the desire oi having a f;ivonte clectcd.or maintaiu-
iug the asccnJoncy of liis party, may have, to a c^>n-
sulerabie extc'nt, the saaje ]ntiij» nce over him, I’ho
ellcct. in either case, would be to make iiim louk
more to the interest ot’t[ie whole—to soi’ren section-
c:l feelings and asperity—to be more ul a patriot,
than the partisan of any particular interest,- ;rad
through tile iniliaiice ol these causes to given more
general charaoter to the puijti^ci of the C'Xiiitry, and
thereby tender the collision between Sectional inter-
e.tb less fierce than it would be if legislation depen
ded solely on the members of the iwo Houses', who
owe no responsibility but to those who elected them.
'I’he same influence acts evejf on the aspirants for
tiie {^reiidency, anil is follow ed to a very consuier-
iibie extent by the same softeninfj and Generalizing
effects. ‘ . ^
members of both Houses, but also public opinion,
and through that, a still more powerful ifidirect in-
liuence over thtm; and thus they may be brought
to sustain or oppose, through Ins influence, meas
UiVG which otherwise they would have opposed not
or suslainetl. and t!ie A’hole Government be made to
lean in the same direction with the Executive.
From these causes the Government, in all of its
depaitments, gravitates steadily towards the numeri
cal majority, and has been moving slowly towards
it from the beginning: sometimes, indeed, retarded,
or even sto])ped or thrown back, but, taking any
considerable period of time, always advancing to-
warJs it. 'J’iiat n begins to make near approach to
that fatal poin*, ample proof m »y b( found m th* oft-
repeated declaration of the mover of trus it solution,
In the case o. thu [ lebident, it may lead to j and of many of his supporters at the extraordinary
I 16 interposing ot his veto against o]ipressive and j session, that'the late i>residential election decided all
dangerous sectional measures, even when support-j the great measures which he so ardently pressed
eti by those to whom he owes his election. U'li be ! throuj?h the Senate. Yes, evm here in this cham-
•omposed of the oppo-
the only eflectual resis-
, , . ■ • . I --w^...icy exists that is to be found
Oovemni. ut ill aoaoii agu.iist u-to rajuire another., Uie aoverninem, wo arc ioU ihnl the popular will
‘ '■ more i as expressed in the Presidential election is to decide
and p^r.ccl responso Iroin the voice of tlie peopie, not onlv the electicn, but every measure which may
r .ere 16 still anotiier iinpn,limc,ut, if not tu the be a:r,tated in tiic canvMS in order to influence tlie
Iiuctinent o. a law, tu us e.xtcwtion, to bo {ound in | result. When what was tiiiis boldly insisted on
he >!?>'’ ! co.nes to be an established nriiicip'e ui action, the
ihe courts, 1:1 all cases commo- beluru thorn 111 law end will be n :ur. ‘
eil Dy those to wlioin lie owes Ins election. Hut be through th.; Semite. Y'es ev. i
the cause of interposing his veio what it may, its ef- her, in the Sei.ate, which i’s con
•ect in all case-s is to l eijuire a greater body of con- sing elenieiu. and on w hich the
stituency, tniough the Lgislativo organs, to put the ,auce to this fatal tendency exist
or e(|uity, where an act ol Congress cuines in ques
tion. to decide on its unconstitutionahty, which, if
(li'cidcfd against tiie law in the Supremo Court, is in
eiiect a permanent veto. But here a diiilrence
must be made between a decision against the consti
tutionality of a law of Congress and that of the
States. ’]’he former acts as a restriction on tiie pow
ers of this Ciovernment. but the latter as an eidar'i-e-
ment.
Such are the various proccsse.'=' of taking the sense
of the people through the divisions and^orgamza-
tion of the diflerent departments of the Governnu nt,
all of which, acting tlirough their iippropriate or
gans, are intended to widen its basis aikl render it
moie popular, instead of less, by increasing the num
ber necessary to put it in aciion, and having for their
object to prevent one portion of tlie community froiH
aggrandizing or enricliiui/ itself
at tne exjjense ol
i.ic other, and to restrict the whole to the splieve in
tended by the li’amers ol the Constitution, £l;is it
t ifected these objects } las it prevented oppression
anj usurpation on tiie part of the (Joverimient ?
Has it accomplished the objects for which the Gov-
• ream-
c r-
-isianees
■ u’ern-
M* 'IS*
-. cM,
_:j'-nse
.ly be
(arli-
* inment was ordained, as enumerated in
ble of the Constitution i Much, \i;r;
tainly has been done, but nut ai'.. '.i.
unghf be en'nnerated, iu the liioCory oi
meal, of liie violation of tne Constitutf
siitnption of powers not delegated to u
version of tfiose delegated to US(“S nevei ■ .
and of their being v/ielded by thedominam
for the time, for its aggrandizement, at tii-
of tne rest ol the community—instances tha.
found in every period of its existence, from iti
est to the latest, beginning with the bank connec
tion at the outset, and ending ivith the J)istribution
act. at its late extraordinary session. How is this
to be accounted tor? What is the cause ?
1 he ex])lanation and cause will be found in the
flict, that, as fully as the sense of the people is taken
in the action or the Oo-vernmont, it is not taken ful
ly enough. For, after all that has been accomplish-
(d in that respect, there are but two organs throuL'’!i
which the voice of the community acts directly o:i
the Government, and which, taken separately, or in
Combination, constitute the elements of wliich it is
eomposed, that is the majority of the States regarded
in their corporate character as bo lies politic, which
in its simple form constitutes the Senate; and the
other is the majority of the people of the States, o:
which, in its simple form, the House of llepresen-
ta'ives is composed. These combined, in the pro
portions already stated, constitute the Executive De
partment, and that department and the Senate ap
point the judges, who constitue the Judiciary. But
U IS only in tlieir simple form in the Sente and the
other House, that they have a steady and a habitual
i'.ontrol over the legislative acts ol the Government.
1 he V(;to ol the Executive is rarely interposed ; not
more than about twenty times during the period of
more than fifty years that the Government has exis
ted. Their eriects have been beneficially felt, but
only casually, at long intervals, and without steady
and habitual influence over the action of the Gov
ernment. The same remarks are substantially ap
plicable to what, for the sake of brevity, may be call
ed the veto of tne Judiciary ; the right of nt’gativ-
ing a law for the want of constitutionality, when it
coai'isin question, in a case before the couits.
1 he liegislature, then, of the L nion, being under
no other habitual and steady conirol but these two
majorities, acting through this and tlie other House,
is, in faet. placed substantially tnider the control of
the portion of the communuy, which the unit'd
niiijoiities of the two Houses reprt^.sent for the time
and which mai consist ot but fourteen States, w'lth
:t federal population of less than ten miiliuns, against
ii little more than si.v. as Ikis beo-’ii already (*xplaine(i
J jui as large as is the loi mer, anti as small ji.s is
the latter, the one is not large enough, in proportion,
to prevent it from plundering, under tlie forms oi'
the law, and the otlier small enough from beinrr
plundered; and hence the many instances of viola
tion of the Constitution, of usurpation, of powers
jierverted, and wiekled for selfish purposes wl,icli
the history of the Government afiords. They fur
nish proof conclusive Uiat .he principle of plunder
so deeply impianted in ail lovermnents, has not
been eradicated in ours by all the precaution taken
by its framers against it.
But in estimating the number of the constitnrncy
necessary to control the niiijority in the two Housers
of Congress at something less than ten millions" 1
have estimated it altogether too high, regardinfr the
practical operation of the Government. °To form a
correct conception of its ])ractical operation in this
respect, another element, which has in practice an
importani inlluence, must be taken into the estimate t *
and which I shall next moceed to explain ’
le lan-
'Mn a more
of :!:e j>nu-
^A-s the Government approaches nearer and near
er to the one absolute .hkJ sitio-It' power, the will of
the greater number, its action u’ill become more and
more disturbed and irregular ; faction, corruption,
and anarchy, will tnore ancJ more abound: patriot
ism will daily decay, and affection and reverence
tor the GovermiK nt grow weaker ami weaker, un
til tiie final shock occurs, when the s\’stem will rush
to ruin ; and tlie swortl take the place of law and
Constitution.
Let me not be inisun lcrstood. I object not to that
structuie ol the (lovernment which makes the nu
merical majority the predominant element; it is,
perhiips, necessary it should be so in all popular
constitutional Governments like ours, which excludes
classes. It is necessarily the exponent of the strong
est interest, or combination of interests, in the coin-
tnimity j and it would seem to be necessary to give
it the preponderance, in order to infuse into the CJo-
vermnent the necessary energ’y to accomplish the
enJs for wliich it Wiis instituted. The great tjuos-
tion is. How is duo preponderance to be ^-iven to it,
wiihout subjecting" the wfiolc, in time, to its unlim-
itedsway? which brings up the question, Is there
inywhere, in our complex system of (xovernment.
a guard, check, or contrivance, sufTiciently strong
to arrr.'t so fearliil a tendency of the Ciovf.-rnment .2
Or, to express u in more tiirect aiul into!! oi!
guage. Is there anywhen,' i.n the svs'
full and pc'lect e.\j):ession ol th voic ■
pie of the States calcnlat-’d to counteract tliis teii(Je-n-
cy to the concentration of all the powers of the ( io-
vernment in the will of the numerical majority, re
sulting from the partin.l and imperlcct exj»ression of
their voice through its organs?
\ es, fortunately, doubly fortunate]}', ther.'' is, not
only a more full and perfect, but a full and perfect
expression to be found in the Constitution, acknowl
edged by all to be the fundamental and supreme law
of the land. It is full and perfect, because it is the
expression of the voicG of each State, adopted by the
separate assent of each, by itself, and for itself, and
is tlie voice ol ai! bv' being tliat of each component
pait, united and blended into one harmonious whoh;.
But it is not only full and j)orfect, but a.s just as it is
lull fnJ perfect; for combining the sense of each,
anu therefore all, there is nothing left on w'hich in
justice. nr oppression, or usurpation can operate.
And, finally, it is as supreme as it is just, because,
comprehending the will ol all. by uniting that of
each of the parts, there is nothinnr within or above
to control it. It is indeed, the vox populi m.c Dei;
the creating voice that called the system into exis
tence, and of which the GovernmeiV. itself is but a
creature, clothed with delegated jiowers to execute
its high behests.
Wo aie ihus broiignt to a question of (he deepe.st
import, and on which the fate of the system de
pends ; How can this full, perfect, just, and su
preme voice of the people, embodied in the Consti
tution, be brought to bear habitually and steadily in
coiniteracting the fatal tendency of‘the Government
to the absolute and depotic control of the numerical
majority ? ()r, if I may bo permitted to use so bold
an expre-ssion, how is this, the deity of our political
s\stem, to be successfully invoked, to interpose its
all powerful creating vo'ice to save from perdition
the creature of its wmII and the work of its hand ?
If it cannot bo done, ours, like all free CJovernments
|)receding it, must go the way of all flesh; but if il
can be, its duration may be from creneration to o-e„.
eration, to the late.=t posterity I'o this all impor
tant question, I will not attempt a reply at this
time. It would lead me far beyond the limits pro
perly belonging to this discussion. I descend from
the uigression nearer to the subject immediately at
issue, in 01 del to reply to an objection to the veto
power, taken by the benator from \ ir'^’inia on this
side the chamber, [Mr. Archer.] ’
H(i rests his support of this resolution on (lie
ground that the object intended to be effected b” the
veto has failed, that the framers of the Constitution
regarded the legislative department of the (Govern
ment, as the one most to be dreaded and that their
motive for vesting the Executive with the veto, was
to check its encroachments on the other depart
ments; but that the Executive, and not the lierrisja-
ture, had proved to be the most dangerous, aiuF that
the veto had become eithev useless' or mischievous
by being converted into a sword to attack instead of
a shield to defend as was originally intended.
1 make no issue with the Senator, as to the cor
rectness of the statement. I assume the flicts to be
as he supposes; not because I agree with him, but
simply With the view of making my reply riiore
brief ^
plain.
Of the two inajorities, which, acting either sepa
rately or m conbination, control tlie Government
the numerical majority is by far the most influen-
fial. It has the exclusive control in the House of
Representatives, and preponderates more than five
to one in the choice of ihe Piesident, assuminr that
the latio of rejiresentation will be fixed at sixty°ei'rht
thousand, under the late census. It also prepon-
tlerates in the appointment of the judges, the rio-ht of
n )ininating having much greater influence m ma
king appointments than that of ad vising and consen
ting. f rom tliise facts, it must he apparent that the
leaning of the Frtsident will be to that element of
power to which he mainly owes his elevation, and on
which he must principally rely, to secure his re-el-
fcction, or maintain the ascenda'ncy of the party and
system of its policy, the head of whicli he usually i«
This leaning of his, must have a powerful elf-ct on
the inclinatioH and tendency of the whole Govern
ment. In his hands are placed, substantially all the
lionors and emoluments of the Government and
these, when greatly increased, as they are and ever
must be wheA the powers of the Government are
^rreatly stretched and increased, must give the Pres
ident a corresponding inti^ience over, nc‘ nlr the
Assuming, then, that the Executive Departjnent
s proved to be the more formidable, and that it re-
quir. s to be checked, rather than to have the power
ol checking others, the first inquiry on that assump-
i-ion, Siiould be into the cause of its increase of pow
er, in 01 del to ascertain the seat and the nature o^
the danjer ; and the next, whether the means pro
posed, that of dive.stmg it of the veto, or modifying
It as proposed, would guard against the danger ap^-
prehended. *
I begin witli the first, and in entering on it, as
sert with confidence, that if the E.vecutfve has be
come formidable to the liberty or safety of the coun
try or other departments of the Government, tiie
cause is not m the Constitution, but in the acts and
omissions of Congress itself
According to my conception the powers vested in
the I resident by the Constitution, are few and effec-
tually guarded, and are not of themselves at all for
midable. In order to have a just conception of the
extent of his powers, it must be borne in mind that
there are but two classes of powers known to the
Constitution ; and they are powers that are express
ly granted, and those that are necessary to carry
the granted powers into execution. Now, by a po
sitive provision of the Constitution, all powers ne-
cessary to the execution of the granted powers, are
expressly delegated to Congress, be they powers
granted to the Legislative, Executive or Judicial de
partment, and can only be exercised by the authori
ty of Congress, and in the manner prescribed by
law'. This provision may be found in w’hat is call
ed the residuary clause, which declares that Con
gress shall have power “ to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to carry into execu
tion the foregoing powers,” (those granted to Con
gress.) ‘-and all other powers vested by this Consti
tution in the Government of the United States, or
in any department or office thereof.” A more com
prehensive provision cannot be imagined. It car
ries with it all powers necessary and proper to the
execution of the granted powers, be the}’- lodged
where they may, and vests the whole, in terms not
/ess explicit, in Congress; and here let me add, in
passing, that the provision is as w’ise as it is com
prehensive. It depositesthe right of deciding wdiat
pow’crs are necessary for the execution of the grant
ed powers, where, and where only it can bo lodged
with safety', in the hands of the law-making power,
and forbids any department or officer of the Gov
ernment from exercising any power not expressly
authorized by the Constitution or the lavvs, thus
making our.s emphatically a Government of laiv
aad Constitution.
Having now shown that the President is restrict
ed by the Constitution to powers expressly granted
to him, and that if any of his granted powers be
such that they require other powders to e.vecuto them,
ho cannot exorcise them without the authority of
Co^igress, I shall now show that there is not one
power vested in him that is any w’ay dangerous,
unless made so by the acts or permission of Con
gress. 1 shall take them in the order they stand
in the Constitufion.
He is, in the first place, made Commander-in-
cheif of the army and navy of the United States,
and the militia, when called into actual service.
I-iarge and expensive military and naval egtablish-
inents and numerous corps of millitia, called into
service, w'ould no doubt increase very dangerously
the power and patronage of the President; but nei
ther can take place but by the action of Congress.
Not a soldier can be enlisted, a ship of war built,
nor a militia man called into service, w thout its au
thority ; and very fortunately our situation is such, *
that there is no necessity, and, probably, will be
none, why his power and patronage should be dan
gerously increased by cither of those means.
Ilo is next vested with the power to make treat
ies anrl to appoint ollicers, -.vith the advice and con
sent of the Sen.ite; and here again his power can
only be made dangerous by the action of one or
both Houses of Congress. In the formation of
treatit's two thirds ol the Senate must concur; and
it is diflicult to conceive of a treaty that could ma
terially enlarfre his powers, that would not re(iuire
an act of Congre.ss to carry it into'effect. 7'he ap-
pointiiii^ power m;i\ , indeed, danLT*'rous!\^ iiiiuease
(i.-i patronage, if i,.liicer,s be useles.sly multi[»lied and
too h’.ghly [)aid ; but if such should be the case, the
fault would be in Congres.-5, by whoae authority ex
clusively they can be created or their compensation
regulated.
But much i.s said in tiiis connection, of the pow’-
er of removal, justly accompanied by severe con
demnation ol the many and abusive instances of the
use of the power, and the dangerous influence it
gives the President, in all of which 1 fully concur.
It is, indeed, a corrupting and dangerous power,
wh>‘n ollicers are greatly multiplied, and highly
paid, and when it is perverted irom its legitimate
object, to the advancement ol personal or party pur
poses. But 1 find no such power iu the list of
powers granted to the l^xecutive, which is proof
conclusive that it belongs to the class necessary and
proper to execute some other power, if it exists at
all. which none can doubt; and, for reasons already^
assigned, cannot be exercised without authority of
law. If, then, it has been abused, it must be be
cause Congress has not done its duty in permitting
it to be exercis“d by the 1^‘esiilent without the sanc
tion of law authorizing its exercise, and guarding
against the abuses to which it is so liable.
The residue of the list are rather duties than
rights; that of reconunending to Congress such
mtrasures as he may deem expedient; of convening’-
both Houses on extraordinary’ occasions; of ad
journing them when they cannot agree on the time ;
of receiving ambassadors and other ministers; of
taking care that the laws be faithfully e.xecuted, and
commissioning the officers of the United States.
Of all these, there is but one which claims particu
lar notice, in connection with the point immediately
under consideration ; and that is his power as the
administrator ot the laws. But whatever power
he"may have in that capacity depends on the action
of Congre.ss. If Congress should limit it.s legisla
tion to the few great subjects confided to k; so
frame its laws as to leave as little as possible to dis
cretion, and to take care to see that they are duly
and faithfully executed, the administrative jiowers
of the President would be proportionally limited,
and divested jf all danger. But if, on the coiUrary,
it should extend its legislation in every direction ;
dravy within its action subjects never contemplated
by' the Constitution , multiply its acts, create nu
merous offices, and increase the revenue and expen
ditures proportionally, and, at the same time, frame
its laws vaguely aiul loosely, and withdraw, m a
great measure, its supervising care over their exe
cution, liis power would indeed become truly for
midable and alarming. iVow I appeal to the Sen
ator and his friend, the author of this resolution,
whether the growth of Executive power has not
been the result of such a course on the part of Con
gress. I ask them whether his power has not in
fact increased, or decreased just in proportion to the
increase and decrease of the system of legislation,
such as has been described ? What was the period
of its maximum increase, but the very period
which they have so frequently and loudly denounc
ed as the one most distinguished for the prevalence
of Executive power and usurpation? Much of
that power certainly depended on the reinakable
man, then atthe head of that Department, but much
—lar more, on the system of legislation, \yhich the
author of this resolution had built up \vith so much
zeal and labor, and which cairied the powers of
the Government to a point beyond that to which it
had ever before attained, drawing many and impor
tant pow'ers into its votex, of which the framers of
the Constitution never dreamed. And here let me
say to both of the Senators, and the party of w'hich
they are prominent members, that they labor in
vain to bring down Executive power, while they
support the system they so zealously advocate. The
power they' complain of is but its necessary fruit
has proved dangerbUs in fact, the fault is not in the
Constitution, but in Congress, I would next ask him,
in what possible way could the divesting the Presi
dent of his veto, or modifying it as he proposes, li
mit his power ? Is'it not clear, that so far from the
veto being the cause of the increase of this power, it
would act as a limitation to it if it had been more
freely and frequently used ? If the President had
vetoed the original Bank—the connection with the
banking system—the tariffs of ’21 and ’28, and the
numerous acts appropriating money for roads, ca
nals, harbors, and a long list of other measures not
less unconstitutional, would his power have been
half as great as it now is ? He has grown great
and powerful, not because he used his veto, but be
cause ke abstained from using it. In fact, it is dif
ficult to imagine a case in which its application can
tend to enlarge his power, except it be the case of
an act intended to repeal a law calculated to in
crease his power, or to restore the authority of one
which, by an arbitrary construction of his power,
he has set aside.
Now let me add, in conclusion, that this is a
question, in its bearings of vital importance to that
beatiful and sublime system of Government, which
our patriotic ancestors established, not so much by
their wisdom, as w'ise and experienced as they were,
guidance of a kind J^rovidence, w'ho, in
iiis divine dispensation, so disposed events as to lead
to the establishment of a system of government wi-
er than those who framed it. The veto, of itself,
as important as it is, sinks into nothing compared to
the principle involved. It is but one and that by
no rneans the most considerable, of those many wise
devices which 1 have attempted to explain, and
wdiich were intended to strengthen the popular ba
sis of our Government, and resist its tendency to fall
under the control of the dominant interst, actino-
through the mere numerical majority. The intt*(>
ductionof this resolution may be regarded as one of
the many symptoms of that fatal tendency, and of
which we had such fearful indications in* the bold
attempt at the late extraordinary session, of forcino^
thro’ a whole system of measures of the most threjT-
tening and alarming character, in the space of a few'
weeks, on the ground that they were ail decided in
the election of the late President; thus attempting
to substitute the will of a majority of the people, in
the choice of a Chief Alagistriite, as the legislative
authority of the Union, in lieu of the beautiful and
profound system established by the Constitution.
The \ (-Jo was all the rage in the Hou.qe to-dav.
From some ol the speeches ol the Federalist.^, u*e
would infer that the re.solufiou i.s taken to pass no
ci(i(iitional revenue lav\’, but to leave the Government
(if their own arguments are to he trusted) entirely
v\ithouf re.sources. 1 hey insi.st that no duties cm
be lawfully collected after the 1st of July, and, nev
ertheless, that the land distribution must go on. It
is the great achievment of Federal VVhig^*ry in the
exti-aordiiiary ses.sion; and, to allow it to iTe repealed
ny tlie lorce ot one ol its own provision?, would be
to coniess t.hat these
T»>-cM-*:. I*' *
JEFFERSONIAN:
CHARLOTTE, N.C.,
TUESDAY MORNING, JULY 12,181?.
Democratic /Republican yoininations:
FOR GOVERNOR,
Louis D. Henry, of Fayetteville,
STATE LEGISLATURE.
Far the Senate—JOHN IVALKER.
Comni07is— JOHN KIRK,
DR. JOS. jr. ROSS,
CALEB ERWIX.
Pur Shn iff—THOMAS N. ALEXASDEI?.
Election the 1st Thursday (4th day) of August ne.xf.
PARAPHRASED I'ROM TIIE n.'.LEIGH nEGIfTKK.
Tlic ranrliiiates now bcloro the people for Govern
or arc, ij(.)UlS D. HKXRV, a Deniocr.itic Rtpuii-
lioan, and .lOlLX M. MOREHKAD, a Federal Whi-j.
\ Ihiiujcratic It>publican means one who goes for eqnsJ
riL^ht?, the liberty ol the 1‘eople, and the Rights and Union . f
the States.
A Federal moans one who is on tkc ouf.-iide, for tiio
people, and on Uic inside, for liiinself. Or, who is for tho
People hfj'orc the flection, and for lumself afterwurd.s.
Which will the People choose I
Be assured that as certain as Congress transcends
its assigned limits and usurps powers never confer
red, or stretches those conferred beyond the proper
limits,so surely will the fruits of its usurpation pass
into the hands of the Executive. In seeking to be
come master, it but makes a master in the person of
the President.' It is only by confining itself to its
allotted sphere, and a discreet use of ii.« acknovvl-
edged powers, that it can retain that ascendency in
the Government which the Constitution intended to
confer on it.
Having now' pointed out the cause of the great
increase of the Executive power on which lhe*^Sen-
ator rested his objection to the veto power, and hav
ing satisfactorily shown, as 1 trust i have, that, if it
prodigious politiciitns had 1
overreached themselves. That they feel they are
probably to stand in thi.? predicament before the
country, is manifest from the frenzy they exhibit on
the loss ol a^bili to which they had given only the
ephemeral life of a sii-.j^le month. Sir Gill'.s Over-
RLACii was not more st/llocuied with passion at any
ol his miscarria^^es, than the Federal managers now
are, in being foiled in the experiment of the little
tarill. Il, in their eight month.s ol legislation, (ta
king in the extra session,) they had built up some
gre.it revenue system, which, by its wisdom, had
o.htained a hold upon the public favor, and had hung
the millstone of distribution rovmd its neck, andfourid
that it must go to the hotttnn, there would have been
some little excuse ibr the exasperation and desperate
griel now displayed. ]3ut when they hav'c put the
multiplied weight of a breach of posi'tive legal cov-
enant—the ov’erthrou* ot all the principles of the
pacifying compromise act—the stripping of the Go
vernment, unconditionally, ol the only vtnl I'asoiij'ce
that can redeem its cred'it—all upon a little law of
a month's duration—and then cry because it fiiils to
suppoit what would sink u navy, it, is enough to
make all the rest of the world 'laugh, W'C^iave
heard that the design ol the Federal majority now
is, to concoct a tarill system on a great scalii, and
attach to it the same proviso which the PiiL\s(m:NT
has just vetoed. \Vill not the people of the United
States think the time ol Congress put to a had use in
this idle .sport oi’ fishing for vetoes ? Will it be tole
rated that the great interesis of the country shall
be thus tritlcd with? Wo think the Federal mana
gers will find tlmt they have carried this mode of
legislation too far already. The game ol heading
Capt. TYt.ru is looked upon by the country as a son
ol chiH’s play, in which it will no longer indulge
sage Senators and Representatives. It expects that
they will immediately turn their attention to provide
the way.s and 'neans of paying for the frolic in
which they have rioted for almost two years.
\ya,Hhing(on (ilvbc, Jane uO,
'•KEEr IT BEFORE TIIE PEOPLE.”
1 hat the Whigs in Congress are now using eve
ry exertion to lay upon them the follow’inir ta.Kes: —
On coarse cotton shirting of oG inches wide—100
per ccnt.
On the same of a little finer quality'—75 per cent.
()n coarse ciilicoes—110 per cent.
On flannels—87 per cent.
On cut nails—3 cents per pound.
On wrought nails—1 cents per pound.
On Salt—10 cents per bushel of 5G pounds.
(>n iron—\-\ cents per lb.
()n brow’n sugar—2 cents per pound.
On lump sugar—G cents per pound.
And on almost every thing else of common con
sumption under the sun, are these Whigs now lay-!
ing like heavy taxes.
Farmers of North Carolina 1 will you elect for
your Governor Joh^i M. Morchead who is one of
the party in favor of these taxes—or will you elect
that firm and uncompromising Democrat, Louis I).
Hennj, who i.s utterly opposed to these, and all oth
er schemes for loading the people with unjust and
oppressive taxation Carolinian.
MR. CALHOU*\’S SPEECH.
We have only' room to call attention to the master
ly speech of Mr. Caliioun* in to-day’s paper, it
is the dearest exposition of the principles of our
Government and the basis upon which our institu
tions rest that w^e have ever seen ; and now that
Mr. Clay, the author of the proposition w’hich call*
ed forth this powerful eflbrt from Mr. Calhoi n',
is fairly'- before the country' as a candidate for tho
Presidency, it becomes every’ citizen to read and ex
amine calmly the inevitable tendency of the meas
ures he is advocating. Mr. Calhopn' shows that
to abolish the Veto power from the Constitution, as
Mr. Ci.AV desires, would at once overthrow our
whole structure oi free GuvernrnenJ. But read his
speec h.
OUT AT LAST.
The Federal party of this County held a Conven*
tion in this pl ice on ihe-1th instant. Ten of the eigh
teen Captain s Oistricts in the Countv were repre
sented—the Chariotte District by Braley Oates. I.
F. Alexander, Daniel Asburv', and J. A. 7’odd.—
After the Convention was organized, the foUowjn^’-
Resolution was gravel^' considered ;
“ Rcfioli'cd. Tliat the sense of this meeting' bo In-
ken to ascertain wheiher they approve of the Tick
et lor tho Legislature submitted to the People by
our opponents.'’
And of rour>''^ decided unanimously in the nega
tive. When wc first glanced at this Resolution, it
somewhat alarmed us, for fear our opponents had a
notion to comn over into the Democratic ranks: a
move we beg that the leaders of that party will not
make. They then nominated Gric>\ Esq.,
for the Senate, and David M. J^ec, Robert J. Me-
Do/cfl, and Hugh Steicarl lar the Commons. A-
gainst these gentlemen personally w’e have nothing
to say: but their political views arc at war with
those of a vast majority of the voters of this County.
Of this we presume they themselves are aware, as
their organ, the Jo?brnal, tells them they' “have to
contend almost against hope.’’ But we now have
opposition : and however weak, our friends should
be wide awake and vigihnt at the polls.
■\Ve are glad to see that the Convention had tho
liberality to pay the following high tribute to tho
official conduct of our present worthy Sheriff, .^Ir.
Alexande r:
Rf'solred, That a.s no objection ran be nrgcil
against the j>resent Siierill’in the discharge of his ol-
licial dutv, ti'.Lit we recommend him for re-election.'’
THE DIFFERENCE.
John M. Moreiiead is for:
The Tariff taxes: (he owns a cotton Factory.)
He is for;
The Bankrupt Law;
The new National IJebt;
Giving away the proceeds ol the public lands when
the Treasury' has not a six-pence in it, and money
has to be borrowed to carry on tho (.Jovernment
from day to day:
For breaking down the Constitution by “ restrict-
ing ”—that is, abolishing the Veto Power ;
And for all the other runious and destructive acts
ot the Whig Congress in the Extra Session.
On the other hand ;
Louis D. Henry is dacidedly opposed to them
in letter and spirit.
He is for;
Free trade and equal rights ;
Against Tarifi ta.xes and exclusive monopoly privi
leges ;
Against the Bankrupt Law, and a National Debt;
Against the bribery Distribution Bill;
Opposed to abolishing the Veto Power;
Opposed to the new Whig “ Pension system ” ot
giving away the public money to Mrs. Harrison
or any body else.
In a word:
Henry is the man for the People.
JSIorehaad is the man for tho monopolists.—Ib.
CALL THE ROLL.
I'hc Federal leaders and papers obstmatelj' main-
tain that their party has lost no strength in the
country' since the elections of 1840; Do they speak
the truth 7 Let facts answer.
In 1S40, John Tyler was the Whig candidato
for the A”ice Presidency'. Messrs. Wise, Gilmer,
Proflit, Irwin, Mallory, Hunter, Rencher, and
Rives, members of Congress, were all then acting
with the Whigs—where are they iiovv'? Where,
too, is the Madiso}iia7i, the paper so strong]}' re
commended and so profusely scattered over the
whole country in 1840 by the National Executive
Whig Committee as the ablest Whig paper at the
seat of Government? And let us then call over tho
roll of Whig States in 1840, and see if there have
been no desertions from Whigery in that quarter.
In 1S40, Maine gave a Whig majority of 210
votes. In 1841, the Democrats swept the State—
electing a Democratic Legislature, and their Gov
ernor by a majority of 8,748.
Connecticut gave the Whigs a majority of 6,324
in 1840. Last April, the Democrats elected their can
didate for Governor by 100 votes over the regular
ly nominated Federal candidate, and also more than
two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature.
In 1840, Xeic York gave the Whigs a majority
of 13,293. In 1841, the Democrats carried the
State by near 15,000 majority—electing two-thiru3
of the members of the Legislature.
The Whig majority in New Jersey in 1840 was
2,317. In 1841, the Democrats had a majority m
the popular vote of the State of more than 1,000.
Pennsylvania gave the Whigs a majority in
1840 of 348. In 1841, the Democratic candidate
for Governor was elected by 20,000 niajoritj,, an
a large majority of Democrats was elected to t le
Legislature. , ,
The Whigs in 1840, had a majority inMarylan'^
of 4.774. In 1841, the Democrats elected a Govcr-