Whole JVo. 366,
ZVirZorou"-, frf-ecom;e County, X. C.) Tuesday, August 30, 1831,
Vol Fill No 2,
yy "Forth-Carolina Free Press? '
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MR. CALHOUN'S ADDRKSS.
From the Pendleton Messenger.
Mr. Symmcs: I must request
you to permit me to use your
columns, as the medium to
make known my sentiments on
the deeply important question
of the relation which the Stales
and General Government bear
to each other, and whieh is, at
this lime, a subject of so much
agitation.
It is one of the peculiarities
of the station I occupy, that
while it necessarily connects its
incumbent with the politics of
the day, it affords him no oppor
tunity, officially, to express his
sentiments, except accidentally
on an equal division of the bo
dy over which he presides. He
is thus exposed, as I have often
experienced, to have his opin
ions erroneously and variously
represented. In ordinary ca
ses, I conceive the correct
course to be, to remain silent,
leaving to time and circumstan
ces the correction of misrepre
sentations; but there arc occa
sions so vitally important, that
a regard both to duty and cha
racter would seem to forbid
such a course; and such I con
ceive to be the present. The
frequent allusions to my senti
ments, will not permit me to
doubt that such also is the pub
lic conception, and that it claims
the right to know, in relation to
the question referred to, the
opinions of those who hold im
portant official stations; while,
on niy part, desiring to receive
neither unmerited praise nor
blame, I feel, I trust, the solici
tude which every honest and in
dependent man ought, that
my sentiments should be truly
known, whether they be such as
may be calculated to recom
mend them to public favor or
not. Entertaining these im
pressions, I have concluded
that it is my duty to make
known my sentiments; and 1
have adopted the mode which,
on reflection, seemed to be the
most simple, and best calcula
ted to effect the object in view.
The question of the relation
which the States and General
Government bear to each other,
is not one of recent origin.
From the commencement of our
system, it has divided public
sentiment. Ever, jn tne Con
vention, while the Constitution
was struggling into existence,
there were two parties, as to
what this relation should be,
whose different sentiments con
stituted no small impediment in
forming that instrument. After
the General Government went
into operation, experience soon
proved that the question had
not terminated with the labors
of the Convention. The great
struggle that preceded the poli
tical revolution ot 1801, which
brought Mr. Jefferson into pow
er, turned essentially on it: and
the doctrines and arguments on
both sides were embodied and
ably sustained; on the one, in
the Virginia and Kentucky re
solutions and the report to the
Virginia Legislature; and on
the other,, in the replies of the
Legislature of Massachusetts
and some of the other States.
These resolutions and this re
port, with the decision of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylva
nia about the same time, (par
ticularly in the case of Cobbett,
delivered by Chief Justice M'
Kean, and concurred in by the
whole bench,) contain what 1
believe to be the true doctrine
on this important subject. 1
refer to them in order to avoid
the necessity of presenting my
views, with the reasons in sup
port ot them in detail.
As my object is simply to
state rny opinions, 1 might pause
with this reference to docu
ments that so fully and ably
state all the points immediately
connected with this deeply im
portant subject, but as there are
many who may not have the op
portunity or leisure to refer to
them, and, as it is possible,
however clear they may be, that
different persons may place dif
ferent interpretations on their
meaning, I will, in order that
my sentiments may be fullv
known, and to avoid all ambi -
guity, proceed to state, summit-!
uii; uu.iuuea tviuuii i uon-
ceive they embrace.
Tho great anil leading prin-
ciple is, that the General Gov- sive right to judge of its pow
ernment emanated from the ers, is to make "its discretion
people of the several States,
forming distinct political com-
munilies, and acting in their se-
parate and sovereign capacity,
and not from all of the people
forming one aggregate political
community; that the Const ilu- ration, as of the mode andmcasure
tion of the United States is in of redress.'1 Language cannot
fact a compact, to which each .be more explicit; nor can high
State is a party, in the charac-jer authority be adduced.
ter already described; and that That different opinions are
the several States or parties, entertained on this subject, 1
have a right to judge of its in-consider but as additional ef
fractions, and in case of a deli-jdence of the great diversity of
berate, palpable, and danger- the human intellect. Had not
ous exercise of power not dele- able, experienced, and patriotic
mvM, uuu uu; nyiu, in
tiie last resort, to use the lang-
uage of the Virginia resolutions,
"o interpose for arresting the pro-
ing, within their1 respective limits,
the authorities, rightsund liberties
appertaining to them.11 This
right of interposition thus so
lemnly asserted bv the State of
Virginia, be it called what it
may, State right, veto, uullifica-conscientious examination, I
tion, or by any other name, I; have not been able to detect it.
conceive to be the fundamental But with all proper deference, 1
principle of our system, resting1 must think that theirs is the cr
uii facts historically as certain ror, who deny what seems to
as our revolution itself, and do-jbe an essential attribute of the
ductions as simple and demon-! conceded sovereignty of the
strativc as that of any political States, and who attribute to the
or moral truth whatever; and I General Government a right ut
firmly believe that on its recog-iterly incompatible with what all
uition depends the stability and
afety of our political institu
tions.
I am not ignorant that those
opposed to the doctrine have al
ways, now and formerly, regar
ded it in a very different light,
is anarchical and revolutionary.
Could I believe such in fact to
be its tendency, to me it would
be no recommendation. 1 vield
to none, I trust, in a deep arid
sincere attaclurient to our poli
tical institutions, and the union
of these States. 1 never brea
thed an opposite sentiment;
but, on the contrary, I have ev
er considered them the great
instruments of preserving our
liberty, and promoting the hap
piness of ourselves and our pos
terity; and next to these, I have
ever held them most dear.
Nearly half my life has passed
in the service of the Union, and
whatever public reputation 1
have acquired, is indissolubly
identified with it. To be too
national has, indeed, been con
sidered by many, even of my
friends, to be my greatest poli
tical fault. With these strong
feelings of attachment, I have
examined, with the utmost care,
the bearing of the doctrine in
question; and so far from anar
chical, or revolutionary, 1 sol
emnly believe it to be the only
solid foundation of our system,
and of the Union itself, arid that
the opposite doctrine, which
denies to the States the right of
protecting their reserved pow
ers, and which would vest in the
General Government, (it mat
ters not through what depart
ment) the right of determining
exclusively and finally the pow
ers not delegated to it, is in
compatible with the sovereign
ty of the States, and of the Con
stitution itself, considered as the
basis of a federal Union. A
strong as this language is. it is
not stronger than that used by
11115 IMUSIIIOIJS JOIIC'ISOn, WHO
said, to give to the General Go-
vernment the final and exclu-
and not the Constitution the
measure of its powers;'1 and that
-un all cases of compact between
parties having no common judge,
each party has an equal right to
htdzc for itself, as well of fhr. nnr-
l iiu I v i (.1 o uio, ior wuocri i nave
the highest respect, taken differ
ent views, 1 wouhi have thought
the right too clear to admit of
doubt; but I am taught by this,
as well as by many similar in
stances, to treat with deference
opinions differing from my own.
The error may possibly be with
me; but, it so, I can only say,
that after the most mature and
acknowledge to be its limited
and restrictive character: ah er
ror originating principally, as I
must think, in not duly reflect
ing on the nature of our institu
tions, and on what constitutes
the only rational object of all
political constitutions.
It has been well said by one
of the most sagacious men of
antiquity, that the object of a
constitution is to restrain the
government, as that of laics is
to restrain individuals. The
remark is correct, nor is it less
true where the Government is
vested in a majority, than where
it is in a single or a few indivi
duals; in a republic, than a
monarchy or aristocracy. No;
one can have a higher respect
for tiie maxim that the majority
ought to govern, than I have,
taken in its proper sense, sub
ject to the restrictions imposed
by the constitution, and confi
ned to subjects in which every
portion of the community have
similar interests; but it is a great
error to suppose, as many do,
that the right of a majority to
govern is a natural and not a
conventional right; and, there
fore, absolute and unlimited.
By nature every individual has
the right to govern himself; and
governments, whether founded
on majorities or minorities, must
derive their right from the as
sent, expressed or implied, of
the governed, and be subject to
such limitations as they may
impose. Where the interests
are the same, that is, where the
laws that may benefit one, will
benefit all, or the reverse, it is
just and proper to place them
under the control of the majori
ty; but where they are dissimi
lar, so that the law that may be
nefit one portion may be ruin
ous to another, it would be, on
the contrary, unjust and absurd
to subject them to its will; and
such I conceive to be the theory
on which our constitution rests.
That such dissimilarity of in
terests may exist, it is impossi
ble to doubt. They are to be
found in every community, in a
greater or less degree, however
small or homogeneous, and they
constitute, every where, the
great difficulty of forming, and
preserving free institutions. To
guard against the unequal ac
tion of the laws, when applied
to dissimilar and opposing inte
rests, is, in fact, what mainly
renders a constitution indispen
sable; to overlook which, in
reasoning on our Constitution,
would be to omit the principal
element by which to determine
its character. Where there no
contrariety of interests, nothing
wrould be more simple ami easy
than to form and preserve free
institutions. The right of suf
frage alone would be a suffi
cient guaranty. It is the con
flict of opposing interests which
renders it the most difficult
work of man.
Where the diversity of inte
rests exist in separate and dis
tinct classes of the community,
as is the case in England, and
was formerly the case in Sparta,
Rome and most of the free
States of antiquity, the rational
constitutional provision is, that
each should be represented in
the Government as a separate
estate, with a distinct voice, and
a negative on the acts of its co
estates, in order to check their
encroachments. In England
the constitution has assumed
expressly this form; while in
the governments of Sparta and
Rome the same thing was effec
ted under different but not much
less efficacious forms. The
perfection of their organization,
in this particular, was that
which gave tp the constitutions
of these renowned States oil of
their celebrity, which secured
lheir liberty for so many centu
ries, and raised them lb so great
a height of power and prosperi
ty. Indeed, a constitutional pro
vision giving to the great arid
separate interests of the com
munity the right of self protec
tion, must appear to those who
will duly reflect on the subject,
not less essential to the preser
vation of liberty than the right
of suffrage itself. They in fact
have a common object, to effect
which the one is as necessary
as the other to secure respon
sibility; that is, that those icho
make and execute the laws shodd
be accountable to those on whom
the laics in reality operate; the on
ly solid and durable foundation
of liberty. If without the right
of suffrage, our rulers would op
press us, so, without the right of
self protection the major would
equally oppress the minor inte
rests of the community. The
absence of the former would
make the governed the slaves of
the rulers, and of the latter, the
feebler interests the victim of
the stronger.
Happily for us we have no
artificial and separate classes of
society. We have wisely ex
ploded all such distinctions; but
we are not, on that account,
exempt from all contrariety of
interestsias the present distrac
ted and dangerous condition of
our country but too clearly
proves With us they are al
most exclusively geographical,
resulting mainly from difference
of climate, soil, situation, indus
try and production, but are not,
therefore, less necessary to be
protected by an adequate con
stitutional provision, than where
the distinct interests exist in se
parate classes. The necessity
is, in truth, greater, as such se
parate and dissimilar geogra
phical interests are more liable
to come into conflict, and more
dangerous when in that state,
than those of any other descrip
tion; so much so that ours is the
first instance on record, where
they have notjormed in an ex
tensive territory, separate and
independent communities, or
subjected the ichole to despotic
sicay. That such may not be
our unhappy fate, also, must bo
the sincere prayer of every lov
er of his country.
So numerous and diversified
are the interests of our country,
that they could not be fairly re
presented in a single govern
ment, organized so as to give to
each great and leading interest,
a separate and distinct voice,
as in the governments to which
I have referred. A plan was
adopted better suited to our sit
uation, but perfectly novel in its
character. The powers of the
government were divided, not
as heretofore, in reference to
classes, but geographically.
One General Government was
formed for the whole, to which
was delegated all of the powera
supposed to be necessary to re
gulate the interests common to
all of the States, leaving others
subject to the separate control
of the States, being from their
local and peculiar character,
such that they could not be sub
ject to the will of the majority
of the whole Union, without the
certain hazard of injustice and
oppression. It was thus that
the interests of the whole were