Whole Ao. iv.iz.
J ol XI V Xo 34
The Turbo rough Press,
BY GEORGE HOWARD,
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DE3IOCKATJC UEPUBL.ICAX
To the I'cople of' the United States.
Continue J.)
One of the strongest temptations for the
collection of large revenue?, and the con
tinuance 'f which is most to be guarded
auainsi, would be the deposile of the pub
lic money in the banks.
If deposited in banks nominally for
safe-keeping, but really to be lent out to
their customers, the banks will have an
interest in swelling the amount, because,
by lending, they receive a profit upon ii;
and their customers will have an interest
in the same policy, because they can bor
row more money, and get mote indulgence
by it. By these means money may be
Tvronafnlly taken from its true owners by
l!ie Government, not for the public str
vire, but to be devoted to private purposes
ItiMvely.
The people may be taxed that the banks
rrm have more money to lend, and their
customers more to borrow. We are op
poed to taxation for such purposes. We
deny the right of the Government to take
the money of the citizen and hand it over
to the hanks to be used by them and their
customers, in their private transactions.
Tli1 taxing power was not granted for such
purposes; ,md when such are its results, re
form should be the watchword ol every
Republican.
We are in f.ivor of such changes in our
fltianci.il system, as will factually prevent
the .ipplicatioo of the money to private
purp ies. The means of accomplishing
this great reform, are of less importance
than i he end to he obtained. We, how
ever, perceive no means so fiVct'ue and
certain, as to let the Government keep its
oanmiupy, by ihe instrumentality if its
O'.vn officers, who shall be put under bonds,
will) heavy securities, not to use or lend it;
and, in addition, making it highly penal
in them so to do. It is not perceived why
the Government cannot make its money as
secure as a bank. All the usual means of
security enjoyed by the banks are within
t reach; in addition to which, it has abso
lute power over the persons of its agents,
which the banks have not. Banks can
not, by regulations, punish their cashiers
aiul clerks for faithlessness and crime with
the penitentiary or otherwise; but the Go
vernment can. It may command all the
buddings, walls, vaults, bolts, and other
sakguard which the banks can; and, in
addition, may dispose of the personal lib
erty of its faithless agents according to its
;v''li expressed through its legislative and
Judicial authorities. Why, then, may it
n 't keep its own money as safely as the
banks can keep theirs, or that deposited
"I'll them? That it can do so, under pro
per regulations, is too obvious to be doubt
e,k Besides, at places where it might be
more convenient, the use of the bank build
lnos themselves could be secured, still pre
serving the public money from private
uses.
Why, then, should not the Government
keep "us own money? It is objected that
the keeping of its own money would dan
gerously increase the patronage of the
Vecutive. Is 11 possible any one can be
'eve that the appointment of ten to twen
ty officers and clerks, involves a more ex
tensive and dangerous influence than the
Pver directly to affect the pecuniary in
terests of the eight thousand two hundred
Tid ninety bank officers, the three hundred
at'd seventeen thousand stockholders, and
l"e six hundred and fifty-three thousand
tutors? That power the Executive has,
s long as he is authorized to place the
F-'oitc money m banks to be lent out fur
P'lvate purposes. Although all the banks
Ynnot be depositories, all think they find
their interest in an extension of the credit
sytem,by the aid of the public money;
juuuion thereto, all are subiect. mi-
ur sur h a system, to the influence of hope
anil r. r . - r
' irom the favors or Irovvns of the
Resident cr Secretary of the Treasury.
It is not by keeping the public money that!
a Government acquires influence or n ,r
but by spending or lending it. One man
lias a milium of dollars to lend; another
has a million to keep, being forbidden to
lend a dollar of it. Which will be the
most courted, and have the most influence
among his neighbor? The answer is loo
obvious to need suggestion. It is thus
w ith the Executive. If ymi would curtail
his influence in the most effectual manner, !
require h.m inflexibly to keep the public
money for public purposes. If you w ould
extend Ips influence in a manner the most
alarming, authoi ize him to lend the public
money, or cause it to be lent, by depositing
it in banks, or otherwise.
The idea that the actual custody of the
public money by public officers appointed
under the authority of Congress would
place it in ie under the control of the Pre
sideut than it has heretofore been, is wholly
deceptive and fallac ious.
His power over it would not be at all in
creased by this measure. The President
could not, under the old or the proposed
system, draw from the Treasury a single
dollar, not even for the payment of his own
salary. Thai operation is effi cled by the
warrant of the Secretary ol the Treasury,
upon the Treasurer's check or order upon
a bank or other depository. It is through
these means that the President, and every
other executie officer receives even his
salary.
II the 'Treasurer had the actual custody
of the public money, instead of keeping it
in banks, the President would be obliged
still to gel a wan am Irom the Secretary
of the Treasury before .e could rertiw
his salary. It is said if the Tieasurer had
the actual custody of the money, the Pre
sident might compel him to put it into his
possession by the exercise of his authority
and power over an fficial dependant.
But is it not just as easy, by the exercise
ol the same authority and power, to com
pel the Treasuier to draw a her k on a
bank? And could not the President or his
instiuunnt obtain the money Irom a bank
on such a check, just as easy he could
wrest it from the Tieasurer's actual pos
sesMoiif Would it noi, indeed, lie a little
easier to compel the Treasurer to draw a
check, than to count out a large sum ol
money? As lor the bank?, they never
have claimed the right to dispute the Trea
suier's cheih, their Outy being ineiely l
pay it. When there were thirty or forty
millions of dollars in I lie 'Treasury, there
was nothing in the law, or in the structure
of the system, to prevent the txci utive efii
cers from checking every dollar of it out
ol the banks, if inclined to apply it to im
proper objects. Indeed, until 1829, there
w as no pi actical restraint upon the Trea
surer w halsoever; the sole authority upon
wnich the banks paid out the public mo
ney, was his individual check; and the re
straint then imposed in requiring that the
warrant of the Secretary ol the 'Treasury
should accompany the Treasurer's diet k,
was one of Executive regulation, ai d noi
of Congressional legislation. 'The dan
gers conjured up from this source are there
fore altogether imagmaiy.
'The union of the purse and the sword,
so much deprecated by our English ant es
tors, was altogether a different matter.
By them the power to raise an army was
called "the sword," and the power to lev)
and collect taxes to support it was called
"the purse." The English Constitution
conceded to the Executive the power to
raise an army, or the power of "the sword,'1
but reserved to Parliament the power to
lay taxes to support it, or the power of "the
purse." It was the attempts of Charles
the First to raise taxes lor the support ol
his army w ithout the consent of Parliament,
thereby uniting "the purse and the sw ord,"
which produced a bloody revolution and
brounht him to the bloik.
Our Constitution concedes to the Execu-
f
live neither ol these powers. rie can
neither raise an army, nor collect taxes to
support it, without the consent ol Con
gress. In their hands are both "the purse
and the sword," and the Executive is but
an instrument to carry their determma
tions into effect. He wields neither the
purse uor the sword otherwise than as the
subordinate ol the legislative power.
Hence it will be perceived that the union
of "ihe purse and the sword" is a very dif
ferent thing from the custody of the public
monev bv Executive officers. lu every
Government under the sun, the most free
as well as the most tyrannical, the keeping
and paying out of the public treasure under
the authority ol law lias oeeu cou&iuereu
an Executive function. When before was
it thought to be dangerous to liberty? Do
we find a trace ol such danger in me an
rieni Republics or the modern; among the
. i i
Greeks, in liome, in ownzenauo, ui
Holland? Was such a question ever rais
ed among the jealous patriots of England?
Is it now a ground of jealousy or alarm in
any other Republic of America, or in any
limited monarchy of Europe? No such
danger was ever perceived, no such ques
tion was ever heard of. To originate it
required the inventive faculties of our own
ingenious countrymen, stimulated by those
lively principles ol human action, political
ambition, and pecuniary interest. It is
not extraordinary that those who wish to
profit by ihe use of the public money pro
nounce it unsafe in any other hands, nor
that those who are in eager pursuit of the
prize of power join in ihe cry. Hut an
impartial people, who have no interest in
being deceived, will only give due weight
to the argument and appreciate the motive
in which it originates.
What would be said in England if some
sensible patriot, to prevent an "union of
ihe purse and the sword," should propose
to keep the money of ihe United Kingdom
in the treasury of Belgium, Hanover, or
Holland. 1 hose nations are scared
more independent of the Rritish Govern
ment and nation than our banks are of the
Government and people of the United
Slates; nor are they, on some occ isions,
more hostile than a portion of the banks.
Is it possible that a Government which!
puts its means so completely beyond its
w n control, can, on all occasions, perform
its engagements, keep its faith, or protect
ihe people by whom it is established, and
whose money supports it? It has hereto
fore been deemed enough that the legisla-
iive pow er can, at will, diminish ihe amount
of money to be collected, and prescribe
ie regulations under winch it shall be
ept. Ii has not been considered necessa
ry to establish an independent branch of
ihe Government for thai purpose, and least
of all to introduce foreign powers tniall
irresponsible to the people, often too strong
for the Govei ument, and always devoted
to making money out of all circumstances
and vicissitudes. 'To make keepers of ihe
public money out of such materials, is in
character with those kingly notions which
would give to our State banks a monarch
corporation for a master, upon the plea
that the people cannot control them.
It is objected that this is a measure of
hostility to the banks. 'The Government
is not to be a hoaider of money. What it
collects it soon expends; and it has seldom
occurred in our history that it has had on
hand, at the same time, more than six or
ight millions of dollars. It ought not to
continue any system ol revenue which
w ill enable it to hold a regular surplus ex
ceding five millions. This is not more
than a large bank finds it necessary to re
tain to carry on a safe business. The late
Rank of the United Slates frequently had
from ten to fifteen millions. For ears to
come, it is probable that the whole amount
of money in the Treasury will not average
three millions, and will scarcely be equal
to one week's recent importation of spe
cie. It is idle to suppose that this can ma
terially effect the operations of the banks.
The only mode in w hich their operations
will be effected is, that they will no longer
have the privilege of lending out money
which is not their own. Is the withdrawal
from them of this privilege nccessaril' an
act of hostility? A farmer has been in the
habit of depositing his money in a bank,
but as he could not get it to pay his hired
hands when he wanted it, the bank having
slopped payment, he concluded that it was
more safe, and more just to his creditors, to
keep it himself. Was there any hostility
to tlie bank in that? It is just so with the
Government. The banks had lent out ihe
public money, and could not collect it
With millions nominally in the Treasury,
the Treasury Department could scarcely
pay a dollar in the legal currency of the
country. It does not desire to be again
placed in such a situation. It does not
wish to be dependant on those whom its
experience has taught it are not always to
be depended upon.
The Government only desires to man
age its own business in its own way; to let
the banks alone, and to be let alone by
them; to use them when the public inleresi
and safety require it, but not to be com
pelled to use them to the public detriment
Is it just to charge every citizen with hos
tility to the banks who does not keep his
monev in them? The idea is absurd, bm
not more so than that a Treasury iudepen
dent of the banks is in hostility to them.
It is objected that it is a measure of hos
tility to a sound currency. The reverse ol
this proposition is true. It will preveiu
Ihe inflation of our paper currency, whicl
arises from the use of the public money
and, in that degree, tend to pervent fluclua
lions, and suspensions of specie payments
Bv exhibiting an inflexible determinalioi
on the part of the Government to recog
nize nothing as money but specie, or u
equivalent, it will inspire the banks with
salutary caution, not by the excess oi men
issues to endanger thai standard. In fine,
it will leave the banks to be sustained by
their own capital and prudeuce, without
tempting idem with ihe uncertain and dan
gerous aid of a fluctuating public deposile.
It is objected lhat this measure is hostile
to the lights of properly, and essentially
levelling in iis character. The reverse ol
tins is true. 'The money of the Govern
ment is the property of the people. 'The
object of an Independent Treasury is to
preserve litis property for ihe use of the
true owners, instead of handing it over to
those lu w hom il does not belong, to be
lent out for their emolument. Its tenden
cy is to protect individual property also.
Nothing is mure destructive to ihe rights
of properly than fluctuations in the stand
ard by w hi h its value is measured. 'The
tendency of this measure is, to prevent
those fluctuations, by preventing, in some
degree, the expansions and contractions
produced by ihe over-issues of batiks, and
thus give stability to property.
It is alleged that this measure is a part
of a scheme lo force on the country a cur
rency purely metallic. This is unfounded. '
A specie currency for the ordinary daily
transactions of life, and such a specie basis
for paper as will always ensure its conver
tibility into specie, when required by the
holders, is what is contended for-; and such
is the only tendency and real design of tin
measure proposed, so far as the banks an
concerned. A purely metallic crrenc
is no part of the Independent Treasury
plan, as proposed by the Administration,
and supported by its friends. In fine, w ill'
the exception of a very small number, who
are in favor of depositing ihe public money
penally in banks, the question at issue be
tween us, and those who favor a deposile
in the banks, may be stated thus: They
wish to have ihe public money deposited
in banks, not to be kept by them, but to be
ent out lor private uses. V e are opposed
to lending out the public money for piivate
uses; and, efitctnally to prevent it, are in
favor of having it kept by public officers,
under heavy bonds and securities not lo use
or si.fler il lo be used for any private
pui poses whatsoever, and to pay it out only
in pursuance of appropriations made by
law, as prescribed in the Constitution.
We do not think that to furnish the
banks w ith money to lend or accommodate
the customers ol banks with the use of the
public money or property, in one of ihe
purposes lor which the power to lay duties
and taxes was delegated lo the Congress of
the Untied Slates.
Oil the contrary, we look upon the em
ployment of it, knowingly and deliberately
lor such a purpose, or where su h is known
to be the natural anil necessary result, ns
an abuse of the most riggravaied charac
ter. Ii is taking one man's property and
ddiveiing it lo another, under lalse pre
tences, and may justly be denounced, (noi
as a levelling operation, but) as an exer
cise of ai bin ut y power, wresting money
and propel tv from those to whom it be
longs, for the use of those to whom it does
not belong. We oppose mis practice as
one of injustice. We are in favor of col
letting only as much money Irom the peo
ple as may he necessary for public purpo
ses, leaving ihe rest to be used by those to
whom it belongs. e are not the ene
mies of the banks, but we are not so much
iheir friends ai to take money out ol the
pockets of our constituents, and deposile
it with them lo swell their aciive capital,
and increase their profits. Let them be
content, as every honest man ought to be,
with using lhat which properly belongs to
them.
We look upon the withdrawal of the
public deposites from the banks, as a mea
sure beneficial to the banks themselves,
and calculated lo promote stability in the
business and currency of the country. So
long as the public money are made the ba
sis of bank issues, they will necessarily pro
duce fluctuations in credit and currency.
As the deposile accumulates, bank loans
and bank notes increase in number and
amount; as the deposite diminishes, bank
accommodations aie curtailed, and ihe cir
culation is retrtuched. Io reflecting man
can doubt that the immense surplus in the
Treasury two y ears ago, being all lent oui
by the banks, was one cause of the over
trading and speculation which ended in a
general suspension of specie payments.
Ought the banks to desire the continuance
f a temptation which experience has
shown they have not the firmness to resist?
Ought the people to permit a return to, or
i continuance of, a system which not only
takes from them a portion of their proper
ty for the use of the banks and their cus-
pmers, but tends to render the rest unsta
ble and insecure, by unsettling the standard
f value, banishing the coin of ihecountrv
rom circulation, and deluging the laud
.villi an irredeemable, and, to a great ex
vent, a fraudulent paper currency? T
avoid ihese evils, we must remove their
causes. One of the inot potent is ihe use
of the public money lor pi ivate put poses.
By polling a slop to that mix hit f, a.d ad
ministering iheTreasury Department w hol
ly independent of tije banks, ihe people of
ihe United Slates will have do.ie much,
through their Government, to fi.i the coun
try with ihe precious metals, to secure a
constitutional currency , to keep the public
faith, to preserve ihe public morals, to give
confidence to credit, and stability to trade,
and above all, to preserve the rights of ihe
States and the liberties of the Ameiican
people.
'The subject of abolition has assumed a
character so formidable in its appearance,
and so desiruci.ive in its tendem. ie, as lo
call for a b ief exposition of our views.
The existing relation of master and slave
between the two races inhabiting the
Southern portion of ihe Union, existed
when the ( 'onstiiuliou was formed, and is
recognized in the apportionment of mem
bers in ihe House of Representatives, ns
well as in ihe imposition of direct taxes,
Mid the clause guaranteeing ihe delivery
up of persons held to service or labor in
one State and escaping into another.
It is manifest that the power over this
subject is not of those not delegated lo the
General Government, and, of course, is
one of the reserved powers : as such, it is
under Ihe entire control of the respective
States, within whose limits Ihe institution
may exist, and within which neither this
Government, nor lhat of the other Slates,
nor their citizens, have anyT more right to
interfere, directly or indirectly, than with
the existence of slavery in Cuba, or any
other foreign country.
From this it follows that any such inter
ference on the part of this Government,
would be without authority, and a manifest
breach of the Constitution, It would, in
truth, be more than a simple breach of that
instrument; it would be destructive of the
primary object for which the Government
was instituted, which was to preserve and
protect more effectually the domestic peace
and tranquility of the Slates, and their citi
zens. It also follows, that such interference on
the part of other States, or their citizens,
would be in violation of the national com
pact, which they mutually pledged them
selves to each other to preserve inviolate
on entering into the Union.
It also follows, that the States, separately
and individually, where slavery exists, aie
alone responsible for it. either for good or
evil: and the impression thai any other
State or its citizens are responsible, in any
way, for its existence, originates in the
gross and mischievous Federal concption
that ours is a s;rear national consolidated
Government, where the whole is responsi
ble for the parts, just as tlie States arc for
counties, instead of a Federal Republic,
composed cf sovereign 3rd independent
States, united together lor their mutual ad
vantage, tranquility , and security.
Such, and so formidable, arc the barriers
ogiiinsl an interference with this dangerous
subject, within, the limits of ihe States.
ISor will ihese against an interference by
the General Government, in any manner,
in this District, he touud less formidable,
when duly considered.
We hold, in the first place, that, lo at
tempt to abolish slavery in this District, as
an intermediate step lo abolishing it in the
States themselves, by this Go eminent, or
the non-slaveholding States, or their citi
zens, would be as clearly and manifestly lia
ble to all the objections, in their full force,
to which a direct attempt to abolish it in the
States themselves would be. It is the mo
tive and object intended, and not the means,
that determine the character of the acl.
There is no code of morals which justifies
the doing of that indirectly which is for
bidden to be done directly. If it be un
lawful to burn our neighbor s house, it
would be equally unlawful to fire another,
or even our own, vvnn me unuuuuu ui
burning his. If there be a difference, the
latter, by adding craft to guilt, is of a deeper
dye.
We also hold that, whatever may be the
individual opinions of public men as to the
character of the domestic institutions of the
slaveholding States, they have no right,
when acting in public stations under the
Federal Government, by any of their acts,
to discriminate between their institutions
and those of the other States. It must be
borne in mind that ours is a Federal Repub
lic, as has been already stated, formed by
sovereign and independent States, for their
mutual security and happiness; and that
they instituted this Government, and cloth
ed it with powers lo carry into effect these
important objects. Such being the charac
ter and object of our system, it isckarlhat
this Government can have no right what
ever to give a preference to the institutions
of one portion of the Union over those of
another, or to use it power to abolish one
. t i- k .Unnthop- nnrt to do"so. be the
pretext what it may, would be directly sub
versive of the object for which it was e