

## INVASION


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signs and portents which the Germans can weigh.

The nature of our air operations affords the enemy one means of determining the imminence of a great invasion. Before an attacking force of fifty divisions, for example, could be sent across the channel there would be a preliminary attack on tactical objectives along the coast. When the RAF and the AAF turn their power from strategic attacks, that is the bombardment of industrial objectives, to tactical support of ground troops by preliminary blasting of gun emplacements, supply dumps, and so on, then invasion is near at hand. At the present time the Anglo-American air fleets are hammering at strategic objectives. This is not the time to enter the argument of strategic versus tactical bombing; however, in some quarters the question has been asked whether the organization that has been perfected for the strategic bombardment of Europe will be flexible enough to provide the air support for our ground forces. There is reason to believe on the evidence of the Italian campaign that our tactical use of air power has not equaled the expectations of aviation enthusiasts.

The signal for the invasion will be recognized by both sides when the allies master the German fighter aviation. From a general bombardment of German industry, the allies have turned to the bombardment of airplane factories. Since the Germans use bombers (JU 88 and DO 217) and fighters indiscriminately as defense aircraft, not only fighter plane production centers but all aircraft industries must be attacked. To destroy finished aircraft heavy assaults have been mounted against places with such an industrial and a political value that a strong defense is required. Berlin of course comes in this category. The situation is much the same as it was in 1940: the prize was not London but the fighter strength of the RAF. When the British gave up their city to air demolition rather than sacrifice their planes, the Germans had to reconsider the planned invasion of England. The Germans are now being forced to make the same decision, either Berlin or the *Luftwaffe*. It is one of the ironies of the war for Goering, who boasted that no bombs would fall on Germany, that he can have neither Berlin nor the *Luftwaffe*.

## Coaches of Winning Teams



ALL SMILES, and they've a right to be. Pictured above are coaches of the winning teams in the recently completed Winter Sports Program. Left to right, they are Lt. (jg) E. D. Forker, USNR, coach of the Wildcat wrestling team; Ensign W. H. Muir, USNR, Buccaneer basketball coach; Ensign C. E. Wilkinson, USNR, Buccaneer boxing coach; Lt. (jg) R. L. Barrick, USNR, Mustang gym coach; Lt. (jg) R. W. Paugh, USNR, Mustang swimming coach, and Lt. (jg) F. E. Wiand, USNR, who coached the Vindicator soccer team.

## ... Book Review ...

TO ALL HANDS: AN AMPHIBIOUS ADVENTURE, John Mason Brown, Lieut., USNR, Whittlesey House, New York, 1943, 236 pp., \$2.75.

Nine out of ten men aboard most warships cannot see what is going on topside. Moreover, in the course of a mission the scuttle-butt that races through the lower decks must, for reasons of security, lack accurate fact on numbers and names of ships, course, speed, and destination. Yet in this war, and in amphibious attack on hostile beaches especially, the lowliest hand must know what is going on, and fully understand the mission of the force as a whole.

Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, in command of a large U. S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force bound for a Sicilian beach, concluding that our "success in combat comes often from brilliant individual initiative," and so as to make full use of the "resourcefulness of the individual sailor or soldier," directed his staff officer Lieut. Brown to present daily broadcasts to the 1500 men aboard the flagship, in convoy on the way over, during rendezvous in a North African port, in the fierce battle at Scoglitti, and on the way home.

Lieut. Brown is excellently equipped to interpret this adventure to the mixed Army and Navy personnel aboard, most of them proceeding into their first battle, and to us. Recently a civilian himself and privately, as he confesses, one of the least bellicose, he judges truly what men new in uniform want to know and how they feel. His long experience as theatre

critic in New York has taught him a sure and immediate response to action and emotion as presented on the stage; writing a daily review and some nine books on the theatre leads him to the right word and turn of phrase; and previous experience as lecturer and broadcaster has taught him what words carry most meaning over the air.

More than 80 on-the-spot photographs, sketches, and paintings help his words to bring the experience to us who were not there. Exciting episodes were few as the huge convoy sprawled slowly across the Atlantic to an unannounced destination in Europe, except as the isolation of the sea magnified trivial events into good broadcasting material. Danger was ever-present, however, and alarms and excursions were many.

The interval gave Lieut. Brown time to create the feeling of being just one unit of a huge armada which spread over the sea and out of sight. The tempo of reporting accelerates as Scoglitti nears, and the battle of the beach comes through with controlled but throbbing excitement.

To All Hands ought to survive longer than most war books. The mission itself has a natural beginning, mounting excitement, a brief period of intense excitement, and a quiet conclusion. The book has a pattern, not unlike that of a large-scale play, which should make good reading long after this particular mission is forgotten in the many missions that brought us victory.

—F. E. B.

## Former CO Here Is Naval Chief At Bougainville

(The following article was written by Tech. Sgt. Theodore C. Link, a Marine Corps combat correspondent and distributed by the Associated Press. It concerns the work of Captain O. O. Kessing, USN, the first commanding officer of this Pre-Flight School, who now is in command of the Naval Base at Bougainville.)

Bougainville — (Delayed) — Transformation of a dismal jungle and swamp area into a huge and impressive air force stronghold has been a successful venture in the three months since combat troops of the Third Marine Division swarmed ashore from transports on Nov. 1, 1943.

When this correspondent left the island a few days after Christmas, pursuit planes were operating out of one fighter strip, and a few bombers had made emergency landings.

On my return, the changes found were amazing. Hundreds of airplanes dotted the air field area. The Piva bomber strip and its dispersal areas, which one could walk around in a short time only a month previously, had become so extensive a jeep was needed even to get around to parts of it.

Roads had been extended so that one ran right to the top of steep "Hellzapoppin' Ridge" and to front line positions along the Laruma and Torokina Rivers. Supply dumps covered acres.

The naval base is a bustling place, as large in population as a small American city. The commander is Capt. O. O. Kessing, USN, a graduate of Annapolis in 1914, and a native of Greensburg, Indiana. (Captain Kessing's family lives here in Chapel Hill.) Comdr. Earle H. Kincaid, USN, also an Annapolis graduate, is Capt. Kessing's Executive Officer.

Forces on Bougainville still undergo the nervous stress of frequent Jap air bombings, but the raids lately seemed to this observer to lack the intensity of previous ones. In three months there have been 215 air raid alarms.

When the writer left at Christmas, Bougainville life was still confined to foxholes from sundown on. Now there are lights in the camps, and picture shows operate nightly.

War bonds can prevent bombs. Do your share.