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Political.

MR. PICKERING'S ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, NO. XVIII.

My fellow Citizens,
In a former address I made a remark of this nature: That Great Britain, pressed by a war unexampled in the annals of the world—all Europe leagued against her, Spain and Portugal against her, which she was defending with her blood and treasure—was extremely unwilling to receive the United States into the number of her enemies. And that partly from a consideration of her interests, and partly from the just desire to avoid a ruinously and disgracefully admitted liability (although it is impossible the British government should feel for them more than the French Emperor has expressed and showed in their faces)—she shew her eyes against them, and not think it expedient to resent, their partialities towards her formidable enemy, and amid multiplied professions of amicable dispositions, their marked ill will and injurious acts towards herself.—These provocations on one side, and forbearance on the other, have served only to encourage their aggravated repetition; until, at length, our government have ventured to commit a direct act of war. I know that our administration will say that the action between their frigate and the British sloop of war took place in the dark, when commodore Rodgers could not know what ship he fought; that their newspaper had already made their apology; or rather their justification. "We understand (says the National Intelligencer) that the conduct of commodore Rodgers, in repelling and chastising the attack on the Chesapeake, was rashly made on the United States frigate President, by the British sloop of war the Little Belt." Has the approbation of the President of the United States. And therefore it was that I went into so minute an examination of the commodore's official report of this affair; and I trust it has appeared that the action with the Little Belt was not accidental and by mistake; but the consequence of special orders intended to produce, or indeed precisely the action with the Little Belt, but an action with a British ship of war; to be brought on, however, in such manner as might enable them to justify it to the great majority of the people whom for a series of years they had found ready implicitly to believe their assertions. If commodore Rodgers had met with the British frigate Guerrier, instead of the Little Belt, then he was to demand the impressed American, and if not delivered up, to attack the Guerrier, and if successful (as expected, the frigate President being of force greatly superior to the Guerrier) then the administration story would have been, that after waiting near four years to receive satisfaction for the attack on the frigate Chesapeake, without obtaining it (although prevented solely by their own misconduct)—they had now taken satisfaction for themselves. But the action of the Little Belt will serve their purpose just as well. Connecting the long chase with the circumstances of the action, the proceedings on the part of the American frigate admit of no qualification.—It is impossible that it should pass our without a demand, on the part of Great Britain, of an explanation and satisfaction; and as satisfaction will be refused, war will ensue.
But what madness (it may be said) to provoke a war with Great Britain, when we have no fleet—no army—no money in the treasury—no remainder of revenue from commerce, and that to be annihilated as soon as war takes place—without taxes, or the courage to impose them; and without credit to borrow, as any government must be which is destitute of funds to pay regularly the interest and ensure the payment of the principal?
These, to be sure, would present, to ordinary statesmen, strong and insurmountable objections to war; but none in our wise and economical republic.—Ours will be the most simple and easily conducted war that was ever waged, since nations began to quarrel. This will be the fashion. The amount of revenue will make it necessary to lay up our vessels of war, to rot in the warm fresh water of the eastern branch of the Potomac at Washington. The small band of troops called the army, will necessarily become still smaller. If the States possessed of seaports wish to defend them, their respective legislatures must provide for the ex-

pense.—If for want of an adequate defence they should be burnt—why so much the better. Mr. Jefferson, the enlightened oracle of democracy, when objecting (as he formerly did object) to the establishment of manufactures in the United States, and considering them as the means of producing the condensed population which forms great cities, sagely remarked—that "the mobs [meaning the mass of the population] of great cities, add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body." Great cities are of course great sores; and for great and inveterate sores, cauterization, or burning, is an effectual operation. The same reasoning will also prevent the further payment of the public debt, or even the interest of it. But necessity is no law. The government will not be content with the public creditor; and satisfy the people (except the public creditor) by ascribing responsibility to party to the unjust war waged against us by Great Britain, "whose power (as Mr. Jefferson says) on the ocean is so ascendant," as to render commerce, the only material source of revenue, impracticable. Many zealous partisans of the administration will not think any apology to be needed. They will not hesitate to say openly, that the public debt is due chiefly to Englishmen—and let them lose it, or wait until a peace shall enable the country to fulfil its obligations. To the inhabitants of the seaports who have subsisted by trade, and to sea-faring men, they may say—We have immense territories open for your reception—fine lands which wait only for hands to cultivate them. To such of them as do not incline to emigrate into the wilderness and become farmers, but remain attached to commerce, navigation and the fisheries—they will say—Trade is out of the question—but the British merchant vessels, monopolizing the commerce of the world, cover the ocean: Fit out privateers—we will give you commissions. Make your fortunes if you can—and by your prizes supply the habitual wants of the people. By privateering too, you will show your patriotism; for the duties on your prize goods may furnish that quantity of revenue which will be indispensably necessary for the public service—to wit—to maintain the public officers, and pay the members of Congress their wages.

Thus it appears that for the contemplated

Notes on Virginia, answer to query XIX.

Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, when they became Presidents of the United States, severally made professions of their political creeds, one article of which was the exact fulfillment of the national engagements to pay the public creditors. But the men who originally opposed, and afterwards execrated the establishment of the system devised under the administration of Washington for the honest payment of the public debts, could not have any love for it; and will therefore not grieve over much for the public inability to discharge those debts. What real regard to the public faith can be felt by the men who could deliberately do an act by which some innocent foreigners have, in effect, been defrauded of four hundred thousand dollars?—Every body knows that Mr. Jefferson in the cabinet, and Mr. Madison and his other partisans in congress, vehemently opposed the establishment of the bank of the United States, under the pretence that it would be a violation of the constitution. In the cabinet, Mr. Jefferson's sophistry was swept away by the masterly hand of Hamilton. The legal huggars which the former had conjured up and grouped together to alarm the pure mind of Washington, who was not a lawyer, were dispersed by the light of truth emitted by Hamilton, like a morning fog before the rising sun. This defeat was never forgotten by Mr. Jefferson and his partisans; and the first opportunity was seized to destroy the institution. And this was at the time when the charter expired. But the United States, originally possessed of stock in the bank to the amount of two millions of dollars remained, when Mr. Jefferson became president of the U. States, the proprietors of 2220 shares, 400 dollars each, prime cost, amounting to 888,000 dollars, and yielding an interest of more than eight per cent. a year. Notwithstanding which, in less than a year and a half (viz. June 30. 1802) when the revenues of the United States were rapidly increasing, and amply sufficient for the support of government and the regular payment of the public debts, Mr. Jefferson caused those shares of bank stock to be sold. The institution devised by Hamilton, so wisely framed and so faithfully managed, gained universal confidence, and its stock rose in price, so that a share which cost the United States but 400 dollars would sell for 580 dollars, or 45 per cent. above par. Then it was, that Mr. Jefferson ordered the shares above-mentioned to be sold; and the sales brought into the treasury of the United States the sum of 1,287,600 dollars. The purchasers were Englishmen, who by the dissolution of the Bank of the United States, have thus lost 400,000 dollars—or to be perfectly exact, 399,600 dollars, the difference between the price they paid to Mr. Jefferson for the United States, and the price to which the shares were reduced by the dissolution of the bank—or the non-renewal of its charter; an event which no man who regarded the public interest and the public faith, and still less foreigners could have expected; but which the circumstances I have stated leave no room to doubt, was contemplated by Mr. Jefferson and company when they sold the United States shares in the bank to those Englishmen; and which, therefore, will be considered as a deliberate fraud.

five war, no funds will be necessary, not even our ordinary peace revenues.

If a war with Great Britain should take place, privateering will be the only mode of annoyance on the part of United States; and fortunes are already enjoyed in anticipation, to arise from the captures of British vessels and merchandize. But this will prove a vain expectation. During a greater part of our revolutionary war, when Great Britain had to contend with the fleets of France, then powerful, and finally those of Holland and Spain, privateering was carried on successfully; but for the last year or two, more fortunes were lost than gained. Experience had taught the British a more effectual mode of securing their commerce. Our privateers and their prizes fell into the hands of the vigilant and more powerful British cruisers, and privateering proved a losing game. At the present time, whatever remains of the Spanish navy is on the side of Great Britain. Fleets of France and Holland have been destroyed, and the remnants are kept shut up in their harbors: while the armed ships of Britain far outnumber those of the whole world beside. With such ample means at her command, Great Britain can sweep the ocean. And if she had desired the destruction of our commerce, as carried on by our own vessels, which her enemies among us (who are the real enemies too of our own country) pretended—she, long ere this time, might have destroyed it.

I have just remarked, that in the projected war with Great Britain, privateering will be the only mode of annoyance on the part of the United States. But shall we not take possession of the British dominions on our northern and eastern borders? This has often been threatened: it is a part of the bullying system in regard to Great Britain:—but it has never been seriously contemplated; and such members of Congress as I have heard mention it, only made themselves ridiculous by the grave faces assumed for the occasion. It was repeatedly intimated in the earlier part of the session which commenced in the autumn of 1807, after the attack on the Chesapeake, when Mr. Jefferson had made a great bustle about preparations for a war with Great Britain.—This bustle was kept up in Congress, which teemed with hostile propositions towards that power; especially when the special mission of Mr. Rose was known and his arrival expected, to make that satisfaction for the attack on the Chesapeake, which the conduct of Mr. Jefferson had prevented being given in London. It was weakly imagined that this noise of war would make an impression on the mind of Mr. Rose.—General Smith, in the Senate, said, "if the British minister arrives and sees the clangor of preparations for war, his language possibly, and very probably, will be very different from what it will be if he finds us reclining on the hopes of a continuance of peace. Within a week I expect a resolution will be brought into one house or the other, to raise thirty thousand men. I wish the new minister who is coming, may see that we are prepared for war."—Such a resolution, or a bill in form was accordingly laid on our tables, and there, with other similar abortive projects, slept through the session. The conquest of Canada, I have said, was never seriously contemplated. The southern leaders probably imagined that the threatened invasion of that country might influence the British councils to yield to the demands of our government: and unquestionably they supposed their partisans in the northern states would be flattered by the project. But the northern states may rest assured, that it will be the last thing attempted by their southern friends, or father masters. The men who now rule the United States will never willingly take any step which will add to the population and power of the northern states. And Canada being on their borders, would, if conquered, naturally unite with them and add to their weight in the decisions of great national questions.

But the folly of attempting the conquest of Canada, would be equal to the difficulty of achieving it. From the British power in that quarter, we have nothing to apprehend; but if Canada were to fall into the hands of France, we should have every thing to fear. And if the conquest were to be made by the United States, the country, either by force or treachery, would be transferred to France! To maintain the possession against the attempts of Great Britain to reconquer it, would require an army and expenditures far surpassing our whole present military establishment. But it would be still greater danger from France, whence might slip out a force sufficient to wrest it from our hands—if under such administrations as have governed us for the last ten years any resistance should be made. The reason imperiously urged by the French government to that of Spain, in the year 1800, for the retrocession of Louisiana, was, "that Louisiana was an ancient possession of France." So was Canada; and were it once in our hands, its restoration to France would be as imperiously demanded of the United States, as was the province of Louisiana of Spain. And would such an administration as Mr. Jefferson's or Mr. Madison's, which has long been cringing at the feet of Bonaparte, resist the demand? Certainly not. But let France possess herself of Canada, and then what additional demands would be made? The northern parts of New York, the western parts of Pennsylvania, the State of Ohio, the territories of Indiana, Michigan and Illinois, the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, the Mississippi Territory, and the whole of Louisiana westward of the Mississippi, would also be in like manner de-

manded; for in all these vast regions France once had military posts or settlements; and she would claim and demand all of them as "her ancient possessions;" and with as good right as she demanded and compelled the Spanish government to regrant Louisiana. But Canada remaining in the hands of Great Britain, she will keep fast shut and bolted that northern door, by which the French would enter and re-possess her ancient territories, and then, by the joint operation of intrigue, corruption and force, attempt the subjugation of the whole U. States. Instead therefore of our attempting the conquest of Canada, sound policy would require its being kept in the hands of G. Britain.

But although our southern rulers will never, by conquest or otherwise, voluntarily add to the strength of the northern section of the United States, they will not hesitate to increase that of the southern section, with or without right. Hence the measure, as base, as it was unjust, of taking possession of West Florida—a country to which (as I shall take occasion to show) we have no title, and which we should not have attempted, had not the distressed and enfeebled condition of Spain, oppressed and over-run by the armies of Europe's tyrant, rendered her incapable of sending thither an adequate military force for its protection. With the like unrighteous views, the conquest of East Florida will be undertaken; and this by the very men, who for so many years have been raising a hue and cry against Great Britain for asking the surrender, and on refusal, for taking the Danish fleet, to prevent its falling (as it would immediately have fallen) into the hands of her implacable and formidable enemy. The British at war for their existence, took from the Danes some twenty vessels of war—and the rulers of the United States while we are at peace with all the world, under a flimsy pretence of title seize one Spanish province, and without even that pretence, or any other which will bear the light, appear to be preparing to seize and by force of arms to take possession of another. But the taking of East Florida will coincide with and render more complete, the grand object of the projected war with G. Britain, the putting an end to all commerce and intercourse with the British dominions, in correspondence with the French emperor's system for destroying the only power which can effectually control his march to universal empire.—By taking possession of East Florida, whose waters unite with those of the United States, they will prevent the renewal of that traffick which during former arbitrary restrictions imposed by Congress on our commerce, was so advantageously carried on by the citizens of Georgia. British vessels entered the Spanish harbours adjacent to St. Mary's, and there received the cotton for which the Georgians so much wanted a market.

Another most important object and effect of the projected war will be the cutting off all supplies of grain, rice, flour, beef, pork and fish from Spain and Portugal; for whose calamities inflicted by the French emperor, our rulers manifested no sympathy; but on the contrary, they and their genuine adherents appeared to anticipate with pleasure the subjugation of those countries by the universal tyrant; and which has been hitherto prevented by the great and effectual assistance of Great Britain. Our sagacious patriots, with Messrs. Jefferson and Madison at their head, have formerly believed that the United States, by withholding their supplies of provisions, could produce a famine in the British dominions in Europe and the West Indies; and I do not know that experience has yet cured them of this folly. Be this as it may, they undoubtedly suppose that Spain and Portugal, for several years the theatres of a most destructive war, ravaged by the French armies and unavoidably much exhausted by their brave defenders, will be incapable of further resistance, if supplies from the United States be withheld. French cruisers have already captured and destroyed our vessels laden with provisions and destined to the ports of Cadiz and Lisbon; and those captures as well as other the most horrible French outrages on our neutral rights, find zealous advocates among the adherents of our administration.

Thus it appears that a war with Great Britain is calculated to produce all the effects which the French emperor could desire; in the full expectation that it will hasten her downfall, and at the same time, reduce the United States to beggary, and leave them a defenceless prey to his insatiable ambition. Such subservency to the views of France of which I have in the course of these addresses given ample proofs, is, as it respects Mr. Madison in particular, now confirmed by Robert Smith, late secretary of state, in his pamphlet just published in vindication of his resignation. And if a great majority of the people continue their blind confidence in their rulers, (Mr. Madison and his partisans, with Mr. Jefferson at their head,) such will be the fatal result of the measures they have planned and will pursue.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

July 1, 1811.

From the Baltimore Federal Gazette.

WATCH THEM.

MR. BEWES,

The news from France, this day received by the way of England, is the same in substance as that received a few days since by the way of Boston, direct from France—namely, that the vessels which had arrived since the proclamation of the President, were allowed to enter and sell, on condition that the amount of their cargoes should be