

A SPEECH FROM MR. CRITTENDEN.

During a visit of Senator Crittenden to New York last week, he was waited on by several Whig associations, who delivered addresses to him, to which he responded in his usual happy style. He disclaimed emphatically any wish to be a candidate for President. The following are extracts from his speech—

The Whig Party was a glorious party and its enemies could not assail it in such a manner as to weaken its principles. When it was the rival of the Democratic Party, it was, of course, engaged in contention with it; but, when that contention ceased, its adversaries were the loudest in its praise, and now he looks for such a glorious re-surrection of the Whig Party of this country to its pristine principles and to its pristine virtues. That was the object of the great Whig Party, of which the lamented chief, Henry Clay, was the prop and head. He (the speaker) had served with him, or rather he should say, under him, in many a long and weary campaign; and, for the whole period of his political life, except on one solitary occasion, there never was the slightest thing between them which could be called by the name of dissension; and that slight cloud was soon after happily dissipated. He looked on Mr. Clay's name and his memory with a reverence which was more than a mere respect, and which was more than a mere admiration, and which was more than a mere admiration of a man who was more than a mere man.

He (Mr. Crittenden) knew Mr. Clay well, and he could truly say that there never was a more intrinsically and essentially great man than Henry Clay. Webster and Calhoun were great names; but he would not compare them. They were all the world to him, but Mr. Clay was the great favorite and champion of the Whig Party. It was to him that they looked in the time of stress, he hoped to see his principles yet prevail, and they would prevail if ever the nation was to be raised to the proud position which she ought to occupy.

Mr. Crittenden alluded to the agitation on a certain subject which is now going on in the country and thought that the time had come when the great agitation for a whole should cease, if for no other purpose than to give the people time to think and see to where they were drifting. He was sick of it, very sick of it, and he thought that the time had come when the great agitation for a whole should cease, if for no other purpose than to give the people time to think and see to where they were drifting.

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North Carolina Delbig.



CHARLOTTE: Tuesday, December 14, 1858.

It will be seen by reference to our advertising columns that the Directors of the Charlotte and S. C. Railroad have declared a dividend of \$31 per share on the Capital Stock of this road. This must be gratifying to the stockholders and we hope the time will soon come when this stock will advance to par.

This body met on the 6th instant, and a program of both Houses were present. The President's annual Message was submitted on that day. We have received it but its extreme length will compel us to divide it, as it would occupy all the space we have at command in our issue. We publish the following synopsis this week to give our readers some idea of its contents:

The President's Message opens by congratulating the country on the contrast with the agitation which existed concerning Kansas a year ago, with the peace and quiet now prevailing. Refers to the Lecompton Constitution, and reaffirms his position on that subject; thinks if Kansas had been admitted with that Constitution the same quiet would have been secured at an earlier day; but being perfectly willing to acquiesce in any other constitutional mode of settlement, he signed the English bill. And it is probable that while Kansas again applies for admission, she will have the population required by that bill.

The Message enters at length into subjects, and recommends the passage of a general law that no new State shall be admitted, unless she has a population sufficient to entitle her to one representative. He congratulates Congress upon the settlement of Utah affairs, without the effusion of blood, and compliments the officers of the Army there, and expresses approval of the conduct of Governor Cumming, and honorably mentions Col. Kane. Refers to the importance of treaties recently negotiated with China and Japan, and thinks the result in the former case justified our neutral policy. He congratulates the country on the abandonment of the right of search by Great Britain; and in reference to Central America, says that negotiations are still progressing, and has not yet abandoned all hopes of success. He refers to the route proposed for the Nicaragua route, and recommends the passage of a law that no new State shall be admitted, unless she has a population sufficient to entitle her to one representative.

Our readers will recollect that the crew of the *Sobr. Echo* has been confined in Charleston for some time, on a charge of piracy. The case was brought before the Federal Court sitting at Columbia and a bill was sent to the Grand Jury which refused to find a true bill. An effort had been made to liberate the prisoners, believing that the law of Congress declaring the slave trade piracy was unconstitutional; this was opposed by the District Attorney and the case was brought before the Court for its decision. On the 6th instant, Judge Nagrah delivered an elaborate decision. He examined the case in all its bearings, and the learned Judge declared it as the law of the land. Judge Wayne in delivering the judgment of the Court, after referring to the argument used, said that the use of the power by Congress in the 4th and 5th sections of the act of the 20th May, 1820, is not unconstitutional, and the prisoners and the witnesses were then remanded to the Charleston jail.

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Arizona. Let us assume temporary protection over the Northern portion of Chihuahua, Sonora, and establish military posts therein, to be withdrawn when Mexico was capable of governing herself.

The political condition of the Isthmus was of the utmost importance. We should feel confident before competent agents, but not to expect the commerce of the world to wait until they do it. Nicaragua may charge fair duties if she will, but must not close the route. Meantime, the President requests permission to employ land and naval forces to keep the route open. The American policy applies to Panama and Tehuantepec, unless Costa Rica and Nicaragua make early peaceful settlement. It only remains, for us to employ force. Granada has offered a new treaty which will remove all difficulties with that State. She probably will not attempt to enforce the tax on our passengers. Relations with Brazil are friendly, and we are trying to get her to abolish the high duties and settle the claims of our citizens.

Now, Mr. Editor, what will be the effect of this Danville connection? It will be to add annually about \$300,000 to the income of the N. C. Railroad from increase of travel, freight and mail pay, to add \$30 to \$40,000 to the income of the R. & Gaston R. R.; and will probably diminish the receipts from travel of the Wilmington & Weldon R. R. \$200 or \$300,000. This is about the result it would have on our Railroads in operation. As to the Atlantic Road, it would probably increase its freight receipts. Mr. Governor Marshall has four times the interest in this road and in Eastern cities that any other man in the State has ought to be a safe guide on this subject, besides being a large stockholder in the N. C. R. Road.

With this result the people of the State would be saved over \$100,000 of taxation annually and her property in the N. C. R. Road increased in value at least one million of Dollars. With this relief of taxation to the people and the N. C. R. Road paying dividends, the Western Extension would go forward without doubt. This Danville road would reach the Coal Fields and the Virginia line, the coal from which would be distributed all along the N. C. R. and throughout the State, and be carried to our seaports, thus creating more wealth and taxable resources than all of our railroads have produced as yet. We in the West cannot reach the Coal Fields of Oklahoma and can only look for coal from this direction. Our mineral elements are now only waiting the great element to add vastly to the wealth and capital of middle and Western North Carolina.

Why then the gentleman from Virginia take the interests of North Carolina under his special keeping, and refuse to give us any railroad charter or any aid to build railroads unless we will make slaves of ourselves—sell out our right to trade any where, except at the Eastern City of Raleigh—a bright commercial prospect to the West!

I have no time to present other views on this question now but will write to you in a few days again on this subject.

THE DANVILLE CONNECTION. Mr. Editor: Upon the supposition that the columns of your valuable journal are ever open to the discussion of both sides of every question involving the public interest, I am the privilege of inserting a short reply to the communication of "Occasional" in the last number of the *Whig*, on the subject of the proposed connection between the Danville and the Raleigh Railroads. "Occasional" is opposed to the bill introduced by Mr. Davidson in the Senate, to repeal the law prohibiting the building of Railroads by private enterprise without a charter from the Legislature, "because, it might cut the throat of the State in her investments already made, or in progress."

I am surprised at any man who values constitutional freedom, to take such a position; and I am still more surprised to see any western man—any legislator, or any man who would be one—advocate such a doctrine, at such time as the present, seeing that the fate of the great connecting link of trade and travel between the North and the South hangs upon the doom of Mr. Davidson's bill. I am, however, not surprised at the course of opposition to this great measure of freedom, pursued by the "gentleman from Virginia," at the head of the Raleigh Register, who two years ago was opposed to the same measure, on the ground that it would be calculated to enhance the wealth of "little Petersburg," and use language of whose opposition is still based on the same consideration as to Richmond, while the other is transferred from Petersburg to Raleigh. There is a tone of moral solemnity in the mode of reasoning that throws the blush of shame and confusion on all ordinary arguments, and causes the pen to fall from my hand in other respects. If, however, circumstances shall render it expedient to do so, I shall prepare an argument of the facts, to prove that the principle contained in Mr. Davidson's bill is not only just and proper in theory, but also, if carried into practice, that it will not cut the throat of the State in any manner, under any circumstances; that the building of the Danville extension will not militate against the interests of the Cape Fear region; and that the same measure will not only benefit all western North Carolina, but will also enhance the value of the stock in the North Carolina Railroad more than anything that can be done for it; that it will injure no one unless it shall be thought so injurious to cut off from a few hungry hotel keepers, east of Greensboro, who have no right to them, the fare bills of an occasional lone, stray traveler, who has lost his way in travelling North or South, over the present N. C. Rail Road, and finally that if the Legislature act incidentally by a course of stupid and perverse legislation, force the trade of western North Carolina to points on the coast of the State, where there are no adequate markets, by the same right they may force it to the top of the highest pine tree in Wake county, for the ride of the air to land upon.

Mr. Editor, by way of appendix to this short note, let me add that the landed interest of North Carolina, which are almost exclusively benefited by these great works of internal improvement, are not yet taxed to the maximum point of a system of revenue, and although the friends of the Danville Connection ask no State aid to build their great work, yet every consideration of State pride and patriotism that seeks to develop all the great resources of the Commonwealth, and the plainest sense of justice to the people of the Fayetteville region of country, call imperiously upon the Legislature to build the Coal Fields Road, and meet out to that people, who have contributed their full quota to make all of our other State improvements, equal justice. Until this debate they have a right to complain of neglect and injustice.

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From an occasional Correspondent. KALAMAZOO, Dec. 3d, 1858. Messrs. Editor: There was in the House of Commons to day, an examination into the case of Mr. Ang Moore of Martin county, as to his qualification to sit in that house as a member, he being under 21 years of age. The Committee to whom the resolution of Dr. Waddell of Stanley, had been referred, reported on Moore's right to a seat and referred the matter to the judgment of the House, stating the fact, that Moore was not 21 years of age. Mr. Moore took the floor in his own defence and stated that there was no constitutional provision against his right to a seat, notwithstanding he was a minor. That there were other cases even before the amendment of the Constitution in 1856, when persons under age were allowed to sit as members of the House, to wit, Bedford Brown and S. Harris, from Calaveras, whose seat was contested and who retained their seats after a thorough investigation. He thought the people were competent to select a suitable agent and the Constitution did not prohibit a minor to sit for them.

Mr. W. N. H. Smith of Hertford, in a very lucid, logical and able argument contended that although the constitution was silent on this point, as to the age, yet that by fair implication it presupposed that the member should be a freeman. That it would be absurd to require higher qualifications in a voter, than it would in the person voted for. That the Constitution required every voter to be 21 years of age, and without expressly declaring it, it meant, when taken entire, that the member should have the *undisturbed* qualification of 12 months residence and 100 acres of land. That to suppose otherwise would be an absurdity and we might have an infant of ten or of five years to make law, not only to govern his own constituents, but for the whole State, who was totally disqualified from voting for persons to legislate—dry him the power to choose a lawmaker and yet give him the higher power to make laws. That a free negro is no more prohibited from being a member than a minor, because there were no words in the constitution expressly excluding him. Such would be the fallacy of the argument, if we were to be restricted to the literal words of the particular section (6) of the Constitution, instead of taking a broad and comprehensive view of the entire instrument.

That further, the fallacy of such a construction might be shown from the fact that a minor might be sent here, who would not be expelled by law on account of infancy, from committing crime, and who could not be expelled from the Senate, or from the House, from the same cause, and might thus be a member of the Legislature, and yet be totally disqualified from voting for persons to legislate—dry him the power to choose a lawmaker and yet give him the higher power to make laws. That a free negro is no more prohibited from being a member than a minor, because there were no words in the constitution expressly excluding him. Such would be the fallacy of the argument, if we were to be restricted to the literal words of the particular section (6) of the Constitution, instead of taking a broad and comprehensive view of the entire instrument.

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From an occasional Correspondent. KALAMAZOO, Dec. 3d, 1858. Messrs. Editor: There was in the House of Commons to day, an examination into the case of Mr. Ang Moore of Martin county, as to his qualification to sit in that house as a member, he being under 21 years of age. The Committee to whom the resolution of Dr. Waddell of Stanley, had been referred, reported on Moore's right to a seat and referred the matter to the judgment of the House, stating the fact, that Moore was not 21 years of age. Mr. Moore took the floor in his own defence and stated that there was no constitutional provision against his right to a seat, notwithstanding he was a minor. That there were other cases even before the amendment of the Constitution in 1856, when persons under age were allowed to sit as members of the House, to wit, Bedford Brown and S. Harris, from Calaveras, whose seat was contested and who retained their seats after a thorough investigation. He thought the people were competent to select a suitable agent and the Constitution did not prohibit a minor to sit for them.

Mr. W. N. H. Smith of Hertford, in a very lucid, logical and able argument contended that although the constitution was silent on this point, as to the age, yet that by fair implication it presupposed that the member should be a freeman. That it would be absurd to require higher qualifications in a voter, than it would in the person voted for. That the Constitution required every voter to be 21 years of age, and without expressly declaring it, it meant, when taken entire, that the member should have the *undisturbed* qualification of 12 months residence and 100 acres of land. That to suppose otherwise would be an absurdity and we might have an infant of ten or of five years to make law, not only to govern his own constituents, but for the whole State, who was totally disqualified from voting for persons to legislate—dry him the power to choose a lawmaker and yet give him the higher power to make laws. That a free negro is no more prohibited from being a member than a minor, because there were no words in the constitution expressly excluding him. Such would be the fallacy of the argument, if we were to be restricted to the literal words of the particular section (6) of the Constitution, instead of taking a broad and comprehensive view of the entire instrument.

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