My E By < (Copyright, 193.1, in all countries oyi the North American Newspaper A!- | liance. World rights rcsen'ed, I including the Scandinavian. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited.) CHAPTER VII As the French authorities wished to honor our national holiday they requested that some of our troops parade in Paris July 4, 1917. We were not prepared to make much of a military* impresr.icn, as our men were largely recruits. But to stinui*v.. r."> i. > rogress at this time, especially in ts efforts to assist the French as agreed upon with General Petain. ts organization by Major Grayson rt. P. Murphy for war work with our !\vii armies was new about completed. The establishment of canteens ;iid huts at the ports and other im ortant points had already be^mi and he numbers increased as fast as teeded. These centers of service later maintained dispensaries and provided *eds and bathing facilities for men raveling: under orders or on leave. Vhen the necessity arose the Red ;ross actively co-operated with the medical corps in the field, contributnjr large r;uantities of supplies and ften additional nurses. The work f the society*, directed from a eon ral office in Paris, eventually emraced practically every endeavor nuehing the health of the armies. CHAPTER IX 1 ielt Paris July :?C. 1907. for a isit with Field Marshal Sir Douglas laig, the British commander ih chief .hose headquarters were in a'n old hateau half hidden away in a magnificent grove at Beldiques. I >vas iccompanied by Colonels Havhord nil Alvord and Captain Patton of ay staff. At dinner the subject of convocation naturally turned on the ciliary situation of the Allied armies, iur own in particular. They were teen to know about our army, its irganizntion and size, and the ;>ros)ects of our putting troops in the ield. As our active participation deicr.ded on many factors, such as raining, equipment and shipping, ray eplic-s, of course, were indefinite ind no doubt disappointing. In turn we asked many questions, ind it was especially, interesting to icar the importance of artiilery ??iliasized by its chief, Major Genera! 3irch, who spoke of the difficulties hey had experienced in supplying hemselves with guns that matched he enemy's. Referring to their lack of artillery n the beginning, General Birch said here was reason to beliefe that they lad finally attained a superiority iver the Germans. Real Teamwork Lacking Sir Douglas told me some of the letails of Nivelle's unsuccessful stack in the spring, how it was known ar and wide beforehand, and spoke jarticularly of the consequent se ious disaffection among the French roops. Although he had placed hinilelf under Nivelle's command for hese operations, he had, he said, ittle confidence in the outcome from he start. He also commented on the failure of the French to co-onerate iuiiy on various occasions. His renarks entirely confirmed the belief '.hat I had long since held that Teal :eamwork between the two armies was almost totally absent. Scarcely anything more strikingl*" mpressed upon me our unpreparedless than what I day during a few sours spent with General Trenchavd it the British flying field, where we ivitnessed flyers doing every imaginable 3tunt, and saw planes of all :lasses, bombing, pursuit and observation. motors of different types and .he thoroughly equipped repair shops. The outstanding thing, however, which it was gratifying to note later on in our own aviation personnel, wa3 the incomparable spirit and alertness of the young officers and the snlisted personnel. Every roan secm. 5VERY THURSDAY?BOONE, N. C. Km'-J araWitjpilySj .{-' 0bJ??K1 n the lander-in-Chief of the Am wWBBW^jB^SKg-'''' : S . Ofc SWrWB r.es G. Harbord, His Chief of Staff. ' ' ed to be disappointed when a flight of planes departed for the front ij without him. t Conferences Valuable This visit to British headquarters i was most instructive, as every opportunity was given us to Study n. timately the details of their wartime : organization. After similar studies of I the French system we selected from i each those features best suited to j perfect a well-balanced staff for our , own army. The cordial relations and good un| d erst an ding established between Sir i Douglas Haig and myself and be| iween the corresponding members of i our staffs and with a number of the j leading British officers with whom | we were later to have official deal- \ i :;:gs -proved very advantageous. In | London, long after the Armistice ; j Sir Douglas in on after dinner speech | ; referred to this visit, which happened < : during a period of depression, and , j said that our timely appearance at | his headquarters had aroused in them , j a strong feeling of hopefulness for the future. Meets Other Leaders My diary at this time notes the fed lowing: ? Paris, Thursday, July 26. '27: Ilad breakfast yesterday at the Crillon with [filoyd George. He is alert and energetic and has a i ^tllear conception of Allied problems. Took lunch with Balfour j^-vAvho thinks Ave have reason to fee! easier regarding submarines. Representatives of the various Allies met for conference on general situation. In the evening, M. Ribotj the prime minister, ^ave n stjHn ^irinoK .\C i [ attending conference. Today attended luncheon to Allied representatives given my President and Mms. Pomc.ro at the Elysee palace. In conference this afternoon j with Petain, Cadorna, Robertson and Foeh at tatter's office. Discussed mil'tary plans, talked about tonnage possibilities and shortage of personnel. Ail pessimistic and reserved. James Stillman. just returned ; from a tour of France, confirms 1 reports of serious depression. Situation Not Hopeful The meeting of the Allied military leaders July 26. which was my first, brought out little that was hopeful. The political relations of the Allies were touched upon in a general way. but only so far as they might affect the military situation. The most significant recent event, of course, had been the crisis in Russia. . With reference to American assistance, I gave in detail the situation as to our man power, immediate and prospective, especially in the light of the latest plans of the department, and laid particular emphaj sis on the necessity of additional j shipping. A cablegram had just been ' received in response to mine of July ! 6 irt which I had requested that at | least a million men reach France by i the following spring. , j This niessitrp inilfopHTin j War Department foresaw a small chance of securing the necessary tonnage, was read to the conference < in nart as follows: "By using all shipping which is now in sight for the purpose and which will be available after month of November, the plan proposes to transport to France by June 15, 1918 twenty-one divisions, comprising almost 420,000 men, together with auxiliary troops and replacement j troops, line of communication troops, j and others, amounting to 214,975 men, makiner a t?tal of 634,975 men." More Tonnage Needed Although short of my recommendations, even this schedule could be carried out only by a very large increase of tonnage. The other members of the conference were of the opinion that if new adjustments could be made ihere might be shipping for nine or ten of onv drifteuvnai before spring. So for the moment, there did not seem to be the slightest chance of transporting a million men to France by the following June. After canvassing the whole situation, the conference expressed '.he unanimous opinion that a defensive role should be adopted on all secondary fronts. The British and French representatives hoped that the surplus troops resulting from this course might be available to strengthen their armies in France and General Cadoma, of course, thought the I Italian armies should have their full share. rORLD erican Expeditionary Foi CHAPTER X j About this time (July, 1917) disturbing reports wore submitted to] me confidentially by one of our na-, val officers sent by Admiral Simsfrom London. Calculations based up-: on tonnage losses for May, June ami July seemed to confirm the conclusions of a month previous that there' would soon be insufficient allied ship-! ping left to bring over an American army of required strength, and That; the Allies would find it difficult to keep up tbeiv food supply froir. over seas. The data presented by the na val officer proved that if this rate: of destruction could not be reduced! the war would be lost before we could fire a shot. This report was certainly most pes-) simistic, but it did not dispel nsv iibh-i r: -i ? Aiuence in cfio success of the clan that had beer tested and was about to be inaugurated by sealing ships over in convoys under the protection! of naval vessels. Additional destroyers requested by Admiral Sims had by this time largely increased such craft in European waters and as a! result the activities of submarines' had been somewhat diminished for July as compared with April. Yet fur the time being ship contraction in British yards continued] below losses and our shipping hoan i at home had scarcely stopped wran-j gling over materials and types. AH these facts caused everybody to realize the extreme urgency of speed.1 and that in turn gave some hope that the prospects might soon become; brighter. Spies Get Sailing Dates The success of submarine warfare j had been largely dependent upon advance knowledge concerning movements of vessels. As there was no doubt that the saliing dates of much of our shipping reached Germany through spies, one way to reduce the danger would be tc close such sources of information. In the beginning the practice by our War Department of transmitting secret information was extremely loose. The data regarding sailings was, of course, sent to my headquarters, but at the same time, or often before, it was also given to both the French and. British--military., attaches and missions in Washington. They immediately transmitted the information by cable to their respective governments, with the result rtvat if "c_ Dally became almost commop knowledge. V >!!>( Rut there were ether sources of information possessed by the enemy. One message intercepted by the French, sent ironi some wireless station in Spain to the German general staff, announced the arrival of sev General Pershing 1 eral American vessels at Nantes and of 10,000 American soldiers at StXazaire, and also gave the routes taken by our transports. Another* evidently intended for submarines, reported the departure of a convoy of transports from New York. These and similar facts were cabled at once to Admiral Sims and to Washington. leadership Big Problem Probably the most important factor in building up an aggressive a. is the selection of leaders. Without efficient leadership the finest of soldiers may suffer defeat by inferior forces skillfully handled. The following was my recommendation to Secretary of War Baker: "My observation of British and French armies and most exacting arduous service conditions at the front fully convince me that only officers in full mental and physical vigor should be .sent here. Contrary course means certain inefficiency in our service and possible later humiliation vjl oxiScers concerned. Cieneral officers must undergo extreme effort, in personal supervision of operations in trenches. Very few British or French division commanders over forty-five or brigadiers over forty. "We have too much at stake to risk inefficiency through mental or physical defects. Strongly. recommend conditions be fully considered in making high appointments and suggest that no officer of whatever rank bo fni* active service, who is not strong and robust in every particular. Officers selected for appointment general officer of line should be those with experience in actively commanding troops. Officers not fulfilling above conditions can be usefully employed at home training troops." These recommendations were not altogether followed at home. In fact very little effort seems to have been made at selection, so that some officers without ambition or initiative, whose inefficiency should have been' well known, and others whose age1 and physical condition were 3uch as to disqualify them for strenuous see vice, were given important assignments. Most of them were known to m? and not a few w.hc, under the rule of seniority, were commanders of regiments and departments, had lacked the energy even to train their commands or themselves in battle exercises, where favorable opportune, had teen afforded. The policy of the War Department from beginning to end seemed to be to appoint officers to the higher grade, according to seniority, with the intention of weeding out the inefficient later on. This appears to have beer, the department's idea of selection and the result was practically 110 selection at all. After t | appointment of such officers it was ; a slow process to eliminate them. In the Training Area The First Division was now v.c" I settled in its training area in the ; region of Gondreeoui-t. south of Ear[ !e-Duc- The troops of the division i had already established friendly rei lations with the French peasantry and had quickly adapted themselves I to their new mode of life. As the natural consequence cf the | financial condition of the frugal French provincial, he was wont to profit by the presence of the British and ourselves, and the open-handed payday habits of the Americans served to givf. some encouragement to this inclination. As a result some coolness grew up later between our men and their early friends. In ali history I do not believe there has ever been an army on foreign soil so considerate and observant of the rights and interests of the people. The peasant class made a strong appeal to every man in the army. Their simplicity, their love of the soil and the long hours of work in the fields by the old men and women and young boys and gills remained the constant admiration of our soldiers. I am inclined to think, however, that the excellent behavior of the men in the first contingent, their rather unmilitary appearance in illfitting uniforms and their apparent lack fo formal discipline created the impression in the minds of French officials that ihey were too kindhearted to become aggressive fighting troops. At ibe conclusion of my inspection of various places Chaumont was selected as the bsct site for our general headquarters. It was on our line of communications to the fro-- and ccifirany placed as to probable sectors of our operations The fine stone regimental barracks became our headquarters and we were abie to obtain ample billeting accommodations in houses for all except the ' ^ '' y i ' ^^ nspecting Poilus. enlisted mc-n, who,were provided wUh^^r-f||l temporary barracks. 2n the next instalment the American chief tells more about the A. E. F. training and billeting areas. BLIGHT By RUTH BCWKiIN I see the trees on every Kill AH brown and dead with subtle blight; I never know disease is there Until it leaves a barren sight. There stand?, the trunk with doty limbs? A tree that once was tall and straight. But now it sways, a tott'ring wreck, And cure for it is all too late. * * * Arid all around I see the wrecks Of human life. The blisrht of sin Has swept across the human heart, Has burned it out and entered in. The barren heart3 and blighted lives Cry out for help; sin l-kes its toll: "Is there no balm in Gilead?" And "no physician" for the soul? And then I seem to see the hands Of Him who waikea by Galilee Stretched forth to heal, and hear Hirn say, "The Great Physician, I am He." .... ^*~ This notice was posted on a pleasure boat belonging to a certain steamship company; "The chairs in the cabins are for ladies. Gentlemen are requested not to make use of them tiil the ladies are seated." Read the AcU?They Ar* Messenger* of Thrift 1 fe . *