

kind, reduced to less than two thirds of its original numbers, have now no more than eleven thousand men capable of taking the field, although about thirteen or fourteen thousand appear under arms; this is owing to the appearance of a great number of soldiers at the roll call, who prefer, sick and wounded as they are, doing duty at their quarters to staying in the hospitals or the depots: When they are wanted to march a little further than usual or to fight, the force they have put upon themselves instantly appears—Wounds, ophthalmias, dysenteries, and other diseases not less common here, have absolutely disabled the rest of the army.

“Even those who are in a condition to march are exhausted by fatigue, enfeebled by the climate, and the wounds and sickness which they have endured; and their courage is proportionably diminished.

With this handful of men we have covered five hundred leagues of country, overawed three millions of inhabitants, who may be considered as so many enemies, and garrison the holds and fortresses of Alexandria, Rosetta, Ralimanie, Gezeb, Benisnof, Medine, Minlet, Siur, Girge, Kene, Cossair, Cairo, Suez, Mitt, Kampi, Salahieh, Arifon, Bilbeis, Cahib, Damietta, Mansora, Sememoud, & El Benous. Should the Grand Vizier attack us, we cannot oppose more than five or six thousand men to all the Ottoman forces which will at his disposal, and should he attack us in two places at once, he will penetrate into the country without a possibility on our side of preventing him.—This would certainly have happened to General Buonaparte, if the Turks, while they were landing at Aboukir, had made the Syrian army advance upon Egypt.”

General Dugate to the Director Barras.

I confess to you, Citizen Director, that I could never have believed Gen. Buonaparte would have abandoned us in the condition in which we were; without money, without powder, without ball, and one part of the soldiers without arms. Alexandria is a vast entrenched camp, which the expedition into Syria has deprived of a considerable portion of the heavy artillery necessary for its defence. Leiba, near Damietta, is scarcely walled in; part of the wall of El Arifsch is tumbling of itself. Debts to an enormous amount, more than a third of the army destroyed by the plague, the dysentery, the ophthalmia, and the enemy but eight days march from us! Whatever may be told you at Paris, this description is but too true. You know me to be incapable of imposing on you by a false one.

“A numerous army is assembled in Syria; fleets, of which we know not the strength, threaten our coasts, which we know to be accessible in many places.—The commander in chief cannot bring together more than 7000 fighting men. The enemy have it in their power to make three separate attacks at the same time—what can 7000 men, and these necessarily divided, hope to do?”

The letter of Buonaparte to the Grand Vizier is a composition of hypocrisy, meanness, and a clumsy attempt at imposture upon a subject, on which according to Kleber, that officer must have been full as well informed as himself.

TO THE ELECTORS OF THE UNITED STATES ARE SUBMITTED.

The following brief and dispassionate reasons, why the President Adams should not be re-elected to that high office.

I. *Because no candidate should be appointed to that office, whose attachment to the principles of republicanism are dubious.*

It is apprehended that the attachment of the President Adams to the principles of republicanism, are in some degree dubious, for the following reasons:

He has written a book in three volumes, of which the general scope is, to recommend a government of three branches, and to praise the government of Great-Britain in particular. In which book not only the general scope, but very many passages, in strong and decisive language, extol the government of Great-Britain, a government

by an hereditary king, an hereditary nobility, and a mock representation of the people. Where by the very constitution of the democratic part of that very government, and not by the accidental disposition of its members, it is completely at the command of the crown. Treating of this subject, Mr. Adams says, “not the formation of language, “not the whole art of navigation and ship-building, does more honor to the human understanding, than this system of government.”

Again, Mr. Adams, in his public answers to addresses, repeatedly expressed, in terms of the strongest and most marked approbation, his opinion, or rather his abhorrence, of French principles and French philosophy, and French innovation. These principles, this philosophy, and this innovation relate chiefly to two points, the changes made by their national government, and the changes made in their national religion. In the first case the principles of the French politicians and philosophers, went to substitute a republican government by representation for a despotic government under an hereditary monarchy. In the second instance, the only permanent innovation is the permission to every man to follow the dictates of his own conscience, instead of binding him to support the national establishment of popery. The violent language of Mr. Adams is indiscriminate and general, and applicable as well to the innovations borrowed by the French from ourselves, as to any other changes introduced in that country.

Again, Mr. Adams has shewn not only a decided dislike of the French republic, its principles, and its rulers, but he has manifested, if not a decided, yet something like a preference of the government and conduct of Great-Britain, which is not a republic, and which is hostile to France, because France is. The depredations of the British have been born not only with more patience than the French (although the former were unprovoked, and the latter were in some degree at least provoked by the British treaty) but are hardly noticed. There is a mildness and temperance in his language, when speaking of our relations with Great-Britain, that manifestly opposed to his acrimonious expressions relating to the French. There may have been a concurrence of measures with the British and in their favor during the present hostilities that prudence can with difficulty justify. Witness the negotiation respecting St. Domingo, not to mention the suspicions that arise from the intercepted letters of Mr. Liston. It is not pretended that these circumstances amount to decisive proof of Mr. Adams's attachment to the monarchical government of Great-Britain, rather than to the republic of France, yet they are such as we should not expect from a firm republican, who cannot but know and feel that this coalition of hostility against France, is, because she is a republic.

Again Mr. Adams has declared that a republican government may mean any thing; a declaration, that republicans would hardly expect from a republican. And in fact our republican constitution has been so strangely innovated upon by forced and unforeseen constructions, and the dangerous adoption of implied powers during Mr. Adams's administration, that he was not a little assisted in verifying his own remark.

It is submitted, that for these reasons Mr. Adams's attachment to republican principles, is at least dubious.

II. *No person ought to be chosen President, who seems inclined to extend his own power and influence, and to abridge the privileges of the people.*

If the the strong declarations of Mr. Adams in his answer to addresses were not proofs of his inclination, the alien and sedition laws, the numerous embassies the careful selection of persons of certain political principles to public offices, and his administration being supported by such men as Tracy, Ross, Sedgwick, Harper, Dana, &c. would be sufficient for the purpose. By men who openly and publicly profess that the government is not energetic enough, that the influence of the executive ought to be increased, and the influence of the people diminished.

III. *No man ought to be chosen President who*

throws difficulties in the examination of his own conduct.

Mr. Adams has done this; and the sedition law is the proof of it.

IV. *No man ought to be chosen President, who is a known friend to standing armies, to permanent navies, and who continues to accumulate funds and loans.*

Our army, our navy, are notoriously measures recommended by the president; and under his administration, we have seen not only a large deficit, but money borrowed at 8 per cent, in time of peace. It was a strong accusation against Lord North that he borrowed at 7 per cent, in time of war.

V. *No man is fit for a President who either wilfully or ignorantly encroaches upon the constitutional authority of the other branches of the government.*

Mr. Adams has done this in the case of Jonathan Robbins.

For, it is well known that the spirit of our constitution requires that the executive and judicial branches should be kept separate, and not encroach the one on the other.

It is equally well known that it is the peculiar province of the judiciary to construe the law of the land.

It is also well known that our public treaties are part of the supreme law of the land; and therefore the construction of them is within the peculiar province of the judiciary.

Yet did the President Adams not only take upon himself the construction of the treaty with Great Britain, by deciding the question of jurisdiction in the first instance, but did further direct a judge of a court to deliver up a man who was previously committed by competent judicial authority.

Nor could President Adams with propriety plead ignorance in this case: for independent of his opportunities of consultation, the commonwealth against judge Lawrence in the three volumes of Dallas's reports, is a case in point. Capt. Barre, of the French ship Perdrix, deserting therefrom, and taking up his residence in New-York, was required to be delivered up as a deserter under the 9th act of the convention with France. The President Washington referred the business to the decision of judiciary, by employing the attorney general Bradford to bring a mandamus, who declared (in substance) from authority, that although the executive was desirous of shewing a sincere intention punctually to fulfil the treaty with France, yet the executive could not interfere to decide a judicial question.

It is submitted to the public whether any one of these reasons be sufficient to induce the public to prefer some candidate more decidedly republican in his principles and conduct than J. Adams.

The following five reasons, why Mr. Jefferson should not be elected President of the United States, are offered in a late Boston paper called the Chronicle.

(COPY.)

As the Jacobins have produced five reasons why Mr. ADAMS should not be re-elected to the high and responsible office of President of the United States—an office which he has filled with dignity and honor—and as those reasons can have no more weight with good men, than a straw put in balance with the Andes—Yet as it may have some influence on weak minds, it may not be improper to state some objections, why THOMAS JEFFERSON is thought unfit for that important station.

1st. He is a Deist,—a man that disregards the volume of divine inspiration, and ridicules the christian religion.

2d. He has uniformly opposed the wise and energetic measures of this government—calculated to support its dignity and ensure its prosperity.

3d. He is confessedly at the head of a party in this country, whose object is opposition to the laws, subversion of order, and destruction of religious principles.

4th. As a wise and political legislator, his abilities are suspected, though his heart were untainted.

5th. His household is French—his language, his dress, his manners, his associates are French—and his library and Philosophy are French.—Such a number of French dishes might be unpalatable to the American taste.