Watchman & Old North State.

BY HANES & BRUNER.

SALISBURY, AUG. 21, 1868.

FOR PRESIDENT:

HON. HORATIO SEYMOUR,

OF NEW YORK.

FOR VICE PRESIDENT:

GEN. FRANK P. BLAIR,

OF MISSOURI.

ECONOMY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT; THE REDUCTION OF THE STANDING ARMY AND NAVY; THE ABOLITION OF THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU, & ALL POLITICAL INSTRUMENTALITIES DESIGNED TO SECURE NEGRO SUPREMACY. Democratic Platform.

IT IS NOT A MERE PARTY TRIUMPH WE SEEK. WE ARE TRYING TO SAVE OUR COUNTRY FROM THE DANGERS WHICH O-VERHANG IT. Gov. Seymour's Address.

THE ELECTION OF A DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE AND A MAJORITY OF DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD NOT GIVE TO THAT PARTY ORGANIZATION THE POWER TO MAKE SUDDEN OR VIOLENT CHANGES; BUT IT WOULD SERVE TO CHECK THOSE EXTREME MEASURES WHICH HAVE BEEN DEPLORED BY THE BEST MEN OF BOTH POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS. THE RESULT WOULD MOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO THAT PEACEFUL RESTORATION OF THE UNION AND RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF FRATERNAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH THE COUNTRY DESIRES. Gov. Seymour's Letter of Acceptance.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Sparkling Catawba Springs,
August 17th, 1868.

CHIEF JUSTICE PEARSON'S LETTER.

Last week we promised our readers that from this place we would, this week, furnish them with a review of Judge Pearson's letter advocating the election of Grant and Colfax to the Presidency and vice Presidency of the United States. That promise we shall now attempt to redeem.

The Chief Justice sets out in the letter referred to by expressing his alarm at the condition of the country—his fear that we are drifting into another civil war—his opinion that the "war clouds" are as dark now as they were in the winter of 1860-61. Then, he says, we were promised "peaceable secession," now we are promised "peaceable nullification." Under these circumstances, he says, he feels it to be his duty to make known the reasoning by which he has arrived at the conclusion that every man who has an interest at stake, and who wishes to preserve the peace of the country should vote for Grant and Colfax. He trusts to be held justified, by the emergency, for expressing his opinion, and to be allowed to do so without being drawn into the vortex of politics: with his views silence would be criminal. We shall grant the distinguished Judge all that he claims in this regard, and shall review his letter, not as the letter of a political opponent, but as the letter of a disinterested patriot. Our object shall be to show the fallacy of the "reasoning" by which he has arrived at his conclusions.

The learned and distinguished Judge has not been content to discuss the questions now agitating the country in a wholly practical light. He has not thought proper to advise the acceptance of the situation, and leave it to *time* to annihilate all former governments and restore the States to their constitutional relations with the federal government, but he has thought proper in his zeal, for what he believes to be the cause of peace, to defend the power of Congress to pass the Reconstruction Acts. In this connection he says:

"I cannot, as others seem to be able to do, exclude from my mind the fact that the South attempted a revolution and was subjugated, and our condition is one of the bitter fruits of rebellion! 'Let us have peace.' This is the point on which my opinion rests."

In taking this course we think the Judge has been particularly unfortunate. He has, as we have, been a life long disciple of that political school in this country which not only denied the right of secession to the States, but which denied that the theory of our government from which it was deduced was the true one. He has from his earliest youth been a member of that political organization which maintained that our form of government was not wholly federal in its character, but that it was a compound government in which the national and federal features were combined. He has always denied the sovereignty of the States in the sense contended for by Mr. Calhoun and the great leaders of the secession movement. He has always maintained that the government of the United States was established by the people of the States, and that in the act of ratifying the Constitution of the United States the people of the several States did "thereby embody themselves into one people, nation or sovereignty for certain purposes and not so for other purposes." He has always maintained that as the laws of the United States operate not upon the States, but directly upon the citizen, the government of the United States is a government of the people of the United States, to which they owe their allegiance directly. He has always maintained that in the execution of its laws the federal government was entirely independent of the State governments in every particular—that in the execution of its laws it used its own officers and knew no State lines further than they were used to designate federal judicial districts. We say that the distinguished Judge has always maintained these views for the reason that they were the views maintained by the great party to which he belonged, and by the great leaders whom he professed to follow—Washington Hamilton, Jay, Marshall, Kent, Story, Webster and Clay. According to this theory a *State* could not commit treason, and if it could not, of course it could not permanently forfeit any of its rights. According to this theory the late war was the result of a rebellion against the government and authority of the United States by the citizens thereof. Every citizen who willingly engaged in the same committed treason, and was liable to punishment as a traitor upon conviction, after a fair trial by a jury of his peers. A large majority of the people of the State may have forfeited their rights and privileges as citizens upon the failure of the rebellion, but the Constitution and laws of the State in existence at the commencement of the war were in existence unimpaired at its close. If civil government was suspended it was only because the offices of the State government had become vacant through the treason of those who held them during or before the war. The people of the State only, being sovereign within the limits of the powers reserved to them by the Constitution of the United States, could reorganize their government and provide for a new election of State officers as they did in 1865. This theory being the true one the ordinances of secession were nullities and the States were always, in legal contemplation, States *in* the Union—were not subjugated and could not be.

Such being the case, we regret that Judge Pearson could not find arguments satisfactory to his own mind without basing them upon an hypothesis which can have no existence upon the principles which he is known to have held all his life, and which can only be supposed to exist if the doctrine of secession be true. For, unless the ordinances of secession did have the effect, in fact and in law, of severing the connection with the Union of the States which adopted them and restoring to them their original sovereign and independent character, we cannot understand how they could have been '*subjugated*," and we think it would puzzle an abler constitutional lawyer than the Chief Justice to explain how it was done. For even if his Honor should assume that it was a civil war, which we are ready to admit, and that the solution of the difficulty must be sought for among writers on international law he will find himself as much perplexed as ever. The authorities will, indeed, sustain him in saying that during the pendency of the conflict the parties in rebellion were without the protection of the constitution and laws of the United States. But they will also inform him that immediately upon the restoration of peace the authority of said constitution was restored in all its force. And was not peace proclaimed by the proper authority in May 1765? by an executive proclamation. And even if the Executive power were not the power to make a proclamation of peace, which we contend it was, can the government by refusing to proclaim the fact prevent that from being a state of peace which according to all the authorities on the subject constitutes a state of peace? And peace being restored, and with it the Constitution and laws in existence at the commencement of the war, what else is wanting to restore the States of the South, and the *people* of the South, to their *ante bellum status?* A general amnesty! All of these being had what remained to be done after the re-organization of the State governments of the South in 1865, and the recognition of the validity of those governments by Congress in submitting to the legislatures elected under them constitutional amendments for their ratification or rejection?

Near the close of his letter the distinguished Judge recurs to the question of the power of the general government in the premises and says:

"In regard to restoring the Constitution and State rights, no one pretends that the reconstruction measures of the President, or of the general government, (for an act passed over the veto is an act of the government) are in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. It is also clear that they are not unconstitutional, but *extra* constitutional: that its acts were done to meet an emergency, not foreseen by the framers of that instrument. Such is the decision of our Supreme Court. * * So the suggestion of restoring the constitution is a pretext, and the notion that as the State has never been out of the Union, she, *instantly* after the surrender, was entitled to all the rights of a State, as if nothing had happened, is a fallacy. Your son rebels, he is still your son, but is he entitled to the rights and privileges of a child until he atones, and is reconciled to his parents? So restoring of State rights is out of the question."

In what Judge Pearson says about the reconstruction measures of President Johnson not being in accordance with the express provisions of the Constitution we concur. But the President never claimed the power to re-organize governments in the Southern States, as is contended by some. He never proclaimed the Constitution and laws in force in North Carolina on the 20th of May 1861, were abrogated or destroyed by the war, but only the laws enacted by the *de facto* governments of the State during the war. On the contrary he expressly recognized the validity of the Constitution in existence at the commencement of the war. His proclamation appointing a Provisional Governor for the State was issued by him in his military capacity, and in it he proclaimed that all civil government was at an end—that is, that the machinery had ceased to work for want of the proper officers to work it. His proclamation of the fact made the fact so, for the reason that it was acquiesced in by all the old officers who at once abdicated their functions in obedience to it. The Provisional Government which it established was established mainly, if not solely, for the purpose of enabling the people to elect delegates under forms with which they were familiar, and meet in Convention for the purpose of "altering and amending their Constitution," and providing for the election of officers to fill out the unexpired terms of those who had abdicated in obedience to the proclamation. This they did. The Provisional Government thereupon ceased to exist. Here, allowing the offices to be vacant, which we have shown they were, the rights of the Sovereign people—the States rights—were respected. Those who were entitled to vote under our State Constitution, who had received the benefit of the general amnesty or a special pardon, and no others were permitted to vote in that election. A general amnesty having been granted her citizens, and the State having in the exercise of her undoubted sovereign powers, reorganized her government the work was—or should have been complete. Whether Andrew Johnson possessed the constitutional power to issue the proclamation which he issued or not was a matter of no consequence. The validity of the government established in 1865 did not depend in the slightest degree upon the powers of the President, but upon the power of the *sovereign people in Convention assembled.* As their act it was universally acquiesced in by the former officers of the State government, and recognised by Congress in submitting to its legislature two Constitutional amendments for their ratification or rejection,—one of which was declared to have been ratified and made a part of the Constitution of the United States by its act—and according to every principle decided in the case of Luther vs. Borden the government then established was a valid and legitimate government.—And when all this was done, and not "*instantly after the surrender*" did President Johnson, and the Conservatives who sustained him, contend that North Carolina was entitled to be restored to "all the rights of a State," and we cannot refrain from expressing our surprise that the able Chief Justice should say that "the suggestion is a pretext."

And how the learned Judge could arrive at the conclusion that the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, which were passed for the express purpose of overthrowing the governments thus established by the people and approved by "the political power," and which "decision by the political power had been taken notice of and followed by the courts," were not "unconstitutional, but only "*extra* constitutional," is beyond our comprehension. Even admitting the Judges premises, and giving him the full force of "the point on which his opinion turns,"—that the "South has been subjugated,"—we would still be unable to agree with him in his conclusions.

"Arguments that prove too much prove nothing at all." Did it never occur to the mind of the Judge that in the argument which he has made in defence of the "extra-Constitutional" power of Congress to pass the Reconstruction acts, he has made an argument which may be used to justify what he so much deprecates—another reconstruction of these State Governments. His arguments on this point are two—that the South was "*subjugated*"—that we are a subjugated people, and that "an emergency" had arisen "not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution." In answer to the first argument we would ask, when will we cease to be a subjugated people? If we *are* a subjugated people of course we have no rights, and never can have any except such as our conquerors choose to confer upon us, and they may be revoked at pleasure. And what emergency had arisen that justified Congress in exercising powers not conferred upon it by the Constitution? None, save that it was dissatisfied with the State Governments in the Southern States and wished to create other for party purposes. As the fact that the South was "*subjugated,*" if such is the fact, will never cease to be a fact, and as Congress itself must always necessarily be the judge of "emergencies," is it not clear from the Judge's "reasoning" that any future Congress may quite as properly exercise the "*extra* Constitutional" power as did the 39th and 40th Congresses? But the Judge is mistaken. The Reconstruction Acts of Congress are not only "*extra* Constitutional, but they are outrageously unconstitutional.

But we are more surprised at the Judge's illustration in the case of the rebel son than in any thing else which he has said. We cannot see the slightest analogy in the cases. Is there no difference between "the rights and privileges of a child," as such, which are derived, and the rights of a sovereign State which are inherent and reserved? "So restoring of State rights is" *not* "out of the question," as Judge Pearson supposes. And even if there was some analogy between the case of the son rebelling and the Southern people rebelling, have not the Southern people made some "atonement?" Did they not lay down their arms and quietly submit to the Constitution and authorities of the United States? Did they not renew their oaths of allegiance, and have they not kept their oaths? And in consideration of this fact have they not all been visited with an act of general pardon and amnesty? And what is the effect of a pardon and amnesty? Is it not fully to restore the party receiving it to the rights he would have possessed if he had never committed the offence? In the case of Garland *ex parte*, the Supreme Court of the United States say, that where it is granted before trial and conviction it *wipes out* the offence, and that where it is granted after conviction it makes the recipient a *new man.* And is there no "reconciliation" in all this?

In our next we will notice those portions of the letter which the Judge doubtless relies upon to convince the Conservatives that they ought to support Grant and Colfax, and endeavor to show how groundless his fears really are.

JUDGE PEARSON'S LETTER—CONCLUDED.

NO II.

In our last we replied to the constitutional views taken by this distinguished jurist: we now propose to review those portions of his letter which have a more practical bearing. He is very much concerned at the declaration of the New York Convention that the Southern State governments are the mere creation of a usurpation—that the reconstruction Acts of Congress are "unconstitutional and void" He seems to be haunted with the idea that the word "*null*" was omitted lest it might call up unpleasant recollections of the days of nullification when the strong arm of Gen. Jackson prevented war.

We must own ourself surprised once more at the importance which the learned and able judge attaches to this declaration much less that he should see any similarity in it to the case of the nullification of the tariff laws by South Carolina in 1832. That was a case where a State claimed the right to decide for herself upon the constitutional validity of an act of Congress, and to nullify it within her borders accordingly. This is a case where a great party, which is striving to obtain control of the national government, expresses *its opinion* upon the constitutionality of certain acts of Congress—declares that in its opinion they are revolutionary, unconstitutional and void. But does this party propose that its Executive, should its candidate, Gov. Seymour, be elected, shall proceed at once to nullify these governments by overthrowing them without the passage of another "reconstruction law" by Congress? Certainly not by anything which is contained in its platform. While the platform firmly proclaims, as the opinion of the Democratic and Conservative party, that those acts are unconstitutional and void, does it proclaim that its opinion is to be the law of Government should it acquire power? Or does it recognize the Supreme Court as a co-ordinate Department of the government, whose highest function is to decide just such questions? Did not that very convention endorse Andrew Johnson, who executed these very laws because they had *not* been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, notwithstanding his own opinion that they were so! We say, upon what must be *very high* authority with the distinguished Judge, that the language of the New York platform is "perfectly constitutional language." The authority we adduce is no less an authority than Daniel Webster himself, whose opinions on constitutional law have always weighed very greatly with all men of the political school to which the Judge and ourself belong.

Judge Pearson will remember, if our other readers do not, that Mr. Hayne, in the celebrated discussion between Mr. Webster and himself, in the Senate in 1829, attempted to fasten the charge of nullification and disunion upon New England in justification of the position which South Carolina then occupied. Among others he arraigned a venerable Ex-Senator from Connecticut who happened to be present on the occasion. He read from a speech of the venerable Ex-Senator, James H. Hillhouse, delivered in the Senate in 1810 or 11, in which he declared that the embargo laws were unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void. "That," said Mr. Webster in reply, "is perfectly constitutional language. Such was the Senator's opinion and he freely expressed it. Such was the opinion of New England, and New England boldly proclaimed it. But who did New England say must decide? Who did the venerable Senator say must decide? Did he claim the right of Connecticut to decide the question for herself? Did he contend that New England might decide it for herself? No such expression ever escaped his lips! He was far too sound a Constitutional lawyer to give any such an opinion as that. New England never gave any such an opinion as that. It was the opinion both of New England and the venerable and distinguished Senator, that after all, the question must be decided by the Supreme Court. So in the old fashioned way of settling disputes New England went to law. Bonds had been given to a large amount under the law; they suffered them to be forfeited and upon them suits were brought. The case was carried to the Supreme Court and it was argued there by the ablest lawyer in New England—Samuel Dexter. He threw all his powers in the argument, for his opinion agreed with that of his neighbors, and he had expressed it freely. His argument was worthy of the man, the subject and the occasion. His very statement was argument, and seemed to carry conviction to the mind. It was delightful to think, and feel, and act in unison with a mind of such evident superiority. Yet after all the court decided adversely to his clients, and New England submitted. Her own opinion and the opinion of Mr. Hillhouse and Mr. Dexter were not changed. But that tribunal which they regarded as having been instituted for the decision of such question had decided against them, and its decisions was, with them, a part of the supreme law of the land. The question was settled, and they submitted as loyal citizens to the settlement."

Of course we have quoted this passage from Mr. Webster's speech from memory, and cannot pretend to exact accuracy, but the Chief Justice will recognize its general faithfulness. No one proposes to take any steps to remove the present State governments at the South without further legislation, which Judge Pearson has unfortunately admitted may be had under the *extra* constitutional powers of Congress to meet "an emergency" of which it must itself be the judge, or without a decision by the Supreme Court that said governments are not legitimate governments, and not entitled to the protection of the federal government. A decision by the Supreme Court that the Reconstruction Acts of Congress are unconstitutional and void would not affect the validity of the State governments already organized in pursuance of their provisions. Nor would a repeal of the law itself affect them, but only prevent the organization of others in states in which such reorganization has not yet been consummated. From such premises we argued, in an article which appeared in the *Old North State* on the 30th of June, that there was *no* constitutional means by which we could get rid of those governments unless we could carry *both* Houses of the next Congress, which we cannot do. No decision will ever be made by the Supreme Court affecting the legitimacy of the existing State governments at the South.—Such decision cannot be made until the court reverses its decision made in the case of Luther vs. Borden. And we are glad to know that the argument which we made at that time, and in which we expressed the very opinions, the enunciation of which in the New York platform now so much alarms Judge Pearson, was regarded by him as conclusive against the power of one Congress to usurp power to undo what had been done under the supposed usurpations of another. But in coming to that conclusion we excluded from our view the "*extra* constitutional" power of Congress which Judge Pearson has brought into view, and justified upon the ground of "an emergency." We were obliged to exclude it to reach our conclusions, and we expect to see the learned Chief Justice yet modify or change his views on the subject.

"God Almighty! forbid a war of races!" exclaims the Chief Justice, and we most reverently respond, Amen! We fervently pray that no such war will ever come, but if it should come history will attribute it to the unconstitutional and partisan legislation of Congress for the Southern States. But, says the Chief Justice, it is impossible to deprive the freedmen of their political rights without producing a civil war! "History," he says, "furnishes no instances of four millions of people, backed as they are in our State by a clear majority of 20,000 voters, being deprived of political rights which they have enjoyed for years. It cannot be done without a civil war. It is against the order of nature."

In the first place we think the Chief Justice is mistaken—very greatly mistaken, in saying that in this State the colored population would be backed by any considerable number of white men. The number would be small indeed. In the second place we think the Judge has overlooked some very remarkable "instances" in the history of his own country, and which came immediately under his own observation. He certainly does not consider the negro the superior race. Yet he has seen *eight millions* of white people in the South submit, without a struggle, to much more than the freedmen would have to submit to in being merely deprived of political rights and privileges. Yes, he has seen *eight millions* of Caucasians, the descendants of the Cavaliers of England and the Huguenots of France—the proudest and the haughtiest of a proud and haughty race—submit, without even an effort at resistance, to indignities compared with which the mere depriving of the freedmen of political privileges might be regarded as an act of justice and mercy. He has seen them submit to the subversion of their governments by the strong arm of federal power, and the organization of others for them by an inferior and half barbarous race. And yet to argue that another reconstruction, backed by the whole power of the government—for you may rest assured that it will never be undertaken unless under a law of Congress passed "to meet an emergency," executed by the President and sustained by the army—in which the freedmen are merely to be deprived of political privileges, cannot be effected without producing a civil war—we must again be permitted to express our surprise. And yet, after having said all this we say that we never expect to see these governments subverted—never expect the principle of impartiality between the races, so far as their civil and political rights are concerned, abolished; and that we would not deprive the freedman of suffrage altogether if we could.

We agree with the distinguished Chief Justice that "the idea of four millions of people, *not slaves*, existing in our midst without some political rights was out of the question—that such a condition never has, with the memory of man, and never will exist" for any considerable length of time. As early as the 12th of January 1867, we took ground in favor of a qualified suffrage for the colored people to be conferred upon them by the Southern States themselves, and we were much pleased at the time to have the warm co-operation of the Chief Justice. We believed then, and believe now, that prompt action at that time would have prevented the passage of the reconstruction acts by which such a bad precedent has been set.

We disagree with Judge Pearson when he says it is inevitable that the Conservatives must split into two parties on the present issues. We see no reason why the *Conservatives* cannot support Gov. Seymour for the Presidency against Gen. Grant. He is certainly a representative man of the true Conservative sentiment of the country, and we do not believe that the Chief Justice himself can find a sentiment in his letter of acceptance which does not meet with his approval. And such have been his sentiments uniformly. Before the meeting of the New York Convention in his Cooper Institute speech, Gov. [illegible] took the same grounds which he [illegible] letter of acceptance, and no [illegible] knows his character doubts that he will act up to his professions. On the other hand we cannot understand how the *Conservatives* can support Grant. Is he not the nominee of a party which is lead by men like Ben. Butler, Ben. Wade, and those other extreme men who have brought the country into its present perils? It is in the election of Gen. Grant that we see danger to the liberties of the country, and the prospect of civil war. In the event of his election we may expect to see a continuance of military rule, in some form or other, but in the event of Seymour's election we may expect to see the military withdrawn entirely, unless the presence of some part of it may be necessary to preserve order.

We think we have shown that the Judge's fears about another civil war are entirely groundless. We also think we have shown that his fears have led him into some errors in his views of the constitutional, or rather the "*extra* constitutional" powers of Congress; or that his Honor is far better in the common law, and in real property law, than he is in Constitutional law. With all proper respect for the Chief Justice, whom we have not treated as a partisan, we now take leave of him. And as he has been assailed for publishing his letter in the columns of a radical paper, we deem it but an act justice to him to state that he twice made application to us for the use of our columns, before he sent his letter to the *Standard*, which was by us refused. We did this, not from any want of respect for the Chief Justice, but because as a supporter of Gov. Seymour, whose election we most ardently desire, we did not feel willing to allow the use of our columns to any person who wished to use them to effect his defeat.

THE STATE CONVENTION.

The Democratic State Convention which assembled at Raleigh, this week, was a grand success. Great unanimity in counsel and a deep felt enthusiasm prevailed among the members. All the signs of the times point with certainty to a great political upheaval of the people in favor of Seymour and Blair. We refer the reader for further particulars in regard to the Convention to the telegraphic report of them to the Wilmington *Journal*, in another column.

The *Morning Star* says:

"Our special dispatches from Raleigh bring the glorious intelligence that the State Convention is a triumphant success. It surpasses our most sanguine expectations. Three thousand delegates, representing seventy-one counties, are in attendance—among them seventy colored delegates. New Hanover sends the Banner delegation, and our own gifted Cowan presides over the deliberations of such a body as he has not met in Raleigh since the days of Harrison, hard cider and log cabins. Read the glad tidings from Raleigh, throw up your hats, and give three times three cheers for Seymour, Blair and Peace.

THE PRESIDENCY, &c.—The N. York Herald says: Kentucky has doubled her democratic majority in one year, and that is a revolutionary fact. Majorities do not vary at such a rate ordinarily. Hitherto the home of Henry Clay has given Democratic majorities, but not such as are given this year. Other parties have had a very respectable hearing in that State. She was one of the two Southern States that gave Lincoln a vote in 1860, and in the same year only Virginia and Tennessee of the Southern States outvoted her on the Bell and Everett ticket. Even in 1864 McClellan's majority was only thirty-six thousand. Nothing like so intensely Democratic in the past as southern States generally, she gives the Democratic candidate this year a majority of ninety thousand—a vote that indicates a movement of the people scarcely less than a stampede. Negro suffrage is held responsible for this change by the local chroniclers, and they are, in all probability, right. Negro suffrage, so avowedly the policy of the Republican party that its orators can no longer make any denial, has applied a tremendous process of "attrition" to the Republican vote in Kentucky, and worked it down to a worthless quantity.

It will do the same thing elsewhere.—Throughout the South we shall see this one definite result of negro suffrage— * *

In the North the vote against the Republicans will be very heavy. Men know how far Democratic misrule would go, and what direction it would take, and they do not know the limit of Radical madness. Judging it by the past, they find it difficult to conceive that the Republican fury has any definite limit. Hitherto it has hesitated at nothing,—has pushed recklessly on wherever hounded by ambitious leaders,—and rather than be dragged where such a party would go, the people will take the chance of revolution with the Democrats. Republicanism, in fact, is driven to a point at which it is desperate. For two years it has stood upon the defensive before the people. Had the popular jealousy of its tendencies been less clearly shown it would have pushed on to the extent of confiscation and proscription; for its leaders felt that these were necessary parts of its policy, that these alone could give it safe possession of what it had already won. Without confiscation, the results of negro suffrage will slip through its fingers. Without proscription, the southern States cannot be kept from the natural leaders of the southern people. The Republican party of the future, therefore, will be ready for any desperation, convinced from its past that the greatest danger is in standing still. There is, then, greater reason than ever why it should be kept from power; and this the people evidently feel. Last year the gains against the Republican party on Congressional votes had wiped out its former majorities and established an equality, and, constantly increasing, the gain will now make the balance on the other side. Such a change as we have seen in Oregon, and half such majorities as Kentucky has given, will present a total to astonish and confound political philosophers.

THE COMING ELECTIONS.

Four State elections occur in September. Tennessee votes on the 13th, Vermont on the 1st, California on the 8th, and Maine on the 14th. Nebraska, Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and West Virginia vote in October. On the 3d of November, (the day of the Presidential election,) New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas, Nevada, and Massachusetts hold their elections. In the next twelve weeks, therefore, we shall have not less than thirty-three State elections.

Don't cross the bridge till you come to it.