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D hole No. 681.
ZYir&orou"-, (Edgecombe County, N. C.) kalnrday, March 31, 1838.
Vol. XIV No. 13.
The Tarborough Press,
BY GEORGE HOWARD,
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! Independent Treasury MIL
I SPEECH OF MR. BROWN,
OF NORTH CAROLINA.
In Senate, Feb. 23, 1833. Upon the bill
to "impose additional duties, as deposi
taries, upon certain public officers, to
appoint Receivers General of public
money, and to regulate the safe-keep-I
ing, transfer and disbursement, of the
public moneys of the United Stales."
Ilr. BROW T said, when the important
measure, which was then before them, bad,
on a former occasion, been presented for
their consideration, he had then availed
himself of the indulgence of the Senate,
to submit the reasons, which intluenced his
Course, in regard to it. The debate, on
the occasion that he referred to, had been
distinguished, as well by the decorum and
dignity, with vvhicb it bad been conducted,
as by that exhibition of high intellectual
powers, which it bad called forth, on both
sides of the question. In rising, to ad
dress them again, he was very sensible of
bis inadequacy to do justice to a subject so
Weighty in its consequences, and of such
fast extent, that it more and more expand
ed on the "mind's eye,"as we progressed
in its investigation. A subject, involving,
in bis opinion, an issue of no less impor
tance, than the continuance of the right of
the people of this country to self-government,
and the maintenance of our republi
can institutions. With this solemn convic
tion on his mind, feeble as he deemed ids
own abilities, he was emboldened to enter
the lists of debate, to grapple with the
Strong, and to do battle, under a banner
consecrated by the principles of free go
vernment, with what skill be might, and
iviih what power he could.
I lie should do Injustice to his own feel
ings, if he omitted to express the satisfac
tion, which he had derived, from listening
to the able and eloquent address of the Se
nator from Ohio, Mr. Allen, in support
ol the measure uelore them. It was a no
ble defence of a noble cause, and one i
which reflected not less honor on the an
cient State of North Carolina, which gave
Mm hini. limit iho vmimr. nnivprhil. ami
Vigorous Commonwealth, which he now so
honorably represents, in this body. I ten
der him, for it, the homage of my sincere
thanks; and feel confident, if the'ciiizens of
bis native State could have heard his able
defence of their long-cherished principles,
that it would have met from the great body
of them, a warm and hearty response.
If, said Mr. Bi the present administra
tion, and its friends, had loved place more,
nnd Rome less; if they had looked more
to considerations of a character, merely
selfish, atid less to the high and honorable
dictates of elevated public duty; if they
had have bowed down in abject homage
to the banking interests of the country,
and had consented to acknowledge their
mastery over the Government, and the
public will itself, then, most probably,
many denunciations, that had been heard
against them, would havebeen spared, and
their path would have been less beset with
difficulties, than at present. In great emer
gencies, the path which patriotism and
public duty point to, is often difficult and
lugged to tread, while that of a conlrary
character is more inviting, (rom its smooth
and more alluring track. Those who
were now acting as the public agents, in
administering the Government, had cho
sen, in this great crisis, the more stern and
rugged, but the more . honorable, path of
patriotism and official duty. They were
endeavoring to raise the standard of pa
triotism and love of country, above the
mere mercenary considerations of banks
and banking interests. Their measures
tended to reinstate that ancient and noble
spirit of liberty, which, when its principles
were endangered, scorned to calculate con
sequences by the sordid rule of dollars and
cents, lie honored sentiments sucn as
these. He would stand by those who sup
ported them, and was ready to share the
sum? political fate with them, whatever it
might be. The country would stand by
them, unless the period had arrived when
liberty had fallen from her "high estate,"
and the more sordid considerations of gain
had triumphed over the more noble prin
ciples of our nature.
Two great political parlies, said Mr.
B. one of them, occasionally, assuming
different names had divided the people of
this country, from the period when the
convention which framed the present Fe
deral Constitution had assembled. Some
of the leading members of that convention,
who were subsequently called Federalists,
entertained strong doubts of the capacity
of men to govern themselves, and were in
in favor of conferring powers on the Fe
deral Government, entirely at variance
with a popular form, and which would
have made it essentially a monarchy.
Ever distrusting either the honesty or
intelligence of the people, or both, the
believed that they could be governed either
by fraud or force alone. The Republican
party, which constituted the other great
division, believed in the entire competency
of men to govern themselves. They be
lieved that the great majority of the people
possessed. a native sense of justice, which
made them honest, and that they had in
telligence enough to carry out into prac
tice its virtuous impulses, in the manage
ment of public affairs. These leading
characteristics, then, existing between ih
two great parties, and separating them b)
a line plain and broad, had been percepti
ble on all the important public questions
which had, from that time to this, agitated
the country. On the other hand, double
and distrust of the people; on the other,
confidence and an entire belief that they
not only wished to do i ight, but had intel
ligence enough to know and pursue what
was right.
No sooner had the Federal Constitution
gone into operation, than the leading
members of the Federal parly, with that
tact, address, and activity, which had ever
distinguished it in all its mutations, &i under
every variely of name, sought to gain for
the Government, in its practical adminis
tration, all that power which they bad
failed to impart to it in its written Consti
tution. In support of what he had said,
as to the views and designs entertained by
the leading members of that party, he beg
ged permission to read a passage from the
memoirs of Mr. Jefferson, in which he com
ments on the tendency and effect of the
financial system proposed by Gen. Hamil
ton in seventeen hundred and ninety-one,
who was then Secretary of the Treasury.
He says on that subject :
" 1 know well, and so must be under
stood, that nothing like a majority in Con
gress had yielded to this corruption. Far
from ii; but a division, not very unequal,
had already taken place in the honest part
of that body, between the parlies styled
Republican
and r ederal. The latter,
being monarchists in principle, adhered to
Hamilton, of course, as their leader in that
principle: auU tins mercenary pnalaux
added to them, insured nun always a ma
jority in both houses; so that the whole ac
tion of the Legislature was now under the
direction of the Treasury. Still the ma
chine was not complete. The effect of the
funding system and of the assumption
would be temporary, it would be lost, with
the loss of the individual members whom
it had enriched, and some engine of influ
ence more permanent must be contrived,
while these myrmidons were yet in place,
to carry it through all opposition. This
engine was the Bank of the United States.
ll that history is known, so I shall say
nothing about it. While the Government
remained at Philadelphia, a selection of
members of both Houses were constant
ly kept as directors, who, on every ques
tion interesting to that institution, or to
the views of the Federal head, voted at
the will of that head, and together with the
stockholding members, could always make
the Federal vote the majority. By this
combination, legislative expositions were
given to the Constitution, and all the ad
ministrative laws were shaped to the model
of England, and so passed. And from
this influence we were not relieved until
the removal from the precints of the bank
to Washington."
Here, said Mr. B. we have sketched,
with a pencil of light, the motives and
causes which gave rise to that first fatal de
parture of our Government from the prin
ciples and theory of its written Constitu
tion, and which, so far as the machinery
of the entire paper system could influence
its action, had been verging nearer and
nearer the British model spoken of ever
since its origin, unless when checked in
its tendency by the resistance of Republi
can administrations. The liberties of the
country, and its free institutions, were now
literally groaning beneath the accumula
ted weight of banking monopolies, The
prediction, so exultingly uttered by the
younger Pitt, many years ago, that the
funding and paper system would prove fa
tal to our Republic, seems to be on tlu
point of being realized. The measure
proposed by the friends of the Administra
tion, is the only one which can reclaim our
original constitutional rights, stay the
march of this mighty inundation of bank
power and influence, and save the free in
stitutions of the country from being over
whelmed, in its rapid and almost resistless
progress The main objection, which had
been urged by those opposed to it, partook
of that distinctive character, jealousy and
distrust of the people, which he had shown
as belonging to one of the political parties
in this country, in its origin, and in all its
subsequent changes. It was an objection,
which, by denying the existence of suffi
cient honesty and intelligence to the citi
zens of this country to execute its financial
affairs, without the intervention of banking
corporations, went to the competency of
the people to govern themselves. The
great argument on which the capacity of
the people to govern themselves rests, is
their supposed honesty and intelligence.
If public officers cannot be selected from
the great mass of our citizens, who are
both faithful &t capable, then it would seem
to follow, as a necessary consequence, from
this argument, mainly relied on by gentle
men in opposition, that the country was
destitute of those virtues, and of that intel
ligence, indispensable to enable its citizens
to govern themselves. It could not fail,
therefore, to attract our attention, that this
main objection had its origin in the earli
est division of parties in this country,
founded on a distrust of the people, and
had, on all the great leading questions of
policy and construction of the Constitu
tion, been the point at which the two par
lies had almost uniformly separated.
Is is an objection, not only at variance
with the foundation principles of our Go
vernment, which, in its theory, supposes
that its citizens are sufficiently honest and
capable to carry out, in official trusts, all the
powers & duties with which it is charged,
but it is a direct insult to the moral sense
of the country, by declaring, in effect, that
the standard of individual honor, and hon
esty, is below that of banking corporations,
whose course of action is mainly influenced
by motives of cupidity and self-interest.
Mr. B. had heard, with no little surprise,
the measure, contemplated in the bill, de
nounced as fraught with more danger than
any which had been, at any time, proposed
under our Government, and as being more
odious than the alien and sedition law.
This kind of assault had become too com
mon to produce much impression, at this
time of day. It had been the fate of al
most every great measure, no matter hew
much recommended by considerations of
public good, to encounter the same harsh
language; and many of those very mea
sures which had then been met, by much
the same style of denunciation, stood now
as enduring monuments of the public safe
ty, and the public good. Nothing was ea
sier than the use of epithets; but the proof
that they are justly applied, is often more
difficult.
The measure thus denounced was, said
Mr. B. the system of the , Constitution it
self. Whatever difference of opinion may
now exist, as to its policy, yet, in justice
to the Constitution under which we live.
injustice to its patriotic framers, it would
be more becoming to be less liberal in such
abuse, as it is, in effect, but a denunciation
of the Constitution, and arraignment of the
wisdom of those who framed it.
The bill, now under consideration, for
the collecting, safe-keeping, and disbursing
of the public revenue, was, in substance,
but a re-enactment of the principles of the
first law, passed on this s.ubject, in seven
teen hundred and eighty-nine, and imme
diately after the Constitution had gone into
operation, and differed only in the circum
stance, that the present bill is one more in
detail, and more specific, in its provisions.
In fact, a law, similar to this in principle,
was among the first and earliest fruits put
forth by the federal Constitution. How
and under what auspices, the Government
thenjust put intooperation had afterwards
taken, a new departure, with the British
form of Government as its model, and the
paper 6yslem, as the great auxiliary to ef
fect the designs of those who admired it,
lie had already abundantly attempted to
show.
It could not, remarked Mr. B. be believ
ed, for a single moment, either from any
thing on the face of the Constitution, or
from any thing said or written, in the de
bates and essays which preceded its adop
tion, that the agency of banking corpora
tions, in managing the financial affairs of
the Government, ever was intended, or
thought of, by its framers, for a moment
In the Constitution, not a word is said
about corporations of this kind, nor is the
most remote allusion, either expressly or
by implication, made to them. How ut
terly absurd is it now to say, that a power,
the most tremendous in its effects as
great in its consequences, as that to make
peace and war, which has shown itself eiir
dowed with strength, not only sufficient to
shake the frame of society, and throw the
times sadly out of joint, but t cause the
Government itself to totter to its base is
given by implication, in some clause of the
Constitution, which those who claim it are
unable to agree on, among themselves? Is
it not an impeachment of the intelligence
of those who framed that instrument, if
banking corporations are so indispensably
necessary and vital, to the management of
the fiscal affairs of Government, as we are
now daily and hourly told, is the case, that
to power to create and employ them for thai
purpose, was not expressly given in some
of its provisions?
The collecting, safe-keeping, and dis
bursing the public money, is, in each and
all of its successive grades, from beginning
to end, the performance of an official act
and duty, tinder the authority of the Con
stitution of the United States. The kind
of public agents who evidently were in
tended, by the framers of the Constitution,
and who are eynressly designated in its
provisions, to execute the several kinds of
official trusts, are "officers of the United
Slates," in the language of the Constitution.
Unless we adopt the solecism, that a bank
ing corporation means an "officer," in the
sense in which it is there used, it may be
well doubted, whether the Government
has authority to employ them as fiscal
agents, because it is clearly the exercise of
an oihcial power, which the Constitution
limits, according to every sound and fair
rule oQconst ruction, to be executed through
the agency of its own ''officers."
The appointing power is clearly an Ex
ecutive function, under the limitations and
restrictions imposed on it by the Constitu
tion. The second section of that instru
ment is tne source, and only source,
from which the authority of the President,
to make official appointments, is derived,
to that branch of the Government, and is
as follows :
" He shall have power, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena
tors present concur; and he shall nominate,
and by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, shall appoint, ambassadors,
other ministers, and consuls, judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other officers of
the United states, whose appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and
winch shall be established by law. But
the Congress may, by law, vest the ap
pointment of such inferior officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in
the courts of law, or in the heads of de
partmcnts."
Here, then, we have the extent and
breadth of the Executive authority to make
appointments, and, under it, "officers
constitute the only class of public agents
he is authorized to appoint, to execute pub-
lie trusts. If that sound and universally
admitted rule of construction be correct, in
expounding the Constitution, that when a
power is, in express terms, conferred in
that instrument, it is, in effect, a negative
of all other power not given, then it fol
lows that the provision ol the Constitution,
which he had cited, by designating "offi
cers " as tne oliicial a&ents to oe appointed
by the President, to carry into effect the
laws, necessarily excludes from the range
of his selection banking corporations to
perform official duties, because, ex vi ter
mini, they cannot, in the sense of the Con
stitution be considered as "officers." The
receiving, safe-keeping, and disbursing the
public money, is clearly the performance
of an official duty, by whatsoever agency
performed, lo the Executive branch of
the Government belongs, and alone be
longs, under certain restrictions, the power
of appointing official agents, to perform
public trusts. Can he, therefore, appoint
any other than that class of public agents
recognised by the Constitution ?
That the framers of the -Constitution
never once thought of banking corporations
for such agency, and intended for their re
venue and finance laws to be executed by
any other class of agents, except through
the officers of the Government, he believed,
was not only most apparent from that in
strument itself, but that opinion was strong
ly fortified by the doctrines expressed in
the able and orthodox numbers written in
defence, of that instrument by Madison,
Hamilton, and Jay. In those, of the num
bers referred to, which treat of the taxing
and financial powers conferred on the Go
vernment, by the Constitution, no other
description of agents is mentioned or allu
ded to, who were. to carry into effect those
trusts, but officers. . Such was not only
then the construction of the Constitution,
by its friends, but its opponents also, who
were ever on the alert to find objections,
and to magnify its powers, for the purpose
of preventing its adoption, and, on no oc
casion, so far as the essays and debates of
those times inform us, conjectured that
banking corporations were to be employed
as a part of the fiscal machinery of the Go
vernment. If it had, foraWment, been
suspected, by that great master-spirit, in
the Virginia convention, of those who op
posed its adoption, that the Government
was to possess the power thus to enlist in
its aid powerful moneyed corporations, ei
ther of its own creation, or those created
under State authority, his stirring and elo
quent denunciations of the dangers which
it threatened to the public liberty, would,
in all probability, have effected its rejec
tion, and we should not, perhaps, have
now been deliberating here under its sanc
tion. Mr. B. was aware that the great prin
ciples which he now touched, on this sub
ject, had not been much in fashion for
many years past, and that much of the
practice, under the Government, since it
had gone into operation, was in opposition
to them. He considered them as the foun
dation principles of our Government.
which had, for years, been partially ob
scured from public observation, under the
rubbish and antiquated abuses of the Bri
tish paper machinery, that had been intro
duced in this country, at a very early pe
riod, after the Government had gone into
operation. The more that the obscurity
which surrounds them is removed, by dis
cussion and investigation, the more bright :
and valuable these great principles become.
Like a rich and inexhaustible mine, the
more it is explored, the more its valuable
treasures reward the researches of the labo
rer.
Anolher consideration, not less entitled
to weight, in a constitutional point of view,
against depositing the public money with
the banks, is, that, when done, it is with
the perfect understanding, on the part of
the Government, that the money deposi
ted is to form a fund, to make discounts
to individuals on. Such, unquestionably,
has heretofore been one among the leading '
inducements of those who have favored
this policy, in addition to the other objects,
of keeping and disbursing the public reve
nue, contemplated by it. Equally certain
was it, that the banks themselves, who re
ceived it, did it with the perfect under
standing, on their part, that they were at
liberty so to make use of it, and which was,
doubtless, the strongest, if not the only
motive, inducing them to take it. Now
he could not see any authority in the Con
stitution, granting to Congress power to
lend the public money, or to authorize
others to lend it. If Congress could au
thorize the banks lo make loans of the pub
lic money, they could, in virtue of the
same power, authorize the Secretary of the
Treasury to open a loan office with the pub
lic funds, and thus enable an officer, who
chose to use them for corrupt purposes, to
lend them out among favorites, or those,
who might proffer the greatest political
subservience. The Constitution gives to'
Congress the power to raise money, to ef
fect certain specified purposes, which are
enumerated in that instrument. The pow
er to raise money, for the purpose of lend
nig u, ib no wnere given, and, consequent
ly, is not one of the legitimate purposes to
which it may be applied. The conclusion,
then, is very furly to be drawn, thut the
deposite of the public money in banking
corporations, to be used in that way, is an
application of the public money not war
ranted by the Constitution, and, most gen
erally, proving alike disastrous to the indi
viduals borrowing it, the banks which lend
it, and the Government which thus permits
its revenue to be used.
Mr. Brown here replies to observations
made in the speeches of Messrs. Webster,
Rives. Tallmadge, and others, and then re
marks :
In relation to the question of a National
Bank, now no longer kept in the back
ground, in the debate by its friends, as was
formerly the case, there was another ob
jection to it,? in addition to many others,
which had been repeatedly urged in de
bate, that had not been adverted to, that
was entitled to great consideration, in his
opinion. Springing, as such an institution
has heretofore, and, if hereafter adopted,
must again, from that broad and undefined
field of construction, which makes the
Constitution mean any thing that ingenious
men may choose to make it, all its sympa
thies would necessarily incline it to support
all that class of measures, claiming the same
lineage. It will, therefore, be the natural
ally of the tariff, of internal improvement,
and all other kindred measures, derived
from construction. Conscious of the doubt
ful tenure by which it would exist under
the Constitution, its interests and safety
would both lead it lo create as many allies
as it could, of the same character for mu
tual support and protection. Here, then,
would exist a great moneyed power, whose
interests would lead it to urge the Govern
ment beyond its sphere of constitutional ac
tion, and to build up other great interests of
doubtful power, in order to guarantee its
own permanency.
It had, said Mi4. B. occurred to him, as.
a circumstance by no means unimportant
&