

But I cannot form any correct estimate of the probable addition resulting to the revenue from such increase. Much would depend on the suppression of the trade carried on by American vessels with enemies' licenses.

With respect to the necessity of providing an additional revenue for the year 1814, I beg leave to refer to the statements made and opinions expressed, when I had the honor several weeks ago to wait on the committee of ways and means. And I beg leave to add that this necessity has been considerably increased by the subsequent expenditures authorized by law; amongst which must be particularly mentioned the act for the increase of the navy, and that for raising 20,000 men for one year. Indeed, considering the general rate of expenditure resulting from the measures which have been adopted, I am of opinion that it will be necessary to recur both to a modification or repeal of the non-importation acts, and to the proposed internal taxes, in order to provide a revenue commensurate, with those expenses.

When an additional revenue of five millions was believed sufficient, that opinion was predicated on a supposition made by the committee, that annual loans of only 10 or 11 millions of dollars would be wanted. With a revenue of 12 millions of dollars for this year, it is ascertained that a loan of at least sixteen millions is necessary. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

ALBERT GALLATIN  
Honorable Langdon Cheves,  
Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means.

From the Federal Republican.

NEW-ORLEANS, 19th Jan.

From the silence of the editors of this city, you people of Washington, are no doubt led to believe that the Louisianians are much pleased with Mr. Madison's judicious choice of a military man to defend us, in case an invasion should be attempted by the enemy. Never, perhaps, was there a more injudicious choice; and how poor little Madison could so far forget the true interest of his favorite Louisiana as to send Wilkinson, after his sham acquittal, to command in the very place where he had outraged all law and decency, has been a subject of conversation among Mr. Madison's friends, particularly as Wilkinson, on every occasion, speaks with the utmost contempt of Mr. Madison, and declares that nothing but fear made him approve of the sentence of acquittal by the court martial in his case.

Since Wilkinson's arrival amongst us this last time, it is but justice to say that he has behaved as well as his malignant heart would permit him; long practised in dissimulation and hypocrisy, he now rolls his eyes to heaven and lays his hand on his heart and declares he only lives for his beloved country. He has made several efforts to get the militia of the state, or a portion of it, to be enrolled under his command, but without success.

Although our poor governor, (from fear, not love) has given him every assistance yet not a single man, unless it is a few vagabonds that in list for short periods, will he ever get to serve under his command. If we were invaded, such is the want of confidence even among the regular forces that I tremble for the consequences. In open violation of the rules and articles of war, he holds lieutenant Russell of the 3d regt. of infantry in arrest and close confinement after trial (and it is generally supposed an honorable acquittal) because the lieutenant is one of those who have dared in the worst of times to speak truth. It has been circulated in whispers to the great joy of the community generally, that Wilkinson would be ordered to the North. Yesterday one of his satellites conversing on the subject overheard, if the general was ordered to the north, he would immediately resign, as his shattered constitution could not bear a rigid northern climate. Should this happen, it will be well for the army and state.

DIED

In this place on Tuesday, William Slade Esq. recently of Edenton. On Wednesday he remains were interred with masonic honors being attended to the grave yard by the brethren and visitors of Jiram Lodge, and a highly respectable concourse of citizens.

Yesterday, Mrs. Elizabeth Rutherford, formerly of Lynchburg, Virginia. She was a young, amiable and pious lady.

MR. POPE'S SPEECH

A few days before Mr. Pope's departure for the city of Washington, a number of citizens of Fayette county, Kentucky, with a view to manifest their confidence in his patriotism and integrity, invited him to a public dinner at Mr. Campbell's well, about five miles from Lexington; where, after dinner, and drinking a number of toasts, Mr. Pope, at the request of the company, rose and addressed them as follows:

*Friends and Fellow Citizens*  
The accountability of public men to the people, is a principle of the highest importance in a republic. A jealous spirit of enquiry on their part is the great preservative of freedom, nor shall I value it less should I in any instance, however unjustly, be the victim of their displeasure. If I have mistaken their interest, their censure will lead me to re-examine the ground upon which I have acted; to see my errors, and to be more circumspect in future. If they have been mistaken, they will at least excuse me. A man's views on public measures and the conduct of public affairs, if made with due regard to truth and decency, are often productive of much good—they provoke discussions of topics of which the people had before but limited information, and thereby shed much light on the public mind with regard to their true interest and the situation of public affairs; and although a man may occasionally suffer much by the licentiousness and malignity of his enemies, he ought to yield to it without a murmur, as a part of the alloy in the great gold of a free government, nor ought the loss of an election, or a temporary depression of his popularity to lessen his love of country or his ardor to perpetuate the blessings of the best of governments. On the 18th day of June last, congress declared war against Great Britain; a measure to which I gave my assent, because I did not think it demanded by the honor or interest of the United States, but incompatible with both. Never

that state of preparation for war, nor of our relations with France, did, in my view, justify the passage of the act of that time. Many of you, some of my best friends, have disapproved the vote, and my enemies who rejoiced at it, have assailed me with a bitterness and malignity never before witnessed in this state. The expediency or necessity of this war is certainly a fair subject of examination before the nation, as any other act of the government, especially by those who are censured, and attempted to be prostrated for opposing it; and its magnitude requires it to be viewed with the most rigid jealousy in a government, the genius and principles of which are so much opposed to a foreign war by conquest. As, however, a majority differed with me, and put the country in a state of war, I did not intend, unless compelled by the severity of reproach, to arraign it; lest it might be ascribed to a wish to divide the people and to abate their ardor in its cause—and since my return to Kentucky I had determined to postpone giving you the reasons which induced my vote, until a more suitable and convenient moment, on account of the danger which threatened our Northern frontier, and seemed imperiously to demand the united efforts of the Western People. Since my return I have published nothing, nor caused any thing to be published to vindicate myself against the censures that have been lavished on me; nor have I traversed the state in quest of opportunities to array the people against the measure. In the utterance of one sentiment I have been uniform, that as it had been declared it ought to be sustained with vigor; many of my relatives and friends I have tried to share the common danger which menaced the country; and many of them are now in the field. I hope, however, that in availing myself of the presence of this assembly to present some of the views which influenced my vote, I shall not subject myself to the imputation of a design to aid the enemy or embarrass the government. Some explanation of a vote which has been so much and so loudly execrated, is perhaps due to myself, to you, and to my constituents in general. I trust I shall be able to satisfy you, that it was not only correct, but that I was consistent with myself, and the solemn declarations of the party, and the administration; and that the course I proposed and supported, they were bound by very consideration of honor and consistency to maintain. If there has been inconsistency it is not imputable to me; those who thought the country ought to be prepared for war before it was declared and upon that principle voted for measures of preparation, were certainly inconsistent in voting for it before the government was ready to make war. When the war bill came to the senate the committee to whom it was referred called upon the war department for information with regard to the state of preparation, the result of which shewed that one third, perhaps a little more than one fourth of the army was raised—but a small part of those officers or men organized, disciplined, or drawn to any point to meet the enemy. This fact ought to be sufficient to silence the charge of inconsistency.

On the ground that we are not prepared for war, I urged in the senate the expediency and necessity of postponing the commencement of hostilities until a subsequent time. I thought the first day of October or November would be as early as our state of preparation would authorize a declaration of war, in the meantime we might have learnt the result of what were called undisclosed discussions with France—England might have found it consistent with the interest of her people, as well as her maritime rights, to have revoked her orders in council—our recruiting business would have gone on, our officers and men would have had time to have learnt their duty, and been placed in proper situations to meet the enemy in the event of hostilities commencing. Had the government been prepared to attack Canada from the frontiers of New York and Vermont, Hill would not have been taken, nor should we have an Indian enemy to encounter. Whatever may be thought of Hill's conduct, it must be evident that his army would not have fallen into the hands of the enemy had the British by an attack below been prevented from reinforcing Malden. I had however other and stronger objections to the measure than the want of preparation, which a concise retrospect of the prominent features of our foreign relations for the last six years will be necessary to explain. Although there are several subjects introduced among the avowed causes of war which I shall hereafter notice, for the present I will call your attention to what I consider the principal causes of the war, whatever may be its objects, the French Berlin and Milan Decrees and the British Orders in Council.

It will be recollected that, in 1806, the king of Prussia submitted to the arms of France. When Bonaparte arrived at Berlin, the capital of that monarchy, he considered himself the master of Continental Europe, and determined to dictate his peace to England, so long his rival and enemy—and accordingly on the 21st of November, 1806 he issued at that city what has been called his Berlin decree, by which the British Isles were declared in a state of blockade, and all trade in British merchandise prohibited: it amounted in fact to a declaration of war against all nations trading to England or in English merchandise. This decree was immediately adopted by the allies of France on the continent.

At that time we had a treaty with France called the convention of 1800; and this decree if intended to be applied to the United States, was a violation of that treaty. Our minister, gen. Armstrong, then at the French court, upon its first appearance, enquired whether that convention, a solemn act of the French government, would protect American property from its operation, and at first received a favorable answer, but on the 18th day of September, 1807, the emperor of France directed the grand judge, the minister of justice, to inform him that as he had not thought proper to express any exception in his decree, there was no ground to make any in the execution, and the decree was accordingly put in force against our commerce shortly afterwards. Thus was the faith of the French government solemnly pledged to the United States, by treaty, violated. This proceeding induced the first embargo in December, 1807, the execution of the Berlin decree on our commerce being the leading avowed cause of that

measure. Very soon after we received intelligence of the British orders in council, which was followed by the French Milan decree. By the French decrees our commerce to Great Britain was interdicted, and by the British orders in council all commerce with France and the countries from which British manufactures were excluded, was also interdicted—each, however, pretending to support its measures upon the principle of retaliation and requiring this government to resist its enemy. By this new and extraordinary system of warfare, almost co-extensive with Europe, our commerce was exposed to much vexation and embarrassment. France, with a view to give a vital blow to Great Britain, established an extended system of exclusion and warfare upon British commerce. England, on the other hand, said to France and her allies, so long as that system is continued I will, with my naval power, deprive you of all commerce except what you receive from me—On England you shall be dependant for foreign supplies.

Our government controverted the justice and solidity of the ground upon which the belligerents based their measures, and refused to become a party in the war unless one of them would abandon his measures in relation to the U. States. In a letter to Mr. Pinkney, our minister at London, bearing date the 4th day of April, 1808, Mr. Madison, then secretary of state, thus expresses himself: "The conduct of the two great contending powers towards this country, as it will now appear to it and the world, fully displays their unequal efforts to draw the United States into a war with their adversary. The efforts on both sides are too little disguised to be worthy the discernment of either, and addressed more over to motives which prove great ignorance of the United States, and indeed of human nature." At the ensuing session of congress, the session of 1808—9, before the embargo was repealed, neither belligerent having revoked his decrees, the whole subject was taken into consideration by the committee of foreign relations of the house of representatives generally, supposed to give the views of the administration, and a report made to the house by their chairman, G. W. Campbell, which contains a very able and elaborate view of the conduct of England and France. In this report the committee in unison with the sentiments expressed by Mr. Madison to Mr. Pinkney, declared that if the United States resorted to war, they must wage it at the same time with both, for war with one would be submission to the edicts and will of the other.

In conformity with the ground thus taken by the administration and the committee of foreign relations, the government on the 1st day of May, 1810, permitted all restrictions imposed by our selves to expire, and seemed determined to let commerce shift for itself until one of the powers should so change its course as to make it consist with the honor, interest and independence of the United States to resist the other. Congress then passed a law authorizing the President in case either of the belligerents should so revoke or modify his edicts, as that they should cease to violate the neutral rights of the United States, to declare the same by proclamation, and that the non-importation sections of a former non-importation law should be revived against the power refusing. Up to this period, May 1810, our government maintained the ground that we neither would nor were bound to select an enemy.

I will now proceed to enquire what France has done to induce us to abandon it, and throw our weight to her scale against Great Britain. Her decrees of Berlin and Milan were sufficient in the opinion of the president and the republican party to place her on the same footing with England, and to render it inconsistent with our honor and independence to select Great Britain as an enemy, although she had urged us to make common cause with her against G. Britain, and went so far once as to declare war for us. It is here proper to observe that the law of May 1810, does not mention the Berlin and Milan decrees, but all edicts, and they are to be revoked so as to cease to violate our rights, by which I would understand that congress meant to require a bona-fide, effectual and, I might add, beneficial change in her policy towards this country. On the 1st day of April 1808, a decree was issued at Bayonne, under which American property was indiscriminately seized in the ports of Europe, and sold for the benefit of France. And on the 22d day of March, 1810, the French government issued a decree entitled the Rambouillet decree, by which all vessels sailing under the American flag, and owned in whole or in part by any American citizen, which had entered the ports of France, were to be seized and sold, and the amount of sales to be deposited in the surplus sum, and commissioners were sent to Amsterdam to seize all American property found there. Thus American citizens, confiding in the justice of the French government, were deprived of their property to a large amount by an act of arbitrary power.

This decree did not reach this country until after the passage of the act of the 1st of May, 1810. Upon being informed of it, the president directed the secretary of state to inform gen. Armstrong, when he communicated the law of the 1st of May, 1810, to let it be understood that a restoration of the property seized would be required to induce him to carry into effect the arrangement contemplated by the law, that he considered such a restoration an indispensable evidence of the just purpose of the French government. These instructions are contained in two letters from the secretary of state to gen. Armstrong, bearing dates the 5th day of June and 5th day of July, 1810. The French government finding that the U. States would not be driven into a war, and that the American merchants would not venture any more property within the grasp of French power, determined to manoeuvre us into it, and by holding out new inducements, to reap another harvest from American commerce. And with these views on the 5th day of August, 1810, the French minister, the Duc de Cadore, informed gen. Armstrong by letter, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan were revoked, and would cease to operate on the first day of November following; that the Emperor loved the Americans, and that their prosperity and commerce were within the scope of his policy. These

fair promises induced the president to issue his proclamation on the 24th day of Nov. 1810, declaring the fact that the French decrees were repealed, and of course the non-importation law was to be put in force against Great Britain without a similar revocation on her part. By this proclamation this government departed from its neutrality. The secretary of state in communicating this proclamation to gen. Armstrong, writes him that the president had issued it on a presumption that the requisitions of his letters of the 5th of June and 5th of July, 1810 respecting the restoration of American property had been satisfied, and this presumption, says the secretary, is strengthened by concurrent accounts, through different channels, that such property as had been sequestered had been actually restored. Thus it must appear that the restoration of the American property unjustly seized in French ports, was one of the conditions upon which the president issued his proclamation.

I have heard much about a distinction between violations of neutral rights on the high seas and in port, but my common sense is not competent to discern it, unless, indeed, the injury in port is more aggravated. Unjust seizures in port was not only a violation of neutral rights, but of the laws of hospitality and natural justice. Hence it will be perceived that the basis upon which the government has proceeded, has been the promised and expected justice of France. In December, 1810, Congress met, and under the impression that French hostility had ceased, and that accustomed commerce with France was to be restored, was determined to make the most efficient resistance against Great Britain, unless a similar course was pursued by her. About a month after the commencement of the session it leaked out that secret decrees had been issued prohibiting the importation of our staple articles, cotton and tobacco, into France, with a view to force or encourage the culture of them on the continent of Europe. This information occasioned much discontent in congress with the arrangement made by the president. The French minister upon being applied to admitted the fact, but intimated that if we would cause our rights to be respected, his majesty the emperor would give us a manifestation of his love—the president was, however, very desirous to make a further experiment upon the justice and sincerity of the French government, to which congress reluctantly consented. A minister (Barlow instructed to demand a fulfilment of the just and reasonable expectations of this country, was sent out in the frigate Constitution in the summer of last year, which did not return until March last. Early in last session the Hornet was dispatched to France, and it was generally avowed and understood, that if upon her return, we did not receive unequivocal evidence of the good faith of France, an attitude ought and would be taken against her. This vessel did not return until the 23d of May when for the first time Congress and the nation were informed of the progress of Mr. Barlow's negotiation—the arrangement with France, the flattering prospects held out in the Duc de Cadore's letters, invited our merchants once more to French ports—but what was the consequence? Many of their vessels were sequestered, and exposed to great and expensive delay and exorbitant duties. In short, it appeared that the ordinary usages of commerce between friendly nations had, on the part of France, been completely abandoned, and of course that the trade interdicted by the orders in council was not worth contending for.

By the arrangement France was bound to make such a revocation as would produce a cessation of hostilities on our commerce by French cruisers. In this she has totally failed, for since the proclamation of the president was issued, French privateers have captured and harassed our commerce in the Baltic, the Channel, the Mediterranean, and wherever else they cruised, in an enormous degree, and during last winter, while congress was voting the measures of preparation to assert our rights by force, many acting under the impression that we were pledged to France, and others, because they preferred resistance by an active, vigorous war, to resistance by restrictions, at the moment the French government was amusing Barlow, and Barlow the people of the United States, with the prospect of two or three treaties, a French squadron was sent out and burnt our vessels trading to Caliz and Lisbon, during a great part of the session. Of these burnings we received conclusive evidence in the month of March.

The Hornet, after being detained several months longer than was expected at last returned on the 23d day of May, and what did she bring? None of the treaties which Mr. Barlow's letters had led the nation to expect; without any evidence of the just purposes of France, but of the most sovereign contempt of that government for the President's demand of a restoration of American property seized in French ports, for a great part of it had been sold and the proceeds of it put into the French treasury, subsequent to the date of the Duc de Cadore's letters announcing the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees. And Barlow writes, that with regard to restoration, or compensation, he never received even a verbal answer until the Hornet was about to sail, when the French minister condescended to promise to discuss our claims. She did perhaps bring a repetition of the old story, that there would be no difficulty if we would cause our flag to be respected; that was, as I understand, if we would make common cause against Great Britain. That France did not make an effectual repeal of her decrees, that she did not in any respect satisfy the just expectations of this country must be admitted; but as some suppose she did repeal her edicts on paper, I will, although it is unimportant, bestow on it a little attention. The decrees of Berlin and Milan were signed by the emperor himself, and promulgated as the fundamental laws of the French empire. How has the fundamental law of the French empire been repealed? By the declaration or promise of the French minister in a letter to gen. Armstrong. Was this promise followed by any public authentic act of the French emperor, announcing to the nation the repeal of the decrees in relation to the U. S.? Did the French courts acquit on the ground of such repeal, is there any public adjudication to that effect? Have the public or private or armed vessels ceased to capture on that ground? Some may have been released upon special application and by the