i • tta
from that (livision of power anii.n^,, ;)e-
partments, and those limitaiio' -. on ih®
.ithorily of each, which belong to 'he,
nature and frame of our governmem.
It would be unforiunate, indeed, if our
line of constitutional action were to vii
prate backward, and forward, accoiditig
lo our opinions of persons, swerving iniB
way lo-tlay, Irom undue attiirhment, and
the other way lo-morrow, from distrust
or dislike. 'I'his may sometimes happen
from the weakness of our virtues, or llw
excitement of our passions ; but I trust it
will not be coolly recommentled to us, aS
the rightful course of public condnci.
Il is obvious to remark, Mr. Cha" uiun,
ihal the Senate have not undertakrn to
give directions or instructions in luis
case. That body is closely connected
with the President in Executive meas
ures. Its consent to these very appoint
ments is made absolutely necessary l)\ the
onsiiiulion ; yet, il has not seen fit, itt
us or any other case, lo take upon il'el*
iie responsibility of directing ihe mode
II which the negotiations should be con*
ducted.
For these reasons, Mr. Chaiitnan, I
am for giving no in.struciions, advice, ot
irections in the case. I prefer leaving
a where,in my judgment, ilic consiituiion
iias lefi it—(o Executive discretion aud
I'xei ulivt' responsibility.
But. sir, I think there are other objec*
tioiis to the amendment. There are part*
of it which I could not agree lo, t it
were proper to attach any such ( (mdiilon
to iur vote. As lo all that j'ai i >•' the
amendment, that asserts the neuir 1 i o icjT
()» the United States, and iht ii.exi ' un-
c\ of forming alliances, no man a' nt3
lo those senti'nents more readily or it) ire
sincerely th.n myself. On these (joints,
we are all agreed. Such is our opui i»n ;
such we know lo l)e the opinion of he
country. If it be thought necessaiy to
affirm opinions which no one either de*
nies or doubts, by a resolution of ihe
House, I shall cheerfully concur in it.
But there is one part of the proposed a*-
mendment to which I could not agree in
anyfoim. I wish to ask the genlleniaa
fVom Delaware himself to reconsider it.
1 pray him lo look at it again, and lo see
w hetlier he means what it expresses or
implies ; for, on this occasion, I should
be more gratified by seeing that the lion-
ourable gentleman himself .had become
sensible that he had fallen into some er
ror, in this respect, than by seeing the
vote of the House against him by any ma
jority whatever.
'I'hat part of the amendment to which
I now object, is that which r‘(juireSy as a
condition of the resolution before us, that
the ministers ** shall not be authorized lo
discuss, consider, or consult niion any
measure which shall commit the present
or future neutral rights or duties of these
United Slates, eithir as may regaid l.u-
ropean nations, or between the vera!
States of Mexico and South An.fnca.”
I need hardly repeat, that this tjnuuntS .
to a precise instruction. It beir»^ i.uder-
«tood that the minister shall not be au
thorized to discuss particular subjects, is
a mode of speech precisely efjuivalt ni to
saying, provided the ministers, be in
structed, or the ministers being insii uct-
ed not to discuss those subjects. After
all that has be«*n said, or can be sanl, a-
bout the amendment being no more tlian
a general expression of opinion, oi ab
stract proposition, this pari of il is an ex
act and definite instruction. It prescribes
lo the public ministers the precise man
ner in which they arc to conduct a pub
lic negotiation ; a duty iiiHnifestly and
exclusively bi-longing, in iny judgment,
lo the I'.xeculive, and not to us.
Bui if wc possessed the power to give
instructions, this instruction would not.
be proper to be givt ii. Lei us examine
il. I'he ministers shall not “discuss,
C(j!is:der, or consult,” &c.
Now, sir, in the first place, it is to be
o!)served, that tliey arc not oidy not Ic^
agree lo any such measure, but lliev arc
nil to discuss U. If proposed to iiiein,
they are or,'\. to give reasons for declin*
ing il. kideed, they cannot reject it; they
can op^y say they are not authorized to
consi/cr it. Would il not be better, sir,
to lyave those agents at lil)erty to explain
policy of our government, fully and
^learly, atul lo sliow the reasons which
f induce us lo abstain, as lar as possible,
from foreign connecii(jns, and lo act, in
all things, with a scrupulous regard to the
duties ol neutrality ?
But again ; They are to discus'; no
measure which may commit our neutra'
rights or duties. To commit is some
what indefinite. May they not mc»Jify,
nor in any degree alter our neutral rights
and duiies ? If not, I hardly know wheth
er a common treaty of commerce could
be ncgolialed ; because all such trealit?:;
alfect or modifv, mere or less, the ncu*
ti’ttl rights or liu ii s cl lix i;ai lies: e'..
_ lCv7ilinu€ci an fourth ^uqc.