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## SENATE of the UNITED STATES.

Friday, Jan. 15.

### JUDICIARY BILL

Mr. WRIGHT of Maryland, observed that he had been called forth early in this debate rather to defend the fact he had the honor to represent, from the unkind imputation of a violation of her constitution, (in which he flattered himself he had succeeded even to the satisfaction of the honorable gentleman himself, who, he presumed from misinformation, had been induced to make it,) than from any desire at that time, to enter into the discussion of the merits of the resolution before them, and although it had already occupied so much of the time of the Senate, and had been so fully and so fully discussed, by honorable gentlemen of great abilities and experience on both sides, yet he should presume to call their attention to such prominent features of the case as had been impressive on his own mind.

This subject has been brought before us in the imposing shape of a recommendation of the President of the United States, the national constitutional organ of the government, in his official message to Congress on the State of the Union; a duty imposed on him by the express letter of the constitution, a duty he was bound by the most solemn obligations constitutionally to discharge, a duty that renovated and enlightened America had too recently felt him to discharge, to readily to believe he would unconsciously abuse.

Sir, this subject has been submitted to the consideration of the Congress of the United States, a body selected for their patriotism, their wisdom, and their virtues, the constitutional organ of the legislative will of the nation, in order to inform their minds, and point their attention to the great and important subjects on which they were convened to deliberate, on the honest discharge of which every thing valuable to America depends. This subject had not been brought before them in a manner to coerce a hasty or an immature decision on the subject, nor had it been left on the vague foundation of suggestion or conjecture, but it had been brought before them in a manner that imposed deliberation, and had been supported by documents that had paralyzed and a small sealed the lips of opposition on the point of its expediency.

But, however imposing the manner, or how ever incontrovertible the matter on which the resolution was predicated, yet, honorable gentlemen are found on this floor to oppose it as a measure of that administration they feel disposed to support, particularly as it impugates the policy of the late administration, and indeed a measure which was the work of their own hands, which mankind at all times have been prone to admire, and however convinced of their errors, have with great reluctance been brought to confess them.

Sir, it would seem by the course of the arguments on the present question, that we had in contemplation to break down the federal judiciary altogether, and to subvert ancient foundations, and as if the agents or perpetrators (as the gentleman from Connecticut has politely called them,) with polluted hands, intended to destroy that constitution, they had sworn to support, and to leave the command without a judiciary to enforce obedience to the laws, whereby the strong might give law to the weak, the rich oppress the poor, and the cruel and the wicked oppress the weak and the innocent; and all with impunity; and indeed would induce a belief, that they alone had either life, liberty, or property to be protected. But the fact is, that the old judiciary system, that has answered every necessary purpose from the commencement of the government, remains inviolate. It is the new system established at the last period of the last session of Congress, a system whereby sixteen new judges were introduced as circuit judges, several of whom had been promoted to be circuit judges from district judges to make room in the district courts, for gentlemen of Congress who wished to establish this new system, and who therefore were by the constitution disqualified to accept that office, created during the time for which they were elected to serve in Congress, and as he had said before, thereby, indirectly, mistaking offices for themselves and the favorites of an expiring administration—a measure resisted by the republicans in both branches of the national legislature, a measure which was carried into operation by those from whom the people have revoked their confidence at the moment the power was passing away, a time when the business in the federal courts had declined nearly one half, and when the sedition law had ceased to be an engine to restrain the liberty of the press, and so punish men for the expression of their honest

political opinions—was all that was intended to be repealed.

Here let me call your attention to the letter of the resolution, which on reading it will be found to extend no farther than to the repeal of the act of Congress of the last session, by which sixteen new federal judges had been created, and a system established at the annual expense of 130,000 dollars. We are now called on as the representatives of the nation, the organ of their legislative will, to determine whether this law, which has been ever odious in the sight of the people, and whose birth was not entirely legitimate, shall be repealed. We are informed by the President himself, that it is unnecessary, and that fact has been established by the document submitted to us on the subject of the judiciary courts of the United States. We are informed also, that on the repeal of this law, and the making some retrenchments, in the naval and military establishments, which have been already proposed in, is predicated the repeal of the odious internal taxes; and in this manner and to effect this desirable purpose, this subject is brought before us. Can we then hesitate to relieve our people from the burthen of their odious internal taxes, by the repeal of this unnecessary law? I should presume not if governed singly by a regard to the public welfare; but we have notwithstanding been told by honorable gentlemen, on the other side of the house, that this law ought not to be repealed.

1. Because it is inexpedient.
2. Because it is unconstitutional.

Upon the first point, that of its expediency, he should not detain the Senate longer than to observe, that the document on our table shows that the old judiciary system, which had been coeval with our government, and had been in operation from its commencement, has been at all times sufficient for the transaction of all the judicial business of the Union; that the business in the courts had already declined nearly one half under the old system, even at the moment of the establishment of the new one; also that it was contemplated to repeal the odious internal taxes, a considerable source of litigation; and that the more odious sedition law had expired, which they all knew had been a source of considerable litigation, and he was sorry to add, had not placed the judiciary above the reach of abuse; but whether deservedly or no, he dared not to affirm; and that the peace we had lately established with France had put an end to another source of litigation, that of admiralty causes on the prize side of the court of admiralty. From this view of the subject, he himself was entirely satisfied of the expediency of the repeal, and had little doubt that every gentleman was equally so, that any evidence could convince.

As to the point of its being unconstitutional—it will be recollected that the President himself has recommended the repeal of this law; an evidence of its constitutionality of so high authority with the enlightened people of America, that it is stood singly on that, it would require a federal host to shake it, but we know the honorable gentlemen on this floor are disposed to contest their respect for that authority on this occasion.—Those gentlemen I will refer to the constitution itself, from whence I presume it will appear that the power now proposed to be exercised is clearly delegated.

In the 8th section, 9th article, Congress shall have power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.—In the 7th article Congress shall have power to establish post-offices and post-roads. There are the precise expressions by which Congress acquire the power over the subjects of the inferior courts and of the post-offices; there is no other authority given them but by these articles; there is no express authority to abolish either courts or post-offices, but the subjects are respectively given to Congress to exercise their legislative will upon, in such manner as should best promote the public good.—I would ask gentlemen, if Congress have not established post-offices without number, and abolished them at their will and pleasure, by virtue of their authority under the 7th article, above stated; and I should be glad to hear from whence the authority to abolish post-offices is derived unless from the article that only expressly authorizes their establishment, and whether the authority given over the subject has not in all past times been held sufficient to justify the abolishing as well as establishing of post-offices.—He then called on the gentlemen in the opposition to point out a difference between the powers of Congress over the inferior courts and the post-offices,

and to show how it was that Congress could abolish the post-offices under an authority to establish them, and not to abolish the inferior courts under the like authority to establish them, & how the same phraseology that is used in vesting the power in Congress over the post-offices & inferior courts, can be construed so as to authorize the abolishing post-offices & not to authorize the abolishing the inferior courts.—But we have been told that by the 1st section of the 3d article this business is to be explained; let us examine it.—The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges of the Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour. By this it has been insisted, that the judges of the inferior, as well as the superior courts hold their offices during good behaviour, and that we have no power to pass this repealing law, because it would operate to displace the judges.

He said that Congress by an extraordinary legislative act with the concurrence of two thirds of the States, had a power to abolish even the Supreme Court. He asked in such case what would become of the judges? Would they be entitled to hold their offices as judges, when in the eye of the constitution there was no such office? No certainly! The constitution meant, and could mean no higher office than a judge under the constitution, and the moment the constitution dissolved the office, the judge under the constitution ceased to have a political existence, & would not be known to the constitution as a judge. So he concluded by an ordinary act of legislation, the Congress might repeal the law creating the inferior courts, and on the repeal of the law from whence the legal existence had been derived constituting them judges, he should be glad to hear how they could be judges; that being created by the law, they derived their existence from the law, and could not as judges survive it; the constitution means a judge known to the law, and not the man who had been a judge, after his political dissolution. He insisted that Congress can establish legislatively, a court, and thereby create a judge; so they can legislatively abolish the court and eventually annihilate the officer, that the inferior courts are creatures of the legislature, and that the creature must always be in the power of the creator; that he who creates can destroy.—But we are asked by the honorable gentleman from New-York, in answer to this, "has a man a right to destroy his own children?" Mr. Wright said he had been taught to believe that man had not been his own creator, but the happy instrument of creation.—But this power that is now denied to us, had been exercised by the gentlemen themselves, in the very law that is now intended to be repealed. You will see by adverting to that law, the district courts of Tennessee and Kentucky annihilated. But we are told by honorable gentlemen, that there was a circuit court established, consisting of these two States and another State, and that the judges of the district courts were appointed judges of the circuit courts; and accepted their commissions as such, and therefore they say that they did not destroy the office of the district judges of Tennessee and Kentucky.—He asked if each other State had not district courts; he asked if there had not been circuit courts established in all the States by that law, and if the district courts of the other States had not been continued; and can it be said that a district court composed of a single State as in the case of Tennessee and Kentucky, is not abolished, and the office of a district judge destroyed, because in the same law a circuit court is established, and the district judges appointed circuit judges? Can it be said in fact that it is the same office, when the duties are extended to three States, to sit in three places, as it was when limited to one State and one place; or will gentlemen tell us that if the judges of the district courts had refused to act as judges of the circuit courts, whether they would have been still judges of the district courts as they had been abolished? or will they say, that by a commission of a district judge limiting his jurisdiction to a State, is the same as that of a circuit judge extending it over three States? And whether the law authorizing the commission over three States ought not to precede the commission vesting that authority.

Mr. Wright asked if Congress, when exercising their authority in the first instance to establish inferior courts, had not the right to limit their continuance to any period, and that at the end of that period, if the law was not continued, what would be the situation of

the judge appointed under the law; would his authority continue? Certainly not. And will any gentleman contend on this floor that if a former Congress had a right to give limitation to the continuance of a law, that the present Congress have not the same authority to limit or discontinue. Honorable gentlemen, however ingenious, will find themselves, he presumed, unable to solve these difficulties, or to reconcile these inconsistencies: for his part the authority by which this subject had been brought before them, the recommendation of the President, had been powerful.—The letter and spirit of the constitution, when recurred to, had established him in that opinion, that they were justified in the measure now proposed, and the practice of Congress in abolishing the district courts of Tennessee and Kentucky, satisfied him that it was no new idea, no new exercise of power, and further that nothing in the form of a constitution can be drawn so guardedly that gentlemen may not be found to differ on its true construction, and even, as in the present case, at different times and on different occasions, differ themselves in the construction of the same instrument. If all these considerations were not sufficient to satisfy gentlemen, and we were obliged to recur to the principles on which this instrument must have been established, we shall find that we do not in any degree violate them, by the construction we put on them. If the British government is recurred to, from whence the State governments borrowed their principles, or if the State constitutions are recurred to, we shall find thoroughly incorporated, the principles for which we contend, that the judges are independent only of the Executive, but never above the law giving them their political existence. He admitted with the gentleman from New-York, that judges ought to be the guardians of the constitution; so far as questions were constitutionally submitted to them; but he held the legislative executive, & judiciary, each severally the guardians of the constitution, so far as they were called on in their several departments to act; & he had supposed the judges were intended to decide questions not judicially submitted to them, or to lead the public minds, in legislative or executive questions; and he confessed he had greater confidence in the security of his liberty in the trial by jury, which had in all times been considered as the palladium of liberty; than in the decision of judges, who had at some time been corrupt.—For his part he did not wish to break down the judiciary or the judges, or to violate the constitution, though he confessed he should feel as secure in the decision of the State judges in even federal questions, with an appeal to the supreme federal court, as in the present judges, and indeed the constitution in the 4th article, sec. which imposes on all State judges the oath to observe the constitution and laws of the United States, always seemed to him to consider the State courts in a certain degree judges of federal questions. Nor had he ever been able to raise a doubt in his own mind, as to the propriety of trusting State judges to decide federal questions, with an appeal to a federal court when he considered that State juries had always been trusted to decide all questions, from whose decision there was no appeal; and indeed the State courts at all times had been the only judicial guardians of our rights, whose integrity had never been impeached. The gentleman from New-York is so careful of the constitution, that he wished it secured by walls of brass. Does he apprehend others wish to violate it, and himself its exclusive guardian, and that other gentlemen do not hold themselves equally bound to protect it, or have nothing worth protecting. For his part he had sworn to support it; but he believed that no human invention could make it more secure than it was, deposited in that hallowed temple, & locked by the key of our holy religion.

WHEREAS my son CHARLES, a youth in his 17th year, absconded or was inveigled away from my house on Rocky Point, on the 13th inst. in company with a young man about 20 years of age named JESSE MOLPASS. All persons are hereby forewarned from harboring or carrying the said Charles away at their peril. I will give ten dollars to any person who will bring him home, or twenty dollars for any information of his being harbored or inticed away.

WILLIAM WILLIAMSON.  
Rocky Point, Feb. 25th—3w.