al feelings and asperity-to be more of a patriot, than the partisan of any particular interest; and through the influence of these causes to give a more general character to the politics of the country, and thereby render the collision between sectional interests less fierce than it would be if legislation depen-

the courts, in all cases coming before them in law end will be near. or equity, where an act of Congress comes in ques-

Such are the various processes of taking the sense of the people through the divisions and organization of the different departments of the Government, all of which, acting through their appropriate organs, are intended to widen its basis and render it more popular, instead of less, by increasing the number necessary to put it in action, and having for their effected these objects? Has it prevented oppression and usurpation on the part of the Government?-Has it accomplished the objects for which the Govble of the Constitution? Much, very much, cer tainly has been done, but not all. Many instances ment, of the violation of the Constitution-of the assumption of powers not delegated to it -of the perversion of those delegated to uses never intendedand of their being wielded by the dominant interest, found in every period of its existence, from the earliest to the latest, beginning with the bank connectheir voice through its organs? tion at the outset, and ending with the Distribution to be accounted for? What is the cause?

The explanation and cause will be found in the fact, that, as fully as the sense of the people is taken of the land. It is full and perfect, because it is the in the action of the Government, it is not taken fuily enough. For, after all that has been accomplishwhich the voice of the community acts directly on the Government, and which, taken separately, or in combination, constitute the elements of which it is composed, that is the majority of the States regarded in their corporate character as bodies politic, which in its simple form constitutes the Senate; and the other is the majority of the people of the States, of which, in its simple form, the House of Representatives is composed. These combined, in the proportions already stated, constitute the Executive Department, and that department and the Senate appoint the judges, who constitue the Judiciary. But it is only in their simple form in the Sente and the other House, that they have a steady and a habitual control over the legislative acts of the Government. The veto of the Executive is rarely interposed; not more than about twenty times during the period of more than fifty years that the Government has existed. Their effects have been beneficially felt, but only casually, at long intervals, and without steady and habitual influence over the action of the Government. The same remarks are substantially applicable to what, for the sake of brevity, may be called the veto of the Judiciary; the right of negativing a law for the want of constitutionality, when it comes in question, in a case before the courts.

The Legislature, then, of the Union, being under no other habitual and steady control but these two majorities, acting through this and the other House, is, in fact, placed substantially under the control of the portion of the community, which the united majorities of the two Houses represent for the time, a little more than six, as has been already explained But as large as is the former, and as small as is the latter, the one is not large enough, in proportion, to prevent it from plundering, under the forms of the law, and the other small enough from being plundered; and hence the many instances of violation of the Constitution, of usurpation, of powers perverted, and wielded for selfish purposes which the history of the Government affords. They furnish proof conclusive that the principle of plunder, so deeply implanted in ail Governments, has not been eradicated in ours by all the precaution taken by its framers against it.

But in estimating the number of the constituency necessary to control the majority in the two Houses of Congress at something less than ten millions, I have estimated it altogether too high, regarding the correct conception of its practical operation in this brief respect, another element, which has in practice an important influence, must be taken into the estimate, and which I shall next proceed to explain.

Of the two majorities, which, acting either separately or in conbination, control the Government, the numerical majority is by far the most influen-Representatives, and preponderates more than five the ratio of representation will be fixed at sixty-eight thousand, under the late census. It also preponderates in the appointment of the judges, the right of nominating having much greater influence in making appointments than that of advising and consen-From these facts, it must be apparent that the leaning of the President will be to that element of omissions of Congress itself. power to which he mainly owes his elevation, and on This leaning of his, must have a powerful effect on the inclination and tendency of the whole Government. In his hands are placed, substantially, all the honors and emoluments of the Government, and,

the desire of having a favorite elected, or maintain- members of both Houses, but also public opinion, granted to the Legislative, Executive or Judicial de- has proved dangerous in fact, the fault is not in the ing the ascendency of his party, may have, to a con- and through that, a still more powerful indirect insiderable extent, the same influence over him. The fluence over them; and thus they may be brought effect, in either case, would be to make him look to sustain or oppose, through his influence, measor sustained, and the whole Government be made to

lean in the same direction with the Executive. departments, gravitates steadily towards the numerical majority, and has been moving slowly towards tution in the Government of the United States, or it from the beginning; sometimes, indeed, retarded, ded solely on the members of the two Houses, who or even stopped or thrown back, but, taking any owe no responsibility but to those who elected them. considerable period of time, always advancing to-The same influence acts even on the aspirants for wards it. That it begins to make near approach to the Presidency, and is followed to a very consider- that fatal point, ample proof may be found in the offable extent by the same softening and generalizing repeated declaration of the mover of this resolution, effects. In the case of the President, it may lead to and of many of his supporters at the extraordinary the interposing of his veto against oppressive and session, that the late Presidential election decided all dangerous sectional measures, even when support- the great measures which he so ardently pressed ed by those to whom he owes his election. But be through the Senate. Yes, even here in this chamthe cause of interposing his veto what it may, its ef- ber, in the Senate, which is composed of the oppofect in all cases is to require a greater body of con- sing element, and on which the only effectual resisstituency, through the legislative organs, to put the tance to this fatal tendency exists that is to be found ernment from exercising any power not expressly Government in action against it to require another in the Government, we are told that the popular will key to be struck, and to bring out a more full as expressed in the Presidential election is to decide and perfect response from the voice of the people. not only the election, but every measure which may There is still another impediment, if not to the be agitated in the canvass in order to inflaence the enactment of a law, to its execution, to be found in result. When what was thus boldly insisted on the Judiciary Department. I refer to the right of comes to be an established principle of action, the to him, and that if any of his granted powers be his divine dispensation, so disposed events as to lead

tion, to decide on its unconstitutionality, which, if er to the one absolute and single power, the will of Congress, I shall now show that there is not one as important as it is, sinks into nothing compared to decided against the law in the Supreme Court, is in the greater number, its action will become more and power vested in him that is any way dangerous, the principle involved. It is but one and that by effect a permanent veto. But here a difference more disturbed and irregular; faction, corruption, must be made between a decision against the consti- and anarchy, will more and more abound; patriotrutionality of a law of Congress and that of the ism will daily decay, and affection and reverence States. The former acts as a restriction on the pow- for the Government grow weaker and weaker, uners of this Government, but the latter as an enlarge- til the final shock occurs, when the system will rush Constitution.

structure of the Government which makes the numerical majority the predominant element: it is, perhaps, necessary it should be so in all popular constitutional Governments like ours, which excludes classes. It is necessarily the exponent of the strongobject to prevent one portion of the community from est interest, or combination of interests, in the comaggrandizing or enriching itself at the expense of munity; and it would seem to be necessary to give the other, and to restrict the whole to the sphere in it the preponderance, in order to infuse into the Gotended by the framers of the Constitution. Has it vernment the necessary energy to accomplish the ends for which it was instituted. The great question is, How is due preponderance to be given to it, without subjecting the whole, in time, to its unlimernment was ordained, as enumerated in the pream- ited sway? which brings up the question, Is there anywhere, in our complex system of Government. a guard, check, or contrivance, sufficiently strong might be enginerated, in the history of the Govern- to arrest so fearful a tendency of the Government Or, to express it in more direct and intelligible language, Is there anywhere in the system a more full and perfect expression of the voice of the people of the States calculated to counteract this tendenfor the time, for its aggrandizement, at the expense cy to the concentration of all the powers of the Goof the rest of the community-instances that may be vernment in the will of the numerical majority, re-

Yes, fortunately, doubly fortunately, there is, not act, at its late extraordinary session. How is this only a more full and perfect, but a full and perfect expression to be found in the Constitution, acknowledged by all to be the fundamental and supreme law expression of the voice of each State, adopted by the separate assent of each, by itself, and for itself, and is the voice of all by being that of each component part, united and blended into one harmonious whole. But it is not only full and perfect, but as just as it is full and perfect: for combining the sense of each, and therefore all, there is nothing left on which injustice, or oppression, or usurpation can operate, And, finally, it is as supreme as it is just, because comprehending the will of all, by uniting that of each of the parts, there is nothing within or above to control it. It is indeed, the vox populi vox Dei the creating voice that called the system into existence, and of which the Government itself is but a creature, clothed with delegated powers to execute its high behests.

We are thus brought to a question of the deepest import, and on which the fate of the system depends; How can this full, perfect, just, and su preme voice of the people, embodied in the Consticounteracting the fatal tendency of the Government to the absolute and depotic control of the numerical majority? Or, if I may be permitted to use so bold an expression, how is this, the deity of our political system, to be successfully invoked, to interpose its all powerful creating voice to save from perdition the creature of its will and the work of its hand If it cannot be done, ours, like all free Governments preceding it, must go the way of all flesh; but if it can be, its duration may be from generation to generation, to the latest posterity. To this all important question, I will not attempt a reply at this time. It would lead me far beyond the limits properly belonging to this discussion. I descend from and which may consist of but fourteen States, with the digression nearer to the subject immediately at it should extend its legislation in every direction; power, taken by the Senator from Virginia, on this side the chamber, [Mr. Archer.]

He rests his support of this resolution on the ground that the object intended to be effected by the veto has failed, that the framers of the Constitution regarded the legislative department of the Government, as the one most to be dreaded, and that their motive for vesting the Executive with the veto was to check its encroachments on the other departments; but that the Executive, and not the Legislature, had proved to be the most dangerous, and that the veto had become either useless or mischievous a shield to defend as was originally intended.

I make no issue with the Senator, as to the correctness of the statement. I assume the facts to be practical operation of the Government. To form a simply with the view of making my reply more

Assuming, then, that the Executive Department has proved to be the more formidable, and that it requires to be checked, rather than to have the power of checking others, the first inquiry on that assumption, should be into the cause of its increase of power, in order to ascertain the seat and the nature of tial. It has the exclusive control in the House of the danger; and the next, whether the means proposed, that of divesting it of the veto, or modifying to one in the choice of the President, assuming that it as proposed, would guard against the danger apprehended.

I begin with the first, and in entering on it, assert with confidence, that if the Executive has become formidable to the liberty or safety of the country or other departments of the Government, the

which he must principally rely, to secure his re-el- the President by the Constitution, are few and effecection, or maintain the ascendancy of the party and tually guarded, and are not of themselves at ail formidable. In order to have a just conception of the extent of his powers, it must be borne in mind that there are but two classes of powers known to the Constitution; and they are powers that are expressthese, when greatly increased, as they are and ever the granted powers into execution. Now, by a poinust be when the powers of the Government are sitive provision of the Constitution, all powers neincrease of the Executive power on which the Sen-

partment, and can only be exercised by the authority of Congress, and in the manner prescribed by law. This provision may be found in what is callmore to the interest of the whole—to soften section—ures which otherwise they would have opposed not ed the residuary clause, which declares that Con- mit his power? Is it not clear, that so far from the gress shall have power "to make all laws which veto being the cause of the increase of this power, it shall be necessary and proper to carry into execu-From these causes the Government, in all of its tion the foregoing powers," (those granted to Congress.) "and all other powers vested by this Constiin any department or office thereof." A more comprehensive provision cannot be imagined. It carries with it all powers necessary and proper to the where they may, and vests the whole, in terms not and powerful, not because he used his veto, but beless explicit, in Congress; and here let me add, in cause he abstained from using it. In fact, it is dif passing, that the provision is as wise as it is comprehensive. It deposites the right of deciding what | tend to enlarge his power, except it be the case of powers are necessary for the execution of the granted powers, where, and where only it can be lodged with safety, in the hands of the law-making power, and forbids any department or officer of the Govauthorized by the Constitution or the laws, thus making ours emphatically a Government of law and Constitution.

ed by the Constitution to powers expressly granted as by the guidance of a kind Providence, who, in such that they require other powers to execute them, to the establishment of a system of government wi As the Government approaches nearer and near- he cannot exercise them without the authority of ser than those who framed it. The veto, of itself unless made so by the acts or permission of Congress. I shall take them in the order they stand in the Constitution.

He is, in the first place, made Commander-incheif of the army and navy of the United States, to ruin; and the sword take the place of law and and the militia, when called into actual service. Large and expensive military and naval establishservice, would no doubt increase very dangerously which we had such fearful indications in the bold the power and patronage of the President; but nei- attempt at the late extraordinary session, of forcing ther can take place but by the action of Congress. Not a soldier can be enlisted, a ship of war built, nor a militia man called into service, without its au- weeks, on the ground that they were all decided in thority; and very fortunately our situation is such, the election of the late President; thus attempting that there is no necessity, and, probably, will be none, why his power and patronage should be dangerously increased by either of those means.

He is next vested with the power to make treates and to appoint officers, with the advice and consent of the Senate; and here again his power can only be made dangerous by the action of one or both Houses of Congress. In the formation of reaties two thirds of the Senate must concur; and it is difficult to conceive of a treaty that could materially enlarge his powers, that would not require an act of Congress to carry it into effect. The ap- ertheless, that the land distribution must go on. It pointing power may, indeed, dangerously increase s patronage, if officers be uselessly multiplied and too highly paid; but if such should be the case, the fault would be in Congress, by whose authority exsulting from the partial and imperfect expression of clusively they can be created or their compensation

But much is said in this connection, of the power of removal, justly accompanied by severe condemnation of the many and abusive instances of the REACH was not more suffocated with passion at any use of the power, and the dangerous influence it of his miscarriages, than the Federal managers now gives the President, in all of which I fully concur. are, in being foiled in the experiment of the little It is, indeed, a corrupting and dangerous power, when officers are greatly multiplied, and highly paid, and when it is perverted from its legitimate object, to the advancement of personal or party purposes. But I find no such power in the list of powers granted to the Executive, which is proof conclusive that it belongs to the class necessary and grief now displayed. But when they have put the proper to execute some other power, if it exists at all, which none can doubt; and, for reasons already assigned, cannot be exercised without authority of law. If, then, it has been abused, it must be because Congress has not done its duty in permitting

against the abuses to which it is so liable. The residue of the list are rather duties than rights; that of recommending to Congress such measures as he may deem expedient; of convening both Houses on extraordinary occasions; of adjourning them when they cannot agree on the time; tution, be brought to bear habitually and steadily in of receiving ambassadors and other ministers; of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, and gers will find that they have carried this mode of commissioning the officers of the United States Of all these, there is but one which claims particular notice, in connection with the point immediately under consideration; and that is his power as the they will immediately turn their attention to provide administrator of the laws. But whatever power the ways and means of paying for the frolic in he may have in that capacity depends on the action of Congress If Congress should limit its legislation to the few great subjects confided to it; so frame its laws as to leave as little as possible to discretion, and to take care to see that they are duly and faithfully executed, the administrative powers of the President would be proportionally limited, issue, in order to reply to an objection to the veto draw within its action subjects never contemplated by the Constitution; multiply its acts, create numerous offices, and increase the revenue and expenditures proportionally, and, at the same time, frame its laws vaguely and loosely, and withdraw, in a great measure, its supervising care over their exe-On iron— $1\frac{1}{4}$ cents per lb. cution, his power would indeed become truly formidable and alarming. Now I appeal to the Senator and his friend, the author of this resolution. whether the growth of Executive power has not been the result of such a course on the part of Congress. I ask them whether his power has not in fact increased, or decreased just in proportion to the by being converted into a sword to attack instead of increase and decrease of the system of legislation, such as has been described? What was the period of its maximum increase, but the very period Henry, who is utterly opposed to these, and all othwhich they have so frequently and loudly denounced as the one most distinguished for the prevalence of Executive power and usurpation? Much of that power certainly depended on the remakable man, then at the head of that Department, but much -far more, on the system of legislation, which the author of this resolution had built up with so much zeal and labor, and which carried the powers of the Government to a point beyond that to which it had ever-before attained, drawing many and important powers into its votex, of which the framers of the Constitution never dreamed. And here let me say to both of the Senators, and the party of which they are prominent members, that they labor in vain to bring down Executive power, while they support the system they so zealously advocate. The power they complain of is but its necessary fruit. Be assured that as certain as Congress transcends cause is not in the Constitution, but in the acts and its assigned limits and usurps powers never conferred, or stretches those conferred beyond the proper According to my conception the powers vested in limits, so surely will the fruits of its usurpation pass into the hands of the Executive. In seeking to become master, it but makes a master in the person of the President. It is only by confining itself to its aliotted sphere, and a discreet use of its acknowledged powers, that it can retain that ascendency in

Having now pointed out the cause of the great ident a corresponding influence over, not only the execution of the granted powers, are expressly delegated to Congress, be they powers ing satisfactorily shown, as I trust I have, that, if it Morehead is the man for the monopolists.—Ib.

The Whigs in 1840, nau a majority of 4,774. In 1841, the Democrats elected a Govercessary to the execution of the granted powers, are ator rested his objection to the veto power, and hav-

the Government which the Constitution intended to

Constitution, but in Congress, I would next ask him, in what possible way could the divesting the President of his veto, or modifying it as he proposes, liwould act as a limitation to it if it had been more freely and frequently used? If the President had vetoed the original Bank—the connection with the banking system-the tariffs of '24 and '28, and the numerous acts appropriating money for roads, canals, harbors, and a long list of other measures not less unconstitutional, would his power have been execution of the granted powers, be they lodged half as great as it now is? He has grown great ficult to imagine a case in which its application can an act intended to repeal a law calculated to increase his power, or to restore the authority of one which, by an arbitrary construction of his power, he has set aside.

Now let me add, in conclusion, that this is a question, in its bearings of vital importance to that beatiful and sublime system of Government, which our patriotic ancestors established, not so much by Having now shown that the President is restrict- their wisdom, as wise and experienced as they were no means the most considerable, of those many wise devices which I have attempted to explain, and which were intended to strengthen the popular basis of our Government, and resist its tendency to fall under the control of the dominant interst, acting through the mere numerical majority. The introduction of this resolution may be regarded as one of Let me not be misunderstood. I object not to that ments and numerous corps of millitia, called into the many symptoms of that fatal tendency, and of thro' a whole system of measures of the most threatening and alarming character, in the space of a few to substitute the will of a majority of the people, in the choice of a Chief Magistrate, as the legislative authority of the Union, in lieu of the beautiful and profound system established by the Constitution.

The Veto was all the rage in the House to-day. From some of the speeches of the Federalists, we would infer that the resolution is taken to pass no additional revenue law, but to leave the Government (if their own arguments are to be trusted) entirely without resources. They insist that no duties can be lawfully collected after the 1st of July, and, nevis the great achievment of Federal Whiggery in the extraordinary session; and, to allow it to be repealed by the force of one of its own provisions, would be to confess that these prodigious politicians had overreached themselves. That they feel they are probably to stand in this predicament before the country, is manifest from the frenzy they exhibit on the loss of a bill to which they had given only the ephemeral life of a single month. Sir Giles Overtariff. It, in their eight months of legislation, (taking in the extra session,) they had built up some great revenue system, which, by its wisdom, had obtained a hold upon the public favor, and had hung the millstone of distribution round its neck, and found that it must go to the bottom, there would have been some little excuse for the exasperation and desperate multiplied weight of a breach of positive legal covenant-the overthrow of all the principles of the pacifying compromise act—the stripping of the Government, unconditionally, of the only real resource that can redeem its credit—all upon a little law of a month's duration-and then cry because it fails to it to be exercised by the President without the sanction of law authorizing its exercise, and guarding support what would sink a navy, it is enough to make all the rest of the world laugh. We have heard that the design of the Federal majority now s, to concoct a tariff system on a great scale, and attach to it the same proviso which the President for the Senate, and David M. Lee, Robert J. Mehas just vetoed. Will not the people of the United Dowel, and Hugh Stewart for the Commons. A-States think the time of Congress put to a bad use in this idle sport of fishing for vetoes? Will it be tolerated that the great interests of the country shall be thus trifled with? We think the Federal manaegislation too far already. The game of heading Capt. TYLER is looked upon by the country as a sort of child's play, in which it will no longer indulge sage Senators and Representatives. It expects that

"KEEP IT BEFORE THE PEOPLE."

That the Whigs in Congress are now using eveexertion to lay upon them the following taxes:-On coarse cotton shirting of 36 inches wide—100

On the same of a little finer quality-75 per cent On coarse calicoes-140 per cent. On flannels-87 per cent.

On cut nails-3 cents per pound. On wrought nails-4 cents per pound. On Salt-10 cents per bushel of 56 pounds.

On brown sugar -2 cents per pound. On lump sugar-6 cents per pound. And on almost every thing else of common consumption under the sun, are these Whigs now lay-

ing like heavy taxes. Farmers of North Carolina! will you elect for with the Whigs-where are they now? Where, your Governor John M. Morchead who is one of too, is the Madisonian, the paper so strongly rethe party in favor of these taxes-or will you elect that firm and uncompromising Democrat, Louis D.

THE DIFFERENCE.

JOHN M. MOREHEAD is for: The Tariff taxes; (he owns a cotton Factory.) He is for:

oppressive taxation? - Western Carolinian.

The Bankrupt Law; The new National Debt:

Free trade and equal rights;


Giving away the proceeds of the public lands when ernor by a majority of 8,748. the Treasury has not a six-pence in it, and money has to be borrowed to carry on the Government from day to day;

For breaking down the Constitution by "restricting "-that is, abolishing the Veto Power; And for all the other ruinous and destructive acts two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature. of the Whig Congress in the Extra Session.

On the other hand Louis D. Henry is decidedly opposed to them in letter and spirit. He is for:

Against Tariff taxes and exclusive monopoly privi-Against the Bankrupt Law, and a National Debt Against the bribery Distribution Bill;

Opposed to abolishing the Veto Power; opposed to the new Whig "Pension system" of giving away the public money to Mrs. Harrison or any body else.



JEFFERSONIAN

CHARLOTTE, N.C., TUESDAY MORNING, JULY 12, 1842.

> Democratic Republican Nominations: FOR GOVERNOR,

Louis D. Henry, of Fayetteville.

STATE LEGISLATURE. For the Senate-JOHN WALKER. Commons-JOHN KIRK, DR. JOS. W. ROSS.

CALEB ERWIN. For Sheriff-THOMAS N. ALEXANDER. Election the 1st Thursday (4th day) of August next.

PARAPHRASED FROM THE RALEIGH REGISTER.

The candidates now before the people for Governor are, LOUIS D. HENRY, a Democratic Republican, and JOHN M. MOREHEAD, a Federal Whig.

A Democratic Republican means one who goes for equal rights, the liberty of the People, and the Rights and Union of the States.

A Federal Whig means one who is on the outside, for the people, and on the inside, for himself. Or, who is for the People before the election, and for himself afterwards. Which will the People choose?

MR. CALHOUN'S SPEECH.

We have only room to call attention to the master ly speech of Mr. Calhoun in to-day's paper. It is the clearest exposition of the principles of our Government and the basis upon which our institutions rest that we have ever seen; and now that Mr. CLAY, the author of the proposition which called forth this powerful effort from Mr. Calhoun, is fairly before the country as a candidate for the Presidency, it becomes every citizen to read and examine calmly the inevitable tendency of the measures he is advocating. Mr. CALHOUN shows that to abolish the Veto power from the Constitution, as Mr. CLAY desires, would at once overthrow our whole structure of free Government. But read his

OUT AT LAST.

The Federal party of this County held a Convention in this place on the 4th instant. Ten of the eighteen Captain's Districts in the County were represented-the Charlotte District by Braley Oates, 1. F. Alexander, Daniel Asbury, and J. A. Todd .--After the Convention was organized, the following Resolution was gravely considered

"Resolved, That the sense of this meeting be taken to ascertain whether they approve of the Ticket for the Legislature submitted to the People by

And of course decided unanimously in the negative. When we first glanced at this Resolution, it somewhat alarmed us, for fear our opponents had a notion to come over into the Democratic ranks; a make. They then nominated Andrew Grier, Esq.,

move we beg that the leaders of that party will not gainst these gentlemen personally we have nothing to say; but their political views are at war with those of a vast majority of the voters of this County. Of this we presume they themselves are aware, as their organ, the Journal, tells them they "have to contend almost against hope." But we now have opposition; and however weak, our friends should be wide awake and vigilant at the polls.

We are glad to see that the Convention had the liberality to pay the following high tribute to the official conduct of our present worthy Sheriff, Mr.

"Resolved, That as no objection can be urged against the present Sheriff in the discharge of his official duty, that we recommend him for re-election."

CALL THE ROLL.

The Federal leaders and papers obstinately maintain that their party has lost no strength in the country since the elections of 1840: Do they speak the truth? Let facts answer.

In 1840, John Tyler was the Whig candidate for the Vice Presidency. Messrs. Wise, Gilmer, Proffit, Irwin, Mallory, Hunter, Rencher, and Rives, members of Congress, were all then acting commended and so profusely scattered over the whole country in 1840 by the National Executive er schemes for loading the people with unjust and Whig Committee as the ablest Whig paper at the seat of Government? And let us then call over the roll of Whig States in 1840, and see if there have been no desertions from Whigery in that quarter. In 1840, Maine gave a Whig majority of 219

votes. In 1841, the Democrats swept the Stateelecting a Democratic Legislature, and their Gov-Connecticut gave the Whigs a majority of 6,324 in 1840. Last April, the Democrats elected their can-

didate for Governor by 100 votes over the regularly nominated Federal candidate, and also more than In 1840, New York gave the Whigs a majority

of 13,293. In 1841, the Democrats carried the State by near 15,000 majority—electing two-thirds of the members of the Legislature. The Whig majority in New Jersey in 1840 was

2,317. In 1841, the Democrats had a majority in the popular vote of the State of more than 1,000. Pennsylvania gave the Whigs a majority in 1840 of 348. In 1841, the Democratic candidate for Governor was elected by 20,000 majority, and a large majority of Democrats was elected to the

The Whigs in 1840, had a majority in Maryland