



# THE PIEDMONITOR

Meet The Real  
J. R. Farley  
See Page Three

VOL. X, NO. 8-10

1948 — CELEBRATING OUR TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY — 1968

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER, 1968



"WHERE TO PUT IT?" seems to be the President's first question following the move to the new building.

## A Far Cry from the Barracks

### Home Office Moves To New Headquarters

As Piedmont packed up its 26-odd years of accumulated belongings in preparation for its second move to new offices, many fled away memories turned up in the back corners of desk drawers.

The packing process before the move seemed to take longer than the getting settled. The decisions of what to keep and what to throw away couldn't be made in a hurry.

Though physically not far from the sight of Piedmont's initial barrack headquarters, the new home office and maintenance facility is a world away from the Company's first home.

On moving days, things that hadn't been seen in years turned up in the most unlikely places. Everything from old airplane models to nearly forgotten Company party pictures was dusted off and put in boxes labeled "New Building." Tomorrow would be soon enough to worry about what to do with all the stuff.

Not too many employees remembered the days in the barracks, but little provocation was needed to get a story from the "old timers."

It was early in August when the movers came and the boxes and desks and chairs and typewriters and bookcases and assorted paraphernalia of nearly 1,200 Piedmont people were transported about a quarter of a mile north down Liberty Street. The actual move started on Friday night and by Monday morning the majority of the offices were occupied, by boxes, if not their inhabitants.

Moving the shops and machinery and equipment took about three weeks longer.

By the first week in October a place had been found for most everything and an "Open House" was held for all the employees and their families.

Nearly 3,000 people from all over the system came for an inspection tour and a barbeque dinner.

The date for the official dedication of the building has been set for October 25th.

Probably the most frequent remark about the new building relates to its size. Including the han-

gar bays, shops and offices, there is a grand total of 305,200 square feet of building floor area.

Though not terribly accurate, big is the best description of the new home office of Piedmont Aviation, Inc.

## DIRECTORS DECLARE CASH DIVIDEND; PROMOTE MRS. GREGG

The Directors of Piedmont Aviation, Inc., declared a cash dividend of 10 cents per share on the company's common stock at the Board's regular quarterly meeting in October.

President Davis announced the new dividend, totaling over \$185,000, will be distributed to approximately 7,300 stockholders in 47 states and 5 countries.

Payable December 2, 1968 to stockholders of record November 15, 1968, the semiannual dividend is the ninth consecutive to be declared since the initial dividend was announced in October 1964.

In other action, the Directors promoted former Assistant to the Corporate Secretary Rilla M.

(Continued on Page Six)

# Piedmont Is Absolved of All Blame In '67 Jet Crash

The National Transportation Safety Board has issued its report on the cause of a fatal mid-air collision accident involving a Piedmont Airlines Boeing 727, and a Cessna 310, owned by Lanseair, Inc., which occurred at an altitude of 6,132 ft. near Hendersonville, North Carolina on July 19, 1967. All 79 occupants of the 727, and all 3 occupants of the Cessna, perished, and both aircraft were destroyed.

In its official findings the Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident:

"... was the deviation of the Cessna from its IFR clearance resulting in a flightpath into airspace allocated to the Piedmont Boeing 727. The reason for such deviation cannot be specifically or positively identified. The minimum control procedures utilized by the FAA in the handling of the Cessna were a contributing factor."

### No Mechanical Failure

The Safety Board said its investigation disclosed no evidence of any failure or malfunction of the airframe, engines, or components of either aircraft involved in the accident.

In its report the Board listed a series of safety recommendations directed to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration that the Board believes would help prevent similar accidents in the future.

The Safety Board reported that both aircraft were operating on Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plans and were in radio contact with Asheville Tower, the facility which was providing air traffic control service when the collision occurred.

The Boeing 727 had departed from Runway 16 at the Asheville Airport and was cleared to proceed via the Asheville VOR en route to Roanoke, Virginia. The Cessna, inbound to the Asheville Airport, had been cleared from over the

VOR to the Asheville radio beacon (RBN) and had reported passing the VOR at 1158:20. The Asheville radio beacon is located 17.4 miles northwest of the VOR on the 298° radial. The collision occurred at a position approximately 9 miles southwest of the VOR on approximately the 243° radial, at approximately high noon in daylight conditions. The weather at Asheville as reported by the Weather Bureau just prior to the accident was estimated ceiling 2,500 feet broken clouds with visibility 4 miles in haze.

Personnel on duty in the tower at the time the 727 departed stated that they observed the aircraft during takeoff and while it was climbing southeast-bound on runway heading. Their last observation of the jet was at a position estimated to be between 4 and 5 miles from the airport, slightly to the left of the extended runway centerline, and in a "shallow" left turn.

### Cessna Pulled Up

At the time of the collision, according to the available evidence, the 727 was in a climbing left turn preceding from south to southeast, with the Cessna proceeding in a westerly direction. The Cessna appeared to be in level flight; however, just before the collision it was observed to pull up sharply, with impact occurring between the nose of the Cessna and the left forward fuselage section of the 727. The jet continued straight ahead momentarily, then nosed over and fell rapidly to the ground. The Cessna was not observed at any time following the collision.

The Safety Board said the record is clear that the Cessna failed to comply with the clearance to proceed from the Asheville VOR to the Asheville RBN. The location of the collision site, approximately 9 miles southwest of the VOR on the 243° radial, is not indicative of a flightpath which would be in compliance with any of the four published instrument approaches

for Asheville.

The Safety Board said it was unable to identify the specific reason for the Cessna's deviation from its clearance but it does not believe there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the Cessna pilot ignored the clearance. However, it is believed reasonable to assume that it was either by reason of confusion or through misunderstanding of the clearance. In either event, it is concluded to be the product of two factors: (1) inadequate knowledge of the Asheville area by the pilot and poor flight planning, and (2) the failure of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system to provide timely information which would have prevented the deviation or at least alerted the pilot to recognize his misunderstandings.

### Air Traffic Control

Concerning the operation of the ATC system, the Board recognizes that it is not infallible. It requires a cooperative effort on the part of both pilots and controllers to achieve the desired results. If an inadequate clearance is issued by a controller, or if an adequate clearance is not followed precisely by a pilot, the programmed margin of safety is decreased.

It appears to the Safety Board, based on the facts in this case and others reviewed in recent years, that controllers in their communications often tend to use the same standards for the professional air carrier pilots and the nonprofessional general aviation pilots. While the Cessna pilot in this case was instrument-rated and well qualified, the controller had no way of knowing the qualifications of the pilot with whom he was communicating. The Board believes that controllers should not equate all pilots with the upper segment of the proficiency spectrum. All the available information with respect to clearances should be given to pilots, particularly nonairline

(Continued on Page Six)



RILLA GREGG

## John Harrigal Is Appointed Director--Reservations Systems

John S. Harrigal, a nineteen year veteran with Allegheny Airlines, has joined Piedmont as Director--Reservations Systems.

Harrigal, who is a native of Swissvale, Pennsylvania, was formerly regional director of reservations for Allegheny at Pittsburgh. Prior to his work with Allegheny Harrigal was with Monarch Airlines.

He attended Central Technical Institute in Kansas City and Pennsylvania State University. His military service was with the U. S. Navy.

Harrigal's primary duties with Piedmont will involve centralizing all of the Company's reservations activities. It is anticipated that this program will require a minimum of two years for completion.

Mrs. Harrigal is the former Do-reen Hill of Swissvale. They have one son.

The family moved to Winston-Salem early in September from Cora-

polis, Pennsylvania where Harrigal had belonged to the local Toastmasters Club and the Masons.



JOHN HARRIGAL