

CONFEDERATE INDEPENDENCE.

From the London Herald.

That man must be endowed with an almost American credulity who continues to doubt that the independence of the Confederate States is an accomplished reality. If, at the outset, Mr. Seward himself had been asked how long he demanded for the accomplishment of the enterprise his Government had undertaken, he would certainly have been satisfied with a single year; and would have been content to say that, if at the end of that period the Confederates could still keep the field in Virginia, the European Powers would be entitled to recognize their independence. Three years have almost elapsed since the first defeat of the Federals, and during the whole of that time the Confederates have fought, not as Spain fought against France during the uneasy reign of Joseph Bonaparte, not as the Spanish colonies fought against Spain, not even as our own American colonies fought against the armies of George III., but as Russia fought Napoleon in 1815, or as Frederick II., defended himself against Austria in the Seven Years' War. The war has been waged for the most part on equal terms, that the one party has fought for empire and the other only for independence. But it has in no way partaken of the character of an insurrectionary, as distinguished from an international, war. The Confederate Government has, from first to last, held a position of perfect equality with that of the Northern States. It has administered, with undisputed authority, the affairs of its own country; and the Federal Government has been unable to exercise any other than a military power there, and that only within the territory covered by its own armies.

The State Governments have gone on as regularly as ever; the administration of the civil law is as perfect in the South as in any European country; and while in the Northern States the necessities of an aggressive war have been held to require the exercise of a military authority superior to the law, the civil authorities have never been overridden by martial law in any Southern district not actually invaded or threatened by the enemy.

To deny such a government the status of independence accorded to Nicaragua, or to Greece, certainly seems the height of absurdity; and this impression is not weakened when we look to the military operations that have taken place. It is true that at sea the Federals have been able to maintain a decided superiority, and that a blockade, efficient enough to impose very serious difficulties in the way of the export of any bulky commodities, has been maintained at every port which has at once so good a harbour and such means of communication with the interior as to be available for commercial purposes; but it is also true that the Federals have hardly gained a single naval success, and have sustained several naval disasters.

It is true, also, that they have been able to occupy several points on the vast extent of Southern coast which are commanded from the sea, and to obtain the control of a considerable portion of the inland waters of the South. They have also penetrated at various points the long and indefensible frontier line, and pushed their armies far into Southern territory. But they have not been able to conquer a single State; and the chief fruit of three years of warfare, besides the disputed possession of Tennessee, is a wide-spread devastation and a considerable havoc among the laboring population of the South. Hundreds of homes and farms have been destroyed, and thousands of negroes stolen.

The Southern armies have sustained no great disaster in the field; they have inflicted half a score of the most terrible defeats recorded in history. Their capital, with a sort of bravado, was planted near their most endangered frontier, army after army, to the number of several hundred thousands, has been hurled against it and completely shattered; a quarter of a million of corpses are manning the plains of Virginia, and with this result, that Richmond is now stronger than it ever was, and very much safer than Washington, and that, instead of asking whether Grant can take the city, men, both North and South, are expecting to hear that Lee has taken Grant's camp, and that a third of the invading army has been left in the hands of the victors. Sherman has followed up the long and costly march which last year had brought the Federal army of the West to Chattanooga; he is not so very far from Atlanta; but while no one fears for Atlanta, all the friends of the North tremble for Sherman and his army. Charleston has been attacked in vain; and after crushing repulses, the Federal besiegers are driven to amuse themselves by a bombardment which, though it succeeded in killing now and then an innocent child, or murdering a bride at the altar, might be continued for a hundred years without bringing the city any nearer to a surrender.

Under these circumstances, it seems perfectly absurd that the policy of European Powers should be influenced by an affection so palpable as that of uncertainty as to the issue of the war. No sober politician considers that the independence of the South has yet to be achieved; it is only in diplomatic dispatches that statesmen speak of the Confederate States as a merely inchoate nationality; but, unhappily, it is by diplomatic language, and not by expressions of personal opinion, that Europe can influence the feelings or the conduct of America. If Lord Russell could speak to the Confederate Government as every one speaks of it, he would secure for England a warm and faithful ally, whose friendship would do more than an army of fifty thousand men to protect the frontier of Canada. If England and France would speak through their Governments the opinion of their people—if they would accord to the Government of Richmond that recognition which it has received from the public opinion of Europe—they would do very much to bring the war to a close, and spare the lives of tens of thousands who must otherwise perish before the North will consent to confess itself beaten. The ill-will of the North toward this country is already so bitter that we can hardly exasperate it.

The United States would go to war with us now if they dared; they will not be the more likely to dare it if we prove our contempt of their monachies by recognizing the South. On the other hand, if we wait to recognize the Confederates till we cannot help it, we shall have no claim on their friendship, and no right to their assistance when the North does find the courage to quarrel with us. Recognition, then, so far from tending to precipitate war, is the best possible guarantee for permanent peace between ourselves and the United States; and if either Parliament or the Administration were capable of a courageous and farsighted policy, Mr. Lindsey's motion might have a chance of being carried, and of rendering material service to the country and to mankind. But to submit such a motion to a house which has just approved Lord Russell's betrayal of Denmark, and in which the authors of our Polish and American policy have an obedient majority of eighteen, is simply to invite defeat, to give an advantage to the Northern faction in Parliament, and to counteract, by an adverse parliamentary vote, whatever effect may be produced by the manifestation of English feeling out of doors in sympathy with the South, and in confident expectation of her complete and speedy triumph.

A one-legged miller is at once a miller and a poor.

THE AMERICAN QUESTION.

From the London Times of August 18.

The people on this side watch with unfailing hopefulness for the least symptom that may promise to be the beginning of the end of the American war. If, at the outset, Mr. Seward himself had been asked how long he demanded for the accomplishment of the enterprise his Government had undertaken, he would certainly have been satisfied with a single year; and would have been content to say that, if at the end of that period the Confederates could still keep the field in Virginia, the European Powers would be entitled to recognize their independence. Three years have almost elapsed since the first defeat of the Federals, and during the whole of that time the Confederates have fought, not as Spain fought against France during the uneasy reign of Joseph Bonaparte, not as the Spanish colonies fought against Spain, not even as our own American colonies fought against the armies of George III., but as Russia fought Napoleon in 1815, or as Frederick II., defended himself against Austria in the Seven Years' War. The war has been waged for the most part on Southern soil; it has, so far, not been a war on equal terms, that the one party has fought for empire and the other only for independence. But it has in no way partaken of the character of an insurrectionary, as distinguished from an international, war. The Confederate Government has, from first to last, held a position of perfect equality with that of the Northern States. It has administered, with undisputed authority, the affairs of its own country; and the Federal Government has been unable to exercise any other than a military power there, and that only within the territory covered by its own armies.

The first move of the Confederates in this case was practical and entitled to be considered. It was a request that four of their public men might have a safe conduct to Washington in order to negotiate, not for any definite and one-sided proposition, but for peace, which both sides profess to desire. The reply to this was in Abraham Lincoln's curt style, to the effect that he will not permit the approach of anybody who does not come authorized to agree to the integrity of the Union and the abandonment of slavery. That, of course, is submission, and means that the Cabinet of Washington will not hear of peace unless upon its own terms. As this is not the temper which the lessons of ages have taught us of the Old World, we cannot be expected to sympathize with it. We shall be more apt to observe that "Pride comes before a fall," and to anticipate that the republican despot will only show on a new stage the fate of his legitimist models.

Where, however, advice utterly fails, and is not even taken kindly, a providential instance may be allowed to speak for itself. The great lesson we wish to impress on the Cabinet of Washington is, that litigants are not fit judges of their own quarrel, and will, therefore, if they are wise, take advice, accept umpires, or bow to tribunals. Here is a great and lamentable instance in the quarrel of Denmark with Germany. Let it not be said that Denmark did really avail herself of the good offices of neutrals, for though she did so in form, she still acted for herself, and has suffered the usual consequences. The Americans are only doing what the Danes have done to their cost. It would not be an easy task to arbitrate between the North and South, nor is it to be expected that any possible award will give either satisfaction or avert all dangers. But anything is better than an indefinite prolongation of the war on its present scale. Nor can the war be conducted on a smaller scale, for hitherto its failures have arisen from the deficiency of men, materials and ships at the point of attack. It is never found possible to complete the line, to protect the flank and rear, to keep up the communications, to follow on a temporary advantage, to detach a corps, without entailing an attack at the point weakened; in a word, to keep up the number to the required mark. We ask the wisest statesmen and the best tacticians of Washington whether this will not bring about delusion. So a day will come when Ireland will not shed its blood like water for purely American causes, but will cripple orphans and widows, fields filled by women, and trade passing into the hands of newly arrived foreigners, will be a terrible comment on the successive calls for millions. A generation will come that will say it had no hand in the war, it is not act of theirs, it is the folly of their wrong-headed and obstinate fathers. So they will not fight nor will they pay for the fighting. To what compromise or submission they will come at last it is not ours to conjecture; but they will one day be glad to accept something that now their souls

CAN THE WAR GO ON?

From the London Morning Post, July 25.

On Monday night Mr. Lindsay inquired it was the intention of the Government, in concert with the other powers of Europe, to use their efforts to bring about a suspension of hostilities in America, and Lord Palmerston replied it, in the present state of things, it was not right that they would be any advantage in such a stop. This induced forces us to ask how long it is real probable that this impracticable, indeed hopeless war will last. Is it at all likely that it will survive the present campaign? It cannot seriously be supposed that the Northerners will go on fighting forever at the cost of national bankruptcy and universal and the desolation of their homes, not only throughout any terrible profit or advantage at present, but even without any prospect of possible benefit in the future. We speak of the desolation of Northern homes, because, as the loss is killed and wounded is at least three times greater than that of the Confederates, there must be not a single family in the Federal States that will have to mourn the death of one or more of its members, or to witness the sad spectacle of a husband, a brother, a son, painfully dragging himself about a cripple for life. Is it credible, it is conceivable, is it even possible, that the Federals should continue such a war much longer? Their doing so really seems to be inconsistent with the nature of man and of things. Man is given to himself systematically for nothing. War cannot be carried on upon national bankruptcy. The sum total of debt which the Federals are piling up like Pelion upon Ossa, must be long fallen with a tremendous crash and bring down all their towers.

The first move of the Confederates in this case was practical and entitled to be considered. It was a request that four of their public men might have a safe conduct to Washington in order to negotiate, not for any definite and one-sided proposition, but for peace, which both sides profess to desire. The reply to this was in Abraham Lincoln's curt style, to the effect that he will not permit the approach of anybody who does not come authorized to agree to the integrity of the Union and the abandonment of slavery. That, of course, is submission, and means that the Cabinet of Washington will not hear of peace unless upon its own terms. As this is not the temper which the lessons of ages have taught us of the Old World, we cannot be expected to sympathize with it. We shall be more apt to observe that "Pride comes before a fall," and to anticipate that the republican despot will only show on a new stage the fate of his legitimist models.

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RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

From the Richmond Examiner.

The capture of Atlanta marks an epoch in the campaign of 1864. The enemy promised himself much by this achievement. He seemed to think that the possession of Atlanta would subdue the South to two additional parts, as completely distinct as the divisions east and west of the Mississippi. He will soon realize his mistake. At Atlanta had a peculiar value derived from the railroads which converged there. But its chief value was lost when the road leading into Eastern and Western Tennessee was cut off at Chattanooga and Knoxville; a thing that was done as long ago as December last. The only special importance which then attached to the place was its being on the most direct line of roads from Richmond to Montgomery. These roads are now blockaded at that point by the enemy; but other roads remain open, and the way is not shut even by railroad communication. The truth is, no particular inland town in Georgia or the interior country, if it embraces no collection of foundries and factories, possesses any vital importance in a military point of view.

The great necessity in Georgia is the preservation of an army capable of making head against Sherman, and prepared to strike a decisive blow if ever he attempts to detach his forces in different directions for the purpose of general occupation and subjugation. The business of a Confederate army there is to watch Sherman and compel him to a cautious concentration of his troops. The situation even in Georgia, the only field in which it presents an unfavorable aspect, is by no means so bad as it appears. The Confederates have a large number of regiments which are continually marching home on the expiry of their term of service, and leaving the armies in the very crisis of a battle; it is evident enough that those who have had no taste of the war will not enter the ranks a second time. Those who have not served may, by the bribe of high bonuses, be kidnapped, by enlisting them when drunk, and other notable American devices, be induced to go forth as food for powder. But at this rate, all the male population having gone through the ordeal either as "hundred days' men" or for a longer term, there will be no inexperienced civilians left to bring within the net of the conscription. This leads to an important conclusion.

Even the civilians themselves, who have had no taste of the realities of war, and have been accustomed to view it on its bright and romantic side, have resisted the draft by force in more than one locality. What then, will be the effect if it is attempted to press trained soldiers who are thoroughly sick of campaigning? There will be another civil war in the North. It has been lightly said that immigrants from the Old World will fill the Northern armies, but this will not bear serious examination. If the North is to be conducted on a smaller scale, for hitherto its failures have arisen from the deficiency of men, materials and ships at the point of attack. It is never found possible to complete the line, to protect the flank and rear, to keep up the communications, to follow on a temporary advantage, to detach a corps, without entailing an attack at the point weakened; in a word, to keep up the number to the required mark. We ask the wisest statesmen and the best tacticians of Washington whether this will not bring about delusion. So a day will come when Ireland will not shed its blood like water for purely American causes, but will cripple orphans and widows, fields filled by women, and trade passing into the hands of newly arrived foreigners, will be a terrible comment on the successive calls for millions. A generation will come that will say it had no hand in the war, it is not act of theirs, it is the folly of their wrong-headed and obstinate fathers. So they will not fight nor will they pay for the fighting. To what compromise or submission they will come at last it is not ours to conjecture; but they will one day be glad to accept something that now their souls

will be lost.

On the other side of the Mississippi the situation is peculiarly favorable. Texas is free from Federal troops; the greater part of Louisiana is in rebellion; Mississippi and Alabama. Even Kentucky has been left unprotected, and the North bank of the Ohio has been threatened. To maintain his long line of communication and make headway into Georgia, he has had to evacuate immense districts of country already overrun, which would have yielded him a thousand times more value than the region of Georgia which he has desolated. Like the dog crossing the stream, he has let go what was substantial to plunge after a shadow. It will cost him more men and money to maintain himself at Atlanta than it would to subjugate and possess any two States which he had occupied, and has now abandoned. If the Confederacy had the election of his policy, it would gladly choose that he should continue his campaign in Georgia rather than employ the same army in many enterprises which she would have infinitely more difficulty in thwarting. If we maintain our army intact, we have but to bide our time and the result will take care of itself. If the season of winter and bad roads sets in, finding Sherman still in Georgia and our own army confronting him in force, we should soon have no reason to regret the loss of Atlanta.

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The situation, though critical, is by no means as dark as some of our contemporaries assert. If the Government at Richmond will but awake to the emergency and send the cavalry which is scattered over Alabama and Mississippi, to the rear of Sherman without delay, we may yet have the pleasure of chronicling the absolute failure of Sherman's campaign, and the capture of a large

portion of the Confederacy.

The situation is critical, that of the enemy is no less so, and it requires but the rapid concentration of our entire cavalry force upon Sherman's line of communication to place the army of the Cumberland in a much more perilous position than the army of Gen. Hood has ever been. Let Forrest, with every cavalryman he can muster in Alabama and Mississippi, strike the enemy's rear between Atlanta and Dalton, and Sherman will be compelled to retreat. Wheeler is interfering with his communications north of Chattanooga, and if Forrest is but ordered to his immediate rear, we may confidently look for the happiest results.—*Morgan Confid.* Sept. 7th.

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