THE SCHLEY
CONTROVERSY
Facts Which Led to the Appointment of th?
Court of Inquiry ? The Hunt For Cer
vera's Fleet and the Famous "Loop"
In the Sea Fight Oif Santiago.
greatest naval dispute I
In the history of this I
country is just now oc- i
cupytug the boards of :
B*rvV'i rj public attention. After i
two years of somewhat i
undlgnilled bickering our i
navul officers art- about to settle sev- I
erul vexed questions, among them the
truth or falsity of a charge imputing
cowardice to a rear admiral. i
All good Americans regret, of course, !
that any such controversy should have
arisen. Most of us will be glad to see
It wiped off the slate for good and all.
Meantime, however, we would like to
know exactly what the row Is ail about, i
Here are the facts In the case so far
as they have been disclosed, set down 1
as Impartially as may lie. i
Now let us begin in the early days <
of the Spanish-American war. In ac- i
cordance with the plans of the navy I
UK A It ADMIRAL SCHI.EY.
cepartment a dying squadron was or
ganized. witli base of operations at
Fort Monroe, for the protection of any
point on the Atlantic coast that might
be menaced by the hostile Spanish fleet.
This squadron was placed under com
mand of Commodore W. 8. Schley.
Meanwhile the Spanish fleet, which
had been fitted und sent out under
command of Admiral Cervera, was ap
proaching the Tnltcd States.
This fleet, which was reported as
leaving Cape de Verde on April 2!). was
composed of the armored cruisers Cris
tobal Colon, Vizeayn, Almlrante Oquen
do and Infanta Maria Teresa, besides
the torpedo gunboats Furor, Terror and
Pluton. It was supposed, of course,
that It would sail for Cuba as Its ulti
mate destination. On news of Cervera
leaving Cape de Verde. Sampson sailed
eastwardly with a portion of his fleet
for the purpose of observation. It was
on this cruise that be bombardod San
Juan, Forto Rico, having had Informa
tion that the Spaniards were to call at
that port, but meanwhile Cervera had
touched at Martinique, then at Cura
cao, near the coast of Venezuela, and
by making a clever flank movement
had come up to the south coast of Cuba
and entered the harbor of Santiago
wholly unobserved by the Americans.
Through Its secret agents in Ha
vana and elsewhere the navy depart
ment had been Informed that Cervera
was under Instructions to reach Ha
vana. or some port connected by rail
with the capital, as he carried muni
tions of war for Its defense. Instruc
tions were accordingly forwarded to
observe and. If necessary, blocltnde
Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba,
as the only port affording the condi
tions favorable for reaching Havana.
Accordingly the Hying squadron, under
Schley, sailed from Key West for
Cienfucgos. with instructions to estab
lish a blockade at that port with all
dispatch. It arrived off Ciettfuegos
May 20, where the original fleet, com
posed of the Brooklyn, Texas. Massa
chusetts and Scorpion, was Inter aug
mented by the Iowa. Castine and the
collier MerrlmaC. The same day the
navy department received Information
that Cervera was reported at Santiago
de Cuba and so informed Sampson,
who at once dispatched the Marble
head with advices to Schley ordering
him. If Cervera was not at Cienfuegos,
to proceed with all haste to Santiago
On the 22d Sampson, then off Ilavnna,
received a dispatch from Key West
elating that Cervera's squadron un
doubtedly had beeu in the harbor of
Santiago on the morning of the pre- i
vlous day. but that It was expected It ;
might Rail for San Juan, Porto Blco, ;
and if Schley had found that It had left
Santiago be should promptly order blm
tc follow in pursuit. Sampson was
then blockading Havana and the north
coast, but he at once sailed eastward
tc prevent the possible approach of the !
Spanish squadron through the channel
In that direction. On the 2flth be re
reived a letter from Schley, dated May
?1. Htating that lie was by no igeaus
satisfied the Spanish siiuadron was not
[it Cleufuegog. A dispatch boat was
Bent on the 27th with urgent orders for
Schley to proceed at once to Santiago,
hut meanwhile cable dispatches were
received from him stating that he had
ascertained the Spanish fleet was not
lu that port, and that on account of
bliort coal supply he could not blockade
the Spanish ships In Santiago, but
would proceed to Nicolas mole. Haiti,
from which point he would communi
cate.
Sampson then cabled Schley from
Key West that the New Orleans would
meet him off Santiago and to make
?very effort to ascertain the location
if Cervera's squadron. Heaving Cleu
tuegos May 24. Schley steamed to a
point about 20 miles southward and
eastward of Santiago, where he signaled
his squadron that the destination was
Key West for coal. On the morning
01 the 27th the Harvard brought him
this dispatch:
W \riiington, via Mole St. Nicolas, May 25, 1898.
All department's information indicates Spanish
! division ia still at Santiago. The department
looks to you to ascertain facts and that the ene J
! my, if therein, docs not leave without a decisive
1 action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that
there are landing places Ave or six nautical miles
west from the mouth of harbor and that there in
surgents will be found and not the Spanish. From
the surrounding heights can see every vessel in
port. As soon as asce*iained notify the depart
ment whether enemy is there. Could not squadron
and also the Harvard coal from Merrimac leeward
of Cape Crpz, Gonaives channel, or Mole Haiti?
1 The department will send coal immediately to
mole. Keport without delay situation at Santia
go de Cuba. Lomo.
Schley's answer was as follows:
Kinqston, May 28, 1898.
I Secretary Navy. Washington:
! Sir?Merrimac engines disabled; ia heavy; am
I obliged to have towed to Key West. Have been
J unable absolutely to coal the Texas. Marblchead,
j the Vixen, the Brooklyn from collier, all owing to
very rough sea. Bad weather aince leaving Key
i West. The Brooklyn ilone has more than suffl
I cient coal to proceed to Key West. Cannot re
main off Santiago present state squadron coal ac
count. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cru? in
the summer, all owing to southwesterly winds.
Much to be regretted cannot obey orders of de
I partment. Have striven earnestly; forced to pro
ceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan pas
sage. Cannot ascertain anything respecting ene
my positive. Very difficult to tow collier to get
I cable to hold. Schlet.
I.ater In the day on whleh this dls
: patch was sent the Texas and the
REAR ADMIRAL HOWISON (RETIRED).
[Moraber board of inquiry.)
Marblehead went alongside the collier
Merrlmac and coaled, the squadron at
that time being about 40 miles to the
southward and westward of Santiago.
That afternoon the squadron sailed in
the direction of Santiago, stopping for
the night about ten miles distant from
that port with the Marblelicad scout
ing about two miles Inside the line.
Larly next morning, May 'JO, a Spanish
man-of-war, the Cristobnl Colon, wh
seen lying at anchor just Itirlde the
harbor entrance, and later other ships
which were identified as belonging to
Cervera's tuiuadrmi, so at 10 a. ni.
Schley eahled to \Vuslilngtou that the
Spaniard# were undoubtedly there,
'the Colon continuing to occupy Its po
sition within view of the American
ships, on the morning of the 31st
Schley, on board the Massachusetts,
with the Iowa uiiil the New Orleaus.
exchanged shots with her and the forts
at a range ot about 7.000 yards.
The next day. June I. Sampson ar
rived and took command, finding
Schley's squadron to the westward ol
the harbor mouth. Immediately upon
the utiiou of these two forces a close
CAPTAIN LEMI.Y, JUDGE ADVOCATE,
blockade was established, and a cordon
was drawn about the harbor entrance
with cruisers and battleships in a semi
circle In front of it and a double line of
smaller vessels and boats inside these.
Thus the harbor of Santiago, in which
Cervera bad been definitely located, was
watched constantly, powerful search
lights being turned upon it at night.
No effort was relaxed during the weary
month that followed to prevent the es
cape of the enemy, and Sampson pro
mulgated in standing orders a plan of
attack by which our vessels were to
close In upoD any of the Spaniards
coming out.
On June 3 occurred the sinking of
the Merrimac at the harbor entrance
of Santiago in order to prevent If pos
sible the escape of Cervera's fleet. On
June 7 the Marbleliead and the Yankee
took possession of the lower bay of
Guantauamo as a harbor of refuge for
the fleet In coaling, etc., and the ma- |
rines were the first to land as invaders
on the soil of Cuba. On the 13th Samp
son was advised that 30 transports
with troops would be sent from Tampa, j
Flu., and a convoy was provided for
them through the Itahamu channel, j
The disembarkation of troops was com- |
n-enced on the morning of the 32d of j
June at Baiquiri, to the eastward of ;
Morro Castle. Sampson had sent his ]
chief of staff to communicate with t
Gtnerul Shafter, but as the latter was
lrsistent that the navy should more |
actively co-operate by shelling the
THE FAMOUS "LOOP" OF THE BROOKLYN.
forts. Morro Castle, and. If possible, the
city of Santiago, an Interview was ar
ranged between the two commanders
to take place on the 3d of July.
It was while Sampson. In the New
York, was hastening toward Slboney
that Cervera made his attempt to es
cape. The New York had reached a point
about four miles east of her block
ading station and about seven miles
from Morro Castle when the Spanish
squadron was espied steaming out of
the narrow channel leading from San
tiago's harbor to the open sea. The
flagship Immediately reversed her
course and steamed in the direction of
the escaping fleet, flying the signal to
close in and attack the enemy. This,
however, the ships on blockade had al
ready done.
When the Spanish ships were first |
sighted, all the blockading vessels were
In a semicircle In the following order,
reckoning from the eastward: The
Indiana, the Oregon, the Iowa, the
Texas and the Brooklyn, the last
nnmed being farther to the westward
than any of the other great ships. The
Massachusetts had gone to Guanta
narno for coal, the torpedo boat Erics
son wns in company with the flagship
and the Gloucester and Vixen lay close
to land, to the eastward and westward,
respectively, of the chanuel.
One of the most Important of the
precepts In the court of Inquiry Investi
gation deals with the so called "loop"
#f the Brooklyn. Captain F. A. Cook
ef the Brooklyn fays In his official re
port: "We opened tire on the lcudlng
ship In five minutes from the discovery.
The port battery was llrst engaged as
we stood with .port helm to hea l olT
the leading ship and gave them a
raking lire at about 1,500 yards range.
The enemy turned to the westward to
close Into the land. We then wore
around to starboard, bringing the star
board battery Into action. The enemy
hogged the shore to the westward."
This was the since famous "loop"
which now plays so conspicuous a part
in the controversy, since different mo
tives fur this maneuver are useribed
to Schley.
Schley explained this maneuver by
slating that he wished to avoid being
lammed by the approaching Maria
Teresa, and also that he did not wish
to "blanket" the tire of his other ships.
A prominent officer. Lieutenant Com
mander Hodgson, who was on the
bridge at the time, is accredited with
having asked Schley when the order
to port the holm was given, "You mean
starboard?" "No, I mean port," Schley
Is said to have replied. "But we will
run down the Texas," the officer is al
leged to have remonstrated. "Let the
Texas look out for herself" is the re
Joinder said to have been made by
Schley. In a recent interview I.ieu
ti bant Commander Hodgson is alleged
to have remarked: "To my personal
knowledge the helm was kept hard
nport during the whole time of turn
ing the loop until eased up to parallel
the course of the Vizcaya, then about
2.800 yards away on the starboard
1 ... 4 . 4.1... n l.1nn'n tnotlonl
UOW. ,\s ujc nruuaij u a ioliiviij
diameter Is only about COO yards, she
therefore could not have run farther
than GOO yards to the southward."
In his annual report for 18Uif the sec
retary of the navy says: "Since my
Inst annual report the navy has for the
first time since its rehabilitation been
put to the supreme test of war. Years
of patient, persistent training and de
velopment had brought it to a point of
higli efficiency which resulted In the
unparalleled victories at Manila and
Santiago?victories which have given
the names of our naval commanders
worldwide fame and added an addi
tional page to the glorious naval his
tory of our country." There was "no
blot on the record," the secretary ob
served, and in concluding his report he
said: "The department feels, in con
templating the vast amount of work
necessary to the successful operations
of the navy during the last year (18981,
that the country as well as the service
has cause for congratulations in the
results which have followed and which
have been so generally approved, and
in the further fact that no personal
feeling has arisen to mar the glorious
victories and magnificent work of the
service."
In the concluding clause, unfortu
nately, the secretary was, to state it
mildly, rather premature in alluding to
the good feeling which was supposed
to prevail among those most promi
nently engaged in the naval service off
the coast of Cuba. It is not necessary
to go back to the beginning of the con
troversy recently precipitated by the
publication of a book reflecting upon
the conduct of Rear Admiral Schley In
the movements off Santiago, and par
ticularly of his action in the battle in
which Cervera's squadron wns de
stroyed. The naval court of inquiry
will determine those matters and will
doubtless settle the discussion as to all
points at Issue.
It will be recalled that soon after
naval operations were over friends of
the present rear admirals, Sampson and
Schley, urged their respective claims
to promotion with a great deal of
warmth, and that action upon the ad
vaucement not only of the parties most
prominent, but of their brother ofllcers
entitled to promotion for bravery and
excellent service was delayed In conse
quence. It is not necessary to more
than allude to the deep feeling which
has since developed, the events are so
recent and so well known. Neither!
Sampson nor Schley had taken official
cognizance of reports and even chnrges
against their characters, and nearly
three years elapsed before such action
was taken. When, however, In the
third volume of Mnclay's "History of
the Navy" passages occurred reflecting
severely upon Rear Admiral Schley's
conduct, he felt impelled to seek a vin
dlcation in the following letter to the'
secretary of the navy:
Great Nrn. R. t.. July ?, loot.
Sir?Within the tin few day* a aerie* of pre** !
comments hare been sent to me from various part* |
?f the country of a book entitled "The History ot
the Navy," written by one Edgar Stanton Maclay.
From these reviews it appears that this edition is
a third solum? of the said history, ext nded to in
clude the war with Spain, which the first two
volumes did not contain, and were in use as text
books at the Naval academy.
From excerpta quoted in aome reviews, in which
the page and paragraph are given, there is such
perversion of facts, misconstruction of intention, 1
such intemperate abuse and defamation of myself, j
which subjects Mr. Maclay to action in civil law.
While 1 admit the right of fair criticism of every |
public officer, 1 must protest against the low (
flings and abusive language of this violent, parti
san opponent, who has infused into the pages ot
his book so much of the malice of unfairness as
to make it unworthy the name of history or of
use in any reputable institution of the country.
1 have refrained heretofore from all comment
upon the innuendoes of enemies muttered or mur- j
mured in secret and therefore with safety to them
selves. J think the time has now come to take i
such action as may bring this <i Ae matter under |
discussion under the clearer and calmer review of
my brothers in arms, and to this end 1 ask such
action at the hands of the department as it inay
deem best to accomplish this purpose.
But 1 would express the request in this connec- j
tion that whatever the action may be it occur in j
Washington, where most of my papers and data
are stored. Very respectfully,
W. S. Schley, Itear Admiral, U. S. N. j
Ills request was promptly granted, as
appears by Secretary Long's reply:
Navy Department, Washington, July 24, 1901.
Sir?1 am in receipt of yours of the 22d inst.
with reference to the criticisms upon you in con
nection with the Spanish-American war and hear
tily approve of your action under the circuin
REAR ADMIRAL SAMPSON.
stances in asking at the hands of this department
4 such actiuai as may bring litis entire natter under
discussion "under the clearer and calmer review of
my brothers in arms."
The department will at once proceed in accord
* ance with your request. Very respectfully,
John D. Long.
The objectionable paragraphs In Ma
clay's "History of the Navy" are as
follows:
Schley, on May 28, 1898, sullied this brightest
of American mottoes by penning, "Much to be re
gretted cannot obey orders" and turned in caitiff
1 flight from the danger spot toward which duty,
honor and the whole American people were most
earnestly urging him.
Viewed in whatever light it may be, the fore
going dispatch cannot be characterized otherwise
than as being, without exception, the most hu
miliating, cowardly and lamentable report ever
penned by an American naval officer.
And further:
In his report about the coal supply of the ves
( sels under his command Schley exhibited a timidi
ty either amounting to absolute cowardice or a
prevarication of facts that were intrinsically false
! hoods.
The coal supply of his squadron, so far from be
ing meager, as Schley reported, is shown by the
| respective logs of those ships, as indicated at
noon May 27, to have been most satisfactory.
Here, then, we have the humiliating spectacle
of an American naval officer of high rank, hav
ing each and every one of his fighting ships with
more than three days' coal supply aboard, with a
collier laden with 4,000 tons of coal, reporting, at
a moment when the greatest crisis of the war was
at hand, that "as the prospect did not seem fa
vorable for replenishing the meager coal supply of
the larger vessels, the squadron stood to the west
ward," or away from the point the whole United
States was most fervently praying and urging him
to reach.
? ? ? ? ? * ?
Soon after the fiasco with the E?gle Schley
found another pretext for delay in the collier
Merrimac, which embarrassed the movements of
the squadron by breaking her intermediate pres
sure valve stem and cracking her stuffing box.
"This," reported the commodore, "was a source
of considerable anxiety, as, with the weather con
ditions that prevailed since leaving Cienfuegos, it
! appeared absolutely necessary to abandon the po
sition off Santiago and seek a place where the
vessels'could be coaled and the collier's machinery
repaired." v
This excuse, like the surf off Cienfuegos, which
Schley deemed too strong for American naval
valor to surmount, and the "rain and rough
weather" which delayed the run to Santiago, was
soon shown to be groundless, for the energetic en
! gineers of the Merrimac soon repaired the dam
age.
Again the author says:
The one great lesson that Nelson gave in naval
strategy was that a captain is never out of posi
tion when alongside an enemy. Farragut's great
! axiom, 60 years later, was that "the nearer you
get to your enemy the harder you can strike."
Schley's contribution to naval strategy, as too
plainly shown by his conduct throughout this
! campaign, was, "Avoid your enemy as long as
; possible, and if be makes for you, run."
The reader has doubtless already
formed his own opinion regarding Hear
REAR ADMIRAL BKNHAM (RETIRED).
[Member board of inquiry.]
Admiral Bcbley's conduct In the war
and, what Is made the most of by
Schley's critics, the famous "loop" of
the Brooklyn In entering the race
against the Spanish warships?which Is
explained by his friends ns a technical
maneuver warranted by the exigencies
of the moment. The whole matter for
examination Is summed up In Secre
tary Long's "precept" Issued to the
court ot inquiry, which contains ten
counts that will clearly explain the
case In controversy, particularly If read
in connection with the resume of
operations leading up to and before
Santiago given In the opening portion
of this article.
These are the lines of investigation
which Secretary Loug has designated
for the official inquiry to follow: 4
1. His couduct in connection with the
events of the Santiago campaign.
'1. The circumstances attending, the
reasons controlling and the propriety
of the movements of the Hying squad
ron off Cienfuegos In- May. 1808.
3. The circumstances attesting, the
reasons controlling and the propriety
of the movements of the said squadron
in proceeding from Cienfuegos to San
tiago.
4. The circumstances attending the
arrival of the flying squadron off San
tiago. the reasons for its retrograde
turn westward and departure front off
Santiago and the propriety thereof.
5. The circumstances attending and
the reasons for the disobedience by
Commodore Schley of the orders of the
department contained in its dispatch
dated May 25. 1898, and the propriety
of ids eouduet in the premises.
C. The condition of the coal supply
of the flying squadron on and about
May 27, 1898: its coaling facilities; the
necessity. If any. for, or advisability
of, the return of the squadron to Key
West to coal, and the accuracy and
propriety of the official reports made
ty Commodore Schley with respect to
this matter.
7. Whether or not every effort in
cumbent upon the commanding officer
of a fleet under such circumstances
wns made to capture or destroy the
Spanish cruiser Colon as she lay at
anchor In the entrance to Santiago har
bor May 27 to 31 inclusive, and the
necessity for or advisability of engag
ADMIltAL DEWEY.
[President board ol inquiry.]
Ing the batteries nt the entrance to San
tiago harbor and the Spanish vessels at
anchor within the entrance to said har
bor at the ranges used, and the proprie
ty of Commodore Schley's conduct In
the premises.
? 8. The necessity, If any, for and ad
visability of withdrawing at night the
flying si]uadron from the entrance to
Santiago harbor to a distance at sea,
if sncli shall he found to have been the
case; the extent and diameter of such
withdrawal and whether or not a close
or adequate blockade of said harbor to
prevent the escape of the enemy's ves
sels therefrom was established, and the
propriety of Commodore Schley's con
duct In the premises.
?J. The pos.tion of the Brooklyn on
tin- morning of July 3. 1898. at the time
of the ex:t of the Spanish \essels from
the harbor of Santiago, the circum
stances attending, the reasons for and
the Incidents resulting from tne turn
ing of the Brooklyn In the direction
which she turned at or alsiut the be
ginning of the action with said Span
ish vessels, and the possibility of there
by colliding with or endangering any
other of the vessels of the United
States fleet, and the propriety of Com
modore Schley's conduct In the prem
ises.
10. The circumstances lending to nnd
the Incidents and results of n contro
versy with I.lontenant Allton C. Hodg
son, V. S. N? who. on July :|. 1898. dur
ing the battle of Santiago was naviga
tor of the Itrouklyn. lit r. hit. it to the
turning of the Brookiytt: al-n the col
loquy at that time between Commodore
Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson and
the ?nsulng eorrespi atlctiee botwei t
| them on the subject thereof, and the
' propriety of the conduct of Adtulial
| Schley Id the premises.