aT'IT'sV t
h 7 PUBLISHED (weiktr) Ijtf ALLMAMD LLi- tUESDAY, JANUARY-1, 1805.
A
It 11 Ktl ' : FT dtiH "-
POLICY Of RUSSIA.
TH AT-thePrracfa Revolution bus over-.
throwa'the ancieWfystem J&f the Balance of
Europe t-i it IpuiWwiopS, lis .'a truth unk
. Tersally ackn wUdgejd - oscillations :
which have takca pUcigi ip thepolicy of al
most every state wnie twtevenVsufficiently
'wove that none of tbeifcij ''jet fas',ieuletl itself
in Usnew:sttiim'gVm'"a
A few years -ago all j&aroe- was leagued
against France. Prussia, ' heaver," soon de
viated into a suspicious" imraljtj;--RHSsla
entered into the vnt in impassion and left it
in apeU She forwdanntinjathioti with
the filler of Franccta i adiustHhp newteFrl
torial arrangenientV aM lViUci? infiuehce
fx!e Germanic Body f nd now we see Bus-
iia and France falUninto open hostility, to
the indulgence of which, la deeds of arms,"
physical obstacles seem alone to Interpose.
. Some of the French politicians have much .
.recommended, a steady and constant alliance
between France and Russia, as calculated to
secure the tranquility of Europe, both in the
North and South,, by equally couUouling the
powers that influence in each. But that sys
tem, though perhaps it. might answer ex
tremely well in quiet times, Ic after a state of
power $c possession to which European nations
have been ivconciled by the time &habit,ishot
likely to succeed when a. general discontent
promft3 every one to covet & pursue some ob
ject to change or improve its situation. 'Far less
-Mill it succeed whenbth or one of the'partics
is actuated by a vfofent arid insatiable spirit
of ambition. France is now animated by
that spirit. The French Government is not
disposed to secure the repose of Europe and
its owm acqnhi'uions by forbearance, hut by
.ction. It is tiot in the nature, of things that
the French government at present should he
inactive ; indeed, if it-were 16 descend to
that system, its neighbours would, by mistak
ing quiet for imbecility, soon rouse" it again
to activity. All ambition of conquest and
aggrandisement is impelled by two princi
ples. It i in its own nature active and stir
ring ; but as it always excites jealousy and
ill-will, it always has enemies ready lo take
advantage of ' its indolence or want of fore
sight. Thus a conquering power is, in a
certain view of the case, always acting in self
defence, even when it attacks.. .We do not
believe that the French government dare
tae to e reitleM,'turbuknt"and offensive.
- Tha moment it adopts a pac'ifick system, it
will be assailed in Us torn and force J to de-
' Itnd itself, because' Tjii' its pacifick sptem
would its neighbours discover a favourable
op($oiluriy to regain or to acquire. Our
situation in India affords an apt illustration
of this necessity. No enlightened statesmun
ever cxpcts cAir vast empire there to be
long at peace. The moment we cease to do
mischief we sh:dl be called to account for ;
vhat wc Ime-diMiev Our. moderation will
lie weakness, so thai we mist be in perpetu
, al hostU'ttics uith thu enemies wc Cnd or
" make. " -v . "
It is evident, therefore, that France and
. Russia are not likely to agree in sharing the
government of the rest of Europe. Buona
parte indeed, there-is reison to believe, has
deceived the Enipcrour of Russia aT to va
rious stipulations which lormt-l the condi-'
t'mns of their momentary union. But we
doubt much whitlier Huia, either seriously
expected that the King of .Sardinia would b
restored or pbta'ur &u adequate indemuity.
But the French. Ciovernrocni has probLbly
disappointed the expectations of Rusia, in
points of which the public is U prccitl but
impetfccly iirornd.
If lu wever the French Government 1. as not
"kept wj fnith-willr the cH-of-Sw-Pterfc-.
bu. gh in p-omotin;; the objects of its ambi
tion, thu mini'.tvrsof Uuttia have shewn con
sideral.lc dcxtrpity in pursuing its, policy.
The estnMMiuv;m of the Retniblick of the
Stvrn hbrvU, which ban, in Uct, become a
Uussiin coluny, was a jitastcr stroke, and it
lia been scr skilfully followed up. lUn.ua.
!rtc never committed i greater error thran
: concurring in tht estuMUhmcnt for Bus
sis, lie liasbitU'tlv repented of it, utid there
, wjs a lime he mediated that orcupj
tion r.f 'lhf Republic nf the Seven lhtnds,
t'ic'i ft'tia umler the fivouroflhc ( rcstiit
circu.tist.inccs of Europe, has so hayi'Ity ef
fectcd. It will ht ic nu'nilitrtd, that in the
repot t of Stbaktiat.i, which, with iuconciiva
hi; m",-dies Buu'tdiiarte caused to be pub
i'.'ted, that vajwuring cnxcnmb jrve an pc
"tuunt of hi- reception cf one of the Islands,
and of the faveursl.lc diipo. itionorthe natives
in j-vccWc tlw I'rciich. This puerile pultica
liurKof Ihe Flench designs mM have in.
'tKcd IUsii t ar.tkipute i'trm, had not the
Co ;il of Fctttkbuibccn alreaily sufncicrUly
dispottd. ' ' '
Mny eircin ,nce base conruireil to
i!iwihs etrsgj antifty 'nh sthieh Hoisia
l.jsU&ourtfl to odraife her position to tic
S'Hilh. V',tTiirnce hs sHiwrt thnt 'the
,deiue of pB'tr Uj Iri'ftU of t dishing a
2rrit nviil pocr in the Bltic Iji ed.
It ii alut tte only frcat drsign of that
tiiipihr h.brin wU'uli has failed j yit in
trtin that scwcmt be did ll that iitiry and
. tutumsunc; libtftd, and he partly sue
cec'titd..'Butthose',whoarebest acquainted w'uh .
Russia, confess the'abstirdity of attempting
to raisb a great and commanding ftaval force
in a sea that is frozen up six months in theT
year, and manning that navy" with boor's.
The events of an hundred years, and the.
steady4 'prosecution! of a political system,
whichlajhe hands ofa. great power always
ensures iuccess, bas effected Peter's objects,,
and no-only brought Russia into the Black
Sea, buV given her the entire dominion . of it.
The nstdgatioa of tbat'kea, connected with
the navgaiioo tof .the Mediterranean,' anfl
- commerce which Russia may carry on,'must
by degrees give her that navy which she
coveted and with it elnvost all the othtr ob
: jects other "ambition in the Soj3tlFst-"4)f
E.urqp; Sliljsoon may have th whole
sburcesofther.Tirrkjj-h marine, once Lr from,
. Wipg despicable, Will with more faci
lity gain the influence she de ires.' Her in
fi' sues in the North wjas acquired by blcddy
wars, in which she gained comparatively
nothing but reputation and experience. A
, more splendid reward awaits hcr.if she con
tinues to pursue her obvious poljcy in the
Black Sea and Mediterranean.
Even during the wild and extravagant ca
reer '6T "Paul, the Mediterranean was the
grand object with which the war' against"
France was' connected It was to Italy that .
the Russian army was sent. .The Russian
fleet was sent fo the Mediterranerii-;. Rus
sian troops were sent to Naples. v The kings
of Sardinia and Naples were take? i-r.dei
protection of Russia. The firnic ol Rdssia was
spread round every shore of the Mvditcri'art-,
an, that her reputation might precede mi U
cilitae her ooruinion. The same couisti'r,u
with Italy and the States of the Mediterrane
an, has since assiduously and afiectedly been
maintained. Theve can be no 'doubt, there
fore, that flow Russia, having obtained an
'establishment in the Archipelago, from, which.
she can influtnce all the adjoining'Tciiritrics. :
of Greece, is determined to .extend and con
solidate her powr in the south of Lurcpc.
She now will send forth her fleets and ar
mies by the So'cth, instead of tlie North,
and her name will ri?.e to a splendour round
.the shores of the Euxine an. I the Mediter
ranean,, which 'it .could never have trained
not to be assumed that Russia is animated
by that dismtei-ested seal th.thas been iVii-
puteu to her. Doubtless it is a desirable
hrng that the. power of FrariCtrrshould-fae-:
reduted, but will that feeling prompt Russia
to afcts when her losses 'would be her Own,
4fld the advantages redound to her rivals or
her enemies ? If Austria will nut, move, will
Russia move further than her cwn interest
-dictates? ' :.
It is not to indulge politicaVreveries, fee
construaion fcif which requires some smaK-'
collection of materials and knowledffef but "
, it is doiyight folly and ignorance io talk-
ta Kussta landlnR mt;n in llolsttfin, drivHi-
f the French' out 'of Hanover and such-like"
absu'rdit its. We., baye . ';constanly : wittie'd"---'
bui readers against .paying ztty'sxmfi.iort to.
these-foolcvies ; and if; ou,r Mmistcrs expect' '
to create a divisicn in the North of Evlrope
by means of Khssia ahd Sweden, tlwy will
Shew themselves grossly,-,, ignorant of the
means, the interest1!.' atd the i.ims of thait'
power with which ' y are' desirous tc con
federate, i "
n the precetling part of litis -artice'we
have erulcavotuvd to shew "at there was
very fmle probability of IJustfia making any
- considerable efforts by sea or lund aj;ainst:
France, in- the'Nqrth,- and that her policy',
would Lo to strengthen Lcr position n the
Mediterrarfenn', bidding .defiance to'the'hds
tilily of her opponent. ' '
It is -evident that the French Government
entertains much more' apprehension uf the
lo'.iAequtnces which may result from Russia
being permitttd to pursue her bclulnes cf
..cgran'diii-inent in that quarter, than from
her exertions in the Nort'i. .-Buonaparte is
fuiiy sensiLle that he cannot directlVj by
force of arms, prevent the completion of
the designs w hich the "occupation of tie Se
ven Islands' has begun. His fleets are block
, aded ui in .Tovdcn, unM r.p impediment cx-,
Uts to the ii.diXini'.e extension vl the Russian '
'forces in the Ionian Islands, if the Turk's
coi tir uc to grant a free j. ssags thiDUgh the
Bosph.'ru and the Dardanelles.
In order therefore, to put a stop to the
growing power arid influence of the Rus
sians, in the 'onipn Sea and the admen?
country, the French Government set us lo
in the black and inhospitable ltgjis of the employ every efi'orlVo prevail upon theiirai'd
Pal'ick. , . . J.. Seignior to. sliut the p-.'.5sagc of tlie Bos-
Tlie war hetiveen England. find France has , ; phcrous. It perhaps, may be U)MlrfeAVotv
afforded to 'Russia, eveiy facility she could ever, whether the Turkish CoKramvut-viU
have desired for the'-attainmerit of her ends, i; vertute to do so. That passage was grvMcd
She has strei.pthened and loilified htr pii- '; to the Russians, not from ignorance of the
lion in such a manner as to bid U flai.ee to d:atger with wh'uli the ccncessir.n was preg
a coup de main. It would Tt quire a power- jj rant,' but from a convir.rioii tliU it might
ful expedition to dislodge her; but there is j be extorted by force, The Turks have now
that this country would per- I! "alien into an aPject leirour oi me l.ussu.n
little probability tbat tins country would per
mit France to disiodge Bussia Ircni an im
portant position in which she wished to
establish herself. Our fleet in the Mediter
ranean therefore is the t'.uislan fleet. Under
iUj protection Russia completes her designs
inXhe Greccian Islands." Nor do wc "con
ceive that our fleet in ihe Mediterranean is !
ill .employed in that service. We can an- J
ticipat no danger to our interests from the i
growth of a power m t.ie south-east of Lu-i-opc,
which in all probability, must always
be the rival of France for grcrtr.ess and do- I
minion. It is an ascendency which in the j
present cirtumstances of Europe, cA nei- i
ther prove injurious lo our commercial nor j
poli'ical interests, ihougli for rca6ns which !
wi',1 be. mentioned, it M ill tend fur the mo
ment to desuoy every chance of an tRicient
continental confederacy ueaintt Fioncf. Jt
m.iy not hurt cur future interests but it viil
not serve ur pftst'iit purposes. There is
every reason lo hrtitve luuvever that Minis-
' tn hive not been aware of the consequences
l- t( thtf lijgyvtjiHij-jiJjiJhti Arclupcjago. "
: Nr have they brtn insen-iLle how" this"
I ; country a "indirectly promoting tf.cir sue
: cess.
1 , Svme conjecture too, that unless the Crand I
; Seignior afl'ords every ficility U-ibe Russian '
projects uiiiesi he p.iws thm the entire
command of the Bosplrorus, the 1iiks will
be attacked and the magnificent tiews of
I'eter and Calluri.te may be realized. The
Radian have a port and a depot in the
Archipelago, and they may attack Coiutan.
tinoplc ou every side. At any rate the
over'hrow of the Turkish power in Europe
is but deferred, even if the present favoura
ble opportunity were to I lost.
If our view of the subject then he corrrut,
the whole object of Russia, jn the event uf
ii war wlih France', wtU be to strengthen and
confirm her position in the Arthiptbgo, and
by consequence extend her influence and
authority in the jMorca, without risking any
thin lo the shock of war and battles. She
will reserve her fuiee and her resources for'
that quarter in which Erancc it likely to
excite opposition to her views, fend where
loo she has most solid advantages to acquire
' We have cicr been cf opinion, md arc
s'ill, thai Bus! will nrt at present attempt
in htm auy forrr in act in ihe North, or
6the Northern frontitri ofFranrc. Ii wouU
lc risking every'lhing, ami nothing to gam
but reputation, which may be better acquired
I another qsarter. Not mention the want of
financial rcourc,theliopclenci of shaking
the military towcr of France unaided ; it ii
power, ana tnnugii uiey cannot oouot the '
views of ihat natron, they are willing to
prrchase a respite at the expenry even of
increasing tins hu thtr dagger. If the Turks,
were to declare that no moie Ri".ian ships
and troops shpirld pnss the Bospl.on.iVi, Ric
tia il may be easily imagined,- would not
qlirt'y submit to that interrupriuu tl'-hcr
fli.ns, It is the object of. the Frcrh v
.wumuiit, however, lo stimulate the Pc tte
to this measmeV trusting that thiy should
l;c able to supi ort their ancici.t Ally in br
ix-sistance, were. Russia to 'attempt main
taining this advantage by-force.
The Turki, of themselves arc little able
to resist ihe power of Russia, which in the
event of a war, would, perhaps, be brought
directly against the capital itself. Indeed
an attack upon Constantinople, by sea and
bod, which the Russians could make, would
in all fu'obuCility, be successful, as the 1 urk
isb government is in no respect prepared
to resist "it. The French, ''indeed, would
Mipply them'with effictrs, but ti e Turks are
"fuu stupiirahJ prcfumparonf -tobe jided
by them. Il was in Constantinople that the
Gretk Empire was vvrrthroun by ihe Br
birianlof the Cress and Creictnt, while the
provinces were "a prey lo anarchy and con
fusion. The present state of the Tuikiih
Empire justiCesthc comparison. Thc Rus
sians by their fleet in the Black Sea, might
even reduce Const sntinop by fumine, by
intercepting the supplies which come frr-m
the provinces on which ii is new, in a great
measure, forced to e'epend, since riisWcr
and civil war have raged in those from which
it formerly derived it subsistence.
But in case lie Turks should, frcm a
dread of the HusMan fewer, still Mintinuv to
grant every facility for the rxu-nrion cf that
power, which they know threatens their try
cxivtence, the French povirnmtnt have net
failed to employ every act and suggeMicn to
alarm ihe Court of Vienna, mpitiin( the
Russian establishment in the loi.lan UUndt,
and ila probable consequent et. It certainly
weart a suspicious ppeoraote, thai Kustia
should be collecting so great a force in ihe
island of the Ionian Sea. It is ridiculous
lo luppon thai these forces arc meant t
attack the power tf France in Half, nd to
preieite tbe alliea f Russia there. Unless
ihe arm' tf Ausliia were to ctcfpy Ihe
French elwwheie, all the Hoops Ruts'a
could at "present land In V.aly weuld trenie.
diattly be defeated. That cannot lc Ihe
object. The Com W f Vienna not a ly mnt
ct tcrtain cme jblouvt of a t:itnin-iab
lishmerit In the' Mediterranean, or on thc'"
shores of Greece, which pi cbtLly inteifties
with itswn maritirte prcspects, but it caii
-not.be indifl'erent to the possibility of an -attack
on C'onstamincple. iislf, either nowr
or; at 'some future pericd, when Russia ha
united and-consolidated the great means run
within her. .reach- In a s.ery short t,iipe all
the Greecian islands, with -their suppiy cf tea
men ic. will b,e al-lhe.dit-pt sij cl Russiii...
It was considered veiy -doubtful pohcy'of.
Joseph It. to connu so far.witlr the views
of Cfctjiarine, in her plaiis tf overthrow ipg the
-T'tM-Jtish Einpii e To' reduce to impotence
an eiwniy- by wlumi the Ausjian Monarchy
had so 9Rffi ,been tr.vugbj( j-it4iin a Ijaif
breadth' of destracJixui,uvsdt'idiC)ebs poll
tick, and wise,-but ? it 'never can be the interest
of that tiouse, to sulT'er" th'fc'seat cl the Turk-,
ish power in-Europe," i'Yul:vitji it, .probably,"
its ir.ot valuable possessions, .to be transfer
red to Russia.; ,M. St.tr"iirvt1.e elder, ilates,.
in bis nates on Fav-er-axelebrattd Memciix,
that he-has frequently heard JustphTl. sty,
'." -That though Austiiu bad often been iu
imminent Uaitr by the Tin bans, it would
be in a much worse state if the Kussian
Bonnets ot Coiistantino'ple." Considering,
indeed, thrXRiissia is a ccighbouring power
to Austria, considering her vast power and
unbounded ambition, it canr.ot be the inter
est, or policy of Austria to connive .at any
acquisitions tha't would render her still more
formidable. It therefore is: as much, the
interest of Austria as of France, to'Watch tl.u'T"'
growii' power of Russia. The vjews of am
bition which are imturai to every grent Vtatt,- -and
which the House of- Au'itf it-aS ' ' al?
ways c.itrishetl, mut now take a utw di
rection. The loS of 'the NetheVluids, ha&
rendered ail acquisition ' in ih,M quarter im
possible. France end Pn sia will never '
suffer her. to obtain miy fnther, or at h as:
...c or.s ide r ab.! e o S cess i oil . of t e r r 1 1 o ry i n G e i;-'
nianv. The Turkish Empire on every side
prt'-ients tevupting booty. , But Russia is the -rivi.I
of ;uch views,' and .will' oppose them,
unless some plan of paitiiicn can be adjusu.l
lo satisfy r-cth. In the'mme manner Au
stria must naturally resist vry exclusive plan
of conquest whicii Russia may entertainTut
tlu? ?xcnse of the Turkish Empire.
In this respect the views of Piussia, r.ust -be
the same with ihtree of Austria. She
must be led to oppose c-vpry acquisition of
Russia, for wb'u;hshe retth'estno ccwiyWnt, ,
because she already fetU the prpoit!efsnce
cf Russia in the poliickn ol the Not ih. .
If tlu n there be uny reason to 'apprehend
that. Russia still entertains those gigantic
views of ambition, whVh the overlhiow of
the Turki'h power is lo satisfy, and which
her present conduct seems So cou;itemnci(
there is little doubt that Austria end Prussia,
both will concur wi'- France in epposing her.
It is evident indttd that the French goveti,
ment has hhoured, and not wiihou' success.
lo alarm ihe jealousy .of the Couil of Viei-na.
Sliould Russia persitt in thete tcherr.ic's.
which manifestly aim at the very heart of
the Turkish Empire, jt wculd not be sur
prising to find Austria opposing her by force'
of arms. It may therefore be the policy f
France to instigate the Turks to a tupluru
with Bussia, in ord'.T io give employment
to the arms of the latter ; ar d kr.cwir.g too,
thai in case she wcie to be successful Austria
would' interfere lo obstruct her .complete
triumph, and the entire gratification of her
ambition.
We shall rot at prestnl enter into any ex
amination hew far the arms of France end
Austria, or how far a Frin'ch army, with the
concuricnce of Austiia, marching by the
shores of the Adriuick, might ofpese tho
dcsignof Russia in the Moves, or even de
"fend thr Turkish Empire should it-be at--lacked'
on any ether side. Vc have no
doubt, however, that cveiy ifforl would be
employed to compel Russia lo abandoii her
pity. . That enquiry, however, at pitsent
might appear tinntcemaiy.
If, however, the Eussij'o government he
sincrre and disinterested in the hostility
which il professes to the system and princi
ple ol aggracfliatmrnt pursued by France,
it will give no room for suspecting the purity
cf its intentions. While Russia continues
to pursue ohjecte of tmbiiicn, which ll.o
other power of Europe must naturally op
pose, it is in vain In expect that I hey will
coi, federate with her to act against France,
lkr professions, then fore, ore tain and nu
gatoiy. SI e in eflca conftmsnnd strength
ens tint Power against which she avows
hostility. '1 he suspicious cti.uct of Russia
in the Mediterranean, is che ciuse (among
other,) why Ausliia cannot he expected la
co-operate in a wsr apiust rrance.
If ihth lle Fmperoiir Alexander mean t
eiffrtthf force ofhls Empire in Ihe causa
cf indcptnilenru end of Europe, let Him dis
claim all personal viewv-lrt him hold forth
grcimdi of conduct 'in wl.ich other nailer. a
would concur r rnund if ar fn which it
would Le gloiiou to tucrrcil, nd in tho
miintenante "of which, tven failure wtulJ
Le free fitundisrace. l t.ChrvttUltt
PATH oFnoiuailoR s.aL at
this ointL.