) hole Jtt. 071
Tarborough, (Edgecombe County, JV. C.J Saturday, September 23,
1837-
Vol. XIII JVb.
88,
j The "Tarbormtgli Pres.?,"
i BV GEORGE HOWARD.
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PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.
fellow-Citizens of the Senate
and House of Representatives:
(concluded.)
I The difficulties heretofore exist
ing are, moreover, daily lessened
I by an increase in the cheapness Si
jby facility of communication; and
j it may be asserted with confidence,
j that llie necessary transfers, as w ell
as the safe-keeping and disburse
ments of the public moneys, can
!be with safety and convenience ac
complished through the agencies
I of Treasury officers. This opin
I ion lias been, in some degree, con
I firmed by actual experience since
4 the discontinuance of the banks as
j fiscal agents, in May last; a period
which, from the embarrassment?
li:i commercial intercourse, pre
jsented obstacles as great as any
jthat may be hereafter apprehend
l td.
J The manner of keeping the pub-
lie money since that period, is ful
1 1) stated in the report of the Sec
J retary of the Treasury. That of-
j ficer also suggests the propriety of
; assigning, by law, certain a.ddi
' tioual duties to existing establish
i mentsand officers, which, with the
; modifications and safe-guards re
ferred to by him, will, he thinks,
e&tble the Department to continue
I to perforin this branch of the ptib
i lie service without any material
addition either to their number or
to the present expense. The ex
I tent of the business to be transact
i td has already been stated; and in
! respect to the amount of money
' with which the officers employed
would be entrusted at any one
1 time, it appears that, assuming a
i balance of five millions to be at all ,
; limes kept in the Treasury, and
then hole of it left in the hands of
j the collectors and receivers, the
j rroportion of each would not ex-
teed an average of thirty thousand
dollars; but that, deducting one
million for the use of the mint, and
f assuming the remaining four mil-j
j lions to be in the hands of one-j
j ba'f of the present number of ofii
1 ters a supposition deemed more
likely to correspond with the fact
I the sum in the hands of each
Huld still be less than the a
j Mount of the bonds now taken
' from the receivers of public mon
I ey. Every apprehension, howev
I tr on the subject, either in respect
j ,0 the safety of the money, or the
J faithful discharge of these fiscal
j transactions, may, it appears to
j be effectually removed by ad
j !'l!g to the present means of the
j Treasury the establishment, by
j taw, at a few important points, of
j offices for the deposite and dis
i bursement of such portions of the
I public revenue as cannot, with ob
j Vious safety and convenience, be
'"tin llie possession of the collec
ts officers until paid over by
Jjjem to the public .creditors.
Neither the amounts retained in
eir hands, nor those deposited
111 the offices, would, in an ordina
Jy condition of the revenue, be
ldrger in most cases than those bf
!ei,under the control of disburs
,US officers of the Army and Na-
' ad might be made entirely
le, by requiring such securities,
a,,d exercising such controlling
Supervi.siou, as Congress may by
;,w prescribe. The principal of-
ers whose appointments would
become necessary under this plan,
me largest number sug
gested by the Secretary of tht
Treasury, would not exceed ten;
nor the additional expenses, at tht
same estimate, sixty thousand dol
lars a year.
There t an be no doubt of the
obligation of those who are en
trusted with the affairs of Govern
ment, to conduct1 them with as lit
tle cost to the nation as is consist
ent with the public interest; and it
is for Congress, and ultimately
for the people, to decide whether
the benefits to be derived from
keeping our fiscal concerns apart,
and severing the connection which
has hitherto existed between the
Government and banks, offer suf
ficient advantages to justify the
necessary expenses. If the object
to be accomplished is deemed im
portant to the future welfare of the
country, I cannot allow myself to
believe that the addition to the
public expenditure of compara
tively so small an amount as will
be necessary to effect it, will be
objected to by the people.
It will be seen by the report ofj
the I osttnaster General, herewith
communicated, that the fiscal af
fairs of that Department have
been successfully conducted since
Alay last upon the principle of
dealing only in the legal currency
of the United Slates, and that it
needs no legislation to maintain
its credit, and facilitate the man
agement of us concerns; the ex
isting laws being, in the opinion
of that officer, ample for those ob
jects. Difficulties will doubtless be
encountered for a season, and in
creased services required from the
public functionaries; such are usu
ally incident - to the commence
ment of every .system, but they
will be greatly lessened in the
progress of its operations.
The power and influence sup
posed to be connected with the
custody and disbursement of tht;
public money, are topics on which
the public mind is naturally and,
with great propiiety, peculiarly
sensitive. Much has been said on
them, in reference to the propo
sed separation of the Government
from the banking institutions; and
surely no one can object to any
appeals or animadversions on the
subject, which are consistent with
facts, and evince a proper respect
for the intelligence of the people.
If a Chief Magistrate may be al
lowed to speak for himself, on
such a point, 1 can truly say,
that to me nothing would be more
acceptable, than the withdrawal
from the Executive, to the great
est practicable extent, of all con
cern in the custody and disburse
ment of the public revenue; not
that I would shrink from any res
ponsibility cast upon me by the
duties of my office, but because it
is my firm belief, that its capacity
for usefulness is in no degree pro
moted by the possession of any
patronage not actually necessary
to the performance of those du
ties. But under our present form
of Government, the intervention
of the Executive officers in the
custody and disbursement of the
public money seems to be una
voidable; and before it can be ad
mitted that the influence and pow-
.i i7 t..n. ..mulct a lit
er OI Hie HiACCUIIVC "uiu
increased by dispensing with the
agency of banks, the nature of
that intervention in such an agen
cy must be carefully regarded,
and a comparison musi oe iumu-
ted between its extent in the two
cases. ...
The revenue can only be col
lected by officers appointed by the
President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 1 he pub
lic moneys, in the first instance,
must, therefore, in all cases, , pass
through hands selected by the
Executive. Other officers ap
pointed in the same way, or, as in
some cases, by the President a-
(Ione, must also be entrusted with
them when drawn for the purpose
of disbursement. It is thus seen
that, even when banks are employ
ed, the public funds must twice
pass thro' the hands of Executive
officers. Besides this, the head
of the Treasury Department, who
also holds his office at the plea
sure of the President, and some
other officers of the same depart
ment, must necessarily be invested
with more or less power in the se
lection, continuance, and supervi
sion, of the banks that may be em
ployed. The question is then
narrowed to the single point, whe
ther, in the intermediate stage be
tween the collection and disburse
ment of the public money, the a
gency of Banks is necessary to
avoid a dangerous extension of the
patronage and influence of the
Executive? But is it clear that
tbe connection of the Executive
with powerful moneyed institu
tions, capable of ministering to
the interests of men in points
where they are most accessible to
corruption, is less liable to abuse,
thau his constitutional agency in
the appointment and control of
the few public officers required by
the proposed plan? Will the pub
lie money, when in their hands, be
necessarily exposed to any impro
per interference on the part of the
Executive? May it not be hoped
that a prudent fear of public jeal
ousy and disapprobation, in a mat
ter so peculiarly exposed to them,
will deter him from any such inter
ference, even if higher motives be
found inoperative? May not Con
gress so regulate, by law, the du
ty of those officers, and subject it
to such supervision and publicity,
as to prevent the possibility of any
serious abuse on the part of the
Executive? and is there equal
room lor such
publicity in a
supervision and
connection with
banks, acting under the shield of
corporale immunities, and con- Nation of this principle, have de
ducted by persons irresponsible to clared, by law, that if notes are
the Government and the people? paid in the transactions of the Go-
It is believed that a considerate
and candid investigation of these
questions will result in the convic
tion, that the proposed plan is far !
less liable to objection, on llie
score of Executive patronage and
control, than any bank agency
that has been, or can be, devised.
With these views, I leave to mediately given to prevent the re
Congress the measures necessary ception into the Treasury of any
to regulate, iu the present emer-j thing but gold and silver or its
gency, the safe keeping and trans- J equivalent; and every practicable
fer of the public moneys.. In the j arrangement was made to preserve
performance of constitutional du-! public faith, by similar or equiva
ty, I have slated to them, without! lent payments to the public credi
reserve, the result of my own re-1 tors. The revenue from lands
flections. The subject is of great j bad been for some time substanti
importance; and one on which we 1 ally o collected, under the order
can scarcely expect to be as united ! issued by the directions of my pre
in sentiment as we are in interest, decessor. The effects of that or
It deserves a full and free discin-der had been so-salutary, and ils
sion,
and cannot fail to be benefit-
led by a dispassionate compari
son of opinions. Well aware my
self of the duty of reciprocal con
cession among the co-ordinate
branches of the Government, I can
promise a reasonable spirit of co
operation, so far as it can be indul
ged in without the surrender of
constitutional objections, which I
believe to be well founded. Any
system that maybe adopted should
be subjected .to the fullest legal
provision, so as to leave nothing
to the Executive but what is ne
cessary to the discharge of the du
ties imposed on him; and whatev
er plan may be ultimately estab
lished, my" own part shall be so
discharged as to give to it a fair
trial, and the best prospect of suc
cess. The character of the funds to be
received and disbursed in the
transactions of the Government,
likewise demands jour most care
ful consideration.
There can be no doubt that
those who framed and adopted
the Constitution, having in imme
diate view the depreciated paper
of the Confederacy of which five
hundred dollars in paper were, at
times, only equal to one dollar in
coin intended to prevent the re
currence of similar evils, so far at
least as related to the transactions
of the new Government. They
gave to Congress express powers
to coin money, and to regulate the
value thereof, and of foreign coin;
they refused to give it power to
establish corporations the a
gents, then as now, chiefly em
ployed to create a paper curren
cy; they prohibited the States
from making any thing but gold
find silver a legal tender in pay
ment of debts; and the .first Con
gress directed, by positive law,
that the revenue should be receiv
ed in nothing but gold and silver.
Public exigency at the outset of
the Government, without direct le
gislative authority, led to the use
of banks as fiscal aids to the Trea
sury. In admitted deviation frpm
the law, at the same period, and
unu"5 lue same exigency, the Sec
retary x)f the Treasury received
their notes in payment of duties.
The sole grouud on which the
practice, thus commenced, was
then, or has since, been justified,
is the certain, immediate, and con-
venient exchange of such notes
for specie. The Government did
indeed receive the inconvertible
notes of State banks during the
difficulties of war; and the com
munity submitted without a mur
mur to the unequal taxation and
multiplied evils of which such a
course was productive. With the
war, this indulgence ceased, and
the banks were obliged again to
redeem their notes in gold and sil
ver. The Treasury, in accord
ance with previous practice, con
tinued to dispense with the curren
cy required by the act ol 17b'J,
and took the notes of banks in full
: conudence ol tneir being paid in
specie on demand; and Congress,
to guard against the slightest vio-
vernment, it must be under such
circumstances as to enable the
holder to convert them into specie
without depreciation or delay.
Of my own duties under the ex
isting laws, when the banks sus
pended specie payments, I could
not doubt. Directions were im-
forecast in regard to the increas-
ing insecurity of bank paper had
become so apparent, that, even
before the catastrophe, I had re
solved not to interfere with its op
eration. Congress is now to de
cide, whether the revenue "'shall
continue to be sq collected or not.
The receipts into the Treasury,
of bank notes, not redeemed in
specie on demand, will not, I pre
sume, be sanctioned. It would
destroy, without the excuse of war
or public distress, that equality of
imposts and identity of commer
cial regulation, which lie at the
foundation of our confederacy,
and .would offer to each State a
direct temptation to increase its
foreign trade by depreciating the
currency received for duties in its
ports. Such a proceeding would
also, in a great degree, frustrate
the policy, so highly cherished, of
infusing into our circulation a lar
ger portion of the precious met
als; a policy, the w isdom of which
none can doubt, though there may
be different opinions as to the ex
tent to which it should be carried.
Its results have been already too
auspicious, and iis success is too
closely interwoven with the future
prosperity of the country, to per
mit us for a moment to contem
plate its abandonment. We have
seen, under its influence, our spe
cie augmented beyond eighty mil
lions; our coinage increased so as
to make that of gold amount, be
tween August, 1834, and Decem
ber, 183G, to ten millions of dol
lars; exceeding the w hole coinage
at the Mint during the thirty-one
previous years.
The prospect of further im
provement continued without a
batement until the moment of the
suspension of specie payments.
This policy has now, indeed, been
suddenly checked, but is still far
from being overthrown. Amidst
all conflicting theories, one posi
tion is undeniable: the precious
metals will invariable disappear
when there ceases to be a necessi
ty for their use as a circulating
medium. It was in strict accord
ance with this truth, that whilst, in
the month of May last, they were
every where seen, and were cur
rent for all ordinary purposes,
they disappeared from circulation
the moment the payment of spe
cie was refused by the banks, and
the community tacitly agreed to
dispense with its employment.
Their place was supplied by a cur
rency exclusively of paper, and, in
many cases, of the worst descrip
tion. Already are the bank notes
now in circulation greatly depreci
ated, and they fluctuate in value
between one place and another;
thus' diminishing and making un
certain the worthtof properly and
the price of labor, and failing to
subserve, except at a heavy loss,
the purposes of business. With
each succeeding day the metallic
currency decreases; by some it is
hoarded in the unnatural fear, that
once parted with, it cannot be re
placed; while by others it is di
verted from its more legitimate
uses, for the sake of gain. Shoyld
Congress sanction this condition
of things, by making irredeema
ble paper money receivable in
payment of public dues, a teqipo
rary check to a wise and salutary
policy will, in all probability, be
converted into its absolute des
truction. It is true that bank notes actu
ally convertible into specie may
be received in payment of the re
venue, without being liable to all
these objections, and that such a
course may, to some extent, pro
mote individual convenience; an
object always to be considered
w here it does not conflict with the
principles of our Government or
the general welfare of the coun
try. If such notes only were re
ceived, and always under circum
stances allowing their early pre
sentation for payment, and if, at
short and fixed periods, they were
converted into specie, to be kept
by the officers of the Treasury,
some of tbe most serious obstacles
to their reception would perhaps
be removed. To retain the notes
in the Treasury would be to re
new, under another form, the
loans of public money to the
banks, and the evils consequent
thereon.
It is, however, a mistaken im
pression, that any Urge amount
of specie is required for public
payments. Of the seventy or
eighty millions now estimated to
be in the country, ten millions
would be abuudantly sufficient for
that purpose, provided an accu
mulation of a large amount of re
venue, beyond the necessary wants
of the Government, be hereafter
prevented. If to these considera
tions be added the facilities which
will arise from enabling the Trea
sury to satisfy the public credi
tors, by its drafts or notes receiv
ed in payment of the public dues,
it may be safely assumed that no
motive of convenience to the citi
zen requires the reception of bank
paper.
To say that the refusal of paper
money by the Government, intro
duces an unjust discrimination be
tween the currency received by it,
and that used by individuals in
their ordinary affairs, is, in my
judgment, to view it in a very er
roneous light. The Constitution
prohibits the States from making
any thing but gold and silver a
tender in ihe payment of debts,
and thus secures to every citizen
a right to demand pavment in the
legal currency, 'i'o provide by
law that the Government will on
ly receive its dues in gold and sil
ver, is not to confer on it any pe
culiar privilege; but merely to
place it on an equality with the
citizen, by reserving to it a right
secured to him by the. Constitu
tion. It is doubtless for this rea
son that the principle has been
sanctioned by successive laws,
from the time of the first Con
gress under the Constitution down
to the last. Such precedents, ne
ver objected to and proceeding
from such sources, afford a deci
sive answer to ;the imputation of
inequality or injustice.
But, in fact, the measure is one
of restriction, not of favor. To
forbid the public agent to receive
in payment any other than a cer
tain kind of money, is to refuse
him a discretion possessed by ev
ery citizen.' It may be left to
those who have the management
of their own transactions, to make
their own terms; but no. such dis
cretion should be given to him
who acts merely as an agent of
the people, who is to collect what
the law requires, and to pay tire
appropriations it makes. . When
bank notes are redeemed on de
mand, there is then no discrimina
tion in reality, for the individual
who receives them may, at his op
tion, substitute the specie for them;
he lakes, them from convenience
or choice. When they are not so
redeemed, il,will scarcely be con
tended that their receipt and pay
ment, by a public officer, should
be permitted, though none 'deny:
that right to an individual; if it
were, the effect would be most in
jurious to the public, since their
officer could make none of those
arrangements to meet or guard
against the depreciation, which an
individual is at liberty to do. ftor.
can inconvenience to the commu
nity be alleged as an objection to
such a regulation. Its object and
motive are their convenience and
welfare.
If, at a moment of simultaneous
and unexpected suspension by the
banks, it adds something to the
many embarrassments of that pro-,
ceeding, yet these are far overba
lanced by its direct tendency to
produce a wider circulation of
gold and silver, to increase the
safely of bank paper, to improve
the general currency, and thus to
prevent altogether such occurren
ces, and the other and far greater
evils that attend them.
It may, indeed, be questioned,
whether it is not fo'r the interest of
the banks themselves that the Go
vernment should not receive their
paper. They would be conduct
ed with more caution and on soun
der principles. By using specie,
only in its transactions, the Gov
ernment would create a demand
for it, w hich would, to a great ex
tent, prevent its exportation, and,
by keeping it in circulation, main
tain a safer and broader basis for
the paper currency. Thai the
banks would thus be rendered
more sound, and the community
more safe, cannot admilof a doubt.
The foregoing views, it seems
to me, do but fairly carry out ihe
provisions of the Federal Consti
tution in relation to tbe -currency,
as far as relates to the public reve
nue. At (he time that instrument
was framed, there were but three
or four banks in the United Slate;
and had ihe extension of the ban
king system, and the evils grow ing
hi
" :I