

# THE RALEIGH MINERVA.

[THREE DOLLARS PER YEAR.]

RALEIGH, N. C.—PUBLISHED (WEEKLY) BY LUCAS AND A. H. BOYLAN.

[HALF OF WHICH IN ADVANCE.]

VOL. 17.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1813.

No. 876.

## Political.

From the Connecticut Mirror.

### THE WAR AND ITS OBJECTS.

In the last Mirror we stated briefly the "accident current" of the first six months of the war. If we are not mistaken, the *fooling* shows a balance much against us. It would seem, however, notwithstanding the disasters we have already experienced, the disgrace we have been called to bear, and the miserable prospect of doing better in future, that Mr. Madison, flushed with his own success in the election, and bent on his own, as well as his country's ruin, is resolved on the prosecution of hostilities; unless, indeed, he is kept off from his pernicious purpose, by the astonishing change of sentiment which a large portion of the nation has undergone since war was declared.

The sole avowed object of the war is, to force Great Britain to abandon the right of searching neutral merchant vessels for her own subjects. We have often stated, what our administration well know to be the fact, that Great Britain will never yield this right until reduced to such distress that she cannot avoid it. That is—she will never abandon it, until she is obliged to sacrifice that, to preserve her independence. The only means that we possess, to enable us to force her to this sacrifice, is the withholding from her our trade. For, though we have captured the *Guerriere*, the *Felic* and the *Macedonian*, yet we do not believe that our administration, weak, vain, vapouring and swaggering as they are, are yet silly enough to imagine, that these successes have made any solid impression on the British navy. The British have, indeed, learned that we have brave and skillful seamen, and that it is more difficult to conquer one of our frigates than they supposed; and that, in order to answer their purposes, they must send more and larger ships than they have heretofore considered necessary. This they can do; and if the war is continued, this they undoubtedly will do. As for military operations on land, we have lost as much character by them, to say the least on the subject, as we have gained on the water. Our mode of reducing Great Britain, then, must be—by withholding our trade—or, in other words, through the medium of Bonaparte's Continental System, to which we have long been a real party.

We will attempt to shew the efficacy of our means to accomplish this end. The trade which Great Britain carries on is not exclusively with this country. This remark is made merely because it would seem as if our Statesmen from the Forest supposed, that our trade is essential to the very existence of that nation. The following extract from a report, made by Lord Sheffield, at the meeting of Lewes Wool Fair, on the 27th of July, 1812, will shew some interesting facts on this subject.

"The real value of the exports from G. Britain to the American States, previously to the American Non Importation and Embargo Laws, and to the British Orders in Council—average of three years, ending 1807, inclusive,

£12,136,811
And to all other parts of America, including the British and Foreign West Indies,
10,599,514

Total for the whole of America, £22,736,325

"The real value of the exports from G. Britain to the American States, average of four years ending 1811, inclusive, during which period the British Orders in Council and American Non Importation and Embargo Laws were in operation,

£6,464,039
And to all other parts of America, including the British and Foreign West Indies,
17,133,557

Making a total for the whole of America, £23,597,612

"In the latter period, therefore, the deficiency in the direct exports to the American States was more than compensated by an increased exportation to the other parts of America; by which it would appear, that during the first mentioned period, the goods exported from hence in American vessels were by no means entirely carried to the American States, for the consumption of those States, but that a large proportion of them must have been conveyed by the Americans to the West Indies and South America; which we have ourselves since supplied directly in British ships; and that an equivalent proportion of the exports to the British North American Colonies and the West Indies, must, in the latter period, have indirectly found their way into the American States to make up the deficiency in the direct importations there."

Here we are presented with the important fact, that though the exports from that nation to the United States were reduced during the existence of our restrictive system, yet the trade was turned to different channels in other parts of America, and that the average amount of exports for four years, ending in 1811, exceeded the average amount for the four years preceding, ending in 1807. Here, then, is the practical proof of the efficacy of that ridiculous system of policy, which the "illustrious Jefferson" invented, to subvert, under a nickname, Bonaparte's "Continental System." And yet the Foresters in Congress are every day declaring, that the true mode of subduing Great Britain, is, by withholding our trade.

But a more interesting enquiry remains to be made on this important subject. What probability is there that the loss even of all the trade with

this country, if it were in our power to deprive them of it, would bring Great Britain to terms of submission? We are much habituated, in this country, to talking of that nation as if she were on the brink of ruin from her own internal distresses, that, with those which are external, she is tottering to her fall; and that, if we only add our weight to the preponderating scale, her fate is inevitable. This unfounded and ridiculous idea comes to us from a source, to which we are indebted for a large proportion of the evils which we experience in our political affairs, viz. from a foreign corps of ignorant, unprincipled desperadoes, who, from having been suffered to interfere in our public concerns, have become our teachers, and our oracles. If individuals suffer themselves to be imposed upon from this quarter, it is incumbent on the nation, and particularly its legislature, to ground their faith upon a different basis. Great Britain never was as powerful as at this moment. We argue this, in the first place, from her capacity to raise money—and in the second, from her ability to resist the attempts that have been made, and are still making to destroy her.

1. From her capacity to raise money. It will be recollected by our readers, that a few weeks since we stated that Great Britain raised in the year 1811 a revenue more than double the amount of all the sums which had been raised for the same purpose in the United States since the establishment of our government. We will now go a little more into particulars. By a return made to the House of Commons, it appears, that the following sums were raised for the service of the United Kingdom for the following years ending the first of January each year, viz.

1802, . . . . .	£78,441,000
1803, . . . . .	73,546,000
1804, . . . . .	58,500,000
1805, . . . . .	68,893,000
1806, . . . . .	81,823,000
1807, . . . . .	84,226,000
1808, . . . . .	83,89,000
1809, . . . . .	94,747,000
1810, . . . . .	97,203,000
1811, . . . . .	99,109,000
1812, . . . . .	105,718,000

Making in the whole in 11 years, £934,101,000 sterling, that is, four thousand one hundred and fifty one millions, five hundred and sixty thousand dollars.

Now, any man, or number of men, may clamor till they are weary about the immeasurable size of the British national debt; here is demonstration, that they have raised more money, by some hundred millions of pounds, sterling, in the short space of eleven years, than would pay the whole of their debt. Is it not then worse than childish to pretend that, by depriving them of an export trade of twelve or even fifteen millions sterling, if it were in our power to do it, we should break down the power of that nation, and force her to yield a point which she considers not only essential to her independence, but to her very existence? But even this miserable end, we have shown, is not in our power to accomplish, for when we cut off our trade, they find other parts of the continent where it is received, to an equal amount.

2. Let us now for a moment enquire, What ability Great Britain possesses to resist the attempts that are making, or may be made to destroy her? A pretty fair experiment has been made for ten years past, by the only power on the globe that had any reasonable expectation of success. His efforts have indeed been astonishing, and almost every other evil, besides the destruction of Great Britain, has been brought by them upon the human race. Every nation in Europe has been dragged into the contest—almost every nation in Europe has been subjugated and enslaved, merely for the purpose of enabling the shocking monster of iniquity, whose mad ambition, and diabolical vengeance, have been the cause of all these attempts, to destroy Great Britain. The royal family of Portugal have been driven into exile from their European dominions—the Pope has been degraded and imprisoned—the monarchs of Naples, Spain, Prussia, and Sweden, have been dethroned—the King of Denmark, the Emperors of Germany and Russia, have been reduced to a state of vassalage—Holland, and a large part of Europe besides, has been annexed to France—sovereignties have been changed and transferred like beads in the snail—kings have been created and recreated—millions and tens of millions of lives have been butchered—decrees of the most tyrannical and sanguinary nature have been established and enforced in the most rigorous and cruel manner—every art, and every base and vindictive passion has been enlisted into the contest—and all for the purpose of destroying Great Britain. For nearly five years past, a most bloody and exterminating war has been carried on in Spain and Portugal—at this moment the whole christian world is in arms, and the terrible cause of all the misery is at an immense distance from the throne which he has usurped, and the empire which he has enslaved and bound in fetters of brass, for the purpose of adding one more nation to the long catalogue of his vassals; the strife is tremendous, the slaughter immense; and the contest is distinguished by every mark of vengeance and desperation—and all for the purpose of destroying Great Britain—and yet Great Britain stands unshaken and unawed—a monument of power and vigor, the most extraordinary that the sons of men ever witnessed.

When this power is reduced so low as to traffic for its existence, then, and not till then, may our

administration expect to find them yield a point essential to their being. This view of the subject will enable us to calculate, with some degree of certainty, the fate of our war. Are we able successfully to maintain a contest, which the mighty force of France, with the aid of all continental Europe, has hitherto proved incompetent to bring to a successful issue? Suppose, what, indeed, may be considered improbable, but which is not impossible, that Bonaparte should prove unsuccessful in Russia, in what plight shall we stand with our adversary? However Mr. Madison may deceive a portion of the people of this country with regard to the real object of the war, the British nation, and particularly the British government, are not so easily duped. They know that it is intended to cooperate with Bonaparte in accomplishing their overthrow. Should he succeed in humbling Russia, we may perhaps expect to obtain from them as favorable terms as have already been offered. Should he fail, the consequences to us are very apparent. Our government will be under the necessity of negotiating without delay—but we imagine the negotiation will be attended with pretty serious disadvantages.

### OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

The president, in his message to congress, says, "Our affairs with France retain the posture which they held at my last communications to you." We were willing to believe, and we ventured to express the opinion, that all we were to know upon the important subject of our relations with that government, was not contained in this single paragraph, from which we might infer any thing or nothing, but that these relations would be made the subject of another and a distinct communication. In this hope (for there was at first more hope than faith in the sentiment) we have waited thus long for the disclosures. We are satisfied, however, that all expectation of a farther view into the arcana of our French concerns is vain, and that if the people obtain any further insight into them, they will not be indebted to their government for it. Nor are they to expect more from the newspapers which speak the sentiments and possess the confidence of the government. Like my uncle Toby, who was careful to give the widow a minute account of all his battles, except that in which he was wounded in the groin, these sticklers for the rights and honor of the nation, never fail to let us know of every British wrong, while the insults and injuries of France, did it depend upon their disclosures, would remain unnoticed and unknown. The reason is obvious. A full and fair disclosure of French perfidy and injustice might have the same effect upon their mistress, the people, as too close an inspection of my uncle's wound, would have had upon his mistress the widow. It would prove they are not the men they would appear to be, and that in the midst of their great professions of zeal in the cause of their country's rights and honor, they were privy and consenting to the violation of both. We are now engaged in a war avowedly waged in support of our commercial rights. We take it for granted that the principle of commercial rights, for which we now contend, is to be maintained at all times, and against all nations; or in other words, that we will maintain our commercial rights as well against France as against England. How then does it happen that we are at war with the one and at peace with the other, at the present moment? Why, says the government, because England impresses our seamen, and imposes unusual restrictions upon our commerce. And what of France? Why as to France "the posture of our affairs with her remains as usual." Now what this posture is, and hitherto has been, remains to be known. Without being acquainted with the secret wrongs inflicted on this country by the French government, or dwelling upon the innumerable insults which she has heaped upon us as a nation, we refer to the following abstract from the report of the secretary of state, to show how far she has respected our commercial rights. By this report is to be shown that since the treaty of 1803, she has captured five hundred and sixty American vessels:

Of those she has condemned,	144
Burnt,	17
Robbed and plundered,	24
Sold,	39
Scuttled at sea,	7
Sunk,	3—234
Sequestered,	80
Confiscated,	5
Of the remainder, fate unknown,	163
Recaptured,	32
Lost,	4
Converted into a privateer,	1
Partially released, acquitted, restored or compromised,	41—326
Total,	560

This is the happy "posture of our affairs with France," so far as this branch of our commercial rights extends! and this is the nation with whom we are in bonds of peace and good fellowship, while at war with England, because in the struggle to support her own rights, she sometimes incommodes us in the enjoyment of ours.

A word more upon this disgusting subject. The president, in his message, adds, "Notwithstanding the authorized expectations of an early as well as favorable issue to the discussions on foot, these have been procrastinated to the latest hour." What information do we derive from this declaration?—What are the discussions on foot? On this point the president has given neither his congress nor his people the least information. Is it to form an alliance offensive and defensive, with a secret un-

derstanding not to lay down our arms until Canada and the Floridas are conquered and Napoleon master of the ocean as well as of the land? or is it to compensate us for the immense loss we have sustained by the plundering, burning and sinking of our property upon the high seas, and its seizure, confiscation and conversion, in her own ports and those of her dependant? Is it formally to acknowledge, that we are a nation without honor and without principle, or is it to wipe off the foul aspersion, by requiring an unqualified acknowledgment of its fallacy? Let us have light.

Alex. Gaz.

### MARYLAND LEGISLATURE.

The following resolutions and resolutions have passed the house of representatives of Maryland, by a considerable majority:

Whereas the permanence and security of our republican institutions depend on the virtue and the attachment of the people—to foster the one, and to confirm the other, is the bounden duty of those to whom, under our inestimable constitution, the administration of public affairs is entrusted. For this purpose, a pacific policy is essential, & ought never to be abandoned, except in cases of extreme emergency, in defence of national independence, and to repeal the hostile invasions of territorial rights. War is the heaviest calamity that can afflict a nation: If resorted to without just cause it must inevitably provoke the displeasure of the Almighty Arbiter of the universe. It produces a boundless waste of blood & treasure; demoralizes the habits of the people: it gives birth to standing armies; it clothes a dominant faction with power, in addition to the inclination, to infringe the dearest privileges of free men—to fetter the freedom of speech and of the press—to plunder private property—to suspend habeas corpus—to violate the constitution by implication and by new definitions and constructions of treason, under the mask of a law; to subject to an odious and unrelenting persecution, perhaps to punishment, citizens whose only crime is an opposition, fairly, honestly, and constitutionally supported, to the system of the national administration. Offensive war is at all times repugnant to the genius of a republic, but if waged by the rulers of a free community, the people, who must necessarily encounter the perils and support the cost of the contest, have a right to expect that at least a chance of success, a favorable prospect of benefits to be derived overbalancing any injuries to be incurred, the probable achievement of the grand objects contended for, and the permanent establishment of national rights, will be made manifest to them. To this end adequate preparation is necessary—genius and patriotism, must explore & call into exercise all the national resources—the treasury must be replenished, and every deficiency provided for—a military and naval force raised with all the necessary munitions of war competent to repel any hostile invasion, & commensurate with the plans and schemes of conquest.—Such a state of preparation would banish all apprehension of entangling alliances with that ferocious despotism, which has blotted from the map of Europe every republic of the old world. In the application of these remarks to the course of policy pursued by the government of the United States, every friend to his country will at once discern, that it is calculated to excite the liveliest anxiety and alarm. After an unprecedented perseverance in a system of commercial restrictions, producing individual distress and national impoverishment, our country is committed in a war with a powerful and formidable foe, without adequate preparation; with an inefficient military force; with a reduced navy, and with an exhausted treasury. To obviate the immediate and oppressive difficulties of the crisis, militia and volunteers are subjected to field and garrison duty, and called upon to supply the deficiency of regulars—enormous sums are to be raised by loans and taxes, and a neighboring colony of the enemy is invaded by detachments of undisciplined troops imperfectly supplied with necessaries. Under such circumstances, folly only can expect success; and should further defeat, disgrace and dismay, accompany our military operations, the gloomy anticipation of an unnatural alliance with the conqueror of continental Europe will naturally be indulged. Thus embarked in a disastrous contest, the nation harassed and debilitated by its continuance, will sigh for peace, and for its attainment the immediate and important objects contended for will be abandoned.

The avowed causes of this war were the orders in council and the impressment of American seamen; the first of these causes is removed, and it may reasonably be inferred, from the communications of the president of the U. States to congress respecting the negotiations with the British government, that the latter might be adjusted to the satisfaction of both nations. Influenced by these considerations, believing it to be an imperious duty of the house of delegates of Maryland, elected with a view to our present foreign relations, to express the opinion of their constituents relative to the present state of public affairs—Therefore,

Resolved, That a defensive war ought to be prosecuted and sustained at all hazards; and for this purpose we are at all times prepared to undergo any privations, and to devote our lives and fortunes to the public service.

Resolved, That offensive war is incompatible with the principles of republicanism, subversive of the ends of all just government, and repugnant to the best interests of the U. States.