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Mediation of the King of Prussia.

ONE of the objects of Mr. Hammond's mysterious mission is now ascertained. He is at Berlin to solicit the mediation of the king of Prussia with the French Republic in favour of Great-Britain and the House of Austria.

In this mode of suing for peace, as well as in his conduct of the war, Mr. Pitt has again justified that opinion of his capacity which not ourselves alone, but all reflecting men, entertained and pronounced very soon in this contest, and long before the difficulties of our situation began to assume their present alarming aspect; for if there could be one step more humiliating, abject, and unsafe than another for this country to take in its present situation, it is that of endeavoring to open a negotiation for peace through the mediation of the King of Prussia.

For what is the principle of mediation? Two Powers make war upon each other; each contends to be in the right; each casts the blame of aggression upon its adversary; and each proceeds to massacre and plunder the other in the name of justice, humanity, and religion. This is the order of the proceedings. At length, when the earth is purged of some hundred thousands of idle rascals who have very little business in it, when a proper quantity of towns, villages and hamlets are laid in ashes, a just proportion of women and children ripped up alive, and when pestilence and famine have gleaned the refuse of the bayonet and sword, the parties are apt to get sick of war, and to wish for what they call peace. In the course of the dispute, however, each party rather for the sake of imposing upon its friends than of convincing its enemies, has made such a clamor about justice, religion, and humanity, and in other respects has so pledged and committed its own honor upon the event of the contest, that a regard to decency and the reciprocal shame of being the first to speak, obliges them to look around for some neutral power, to whom they may hazard a confession of their mutual folly and absurdity. Thus it is that regular Governments, as happily established among the nations of Europe, first invented the farce called mediation. The neutral power is found, explanations are given to that power, the object of persisting in hostilities is stated, great moderation alerted, and desire is expressed, and authority given, that such matters may be communicated to the adverse party. Critically to invest gate this sort of proceeding, is not our business here. Suffice it that this is the established mode among modern nations; and if it be one which, in any honourable way may lead to peace, that object is too desirable to admit of one stating any unnecessary objections to the adoption of it.

Mediation, however, like every thing else, is subject to laws of its own. There are principles of public policy, known, abroad, and determined, which regulate all modes of proceeding by mediation. As the most invaluable or all the treasures of a nation, namely its honor, is entrusted without reserve or limit to a mediator, the proper choice of a person to fill that office becomes of the very highest consideration and importance. It may happen, as in the case before us, that all the great points of honor and interest we have to discuss with our avowed enemy, are involved in that choice. On these principles the king of Prussia is the very last power in Europe whose mediation Mr. Pitt should have solicited.

The king of Prussia is to be considered in two capacities; and in neither of them is he a neutral power. First, he is an independent sovereign, who, after having been at war with France on principles avowed by him in common with Great Britain, the Emperor, and the Empire, is now connected with

France by a peace which is tantamount to an alliance. Secondly, he is a member of the Germanic constitution, of which the Emperor is the chief.

With regard to the first of these points, it is material that we never suffer the artifices of Mr. Pitt to draw our attention from the original grounds of the confederacy. The motives to war were so various, the component parts of the confederacy so hostile to each other, the factions in the British councils so widely asunder in their respective views, that to keep together the incongruous mass, and discipline in some sort the mixed mob that was to march into France, it was thought necessary to collect all the causes of dispute with her into one general sweeping sentence, and so call the contest "a war for the preservation of civil society." If this description of the war was true at any time, it has been true all along. It is true now. The followers of this doctrine were right in seeing no neutral party; for where there is no medium, there can be no neutrality; and certainly whatever may be the compromises of Mr. Windham and his friends with Mr. Pitt, there can be no medium between the preservation of civil society and its destruction. The confederacy accordingly set out with avowing the principle. No sentiment was heard at first of a less vast and a direful import, than "kill them or they will kill you; he that is not for me is against me"—sentiments once written by our swords in American blood, and walked out afterwards with our own. Their PUBLICISTS asserted the abstract principle. Their ministers, and to the eternal disgrace of the British name, before all others our own, attempted to enforce the practical consequences. If their reasoning was true, Denmark, Sweden, the Swiss republics, Genoa, &c. &c. were justly to be considered in a state of hostility to the confederates, because they did not take up arms against France. In what state would it be just to consider that power, itself forming the cornerstone of the confederacy, itself the provider of the largest army, and the best regular general in Europe, to carry its purposes into effect, itself furnishing the first king who set hostile feet on French territory, proclaiming all its armed inhabitants robbers and rebels, and threatening to deal with them as such?—in what state, we repeat, would be just to consider that power, which, after all such declaration and acts, should suddenly patch up a separate and most advantageous peace with France, just in the very crisis of the fate of Europe; and not merely a peace, but a peace which, by its provisions, gave France all the benefit of an alliance? We will suspend for a moment all reflections on the king of Prussia's mysterious conduct in Champagne, his leaving the Netherlands open to Dumourier's irruption, the almost total inaction of his troops during the whole period of his hostility to France, notwithstanding the 1,200,000l. we sent him and the British commissary worth as much more; we will pass over all these circumstances, great and important as they are, to ask this single question.—in what light was the coalition, upon their own principles, to consider the king of Prussia after the peace of 1794?

Certainly not as a neutral power, for according to them there could be no such thing as neutrality. Certainly not in so favourable a light as those other powers, which, having done nothing to assist France, might be admitted to the benefit of a constructive neutrality. The king of Prussia had done much more. With twelve hundred thousand English guineas in his pocket, he had agreed with France upon a line of demarkation to be maintained by force of their joint arms, against all invaders, be they whom they might; a demarkation which secured to France the possession of the Netherlands, and greatly facilitated the consequent reduction of Holland. In fair truth, then, the king of Prussia, from

the signing of that peace, was to be considered as an enemy; as he certainly would have been treated, only that the confederates were afraid of him.

From a declared enemy therefore, the king of Prussia, becomes in '94, the avowed friend and secret ally of the French republic.—Retiring from his station in the confederacy, he falls back into that of a member of the Germanic constitution, owing obedience to the emperor as his chief, and bound to the defence of that constitution. How he defends it—how he shows his loyalty to its chief—how he manifests his attachment to the Germanic body and the venerated establishment of so many centuries, let his attempt to draw other members of that constitution from their allegiance, when he made his own peace, let his recent seizure of Nuremberg, let the negotiations now carrying on with France about Mayence, Frankfort and Hamburg—let these acts of his truly wise and royal politics speak for themselves.

Of all these acts, the choice of the king of Prussia for a mediator on the part of Great Britain, is a direct confirmation and sanction. It has all the ignominy of a retraction of the whole principle of the war, without its utility. It is casting down the honor and the faith of this proud country, at the feet of that monarch, in order to engage him to cast it in his turn at the feet of the "regicide" directory of France; it is suing for peace, not only in the true spirit and affect of suing, but in its meanest and most abject form; it is suing for it through the medium of a power to whom we owe war and punishment, rather than solicitation and confidence. It is a base trifling with our national faith, because this very monarch whom we are now elevating into the high and powerful office of mediator, is he that in the outset of this desolating contest, has shown his hereditary enmity to the house of Austria, our ally, and let slip no opportunity of aggrandizing himself at its expense.

We know not how these transactions may affect those who two years ago abandoned their friends, and sacrificed, as they say, themselves in order to infuse strength, and inspire ability into Mr. Pitt's administration. The celebrated declaration of Mr. Windham, never will be forgotten. Speaking in the name of the rest, he declared his junction with Mr. Pitt to be, not because he was in want of able assistance—Not because he was honest, but because he ought to have no temptation to be otherwise. But to those from whom unanimity at the present crisis, is so loudly required, the success which has attended Mr. Windham and the duke of Portland, in their attempt to bolster up this wretched and unfortunate minister, should suggest an answer and operate as a warning; an answer derived from the surest of all sources, that of experience—a warning, drawn from the result of that experience, how they trust the last stake of the British empire in the hands of a minister who can neither make war nor peace; and who commences what he will affect to call an honourable negotiation, by a step so disgraceful, more dishonorable, and more dangerous to the future safety and liberties of Europe, than ever entered into the contemplation of the most determined Jacobin in any of the revolutionary societies, whether of England or France.

BELFAST, September 2.

We have the news of the Spaniards declaring war against us, which we are making every preparation for. The country here is in the greatest fermentation, with united Irishmen, and another party, called the Orange men, they are constantly fighting and killing one another. The Orange party are strong for government, and are backed by all despots, who have sworn to extirpate all Catholics. We have nothing here but trou-