THE SCHLEY CONTROVERSY

Facts Which Led to the Appointment of the Court of Inquiry-The Hunt For Cervera's Fleet and the Famous "Loop" In the Sea Fight Off Santiago.



IE greatest naval dispute Spanish squadron through the channel in the history of this in that direction. On the 26th he re country is just now oc- ceived a letter from Schley, dated May cupying the boards of 23, stating that he was by no means public attention. After satisfied the Spanish squadron was not two years of somewhat at Cienfuegos. A dispatch boat was undignified bickering our sent on the 27th with urgent orders for naval officers are about to settle sev- Schley to proceed at once to Santiago, eral vexed questions, among them the but meanwhile cable dispatches were truth or falsity of a charge imputing cowardice to a rear admiral.

All good Americans regret, of course, arisen. Most of us will be glad to see it wiped off the slate for good and all. would proceed to Nicolas mole, Halti, Meantime, however, we would like to from which point he would communiknow exactly what the row is all about. cate. Here are the facts in the case so far as impartially as may be.

of the Spanish-American war. In ac- of Cervera's squadron. Leaving Ciencordance with the plans of the navy fuegos May 24, Schley steamed to a

received from him stating that he had ascertained the Spanish fleet was not in that port, and that on account of that any such controversy should have short coal supply he could not blockade the Spanish ships in Santiago, but

Sampson then cabled Schley from as they have been disclosed, set down Key West that the New Orleans would meet him off Santiago and to make Now let us begin in the early days every effort to ascertain the location



REAR ADMIRAL SCHLEY.

department a nying squadron was organized, with base of operations at Fort Monroe, for the protection of any point on the Atlantic coast that might be menaced by the hostile Spanish fleet. This squadron was placed under com-mand of Commodore W. S. Schley.

Meanwhile the Spanish fleet, which had been fitted and sent out under command of Admiral Cervera, was approaching the United States.

This fleet, which was reported as leaving Cape de Verde on April 29, was composed of the armored cruisers Cristobal Colon, Vizcaya, Almirante Oquendo and Infanta Maria Teresa, besides the torpedo gunboats Furor, Terror and

point about 20 miles southward and eastward of Santiago, where he signaled his squadron that the destination was Key West for coal. On the morning of the 27th the Harvard brought him this dispatch:

WARMINGTON, via Mole St. Nicolas, May 25, 1898. All department's information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The department looks to you to ascertain facts and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that action. Cubana familiar with Santiago say that there are landing places five or six nautical miles west from the mouth of harbor and that there in-surgents will be found and not the Spanish. From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained notify the depart-ment whether enemy is there. Could not squadron and also the Harvard coal from Merrimac leavard of Cape Cruz, Gonaives channel, or Mole Haiti? The department will send coal immediately to mole. Report without delay situation at Santia-go de Cubs. Loso.


man-of-war, the Cristobal Colon, was # the Brooklyn. Captain F. A. Cook harbor entrance, and later other ships Cervera's squadron, so at 10 a. 111. Schley cabled to Washington that the Spaniards were undoubtedly there. The Colon continuing to occupy its position within view of the American ships, on the morning of the 31st Schley, on board the Massachusetts, with the Iowa and the New Orleans. exchanged shots with her and the forts at a range of about 7,000 yards.

The next day, June 1, Sampson arrived and took command, finding Schley's squadron to the westward of the harbor mouth. Immediately upon the union of these two forces a close



blockade was established, and a cordon was drawn about the harbor entrance with cruisers and battleships in a semicircle in front of it and a double line of smaller vessels and boats inside these. Thus the harbor of Santiago, in which Cervera had been definitely located, was watched constantly, powerful searchlights being turned upon it at night. No effort was relaxed during the weary month that followed to prevent the escape of the enemy, and Sampson promulgated in standing orders a plan of attack by which our vessels were to close in upon any of the Spaniards coming out.

On June 3 occurred the sinking of the Merrimac at the harbor entrance of Santiago in order to prevent if possible the escape of Cervera's fleet. On June 7 the Marblehead and the Yankee took possession of the lower bay of Guantanamo as a harbor of refuge for the fleet in coaling, etc., and the marines were the first to land as invaders on the soil of Cuba. On the 15th Sampson was advised that 30 transports with troops would be sent from Tampa, Fla., and a convoy was provided for them through the Bahama channel. The disembarkation of troops was commenced on the morning of the 22d of June at Baiquiri, to the eastward of General Shafter, but as the latter was irsistent that the navy should more



seen lying at anchor just inside the of the Brooklyn says in his official report: "We opened fire on the leading which were identified as belonging to ship in five minutes from the discovery. The port battery was first engaged as we stood with port helm to head off the leading ship and gave them a raking fire at about 1,500 yards range. The enemy turned to the westward to close into the land. We then wore around to starboard, bringing the starboard battery into action. The enemy hugged the shore to the westward."

This was the since famous "loop" which now plays so conspicuous a part in the controversy, since different motives for this maneuver are ascribed to Schley.

Schley explained this maneuver by stating that he wished to avoid being rammed by the approaching Maria Teresa, and also that he did not wish to "blanket" the fire of his other ships.

A prominent officer, Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who was on the bridge at the time, is accredited with having asked Schley when the order to port the helm was given, "You mean starboard?" "No, I mean port," Schley is said to have replied. "But we will run down the Texas," the officer is al-leged to have remonstrated. "Let the Texas look out for herself" is the re joinder said to have been made by 10 Schley. In a recent interview Lieutenant Commander Hodgson is alleged to have remarked: "To my personal knowledge the helm was kept hard aport during the whole time of turning the loop until eased up to parallel the course of the Vizcaya, then about 2.800 yards away on the starboard As the Brooklyn's tactical bow. diameter is only about 600 yards, she therefore could not have run farther than 600 yards to the southward."


In his annual report for 1898 the secretary of the navy says: "Since my last annual report the navy has for the first time since its rehabilitation been put to the supreme test of war. Years of patient, persistent training and development had brought it to a point of high efficiency which resulted in the unparalleled victories at Manila and Santiago-victories which have given the names of our naval commanders worldwide fame and added an addltional page to the glorious naval his-tory of our country." There was "no blot on the record," the secretary observed, and in concluding his report he said: "The department feels, in contemplating the vast amount of work necessary to the successful operations of the navy during the last year (1898). that the country as well as the service has cause for congratulations in the results which have followed and which have been so generally approved, and in the further fact that no personal feeling has arisen to mar the glorious victories and magnificent work of the service.

In the concluding clause, unfortunately, the secretary was, to state it mildly, rather premature in alluding to Morro Castle. Sampson had sent his chief of staff to communicate with to prevail among those most promithe good feeling which was supposed nently engaged in the naval service off the coast of Cuba. It is not necessary actively co-operate by shelling the to go back to the beginning of the con-

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His request was promptly granted, as appears by Secretary Long's reply:

Navy DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, July 24, 1901. Sir-1 am in receipt of yours of the 22d inst. with reference to the criticisms upon you in con-nection with the Spanish-American war and hear-tily approve of your action under the circum-



of this article. These are the lines of investigation which Secretary Long has designated for the official inquiry to follow: 1. His conduct in connection with the

events of the Santiago campaign. 2. The circumstances attending, the reasons controlling and the propriety of the movements of the flying squad-

ron off Cienfuegos in May, 1898. 3. The circumstances attending, the reasons controlling and the propriety of the movements of the said squadron in proceeding from Clenfuegos to Santlago.

4. The circumstances attending the arrival of the flying squadron off Santiago, the reasons for its retrograde turn westward and departure from off Santiago and the propriety thereof.

5. The circumstances attending and the reasons for the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the orders of the department contained in its dispatch



REAR ADMIRAL SAMPSON.

stances in asking at the hands of this department such action as may bring this entire matter under discussion "under the clearer and calmer review of my brothers in arms." The department will at once proceed in accord-

ance with your request. Very respectfully, John D. Long.

The objectionable paragraphs in Maclay's "History of the Navy" are as follows:

Schley, on May 28, 1898, sullied this brightest Schier, on May 25, 1995, stilled this brighter of American motioes by penning, "Much to be re-gretted cannot obey orders" and turned in caitiff flight from the danger spot toward which duty, bonor and the whole American people were most carnestly urging him. Viewed in whatever light it may be, the fore-when dimetric months characterized thereas

going dispatch cannot be characterized otherwise than as being, without exception, the most hu-miliating, cowardly and lamentable report ever penned by an American naval officer. And further:

In his report about the coal supply of the ver sels under his command Schley exhibited at timidi-ty either amounting to absolute cowardice or a prevarication of facts that were intrinsically false-hoods.

hoods. The coal supply of his squadron, so far from be-ing meager, as Schley reported, is shown by the respective logs of those ships, as indicated at noon May 27, to have been most satisfactory.

Here, the have been most satisfactory. Here, the have the humiliating spectacle of an American naval officer of high rank, hav-ing each and every one of his fighting ships with more than three days' coal supply aboard, with a collier laden with 4,000 tons of coal, reporting, at

dated May 25, 1898, and the propriety

of his conduct in the premises. 6. The condition of the coal supply of the flying squadron on and about May 27, 1898; its coaling facilities; the necessity, if any, for, or advisability of, the return of the squadron to Key West to coal, and the accuracy and propriety of the official reports made by Commodore Schley with respect to this matter.

7. Whether or not every effort incumbent upon the commanding officer of a fleet under such circumstances was made to capture or destroy the Spanish cruiser Colon as she lay at anchor in the entrance to Santiago harbor May 27 to 31 inclusive, and the necessity for or advisability of engag-



Pluton. It was supposed, of course, that it would sail for Cuba as its ultimate destination. On news of Cervera leaving Cape de Verde, Sampson sailed eastwardly with a portion of his fleet for the purpose of observation. It was on this cruise that he bombarded San Juan, Porto Rico, having had information that the Spaniards were to call at that port, but meanwhile Cervera had touched at Martinique, then at Curacao, near the coast of Venezuela, and by making a clever flank movement had come up to the south coast of Cuba and entered the harbor of Santiago wholly unobserved by the Americans.

Through its secret agents in Havana and elsewhere the navy department had been informed that Cervera was under instructions to reach Havana, or some port connected by rail with the capital, as he carried munitions of war for its defense. Instructions were accordingly forwarded to observe and, if necessary, blockade Clenfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba. as the only port affording the conditions favorable for reaching Havana. Accordingly the flying squadron, under Schley, salled from Key West for Clenfuegos, with instructions to establish a blockade at that port with all dispatch. It arrived off Cienfuegos May 20, where the original fleet, composed of the Brooklyn, Texas, Massachusetts and Scorpion, was later augmented by the Iowa. Castine and the collier Merrimac. The same day the navy department received information that Cervera was reported at Santiago de Cuba and so informed Sampson, who at once dispatched the Marblehead with advices to Schley ordering him, if Cervera was not at Cienfuegos. to proceed with all haste to Santiago. On the 22d Sampson, then off Havana, received a dispatch from Key West stating that Cervera's squadron undoubtedly had been in the harbor of Santiago on the morning of the previous day, but that it was expected it might sail for San Juan, Porto Rico, and if Schley had found that it had left Santiago he should promptly order him to follow in pursuit. Sampson was then blockading Hayana and the north coast, but he at once salled eastward Schley's answer was as follows:

KINOSTON, May 28, 1898.

Eixosron, May 28, 1898. Secretary Navy, Washington: Sir-Merrimac engines disabled; is heavy; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas. Marblehead, the Vixen, the Brooklyn function collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key West. The Brooklyn filone has more than suffi-cient coal to proceed to Key West. Cannot re-main off Santiago present state squadron coal ac-count. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwesterly winda. count. impossible to coal neward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to southwesterly winds. Much to be regretted cannot obey orders of de-partment. Have striven earnestly: forced to pro-ceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan pas-mage. Cannot ascertain anything respecting ene-my positive. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold. SCHLET.

Later in the day on which this dispatch was sent the Texas and the



REAR ADMIRAL HOWISON (RETIRED). [Member board of inquiry.]

Marblehead went alongside the collier Merrimac and coaled, the squadron at that time being about 40 miles to the southward and westward of Santiago. That afternoon the squadron sailed in the direction of Santiago, stopping for the night about ten miles distant from that port, with the Marblehead scouting about two miles inside the line. to prevent the possible approach of the | Early next morning, May 29, a Spanish

THE FAMOUS "LOOP" OF THE BROOKLYN.

city of Santiago, an interview was arranged between the two commanders to take place on the 3d of July.

It was while Sampson, in the New York, was hastening toward Siboney that Cervera made his attempt to es cape. The New York had reached a point about four miles east of her blockading station and about seven miles from Morro Castle when the Spanish squadron was espled steaming out of the narrow channel leading from Santiago's harbor to the open sea. The flagship immediately reversed her course and steamed in the direction of the escaping fleet, flying the signal to close in and attack the enemy. This, however, the ships on blockade had already done.

When the Spanish ships were first sighted, all the blockading vessels were in a semicircle in the following order, reckoning from the eastward: The Indiana, the Oregon, the Iowa, the Texas and the Brooklyn, the last named being farther to the westward than any of the other great ships. The Massachusetts had gone to Guantaname for coal, the torpedo boat Erics son was in company with the flagship and the Gloucester and Vixen lay close to land, to the eastward and westward, respectively, of the channel.

One of the most important of the precepts in the court of inquiry investigation deals with the so called "loop"

forts, Morro Castle, and, if possible, the | troversy recently precipitated by the publication of a book reflecting upon the conduct of Rear Admiral Schley in the movements off Santiago, and particularly of his action in the battle in which Cervera's squadron was destroyed. The naval court of inquiry will determine those matters and will doubtless settle the discussion as to all points at issue.

It will be recalled that soon after naval operations were over friends of the present rear admirals, Sampson and Schley, urged their respective claims to promotion with a great deal of warmth, and that action upon the advancement not only of the parties most prominent, but of their brother officers entitled to promotion for bravery and excellent service was delayed in consequence. It is not necessary to more than allude to the deep feeling which has since developed, the events are so recent and so well known. Neither Sampson nor Schley had taken official cognizance of reports and even charges against their characters, and nearly three years elapsed before such action was taken. When, however, in the third volume of Maclay's "History of the Navy" passages occurred reflecting severely upon Rear Admiral Schley's conduct, he felt impelled to seek a vindication in the following letter to the secretary of the navy:

nent when the greatest crisis of the war was a house that "as the prospect did not seen fa-vorable for replenishing the mesiger coal supply of the larger vessels, the squadron stood to the west-ward," or away from the point the whole United States was most fervently praying and urging him to reach. to reach.

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Soon after the flasco with the Eugle Schley bound another pretext for delay in the collier Merrimac, which embarrassed the movements of Merrimac, which embarrased the movements of the squadron by breaking her intermediate prea-sure valve stem and cracking her stuffing box. "This," reported the commodore, "was a source of considerable anxiety, as, with the weather con-ditions that prevalled since leaving Cienfuegos, it appeared absolutely necessary to abandon the po-sition off Santiago and seek a place where the vessels could be coaled and the collier's machinery remained." paired."

repaired." This excuse, like the surf off Clentuegos, which Schley deemed too strong for American naval valor to surmount, and the "rain and rough weather" which delayed the run to Santiago, was soon shown to be groundless, for the energetic en-gineers of the Merrimac soon repaired the dam-

Again the author says:

Again the author says: The one great lesson that Nelson gave in naval strategy was that a captain is never out of posi-tion when alongside an enemy. Farragut's great axiom, 60 years later, was that "the nearer you get to your enemy the harder you can strike." Schley's contribution to naval strategy, as too plainly shown by his conduct throughout this campaign, was, "Avoid your enemy as long as possible, and if he makes for you, run."

The reader has doubtless already formed his own opinion regarding Rear



REAR ADMIRAL BENHAM (RETIRED). er board of in

Admiral Schley's conduct in the war and, what is made the most of by Schley's critics, the famous "loop" of the Brooklyn in entering the race against the Spanish warships-which is GEART NECK, N. Y., July 22, 1001. Sir-Within the last fow days a series of press comments have been sent to me from various parts of the moment. The whole matter for Schley in the premises.

ADMIRAL DEWEY. [President board of inquiry.]

ing the batteries at the entrance to Santiago harbor and the Spanish vessels at anchor within the entrance to said harbor at the ranges used, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

* 8. The necessity, if any, for and advisability of withdrawing at night the flying squadron from the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea, if such shall be found to have been the case; the extent and character of such withdrawal and whether or not a close or adequate blockade of said harbor to prevent the escape of the enemy's vessels therefrom was established, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

9. The position of the Brooklyn on the morning of July 3, 1898, at the time of the exit of the Spanish vessels from the harbor of Santiago, the circumstances attending, the reasons for and the incidents resulting from the turning of the Brooklyn in the direction which she turaed at or about the beginning of the action with said Spanish vessels, and the possibility of thereby colliding with or endangering any other of the vessels of the United States fleet, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the prem-

10. The circumstances leading to and the incidents and results of a controversy with Lieutenant Albon C. Hodgaon, U. S. N., who, on July 3, 1898, during the battle of Santiago, was navigator of the Brooklyn, in relation to the turning of the Brooklyn; also the colloquy at that time between Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson and the ensuing correspondence between them on the subject thereof, and the propriety of the conduct of Admiral