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On the Lighter Side . . .

In the Spring, and almost any other time, a young man's fancy turns to thoughts of one dame thing after another.

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A well-built girl is like a three ring circus; a guy does not know where to look first.

First Aerial Gunner: "What's the last word in Jap planes?"

Second AG: "Jump!"

Short story of the week: "Wilt thou?" She wilted.

One good way to pay off the national debt would be to raffle off a discharge every day.

GI: "A paratrooper is a soldier who climbs down trees he never climbed up."

After all, the Constitution grants every guy the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of

The Second Battle of the Philippines

By LT. (JG) WILLIAM SHANAHAN, USNR

There can be no doubt that the Second Battle other hard battles may be expected. And it is of the Philippines was an epic sea fight on the scale of Trafalgar and Jutland. While the enemy's naval power has not been annihilated as some enthusiastic commentators claim, the Japanese have suffered losses which will affect both the course and the length of the war. And it is reassuring to note that the battle was no mere triumph of material, for at one time units of the Seventh Fleet were outnumbered. This instance and the resourcefulness shown throughout the fighting testify to the legendary skill of the English-speaking peoples in sea warfare.

The battle has brought into sharp focus the reasons for which sea power is employed. For the command of the sea around the Philippines we have risked a great naval battle in waters and under conditions favorable to the enemy. That our challenge was met in great force was an indication that the enemy realized the strategic value of Philippine water for the communications and the defence of the Japanese Empire.

Heretofore the enemy has not risked more than small detachments to dispute the command of the sea which we obtained around his outlying atolls and island bases. To prevent the capture of the Philippines which would cut off Japan from the Indies the Imperial Navy struck at the forces guarding the communications of our expeditionary force. Their well-timed attack began after we had committed ourselves to a full scale operation by putting a quarter of a million men ashore on Leyte. If this attack had been successful the Japanese would not only have inflicted losses on our fleet, but would have been able to destroy our ground forces which would be left without logistic support.

The skill and daring with which the Japanese plan was executed should warn us that

happiness, thought the yeoman as he chased her down another block.

"Aren't you getting tired of this bachelor \$500 follows." life all the time, Bill?"

"Certainly not," replied Bill. "What was good enough for my father is good enough for me."

Telegram received by parents of a Seabee

well to remember that the resources in ships remaining to Japanese are approximately as great as those risked in this great battle. Japan's carrier strength has been seriously weak ened, however, and her fleet must depend even more on shore-based aircraft.

All the shortcomings of this type of air sup port were evident in the Philippine operations In the island channels the Japanese expected to work with land-based aircraft, some of which was apparently under army command The organizational weakness of this arrange ment placed the Japanese at a very great disadvantage when faced by well-coordinated ship and plane attacks. This again drives home the lesson that ship and plane must fight together, be directed by the same command, and be independent of the immobile shore bases of land aircraft.

In the first and second battles of the Philippines our carriers and battleships fought to gether in a great fleet action for the first time Aircraft carriers were the only capital ships used in the Coral Sea and at Midway but in the Philippines "flattops" working with "floating gun platforms" carried out the lessons learned in previous operations against island strongholds. Our successes against both shore and naval targets confirm the importance of aircraft as the striking arm of the fleet. Some enemy capital ships have been sunk by gun fire but most of the damage to the enemy fleet has been inflicted by air at

The strategic implications are equally clear. The United States Navy has won command of the seas on the approaches to the Asiatic stronghold of the enemy; the combined offen sive power of the British and American fleet will carry the war to the islands of Japan.

in New Guinea: "Natives here have never seen American Seabees. Never heard American slang. Never played poker. Money order for

They parted at her doorstep

And she whispered with a sigh; I'll be home tomorrow night, dear,"

And he answered, "So will I."

