-' FRIDAY, APRIL 11, 1953
AGE TWO
TH1 OAltT TAB,
Bomb Test Suspension
The .Soviet I'liion's recent announcement
of their suspension of nuclear testing has
in. nil- Acllai Stevenson l(Mk like a prophet
ol the decade, for it was not two years ago
when he proposed that the United States do
the s.;me thin;;, and lot an election partly
lecaiic o this piopos.il.
What .Stevenson realized at that time, and
wh it Ameiican leaders have failed to realize
until now. was that at that time the Soviet
I'nion h.id possessed the propaganda advant
age ocr the Tinted States for only a short
time, and" that the United States by discon
tinuing unclear testing at that time could
icasscit her leadetship as a peace loving na
tion and call the Soviet I'nion's peace hlulf
at the same time.
Now that the Soviet 1'niou has announced
Misprision ol nudear testing, there still re
mains in the I'nited States a complete lack
ol leadership.
; The general icactiou Irom Washington
was to treat the Soviet announcement as a
propaganda move, which indeed it was. How
ever, there seems to he such a void ol im
agination among the leaders in Washington,
as to come up with no conciete proposal to
match the Russian announcement.
The Piesidtnt has announced that the
I'.S. will (oiitinuc to test wcawns in the
face of the vciy leal piotests hv neutral states
.sin h as India.
Again the IMcsidcnt has let the Soviet I'n
ion he punned in the light of a peaceloving
nation, and leads the woild to believe that
the Tinted States is the wai monger nation
whose sole aim is to attain atomic supremacy
ov er the Sov iet I'nion.
'I his is not the picture tlu.t the Tinted
Stales should yive to its allies or to its po
tential allies.
It makes veiv little diffeieiue in the eves
of the woild that the Soviet I'nion has just
(ompletcd a large series of tests or that the
I'nited Stales is experimenting with a
"hail" hvdiogeu homh. What the people
ol the world ; e looking for is concrete ac
tion tow. ml the ending of the nuclear men
k e.
It makes veiv little dilference also to have
statements in the paper about the necessity
tor testing lor scieutilie progress, when the
onlv thing the Tnited Slates seems to be
testing is materials loi k m lave.
I he Tnited States can at least break even
with the Russians on the latest propaganda
move, bv announcing suspension ol Ameii
can nuclear testing. Py this the Tnited States
will be pacilving the potential allies like Iu-
di.irtitfid at the s. ine time calling Russia's
blull. II Russia does not test anv more, the
Tnited States will have gained one of the
goals that ir wanted to gain at (ieneva. H
Russi. does test in the luture. Russia is put
in the light ol a war monger, and the T.S.
w ill be fiee to te st.
'I he Tnited States still cannot lose bv the
suspension ol the tests, and the people ol
the woild will test quite a bit easier without
the tin e.it ol additional Strontium 0 in the
.lii.
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A9e
Problems In The Atomic
Nuclear Tests: Another Viewpoint Policy Needs Revision
(David Lawrence is publish
er of U. S. News and World
Report. It is from this week's
issue Dial this article is taken.)
The Soviet Union's proposal tem
porariy to suspend, of its own
accord, the testing of H-bombs
has been hailed by some newspa
pers here and abroad, and by
some partisan politicians in Con
press, as a great "propaganda
victory" for the Communists.
To the gullible and the craven,
to the weak-kneed and the "prac
tical" who used to advocate doing
business with Hitler and who now
want to do business with Khrush
chevthe Moscow proposal is a
"stroke of genius."
But to the President of the Uni
ted States, who has faith in the
truth, the Communist stratagem is
a "gimmick" and a diversionary
tactic. To all straight-thinking peo
ple throughout the world, the Sov
iet proposal is a transparently
phony scheme.
For the Communists have just
completed their own scries of
tests, and they know that the
United States is about to begin
a new series of tests. Prime Minis
ter Macmillan told the House of
Commons last week that Great
Britain now has "specific evi
dence" that not all nuclear tests
can be detected by other govern
ments. The Soviet Union, indeed,
rejected the resolution overwhelm,
ingly adopted last November by
United Nations General Assemby
calling for a supervised ban on nu
clear tests and the ending of the
production of nuclear weapons,
with controls. Khrushchev now
says he favors "international con
trol" of tests but avoids endorse
ment of the U. N. plan. What the
really wants is his own kind of
supervision.
Why. incidentally, was the offer
made by the Soviet Union to ban
only the tests of H-bombs? Why
didn't Moscow announce a deci
sion to accept proposals already
made by Western governments to
abandon completely the manufac
ture and use of nuclear weapons
under an inspection system that
would insure compliance? If test
ing is a crime against humanity,
then the use of nuclear bombs
hereafter would be an even worse
tragedy for . mankind.
Throughout the 8.000-word speech
of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromy
ko. there is only one sentence
about a possible abolition of the
use of atomic bombs, and this is
couched in the vaguest terms as
Chervi l (ill
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IsWilt Carolina
hktt lirtt ...
Editor
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CURTIS B. CANS
CHARLIE SLOAN
J 0 1 1 N W HIT A K Pat
. PAUL RULE
BILL KINCAI1)
DAVIS YOUNG
DAVE WIBLE
BUST V HAMMOND
FKEI) KATZIN
AVERY THOMAS
... SYD SHUFORD
ANTHONY WOLFF
. 7 JOAN BROCK
GLENDA FOWLER
BAilltY WLNSTON
WIUT W HITFIELD
ED ROWIND
BUSLNESS STAFF John Mintcr, Lewis Rush, Wal
ker Blanton.
NEWS STAKE l'ringle Pipkin. Sarah Adams. Dave
Jones, Parker Maddrey. Ed Rowland. Mary
Moore Mason. Wcktbrook Fuwler, Stn Black.
Virginia Sandidge, Ben Taylor, Eddie Goodman.
Wjndham Hewitt, Ken Friedman.
v t
it--
Ths Atomic Bomb
. . . v:ith it questions
an aim or hope. Vet every wordv
uttered against nuclear tests eoulcf
be applied even more effectively
against the production and use 'Of
any nuclear weapons.
The argument of the native jit
'our midst is that the suspension,
of the tests will be a "good begin
ning." After this it is wishfully
argued may come 'other agree
ments. It is familiar 'refrain. ' It
has been heard every year since
1954. Yet after we engage in talks
and conferences, we find out what
we knew before that the Com .,
munists break their pledges and
will not accept anything but the
unconditional surrender of the
Western world. Once we agree to
stop testing, and the agreement
is subsequently broken by the Sov
iets, then as the cliches goes"
we will at least know 'where we
stand. "To put it more realistical
ly, Khrushchev will be in a posi
tion to terrorize the Western na
tions and tell them, where they
will by "buried."
' Every one of the Soviet propos
als, including the recent demand
that American bases be abandon
ed and onr troops by withdrawn
from Western Europe, has a single
military objective to win domina
tion for the communists without
firing a shot.
There are group here and
abroad who arc tired of the fight
for ideals. They want to appease
the Communists by accepting the
present enslavement of the captiv e
countries as irretrievable. Why do
not some of these same unwitting
apologists for the cause of the
Communists demand the suspen
sion of a few other things besides
tlv testing of H-bombs? Have they
no interest in the fate of the Hun
garian people and the peoples of
the captive countries who are
being tortured every day, not by
Soviet tests" but by Soviet acts
of brutality?
Under certain conditions, we
would agree to suspend the use
of nuclear weapons atthougether,
and we have indicated this posi
tion frequently in the past. But
the Soviet Union first must
establish the sound conditions that
would warrant the taking of such
steps by the free nations of the
world today. '
(The following is an editor
ial which appeared in this
week's issue of "The Nation.")
The president and Mr.' Dulles
must realize that the1 United States
is ; in grave diplomatic trouble and
that trying to get but of it' with
quips and evasions just isn't going
to work"! By their unilateral sus
pension of nuclear testing the
Russians have. got, us on the dip
lomatic hook. It 'makes little dif
ference that the Russian move is
tainted with some .blatant horn
swoggling. , The fact remains that
they correctly 'gauged the state of' !
public opinion in part of the world
vital" to us,1 and acted with bold
ness orginality, and superb timing.
By all the rules, they have earned
their diplomatic triumph.
The outlines of ' w-hat they ac
complished are only beginning to
become clear, and the spectacle is
neither pleasant nor . reassuing.
Mr. Dulles feared to lose his shirt
at" a summit conference: He has
already lost it without the con
ference. The Russians had indicated a
willingness to cease nuclear test
ing With some sort of inspection
system backing up the agreement.
This was one of the practical ques
tions on which we could- have
negotiated f freeing the Soviet
satellite, re-unifying Germany on
our terms, etc., are issues on
which no serious diplomat would
waste his time); and, had en
agreement been reached, we could
have shared the credit with Mos
cow and reaped some advantages
from the inspection arrangement.
Now the Russians take all . the
credit, leaving us to incur obloquoy
for our tests in the pacific prov
ing grounds, while their own re
cent tests escape practically scot
free. If all this is a "gimmick",
one' can only wish to God that
our statesmen could concoct such
gimmicks once in a while.
Aside from the diplomatic de
feat, we are in an uncomfortable
position militarily. The big fission-fusion-fission
bombs are obsolete.
In a sense, they work too well:
they kill ho indiscriminately and
on such a grand scale that no na
tion can afford' to use them. The
rational line of development inso
far as rationality can play1 a part
in these affairs is "miniaturiza
rion' 'of missile Warheads, as well
as the 'familiar miniaturization of
components in the guidance sys
tem. We must ask ourseives: Why
are the Russians so ready to sus
pend tests? Ohe reason is that they
would like to reduce their arma
ment expenditures, which are far
more onerous to them than ours
to us. To this extent they are act
ing in good faith, and indeed it is
as' stupid to postulate that they
are always wholly' Machiavellian
as 'to believe that their motives
are as pure and humanitarian as
they say. But there must be other
reasons,' and one, which must be
asumed as a matter of elementary
prudence, Is that they are' satisfied
with their present missile tech
nology. In other' words, they 'are
ahead; of us, and probably the best
we can hope for is to catch up
with them hi our forthcoming ser
ies. These races tend to be neck-and-neck,
'and by all indications we
are a neck behind.
Mr. Eisenhower must therefore
try a new line. It would be best,
of course, if the new line did not
include Mr. Dulles, but ' since it
will, the President should acknow
ledge to his own private self that
Mr. Dulles doesn't know where he
is' going. For his own sake and
that of .'the country, 'the President
must take the reins in his own
hands. And as he prepares to do
so, he should bear in mind that
the reason the Rusians have been
able to get away with a certain
amount of transparent propagan
da is simply that the world wel
comes any 'move at all towards a
cessation of the nuclear-armaments
race.
For The Record
FSrsfAtomk- Bomb ..
Firsf Hyclrogirr Bomb
Firsf Satellite ". L L
Number'6f Tests
United States
July 14, 1945 ;
Nov. 1, 1952 1
... Jan. 1958
; n - 1 :
Russia
Sept. 12. 1949
Aug: 12, 1953
Oct, 12, 1957
39
Science Paves
Way
For
Nuclear Detection
David Bird
roii
Bird
Seir
SPORTS STAFF Elliott Cooper.
I nOTOCiRAJ'ilEKS Norman Kantor, Buddy Spooa,
Night L'ditor
rEBLEY BARROW
(This article is taken
this weeks 'Nation." Mr.
is on the staff of The
York Times.)
There can he no doubt that if
a nation wants to carry out (nu
clear) tests in secrecy, obser
vation will become diTficult and
uncertain Dr. Edward Teller.
University of California physi
cist who fs commonly referred
to as "the father of the H-bomb."
On the technical matter of
whether you could develop a sys
tem to enforce the test ban. I
think you can do this Dr. Wil
lard F. Libby, scientific mem
ber of the U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission.
The Soviet Union's unilateral re
nunciation, pro tern, of further
nuclear tests simply points up the
need to settle once and for all the
controversy now pervading the
question of whether nuclear dis
armament a'i cements can be
made to stick through workable
inspection methods. It is a con
troversy that is carried on mainly
in the dark because the United
States Atomic Energy Commis
sion, presumably to keep the Rus
sians in equal darkness, has held
nuclear explosion detection me
thods under a cloak of secrecy
ever since it made it first cryptic
announcement almost nine years
ago that the Russians had set olf
their first atom bomb.'
Since then the AEC had regular,
ly announced Russian nuclear
tests, but its sparse reports have
never mentioned how these were
detected or how accurate the de
tection methods are. Actually, the
most the Government has reveal
ed came in a statement from
PresiJent Eisenhower at a recent
news conference. lie said that
"with proper inspectional facili
ties, seismic and electronic, and
so on, (nuclear tests ought to be
detected."
If this dearth of information?
leaves the average citizen with
little basis to make an intelligent
judgment in the face of emotional
appeals for and against nuclear
inspection systems, it has also left
at. least some atomic scientists in
a similar position. Dr. Harrison
iJrown, a professor of geochemis
try at the California Institute of
Technology who worked on the de
velopment of the first atomic bomb
at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, said in
testimony before the Senate Dis
armament Subcommittee that it
was easier to get information on
radioactivity and its detection from
Japan than from the Atomic En
ergy Commission. He added that
the Japanese regularly and volun
tarily sent him this information,
while the AEC required a "spe
cial plea," although he has the
highest type of security clearance.
Dr. Brown suggests that this
with-holding of information gives
those in control excessive power
in policy formation, since they can
make statements which cannot be
checked or refuted by critics.
As Dr. Brown's testimony indi
cates, there has been considerable
activity outside the AEC's securi
ty net on methods of detecting nu
clear tests. Much work has gone
on in Japan; some has been done
by American scientists indepen
dently of the AEC. A great deal
has been published without any
type of security label. Unfortun
ately, most of the nuclear news
that reaches the American public
is channeled through government.
And the AEC, adhering to its po
licy of secrecy, refuses to recog
nize this information from outside
domain. That this domain is ef
fectively extended to other gov
ernment agencies is illustrated by
the Weather Bureau official who,
when asked recently about the de
tection of nuclear blasts through
minute barometric variations, re
fused to comment on the grounds
of security.
Barometric variation as a means
of detecting nuclear eplosions--which
hasn't rated public comment
in this country lias been under
experimentation and perfection for
several years in Japan. With it
the Japanese have been able to pin
point quickly the location of the
U. S. and Russian nuclear tests.
It is one of the four main tcchni-
gues, developed outside the AEC.
of detecting these tests.' according
to Dr. Jay Orenr, a Columbia Uni
versity physicist who has been ex
ploring the field in nonclassified
research. The other methods are
through seismic waves, "visible
light and radioactivity.
Barometric variations can mea
sure the energy that is transmitted
to the air from an explosion. This
energy travels the way sound does
and with the same speed. Then
the energy reaches a "sensitive
microbarometer (similar to those
used to check weather conditions
by changes in air pressure) it
causes a sharp movement in the
markings on the recording drum.
By noting the time the shock wave
is recorded on microbarometers
at varying distances and different
points in relation to the blast, the
exact location can be determined.
Judging by the accuracy with
which the Japanese have detected
Russian and U. S. tests more than
2,000 miles away, this method ap
pears to be the most sensitive and
quickest for detecting a nuclear
explosion.
Seismic waves can detect nu
clear tests through another set of
disturbances in the earth.; Both
earthquakes and explosions are
picked up by seismographs, but
each phenomenon has its own
signature. Earthquakes, a long
and complex pattern of shifting of
the earth, manifest a long and
complex pattern on the seismo
graph chart. 'Explosious, on the'
other hand, are sharp and com
pact movements and show up this
way on a seismograph. Another
difference is that an explosion is
to tally outward in its movement
from its point of origin, and thus
shows up with a similar outward
initial movement on all seismo
graphs, no matter where locafed
with relation to the. blast. Earth
quakes show up as different pat
terns on seismographs, depending
on whether the instruments are
situated on the "push" or to !he
"pull" direction in relation to the
guake. Seismographs' are generally
the only means of detecting under
ground blasts! Their effectiveness
- -- -,...- . -,..
is attested by the fact that . the .
ACE's underground test last Sept
ember in Nevada was detected in
College, Alaska, more than 2.000
miles away.
All nuclear explosions above the
ground '' give - off tremendous
amounts of light and this provides
for the third method of detection
visible light. The hot gases gen- '
crated by a nuclear explosion pro
duce the characteristic large ball
of fire. While not admitting that
this is a means of detection that
it utilizes, the AEC has stated
that "the fireball from a -megaton
nuclear bomb would appear to an
observer sixty miles away to be
more than thirty time as brilliant
as the sun at noon." In several
of the nuclear tests made at the
Nevada test site, in all of which
energy yields were less than 100
kilotons, the glare in the sky. in
the early hours of the dawn, has
been visible 400 or more miles
away. The AEC goes on to say
that "as a general rule, the lumi
nosity does not vary greatly with
the energy or power of the bomb."
The light from an atomic blast can
be seen many miles away because
of reflection from the upper atmos
phere in much the same vvay that
we see the sun in the form of
twilight long after it has disap
peared below the horizon. An in
spection station checking on nu
, clear tests could be equipped with
sensitive electric eyes to detect the
brightness from a bomb blast.
Generally, the limit of effective
detection by this method would
. about 500 miles.
The fourth detective technique
measures the "dirt" that comes
from a nuclear explosion radio
activity. ' Every nuclear bomb even the
"9S per cent clean" ones that have
been Jested recently - releases
radioactive particles' into the air.
Some of these' fall to earth quick
ly, but others are carried into
the upper air currents. These
particles eventually come down to
earth and a nuclear explosion is
fndicated when the radioactivity
count rises. as shown on a 'geiger
counter. The location of the bomb
blast "can be determined by chart-
New Report On Fallout
(Dr. Libby is a member pf &ie Atomic En.
ergy Commission. His article appeared in this
week's issue ofU. S. News and World Report.)
The biological hazard .from tjie radioactive fall
out from weapons testing is not well known, and,
like many biological problems, the determination of
the hazard in any exact way seems to be almost im
possibly difficult.
Fortunately, however, it is possible to compare
the radiation from radioactive fall-out with the in
tensities of ' natural radation to which we are al
ways exposed. '
'' For example, it is clear that the present level
of radio-strontium in bones of young children, which
are of course, closest to being in equilibrium with
the' fall-out since adults have had their bones some
time even before there was any radioactive fall-out
is ' about 2 milliroentgens: per year, as compared
to an average natural dosage of 150 to 200 millero
entgens'per year or about 1 to 2 per cent of the
dosage from natural sources to the bones, depend
ing upon location.
' Natural radioactivity present in the ground,
building materials and even in our own bodies
gives us an average total dose at sea level of about
150 milliroentgens per year, and medical x-rays add
something like another 150 milliroentgens.
The radiocesium taken into the body and the
penetrating radiations from non-assimilable radios
active fall-out contribute perhaps another 3 or 4
per Cent to the whole body dosage.
Thus, the total dosage to freshly formed human
bone is at most 5 per cent of the natural dosage.
Furthermore, we do know that the variations in
natural background dosages from place to place
are enormous in magnitude as compared to the fall
out dosage.
For example, it has been found that exposure
from external radiation rise from a value of about
110 milliroentgens per year at sea level to some
thing like 230 milliroentgens per. year to 5,000 to 6,
000 feet altitude in the United States .These num
bers are considerable larger than-those expected on
the basis of earlier calculations and measurements,
the increase apparently being due to the cosmic
rays and their increase with altitudes.
In addition, the effects of radioactivity in the
soil and ' in building materials made of stone or
soil are considerable, amounting in some instances
to 50 to 100 "per cent of the average natural back
ground dose at sea level; and the magnitude ot
the medical exposures to x-rays approximates, on the
average, those due to all natural sources.
We see. therefore, that whatever the extent of
our ignorance of the biological effects of radiation,
we do know that these effects are not unexper
ienced by the human species, even from the ge
netic point of view, since it is clesx now that per
sons living at high altitudes on granitic rocks al
ways have received extra radiation many times great
er than is contained in the radioactive fall-out from
the testing of nuclear weapons, and that even those
living on certain sedimentary rocks at sea level
always have received ab&ut 10 to 20 times the
present fall-out dose.
Of course, this dos not. mean tbat any ot th?
effects from radioactive fill-out .are in any way neg
ligible, and it does not mean that certain numbers
of people will not be injured by radioactive fall
out radiations, even though these numbers be very
' small relative to the total population of the world.
View 8l Preview
ing the speed and direction of the
air currents from which the sam
ples were taken. The length of
time that has elapsed since ' the
blast released the radioactive
particles can be measures by the
age of the particles, which decay
at a determinable rate. The main
drawback in this method is that
it may take weeks for the parti
cles to drift into a detection sta
tion. Thus where speed in identi
fication is necessary, other techni
ques will be used and radioactivity
samples will serve only a back
stop check.
Using these four methods, Dr.
Orear, the Columbia physicist,
feels that inspection stations with
in three hundred miles of eacn
other would be' able to detect
even low-yield tests in the low
kiloton range. Transferring this to
a map. for example, it would re
quire only some twenty-five out
posts in the Soviet Union to detect
a test anywhere within that coun
try's 8.7 million square miles of
area. It should be pointed out, in
this connection, that the USSR has
agreed in principle to the establish
ment of inspection posts.
All four of the detection systems
can check on nuclear explosions
above the earth the most dan
gerous type because they -release
deadly radioactive fallout into the
air. Deep underground tests, which
do not release contamination and
are more useful for the non-military
applications of atomic power,
can still be detected by at least
one method seismic "waves.
While nuclear tests above and
under the ground have been the
most frequent types, there remains
one other general method; under
water testing. This has been claim
ed ' to be somewhat difficult to
detect in spite' of the fact that un
derwater tests at Bikini were re
corded on seismographs. But even
with these, there are at least two
methods of detection: by measur
ing samples of water for increases
in radioactivity" and by using hy
drophones to check disturbances
; in, the water in precisely the man
ner in which microbarometers are
usecl to detect air vibrations.
It has . no doubt been noted elsewhere, but it
merits being noted again here, that the normal fur
therance of "co-recreational" relationships is sadly
hindered at Carolina. There is no place on this
campus, for two people to be. alone together (ex
cepting parked cars and Kenai Woods on warm
evenings).
The philosophy, conscious or unconscious, be
hind this state of affairs seems to be that affection
between Carolina ladies and gentlemen (Note:
those terms are used advisedly) is a Bad Thing, and
should be carefully controlled.
. The end result is that local young lovers are
forced either to abstain from even the most simple
and innocent love-making, ... or engage in some de
gree of public display which is uncomfortable for
everyone concerned.
This is but an outline of a problem for which
there is no easy solution; nevertheless, it is a mat
ter of considerable importance, applying in lesser
degree to many areas of social activity on the camp
us.. The present situation is serious enough to
cause concern, but it will get much worse before
it gets better. Whatever the present magnitude of
these and many other problems with which the
University is faced, the imminent sizable increase
in student population will serve to compound the
difficulties.
The causes and the ramifications of the existing
situation are many. The American moral -climate
surrounding love, both platcnic and physical, is a
part of what is commonly referred to as our "Puri
tan heritage"; thus it is a current in the main
stream of the development in- the Western world
of that physical-intellectuai-emotional complex which
we call 'love.'
Obviously, the American attitude toward love
and related activities is often self-defeating, en
couraging and making more pleasurable nominally
illicit activities wheh it strives to control; and. at
the same time, seriously undermining the mature
marital relationship which it is supposed to strength
en and sanctify.
Putting aside, for the moment at least, all far
reaching considerations, we are faced with a Fri
day evening, and hundreds of couples are faced with
the choice of one of several available ways to
spend the evening.
It is safe to assume that the relationships exist
ing between these couples constitute a continuum
from absolute strangers to lovers.
Only for the absolute strangers does Chapel
Hill provide any satisfactory surroundings; for
the success nf a b1ind-dati. or of arv first dat. is
often fostered by the sectxity of either a movie or
some form of public or group activity.
To be sure, any couple, no matter how intimate
their relationship,' may o:;ten enjoy such activities;
but It is essential to the maturation and determi
nation of such relationships that there be "'an oc
casion and sanction for privacy when "it is desired.