

DISPUTE OVER ISLAND OF YAP HAS AT LAST BEEN BROUGHT TO END

America and Japan Reach An Agreement.

SOON TO SIGN A TREATY

Japan Retains Control But Gives U. S. Cable and Wireless Privileges.

HAVE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

This Agreement Erases One Of The Principal Causes For Controversy Between Washington and Japanese Capital.

Washington, Dec. 12.—The American and Japanese governments have composed their differences over the Pacific island of Yap, and are preparing to sign a treaty by which Japan retains administrative control over the island and the United States secures the cable and wireless privileges there for which she has contended since the Paris peace conference.

In the same treaty Japan's league of nations mandate over Yap and all the other northern Pacific islands formerly under German sovereignty is given recognition by the United States on certain stipulated conditions. These conditions include provision for free admission of missionaries and protection of American interests in the mandated territory, and require that Japan shall report to the United States as well as to the league on details of her administration of the mandate.

The Yap cable and wireless rights, regarded as highly important because of the island's advantageous position in the center of the Pacific group to the south of Japan, are accorded by the treaty to the American and Japanese governments and nationals alike, on terms to be aided by the Japanese government in securing needed property facilities.

The immediate value of the arrangement to the United States lies in the concessions with respect to cable communication, because they insure complete American control of the existing cable between Yap and Guam. Considerable importance also is attached by Americans to the extension of radio privileges, although it is to be agreed in the treaty that no American radio station will be installed so long as the present Japanese plant is operated without discriminatory exacting.

Signatures of the convention is expected within a few days, erasing one of the principal causes for controversy between Washington and Tokyo, and bringing to an end negotiations which have covered a period of several months.

Final instructions to the Japanese delegates to accept the latest American proposal of a settlement are understood to have been received from Tokyo foreign office last night.

STATE DEPARTMENT MAKES PUBLIC TEXT OF THE TREATY

Washington, Dec. 12.—The text of a treaty between the United States and Japan covering an agreement as to the status of the island of Yap is made public today at the state department. The points of the agreement are as follows:

1. It is agreed that the United States shall have free access to the island of Yap on the footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation, in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable and wireless rights, and in all that relates to the establishment of radio telegraphic stations on ships and shores, without discriminatory exacting or preferences or exactions of any kind.

2. It is further agreed that the United States shall enjoy in the island of Yap the following rights, privileges and exemptions in relation to electrical communications:

(a) Rights of residence without restriction, and of acquisition and enjoyment of undisturbed possession, upon a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nation or their respective nationals of all property and interests, both personal and real, including lands, buildings, residences, offices, works and appurtenances.

(b) No permit or license to be required for the enjoyment of any of these rights and privileges.

(c) Each country to be free to operate both ends of its cables, either directly or through its nationals, including corporations or persons.

(d) No cable censorship or supervision of operation of messages.

(e) Free entry and exit for persons and property.

(f) No taxes, port, harbor or landing charges, or exactions with respect to operation of cables or to property, persons or vessels.

(g) No discriminatory police regulations.

3. Japan agrees that it will use its power of expropriation to secure to the United States needed property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication in the island, if such property or facilities cannot otherwise be obtained. It is understood that the location and area of land to be so expropriated shall be arranged each time between the two governments, according to the requirements of each case. American property and facilities for the purpose of electrical communication in the island are to be exempt from the process of expropriation.

4. The United States consents to the administration by Japan of the mandated islands in the Pacific ocean.

(Continued on Page Twelve)

Forecast by States.

Washington, Dec. 12.—Virginia: Cloudy Tuesday; Wednesday fair.

North Carolina: South Carolina: Georgia: Florida: extreme northwest Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi: Fair Tuesday and Wednesday; little change in temperature.

Tennessee: Generally fair Tuesday and Wednesday; not much change in temperature.

Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, East Texas and West Texas: Tuesday and Wednesday fair.

Thermometer Readings.

The temperature in Greensboro and vicinity yesterday according to A. R. Horry, local government observer, was: High.....69. Low.....34.

Mr. Harding Will Not Call Economic Meeting

If Called to Meet in Brussels Or Some Other European Capital Early In Year United States Will Probably Not Be Represented—Foreigners Disappointed; But No Useful End Can Be Served Till Reparations Are Settled.

Washington, Dec. 12.—President Harding will not call an economic conference to meet in this city at the close of the present gathering, if, as seems likely now, an economic conference is called to meet in Brussels or some other European capital early in the year.

The United States will not be represented unless there is a very radical change of mind. These two circumstances which became known today, constituted a very severe disappointment to many of the foreign countries in this city, many of whom have recently expressed the hope that the United States would at least share in a European economic discussion, which has been made inevitable by the recent German default.

The American decision would seem to be based upon two factors, one foreign and the other domestic. It is the prevailing point of view, as I pointed out in my last Sunday article that no useful end can be served by any economic conference as long as the reparations issue remains unsettled, and there is no American desire to undertake the responsibility and the obvious dangers incident to bringing about a settlement.

From the American official point of view, the key of the whole situation in Europe at the present time, economic and political alike, although the United States is only interested in the economic aspect, must be sought in the reparations issue. The idea that the watch of the world can be set to ticking again in Great Britain and France are at loggerheads over reparations is held to be manifestly absurd. The United States has very great interests at stake, these interests reported in my last Sunday article, which continues to decline with obvious effect in all directions. But the consequential question is: What useful purpose can the United States serve by attending such a conference as long as the fundamental conditions remain both unsound and unstable?

Must Settle Reparations.

There is a very wide spread belief that no real progress will be made toward economic reconstruction in Europe or in the world until England, France and Germany can reach agreement on the whole subject of reparations. There is no disguising the fact

that American expert opinion is on the whole far more sympathetic to the British than to the French point of view. At the Paris conference and since the Paris conference American expert opinion, official and unofficial, has continued to believe that there was not the slightest prospect of collecting from Germany anything like the sum which was expected at Paris and actually named in the decisions of last May. But the United States is not one of the parties to reparations and has not intention of undertaking to participate in a discussion which would obviously lead to a request for American assistance, financial and otherwise.

The decision not to participate in an economic conference is also strongly influenced by the fact that Congress views with supreme suspicion every sort of proposal which involves the United States in the European financial mess. There is pending now and likely to be passed soon a measure which will give the secretary of the treasury power to fund the allied debt, but a real discussion of the subject has disclosed the fact that the present temper on Capitol Hill is totalling hostile to any concessions to Europe. Congress intends to grant the permission which the President has asked, for the secretary of the treasury, but it is going to grant the permission in a very grudging spirit, and it is going to make the concession around with conditions which will make it impossible for the secretary of the treasury to do anything more than provide a method of making upon a five per cent rate of interest.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

Would Provoke Criticism.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

Must Settle Reparations.

There is a very wide spread belief that no real progress will be made toward economic reconstruction in Europe or in the world until England, France and Germany can reach agreement on the whole subject of reparations. There is no disguising the fact

that American expert opinion is on the whole far more sympathetic to the British than to the French point of view. At the Paris conference and since the Paris conference American expert opinion, official and unofficial, has continued to believe that there was not the slightest prospect of collecting from Germany anything like the sum which was expected at Paris and actually named in the decisions of last May. But the United States is not one of the parties to reparations and has not intention of undertaking to participate in a discussion which would obviously lead to a request for American assistance, financial and otherwise.

The decision not to participate in an economic conference is also strongly influenced by the fact that Congress views with supreme suspicion every sort of proposal which involves the United States in the European financial mess. There is pending now and likely to be passed soon a measure which will give the secretary of the treasury power to fund the allied debt, but a real discussion of the subject has disclosed the fact that the present temper on Capitol Hill is totalling hostile to any concessions to Europe. Congress intends to grant the permission which the President has asked, for the secretary of the treasury, but it is going to grant the permission in a very grudging spirit, and it is going to make the concession around with conditions which will make it impossible for the secretary of the treasury to do anything more than provide a method of making upon a five per cent rate of interest.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

Must Settle Reparations.

There is a very wide spread belief that no real progress will be made toward economic reconstruction in Europe or in the world until England, France and Germany can reach agreement on the whole subject of reparations. There is no disguising the fact

that American expert opinion is on the whole far more sympathetic to the British than to the French point of view. At the Paris conference and since the Paris conference American expert opinion, official and unofficial, has continued to believe that there was not the slightest prospect of collecting from Germany anything like the sum which was expected at Paris and actually named in the decisions of last May. But the United States is not one of the parties to reparations and has not intention of undertaking to participate in a discussion which would obviously lead to a request for American assistance, financial and otherwise.

The decision not to participate in an economic conference is also strongly influenced by the fact that Congress views with supreme suspicion every sort of proposal which involves the United States in the European financial mess. There is pending now and likely to be passed soon a measure which will give the secretary of the treasury power to fund the allied debt, but a real discussion of the subject has disclosed the fact that the present temper on Capitol Hill is totalling hostile to any concessions to Europe. Congress intends to grant the permission which the President has asked, for the secretary of the treasury, but it is going to grant the permission in a very grudging spirit, and it is going to make the concession around with conditions which will make it impossible for the secretary of the treasury to do anything more than provide a method of making upon a five per cent rate of interest.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

Must Settle Reparations.

There is a very wide spread belief that no real progress will be made toward economic reconstruction in Europe or in the world until England, France and Germany can reach agreement on the whole subject of reparations. There is no disguising the fact

that American expert opinion is on the whole far more sympathetic to the British than to the French point of view. At the Paris conference and since the Paris conference American expert opinion, official and unofficial, has continued to believe that there was not the slightest prospect of collecting from Germany anything like the sum which was expected at Paris and actually named in the decisions of last May. But the United States is not one of the parties to reparations and has not intention of undertaking to participate in a discussion which would obviously lead to a request for American assistance, financial and otherwise.

The decision not to participate in an economic conference is also strongly influenced by the fact that Congress views with supreme suspicion every sort of proposal which involves the United States in the European financial mess. There is pending now and likely to be passed soon a measure which will give the secretary of the treasury power to fund the allied debt, but a real discussion of the subject has disclosed the fact that the present temper on Capitol Hill is totalling hostile to any concessions to Europe. Congress intends to grant the permission which the President has asked, for the secretary of the treasury, but it is going to grant the permission in a very grudging spirit, and it is going to make the concession around with conditions which will make it impossible for the secretary of the treasury to do anything more than provide a method of making upon a five per cent rate of interest.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

Must Settle Reparations.

There is a very wide spread belief that no real progress will be made toward economic reconstruction in Europe or in the world until England, France and Germany can reach agreement on the whole subject of reparations. There is no disguising the fact

that American expert opinion is on the whole far more sympathetic to the British than to the French point of view. At the Paris conference and since the Paris conference American expert opinion, official and unofficial, has continued to believe that there was not the slightest prospect of collecting from Germany anything like the sum which was expected at Paris and actually named in the decisions of last May. But the United States is not one of the parties to reparations and has not intention of undertaking to participate in a discussion which would obviously lead to a request for American assistance, financial and otherwise.

The decision not to participate in an economic conference is also strongly influenced by the fact that Congress views with supreme suspicion every sort of proposal which involves the United States in the European financial mess. There is pending now and likely to be passed soon a measure which will give the secretary of the treasury power to fund the allied debt, but a real discussion of the subject has disclosed the fact that the present temper on Capitol Hill is totalling hostile to any concessions to Europe. Congress intends to grant the permission which the President has asked, for the secretary of the treasury, but it is going to grant the permission in a very grudging spirit, and it is going to make the concession around with conditions which will make it impossible for the secretary of the treasury to do anything more than provide a method of making upon a five per cent rate of interest.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

Must Settle Reparations.

There is a very wide spread belief that no real progress will be made toward economic reconstruction in Europe or in the world until England, France and Germany can reach agreement on the whole subject of reparations. There is no disguising the fact

that American expert opinion is on the whole far more sympathetic to the British than to the French point of view. At the Paris conference and since the Paris conference American expert opinion, official and unofficial, has continued to believe that there was not the slightest prospect of collecting from Germany anything like the sum which was expected at Paris and actually named in the decisions of last May. But the United States is not one of the parties to reparations and has not intention of undertaking to participate in a discussion which would obviously lead to a request for American assistance, financial and otherwise.

The decision not to participate in an economic conference is also strongly influenced by the fact that Congress views with supreme suspicion every sort of proposal which involves the United States in the European financial mess. There is pending now and likely to be passed soon a measure which will give the secretary of the treasury power to fund the allied debt, but a real discussion of the subject has disclosed the fact that the present temper on Capitol Hill is totalling hostile to any concessions to Europe. Congress intends to grant the permission which the President has asked, for the secretary of the treasury, but it is going to grant the permission in a very grudging spirit, and it is going to make the concession around with conditions which will make it impossible for the secretary of the treasury to do anything more than provide a method of making upon a five per cent rate of interest.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

Must Settle Reparations.

There is a very wide spread belief that no real progress will be made toward economic reconstruction in Europe or in the world until England, France and Germany can reach agreement on the whole subject of reparations. There is no disguising the fact

that American expert opinion is on the whole far more sympathetic to the British than to the French point of view. At the Paris conference and since the Paris conference American expert opinion, official and unofficial, has continued to believe that there was not the slightest prospect of collecting from Germany anything like the sum which was expected at Paris and actually named in the decisions of last May. But the United States is not one of the parties to reparations and has not intention of undertaking to participate in a discussion which would obviously lead to a request for American assistance, financial and otherwise.

The decision not to participate in an economic conference is also strongly influenced by the fact that Congress views with supreme suspicion every sort of proposal which involves the United States in the European financial mess. There is pending now and likely to be passed soon a measure which will give the secretary of the treasury power to fund the allied debt, but a real discussion of the subject has disclosed the fact that the present temper on Capitol Hill is totalling hostile to any concessions to Europe. Congress intends to grant the permission which the President has asked, for the secretary of the treasury, but it is going to grant the permission in a very grudging spirit, and it is going to make the concession around with conditions which will make it impossible for the secretary of the treasury to do anything more than provide a method of making upon a five per cent rate of interest.

Such being the situation and such being the political temper in this country—and no one can doubt but that Congress at the present time is supported by the mass of the American public—it is obviously that any executive action looking to an economic conference in Washington would provoke suspicion and invite criticism. It might even do more. It might compromise the status of the United States in the eyes of the world, and it might bring to the attention of the world the fact that the United States is not ready to meet the situation which is being created in Europe.

COMMITTEE IS NAMED TO PUSH FINAL ACTION ON NAVAL LIMITATION

"Committee of Fifteen" to Handle Whole Subject.

DESIGNED TO SAVE TIME

This New Body Will Make Decisions and Report to Conference.

FRENCH-ITALIAN DISPUTE

It Is Disclosed That Italy Wants Same Naval Ratio as Allowed France.

Washington, Dec. 12.—New machinery to expedite final action on naval limitation agreements was set up today by the arms conference. At the suggestion of the American group, the former committee of experts, was "scrapped" in favor of a "committee of fifteen" including both plenary delegates and civil and naval experts of the five powers. The whole subject of naval limitations including the controversial "5-5-3" ratio was turned over to the new committee to be put in final shape for the conference.

Meanwhile, it became known that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

There were indications, however, that the new step was based upon the instructions from Tokyo regarding the "5-5-3" ratio. The nature of the communication was not disclosed. There were many indications, however, that it marked a definite step toward acceptance of this vital point in the naval limitation project.

The "committee of 15" was described by a British spokesman as a means to "short circuit" delays unaccountable in the previous division of labor between committees of delegates and separate committees of naval experts. The new committee will be able to reach decisions as to direct recommendations to the conference. Several recommendations will be eliminated to save time. No other official or semi-official explanation of its creation was given.

Japs May Have Caused It.

Titled Woman Too Poor for Politics.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.



The Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a seat in Parliament on account of her financial condition, is allied with the labor party.

Countess of Warwick, who was forced to abandon her political campaign for a