

Paradise Romeo's description of an Apothecary.

I do remember a precise old maid,
And her abode she dwells - whom late I noted
In rustling gown, with wan and wither'd tips,
Dimm'd and formal, dusting cloth in hand,
Rubbing her chairs, and meagre were her looks,
Envy had worn her to the very bones;
And in her shining parlour, flow'rs pots flood,
Deck'd with geranium and jessamine,
And orange trees, and roses, pinks, and lilies,
' Bachelor's buttons,' crisp as the herself,
And lowly path in flow'rs, the type of love:
Six chairs, two tables, and a looking-glass,
Were burnish'd bright and oft; and round the room,
On wall, in closet, or on mantle-piece,
An old work basket, sal-volatile,
Portraits of maiden aunts, in ball-room fair,
With lamb or lap-dog hanging on their arms,
Novels from Circulating Library,
' Law's serious call to unconverted' folks,
Love Elegies, a bible and a cat,
Were duly set, for ornament or use,
As plenty prevail'd or visit or came in.
Littling, as thro' the house her shrill voice
Scream'd,
Scolding the servants, to myself I said,
And if a man did with to give a wife,
With show of courtship, here's an ancient maid,
Whose lips have practis'd long before the girls,
The terms of refusal, and the eager yes
Following a quick as echo to the sound.
And his fair thought does but scorn myne id,
I'll in my sock - some younger maid to wed!
A I remember this should be herself,
Bring twinght hair, th's out upon the trot
To batter scandal for a dith of tea.

SPEECH of Mr. Joseph Alston, jun. in the Legislature of South Carolina, on the proposed Amendment to the Constitution.

Tuesday, May 15.

Mr. CHAIRMAN - It required no uncommon share of political sagacity to foresee the claim which has been exercised by the proposed amendment. In this, as in every other country, there will always be found a certain description of persons opposed, from principle, to every thing like a change in the government. No matter how early the remedy - no matter how glaring the evil, it has been imposed upon them by the folly of an older generation, and they bow with superstitious reverence to the idol of their fathers; whether it be a crocodile or a serpent. Too weak to calculate the effects of alteration, too timid to hazard it, were they even capable of calculating, they start from innovation with the same horror as from a spectre; and even passive obedience is preferred to the privilege of invading an established right - We have seen it enough that vice herself be once enthroned, to receive forever after, the homage due to virtue. But, sir, it was not from the infatuated devotees of the established order of things alone, that hostility to this amendment was to have been anticipated: it was equally to have been expected from those, who, without any similar predilection for old forms and usages, who, regardless of the principle, look only to the immediate tendency of every alteration which is offered, and as it accords or clashes with their respective views, become its zealous advocates or its ardent opposers. Thus the general ticket, which, in Massachusetts, was hailed by a certain party as the legitimate offspring of address and patriotism, in Virginia, where different motives prevailed, and different effects followed, its adoption was deemed as the bastard issue of iniquity and oppression. Thus the very measure now under discussion, that measure which, a few years since, was again and again urged upon our acceptance, is now denounced to us by its former advocates, as more fraught with mischief than the fabled box of Pandora! The important advantages which, when it was first covered our dissent, have disappeared; and a complete monopoly of electoral power by the larger States - the most dreadful oppression of the smaller members of the confederacy - an anarchy, diffusion and every other evil that may claim credulity, or inspire patriotism with doubt, are now confidently predicted as the necessary consequences of its adoption. Happily for us, experience has long since decided that it is not among the zealous of party we are to look for inspiration: 'Spite, therefore, of the gloomy prophecies which have been chaunted upon the occasion - 'false of the numerous and solemn warnings, which have built upon us from so many quarters - no doubt, in the plenitude of political charity - I shall still think, to amend our constitution in the manner proposed, essential to our national tranquility; and consequently, wise and proper.

eventual election, is with the small States. / But continue gentlemen, by allowing the elections in the first instance, to designate between the two persons elect is to vote for, you render the failure of election by the people more remote; the probability of reference to States is, consequently, lessened, and this entails an alarming departure from the federative feature of the present mode of election, which was expressly intended as an equivalent to the small States, for the sacrifice of their influence in the electoral choice.

With regard to this pretended concern for S. I confess myself entirely an abolitionist. As far as can be collected from the instrument itself, those who formed our constitution appear to have acted solely upon the two principles; a desire to strengthen the union of the States, and at the same time, to give stability to the government they were about to establish. To this, rather than to any other cause, I have always attributed the success of the federative and popular principles discernable in the constitution. With regard to the particular point in discussion, the idea of the eventual election by States being due to the smaller members of the confederacy, as a return for the donation of their influence in the electoral choice, may have been introduced in the course of debate; but this contingent exercise of power, is liable to occur, should have been formerly deemed an equivalent to the small States for the sacrifice they had made, appears to me to be too prosperous to be urged. If it were to be considered, all I can say is, that the small States could have but little understood the value of the treasure they parted with for such a bubble. But, sir, besides the strong predilection against the supposed compromise, in this instance, desirable, as well from the inequality of the pretended concessions as from the surrender of federative principles by the larger States in other parts of the constitution for which they received not even the semblance of an equivalent; the intention of the remaining parties furnishes the most direct evidence against the fact. We had primarily united as sovereign and independent States; as such, each State, like individuals in the original formation of a consolidated government, had brought with her equal rights and a claim to equal influence. However strong, therefore, there may have been the arguments in favor of a partial surrender of State sovereignty upon the ground of expediency; the large States, as a matter of right, could have had no possible claim to such a sacrifice from the small States. Any claim of this nature could not but have been viewed precisely in the same light as would now be the claim of France, or Russia to dominion over their less powerful neighbors. - Thus being the case, then, the participation by the small States of equal influence, in some instances with the large States, cannot be considered as an equivalent for the diminution of their influence in other instances. In this the constitution has merely preferred to them what they had before a fair right to enjoy. Here, consequently, is no sacrifice by the great States, wherever on the other hand, the small States have consented to forego their claim to the equal influence, it is manifestly a sacrifice on their part; and this sacrifice, so much as a compromise necessarily implies a mutual concession, cannot be considered in that light. It would only therefore, as I before observed, have resulted from a general concession among the States, small as well as great, of the federal advantages to be derived from a government thus organized; that is, among the federative and popular principles. Whether they judged correctly or not, is another question; but from this view, I think, it evidently follows, that if the proposed amendment can be shown at all likely to promote the harmony of the union, in adopting it, however it may encroach upon the federative principle, we shall act, not only wisely but strictly according to the spirit in which the constitution itself was formed. Under our forefathers however, as made a law as an answer to the extraordinary objections which have been raised to the amendment upon the ground of its being so dissimilar to the spirit of the constitution than from any conviction of the necessity of proving an analogy. For my own part, provided the expediency of any amendment be shown, I should deem it of final consequence to enquire whether it accorded with the views of those who formed the constitution or not? So long as I remain convinced of the progressive improvement of the human mind in most sciences, particularly in that of government, where the best light, the light of experience, will always be in favor of the present generation; I shall be little inclined to doubt the wisdom of any measure merely from the circumstance of its not having occurred to those who preceded us. - But, sir, however we may differ as to the motives which induced the combination of the federative and popular principles, which can only be seen to exist in the constitution, it must at least be conceded that, in the case under consideration, it was intended to give the popular principle the preference; since it is only upon the contingent failure of election by the people, that the choice of your executive devolves upon the States. It is a fair presumption, therefore, that wherever any constitutional obstacles prevent themselves to the free operation of the principle this principle preferred, they are to be attributed to inadvertence. To have given the right of election in the first instance, to the people, and at the same time, carefully created such difficulties as would, to a certain degree, render that right completely nugatory, would have been a species of political juggery which we cannot, in candor, attribute to the convention. This then becomes the question: Shall we fulfil the manifest intentions of those who formed the constitution, by correcting those faults in their work which time has discovered, or shall we through mistakes respect, continue to expose ourselves to the ruinous effects of their errors. That these difficulties to a free exercise of electoral power by the people, do exist, every man capable of calculating must be conscious.

Behold the alternative to which the constitution, as it now stands, reduces us! In the electoral choice, we are to vote for two persons; that is for a President and Vice-President; but either to secure their election of the first, the will of the majority is to be sacrificed in the latter appointment, or, by endeavouring to elect both, they expose themselves to be completely defeated by the minority, however inconsiderable! Do you doubt this? Recall to mind your late election. For six days you saw the fate of this country, like the fowl of Democles, hanging suspended by a hair. The virtue of one man saved us; for I do not hesitate to say that, had the lead of those intrigues when calamity, for the accomplishment of purposes too infamous to be avowed, and directed against the present Vice-President, been really practiced, he had been elected President; and this the united wishes of nearly two-thirds of America had been defeated. Had this happened, what had been the consequences? Perhaps - But, sir, let us not ponder upon the mantle of oblivion over the transaction, or mark it only as a beacon to warn us of the quicksand! With our dwelling therefore, upon this unhappy incident, I would merely ask, whether it be prudent, when we have it in our power to easily to correct it, to continue a provision which will, every four years, expose us to the same dangers? No, sir - we may not always have a Vice-President so ready to fulfil the wishes of the people - we may not always have a minority so yielding as in 1800.

I am aware it has been said, and I accede to the truth of the remark, that an election by the House of Representatives, at the period to which I allude, would have been as flimsy constitutional, and, consequently, as binding upon the community, as would have been a choice, in the first instance, by the people. But let it be remembered, Mr. Chairman, that in all countries, the minds of that community - they, in short, who in every revolution carry the torch of destruction, are guided, not by cool political calculations, but by the passions. Had there happened a different choice from that which eventually was made, you would in vain have expounded to an enraged population, the principles on which your constitution was predicated; in vain have expounded to them the advantages of continuing the federative and popular principles. Your difficulties would have been still; the only object of their regard, in a different choice from their own, would have been the violated majesty of the people. I anticipate in the times of government, their answer to this. - What, it will be asked, is the impetus of a mob to do to us? Is our constitution to vary with the ever varying caprices of the ignorant and turbulent? No, sir; But where the wishes of that Mob unite with sound policy to call for an alteration, it will always be, at least, an additional reason with prudent men, to harken that alteration.

It has, indeed, been asserted elsewhere by an orator, whose speech I have now in my hand, and his attention has been repeated to gentlemen here, that the very case which occurred at the late election, was compensated by the constitution. According to their construction, it never was intended that the majority should elect both President and Vice-President. It was known by the convention, say they, that in this country, in common with all others, where there is freedom of opinion and speech, there would be parties. They likewise knew that the intolerance of the major or ruling sect and political party, was frequently exercised upon the minor party; and that the rights of the minority ought to be protected to them.

As well then, to secure the rights of the minority, as to check the intolerance of the majority, they placed the majority in jeopardy, if they should attempt at grasping all the benefits of a President and Vice-President within themselves, to the total exclusion of the minority. The language of the constitution to such majorities is, 'take care that you aim not at too much, for if you do it is put into the power of the minority to check you; and by a judicious disposal of their few votes, determine the choice of President.'

Thus, by the way, I should rather suspect to be the language of the interpreter, than of the constitution. But, before I proceed to an examination of their opinions, allow me to call your attention to the complete change of position, which is here manifested. In my original regard to the federative principle - it is no longer a regard to the interests of the small States, who erect their abhorrence to the designating system; - The exclusion of the minority from power, is now the fair source of opposition. For, it is to be remarked, that, as the constitution now stands, not only a majority of the people may be defeated by the minority; but that this same thing may as easily occur where the popular majority involves likewise a majority of States. Now, sir, however we may differ with regard to the relative weight constitutional means to be attached to the popular or federative majorities, in the election of President and Vice-President; one would hardly have supposed that the chief argument in favour of the present provision of the constitution, would have been that, under it, a case might occur, in which neither of those majorities should prevail. Yet, such is actually the fact! It is absolutely necessary, it seems, that the minority should elect, at least, a Vice-President, to give them some check upon the majority, and to prevent their rights being trampled upon. Of all the visionary projects ever engendered by political quackery, the idea of giving the minor a constitutional control over the major party, is, perhaps the most absurd. Obedience to the majority is the vital principle of every free government.

The only check the law can have upon the many, is public virtue and a proper conviction of the instability of parties. Majorities have always the power; and if neither a regard to moral nor political justice, a due respect for the judgment of posterity, nor a sense of interest can save the rights of a minority from violation,

all the constitutional checks you can devise, will offer but a feeble barrier to their encroachments. But waive the folly of this project - grant too, that the powers of our Vice-President, were really such as would render him this check upon the Executive - I should, if possible, be still more averse to putting his election into the hands of the minority. Upon all political questions, even among the most honest men, there will be some difference of opinion; experience alone decides which is right. Whatever therefore be the political complexion of the party in power, I think it proper they should be allowed a fair experiment. And, to this end it is essentially necessary that they be allowed to pursue their measures in tranquillity - entirely unfettered and unobscured by any unnecessary checks. It must be a miserable policy, indeed, that would not, steadily pursued, prove less injurious to us, than to have our administration embarrassed at every step - hesitating where they should act with decision, and to become from division of sentiments, not acting at all.

But, sir, were it really desirable to allow the minority this check, that desire would not be effectuated by giving them the election of the Vice-President.

The constitution has determined, that the legislative and judiciary branches of the government are to be elected by the people; the executive is to be rendered dependent of the Vice-President necessary to any act of his. The President, in his power, is considered as acting entirely from his own discretion, and is a single responsibility for his conduct. Even in the case of a council, which custom requires, preferred to him, the Vice-President is never consulted. The fact, that such an officer a Vice-President, except his casting vote upon an equal division of the Senate, so far from providing any check upon the executive, has not the smallest influence in the government. The only chance, therefore, of his being invested with power, rests upon the contingency of his being called to act as President. Now, it has been conceded, on all hands, that the appointment, at least of the chief magistrate, belongs, of right, to the popular majority; but however just, however rightful may be the claim of the majority to that appointment, in the first instance should their candidate die, within one month a fresh election, it is equally just, equally rightful, according to the logic of gentlemen, that, for the remaining years and at intervals, they should submit to an appointment by the minority; - I say, without this right of the minority, no majority would be protected! In other words, to prevent the majority trampling upon the rights of the minority, the minority are to trample on their rights. Whatever may be thought of the wisdom of the doctrine, it must, at least be allowed the merit of novelty; I say the merit of novelty, for, ingenious as may be the theory of electors, I am convinced it never occurred to the framers.

As little, sir, can I believe, that an election by States was contemplated as the consequence of the right given to the people to vote for two persons, being exercised. Had the present mode of election really been intended by the convention, as a compromise between the federative and popular principles, as has been asserted; why, I would ask, seek the accomplishment of their object by a method so circuitous? Not only so circuitous, but so precarious too? Would it not have been easier, more direct, to have it once said - Let a majority of the people elect a President; a majority of States the Vice-President? Or, if a full more equal compromise had been desired to have had - Let those majorities elect alternately, one the President, the other the Vice-President? Here their meaning would have been clear to the meanest capacity; the popular and federative principles, between which the most exact compromise would have been preferred, would have moved, each in its own orbit, distinctly marked that we should have had nothing to do with their election. This, or some similar plan, was not adopted, because to exact a compromise was not intended. It is remarkable that whatever a union of the two principles, not wholly contradictory, as the present; for instance, was meant, nothing can be plainer than the language of the constitution. In the appointment of electors, for example, this union is evident; the words of the constitution, accordingly are, or words to that effect - Each State shall have an elector for every member he lends to the house of representatives, two being added for her senators. Again, it is equally clear, in respect orders, in the event of a failure of election by the people, that the house of representatives shall elect; the representation from each State having one vote. - It is true that one of the provisions for that reference, is the very case which occurred at the late election; two persons having an equal number of votes, and those votes a majority of the whole. But how did that case happen; how will it happen, whenever it again occurs; From the equal wishes of the people, in favour of the two candidates? No - the wishes of the people in 1800, were clearly understood by every man; perhaps, there never will occur a case, in which their wishes will not be already understood. - This reference then, was the inevitable, the necessary consequence of an attempt to, on the part of the people, to exercise completely a right given them by the constitution itself; a right to vote for two persons. The constitution, therefore, as it now stands, puts the people, in the same situation with the owner of a piece of land, so situated, so surrounded with lands of his neighbors, that with the best title in the world to the land, he cannot procure access, without incurring an admission of trespass. Their right to vote for two persons; and their obligation not to designate, are so widely at variance, that the full exercise of that right would be the power of appointment, as the words of the constitution imply, confers merely the power of nominating the candidates from among whom the House of Representatives are to elect. - But, sir, are we to reconcile these contradictions? By supposing that those who form the constitution, meant to convey a power in words, which never should be enjoyed in fact? Can you leastly reject the idea; better to have made no mention of such a power, than to have thrown it among us, an apple of discord. Shall we rather agree with those who assert, that a partial exercise only of electoral power by the majority was contemplated, and that, by not allowing the elector to designate, it was intended to give the minority a control over the majority in the appointment of Vice-President? This is a great force in politics to be admitted. - Besides, the means are not adapted to the end. It is really the object of the minority to elect a Vice-President? A proper understanding among those who compose the majority, if they exceed the minority but by two votes, will defeat them. Is it the object of a furious minority, on the other hand, to nullify the majority in the choice of President? If there be not a great disparity between the two parties, all the efforts, all the skill of the majority, even their consenting to relinquish the appointment of the Vice-President, may not prevent the triumph of the minority. Each elector is to vote for two persons; Now, although the electors of the different States composing the majority, may vote uniformly but for one candidate, the person they intend as President, and vote for half a dozen different men as Vice-President, that by thus scattering their votes for this officer, their candidate for the presidency may be disappointed; should either of the half dozen men thus voted for as Vice-President, be discovered by the minority, and their votes be united in his favour, he may become your President. This is an extreme case, I acknowledge; but, upon a question of such high importance, every possible case ought to be foreseen.

[TO BE CONTINUED]

RALES OF STORAGE at Wilmington, for 1800 For sale at this Office.