

The Old North State

SALISBURY, FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1861.

GOV. GRAHAM ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CONVENTION LAW.

Some of our contemporaries, who differ with us in relation to the constitutionality of the present convention law, have asked us to read the argument of Gov. Graham on the same subject, made in Senate during the session of 1860-61. They could have done so with much more propriety had they been able to show that it was regarded as conclusive at the time. It is the great and convincing argument that some contend it was, why did it not convince the Governor's party friends in the Legislature? No leader of a party ever wielded a greater influence in this State than Gov. Graham at that time did with the Whigs of North Carolina. Yet in spite of all this he was unable to carry him, in favor of his proposed convention, such distinguished Whig lawyers and statesmen as Wm. B. Sheppard, P. H. Winston, Jas. S. Ashe, Thos. S. Ashe, Anderson Mitchell, Archibald H. Caldwell, of Salisbury, James H. Hudnall, Richard H. Smith, and a number of others from all parts of the State. All of these gentlemen believed the bill to be unconstitutional and several of them freely denounced it as revolutionary, notwithstanding the argument of their chief, Gov. Graham. It was not at all conclusive to them, any more than it is to our mind; we have read it and are not surprised that it failed to convince many of those to whom it was addressed. It was completely and fully answered at the time by Mowers, Winston, Fisher, Biggs and others, as well as by the articles of our correspondent CIVIS in January last.

JUDGE BOYDEN.

Some of the papers of the State continue to represent Judge Boyden as favoring the present Convention. This is a great mistake. Mr. Boyden was as strongly in favor of a Convention as any man in the State, if called in a Constitutional manner, and so proclaimed himself both privately and publicly. But his views of the present bill are precisely those of the late Chief Justice Rufus, as expressed in the letter which we published last week, and which will be found in our columns again this week, from that great jurist.

THE YADKIN RAILROAD.

We invite attention to the proceedings of a meeting of the citizens of the counties of Rowan, Anson and Stanly on the 30th ultmo for the purpose of organizing the Board of Commissioners under the Act to incorporate the Yadkin Railroad Company. No more important enterprise to the citizens of this town and county has ever engaged their attention. Upon the building of this road depends the future destiny of Salisbury. Without it she will, in all probability, remain for years to come what she now is—a mere provincial town without any perceptible progress or improvement. With it she will at once start upon a new career of prosperity, and soon become one of the most important inland towns in the State. Build this road and Salisbury will at once become the competing point for freight on the N. C. Road and the one proposed to be built, the advantages of which will be very great to the business of this place. At some future time we will resume the subject.

THERE PLAN WHICH IS MORE AGAINST THE RIGHT THAN THE LEFT FROM THE PLAIN PATH OF DUTY.

This plan, which is more against the right than the left from the plain path of duty. In no election that has ever been held in North Carolina has there been a higher or more important principle involved than in the one now pending. It rises high above all considerations of a mere partisan character—it calls for the highest exercise of patriotism and independence. These qualities are not generally found among politicians, but we believe they still have an existence among the honest people of the country, and that this fact will be shown by the result of the vote in August next. This cry of "radicalism" is but the old cry of "stopple" that will never cease to be heard while human nature remains what it now is. The people will remember that if opposition to the present convention scheme is radical in then Chief Justice Ruffus, Gov. Bragg, Gov. Reid, P. H. Winston, Anderson, Mitchell, Charles F. Fisher, A. H. Caldwell, Thomas S. Ashe, Wm. B. Sheppard, R. H. Smith, and numerous others were radicals in 1854 or since. They will be deceived by no such cry. The editor of this paper, at least, will pass it by as the idle wind and regard it not. He has stood erect in the ranks of greater storms than the present, and he will not quail now, when other others may do.

THE SENTINEL AND THE SEA TURTLE.

A man on the ears was recently bitten by a sea turtle. The Raleigh *Sentinel*, whose capacity is such that it delights to deal in questions of the greatest possible magnitude, asks a number of contemporaries who are responsible for the damage—the man who was shipping it, the man to whom it was consigned, the Railroad Company or the turtle. It then says it would like to hear from Bro. Hailes on the Constitutional question?

As it is a part of our nature always to be accommodating we have taken the pains to look somewhat into the matter, for the *Sentinel's* gratification. We can find nothing in the Constitution of the State, or of the United States, or in the recent amendments thereto, accepted by the *Sentinel* as law, authorizing or empowering the turtle to bite any one—there is no such delegation of power to turtles in either instrument. On the other hand we can find nothing in either instrument, or in the amendments thereto, forbidding the exercise of such power by the turtle. Thus, according to the rule of construction adopted by the *Sentinel* and followers, would be *conclusive* of the turtle's right to bite the man, and no one would be responsible for the damage.

As the *Sentinel* well knew that we did

not accept of its rule of construction, or it would not have called on us for our opinion. We can see nothing in the constitution allowing any such powers to the turtle. We do, however, find that certain individual and personal rights are held to be *indefeasible*, and that among these are "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness." From this we conclude that the turtle had a right to bite the man in self-defence. The whole question, then, turns upon this point: Did the man in any such hostile demonstration against the turtle as might reasonably have raised in the mind of his turtleish bosom apprehensions that his life was endangered? If so we think the turtle had a constitutional right to bite the man, otherwise not. But this latter point, turning wholly upon a question of fact, is not within the province assigned us by the *Sentinel*. It is a question for the jury, which jury the *Sentinel* sends upon the facts the *Sentinel* will be able to announce our decision upon the constitutional question to its readers, and it is hereby authorized to do so.

Hon. D. M. BARRINGER has written a letter in favor of the pending convention. We will publish it with comments before the election, as well as the opinion of Mr. Moore. We are not afraid to let our readers see both sides.

Will any of those editors who advocate the convention publish any of the arguments on the other side? Will any of those papers that excused Judge Ruffin's letter to the skies, as setting forth the only "true" constitutional doctrines in 1860, republish it now? Will they even remind their readers of the existence of such letter and the purport of it? None of them have done so yet; whether any of them will do so or not remains to be seen. They will find a correct copy of so much of it as contains the argument in this issue of our paper.

JUSTICE.

CHIEF JUSTICE RUFFIN ON THE MODE OF CALLING A CONVENTION.

Under date of July the 2nd 1860, the late

Chief Justice Ruffin wrote a long letter to a member of that body, discussing the powers of the convention of 1860. We present below all of that part of his letter in relation to the manner in which a convention of the people must be called under the constitution of this State. It is clear, unequivocal and to the point. The eminent Chief Justice had no doubt whatever at the revolutionary character of a convention called after the manner in which the present is attempted to be called. This will be almost universal y admitted to be the very highest authority that can be cited on either side in the pending contest, and will, we believe, have more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is obvious, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid down in the Rhode Island case, in order to avoid popular commotions, evolution, and uncertainty, to what the constitution can render more weight than any other.

We have italicized certain portions of the letter bearing more closely on the question now under discussion:

"You will perceive, that I have hitherto discussed this subject, as depending on the original and natural rights of our people, unaffected by any provision of our pre-existing constitution; and, even on that basis, I deny the authority of your Convention to make or propose a new or modified form of government for us. But the clause in our constitution, touching its anomalies, or the call for a convention for that purpose, is so clear and so precise against any such convention as we have had, as to put the mind beyond doubt or argument, as it seems to me. Two modes of amending the constitution are provided: One through the agency of the General Assembly, proposing an amendment for ratification by a vote of the people, which need not be considered here; the other, by a Convention called in a manner prescribed in the Constitution, which is the master word for consideration. It is evident, that, in prescribing these two all other modes are excluded by irrefutable inference. In respect to a convention, the words—"No convention of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by a resolution of the same body"—admit of no construction whatever but that of a constitution, which was no doubt, upon the sound principle laid