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4The Tar Heel Thursday, June 20, 1985 L.JT Nicaragua from page 3 WiriiitWnntin IRQ guerrilla group led by Angusto Cesar Sandino was organized to oppose U.S. intervention. U.S. forces left again in 1933 when the newly-created National Guard, commanded by Gen. Anastasio Somoza Garcia took over. In 1934 Sandino was assassi nated, reputedly on Somoza's orders, but some of his followers (Sandinis tas) continued to actively oppose the regime. Somoza became Minister of War, then in 1935 seized power in a coup, becoming President in 1936. One of Somoza's own nominees succeeded him in 1947, but Somoza overthrew organized into militias. Businessmen, professionals, the Roman Catholic Church and even the usually deferent opposition political parties sup ported the struggle against Somoza. From Feburary 1978 when mass armed revolt broke out in the city of Masaya until the July 1979 revolutionary victory, the FSLN coordinated and organized what would have otherwise been a spon taneous mass revolt. With the FSLN approaching Managua on five different fronts across the country, Somoza resigned and tied Nicaragua on July 17, 1979. him and put his uncle in as President. He was assassinated in Paraguay in In 1950 the uncle died and Somoza 1980. The National Guard disinte resumed power. He remained in grated within 24 hours, and the office until 1956, when he was guerilla commanders entered M ana assassinated by a Sandinista. The gua and set up the Government of Somozas remained dominant in National Reconstruction amidst Nicaraguan politics until 1979, how- domestic and international goodwill. ever, with a family member holding the office of President or Com mander of the National Guard. The Revolution The Frente Sandinista de Libera cion Nacional (FSLN) was formed in 1962. to overthrow the Somoza regime. The public gave little support to the FSLN for 15 years; however, several events which provoked anger at the Somoza regime, increased the popularity of FSLN. After the devastating earthquake of 1972, in which 10,000 Managuans were killed, Somoza imposed martial law, while at the same time increasing personal gain. In 1978 Somoza's government was implicated in the murder of Pedre Joaquin Chagua, editor of Nicaragua's most popular newspaper La Prensa. Amnesty International had reported in 1977 on the syste matic torture and murder by the regime. The revolution involved almost all sectors of Nicaraguan society. Most of the poor and working class were But victory had come at a high price: 4U.000 estimated killed, Nicaragua, while others, including the U.S., gave to a lesser extent. With this money, the GNR set up many social programs and purchased vital imports. International aid did not, however, restore Nicaragua's produc tivity or address imbalances in the economic structure. In September 1979, in an effort to cut public spending, the government declared a one-year "state of social and eco nomic emergency." It soon became clear however that other factors were responsible for the economic problems, factors related to Nicaragua's political realities. After the victory, class-based social and political changes began primarily because all social classes had taken part in the revolution. By 1981, social tensions were growing. Internal Conflicts The lower classes benefited the most from the government's early policies, which included holding a literacy campaign that raised the number of functionally literate Nica- raguans trom to 8 percent, I V MEXICO V GULF Nv Y MEXICO J I J BELIZE v h hi CUBA CARIBBEAN SEA PACIFIC OCEAN HONDURAS f SALVADOR- NICARAGUA Managua COSTARICA ' iw.uw wounded, and well over 100,000 left homeless. A United Nations' study estimated material damages to be $500 million. Per capita gross domestic product fell by 23 percent in 1979. The economy was reducing rents bv 50 Dercent. and devastated, and Somoza had left $ 1 .6 expanding public health services. By billion in debts and a depleted 1981 however, these programs were government treasury. Even after threatened by inflation and the confiscating Somoza's properties, the government's need to cut back on GNR estimated it would require 10 spending. years to rebuild Nicaragua to its ' The private sector was FSLN's prewar capacity. main opposition. They felt their role in overthrowing bomoza merited decisionmaking power and feared that the FSLN would continue to parcel out private property. The Sandinistas on the other;hand were ambivalent toward the"private sector. It would have been easy for the government to blame its troubles on their lack of cooperation, however, not only did it need their productive assets and managerial skills for reconstruction, but also foreign lenders demanded Nicaragua keep the freedom of disssention and' maintain the private sector. Other critics of FSLN included La Prensa and the Roman Catholic Church, both saying they supported The Early Government In August 1979 the GNR issued a 'Statute in Rights and Guarantees for the Citizens of Nicaragua,' insuring personal freedoms and the freedom of the press. They postponed elections until 1985 however, so they would have time to begin reconstruction. Some foreign governments and multilateral lending institutions gave loans and grants generously to a pluralistic society and that FSLN defense was becoming increasin el v auto cratic. Three times during the summer of 1981 the government shut down the newspaper. Though the church at first suppported the revo lution, by 1981 most of the Catholic hierarchy openly opposed the govern ment's drift towards "Marxist atheism." The FSLN radicalizes Although FSLN was not a political party, it appeared to be evolving into one. The three-member governing junta was Nicaragua's highest deci sionmaking body, but policy was also debated in the nine-member National Directorate of the FSLN. Foreign observers could see a division in the directorate between the 'pragmatists,' who followed the politically plural istic model, and the 'idealogues,' who Saw Cuba as their model. 4 With Nicaragua finding new direc tion, relations with the U.S. declined. In 1981;. the Reagan administration claimed Nicaragua was channeling arms to' the leftist insurgents in El Salvador; and cut off U.S. bilateral aid, giving $10 million to support counter-revolutionary forces. Relations continued to sour as Nicaragua accused the U.S. of aggression. Feeling a counter revolution attempt was inevitable. Nicaragua began building a large rim Cx-.f2. f). Tannins Center i Offers year round tanning with the new UVA Suntan Bed. Bring this ad in to get 5 visits for $20.00 thru 630. Remnants of the National Guard which had escaped to Honduras began raiding border towns as the first stage to a counter-revolution, and in 1982 a 30-day state of national emergency was declared. In an effort to stop Nicaragua from sending weapons to El Salvador, the United States gave an additional $9 million for CIA covert operations to weaken the economic infrastructure of the country. With U.S. spy planes vio lating Nicaraguan air space and a military, build-up in Honduras, Nicaragua feared an invasion. Relations improved in April how ever, when the United States offered an eight-point peace plan in which, among other things, it would end training of Somocistas and resume aid, if Nicaragua would stop sending arms to leftists in El Slavador. In March 1982, after its sixth closure, La Prensa along with the rest of Nicaraguan media, was subjected to prior censorship for the 30-day period of emergency. This censorship was extended every month until July, when it was extended for six months. The emergency also restricted foreign and domestic travel and suspended all constitutional rights. In Janurary 1983 relations again deteriorated when Honduras and the United States started the 'Big Pine,' a series of extensive military maneuv ers just to Nicaragua's north. At the same time anti-Sandinista guerillas in Honduras started new attacks. The most significant new development occured in April, when Eden Pastora Gomez, who had resigned from his position as deputy minister of defense in 1981, now acccused the FSLN of betraying its original ideals and formed the Sandinista Revolutionary Front to overthrow the government. Pastora became leader of non Somocista opposition to the FSLN, and with his followers gained support from the moderate foreign govern ments that had aided Nicaragua for See Nicaragua page 7 r-TTirimmiiiw 1 V u U (J , ScTX 105 No. Columbia jj 5 Hair styling & Ea l m. 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Daily Tar Heel (Chapel Hill, N.C.)
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June 20, 1985, edition 1
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