

THE RALEIGH MINERVA.

THREE DOLLARS PER YEAR.

RALEIGH, N. C.—PUBLISHED (WEEKLY) BY LUCAS AND A. H. BOYLAN.

HALF OF WHICH IN ADVANCE.

VOL. 18.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1813.

No. 909.

Highly interesting Document.

FROM THE (G. T.) FEDERAL REPUBLICAN.
SECRET CORRESPONDENCE.

[TRANSLATION.]

Baltimore, 14th June, 1809.

The minister of France to Mr. Robert Smith, Secretary of State.

Sir—The federal government is going to settle all its differences with Great Britain, and to make a treaty of amity, of commerce, and of navigation with that power. You, as well as Mr. Gallatin, have manifested to me a desire also to make a new convention with France, to take the place of that which expires on the 30th September next.

I will for a moment call to your consideration (without any reflection) this double object, which the federal government proposes to itself, and the difficulties of accomplishing it, in a manner advantageous for all the contracting parties. My just deference for your government, sir, does not permit me to make any observation on the haste with which the executive has received the first overtures of the English ministry yet composed of the same men who very lately discovered a very manifest aversion to every species of conciliation, and who joined to a denial of justice to the Americans, every asperity of forms, of tone, and of style towards the agents of your government.

If I have supposed that this very haste was necessary to satisfy the wishes of the people of whom foresight is not the first virtue, others may see in that political proceeding a precipitation, perhaps dangerous, and if it does not lessen (ne diminue pas) the Dignity of the Executive, may at least produce consequences prejudicial to the true interests of the Union. It is on these very interests, much more than on those of France, as its enlarged and liberal policy, its principles of universal justice, and the elements of which its power is composed, have placed it beyond all attacks (hors de toutes les atteintes)—it is only on the interest of your government that I fix my attention and invoke your's, under a circumstance so delicate.

My correspondence with your predecessor is enough to convince you, sir, that I have not left him ignorant of the dangers of the crisis of Europe, and its inevitable effects on the destiny of the states of the American Union. Positive and multiplied information on the events of the other continent and their probable results, has enabled me sometimes to raise the veil which yet covers the designs of the first powers of the political world.

I have thought that it was not incompatible with my duty to submit to the wisdom of your government the new chances, which the changes, brought about in Europe offer to the commercial interests of the United States; and the inconveniences which may result from their refusal to accede formally to the principle of the maritime confederation.

It does not belong to me to examine, how far the preceding administration was mistaken in its conjectures, but the verbal proposition, which you have made to me, sir, to conclude a new convention (a proposition which I have submitted to my court) necessarily leads me to some observations on the respective position of France and the United States.

Your government looks to nothing in its treaties, but to the interest of its foreign commerce. This is the principle object of its policy. France considers foreign commerce only as an addition (accessoire) to its system of general administration. Numerous canals of communication, which aid its rivers, and in multiplying their directions, procure for it all the opening necessary to keep up in the interior and with its allies that immense circulation of all the objects of their reciprocal wants. In France commerce is not a power (puissance) in the state: it shares with other national professions the protection of the government, which only honors them with its support and encouragement in proportion to the degree of their utility and importance. In short foreign commerce is not considered in France as an indispensable thing, although it is so considered in the United States.

You will then readily, see, sir, that France has not the same interest, which the federal government has, to make a treaty of commerce and navigation with the United States, while it is evident, that whatsoever may be the dispositions, the result does not offer an equality of advantage to the two governments.

It is only then by means of Political sacrifices, that one can re-establish the balance in a commercial treaty, and also render it of common utility to the two parties. Besides (and I have not suffered it to remain concealed from the administration, which preceded that of Mr. Madison) can the federal government believe, and I appeal to your discernment to judge if the United States have not given causes of serious and multiplied complaints to France during the terrible conflict which she has had to sustain against all the armed powers of Europe? Notwithstanding the popular infatuation, and the hurrying off of the public opinion, and the public fury towards a power systematically inimical as well to the United States as to France, I will appeal to the authority of all the sensible men of your own country, sir, to know, if for more than five years past the federal government has conducted itself towards the French government in a manner to

merit the advantages which you expect from a new convention.

It would be useless and too tedious to examine here what has already all the light of evidence, whether the preceding administration has not taken the worst course which it could have taken to avoid collision with the two principal belligerent powers. The Americans have appealed to the rights of neutrality, and until now at least their government has endeavoured by proceedings which I shall not permit myself to give a name to, (de qualifier) to draw near to Great Britain, who outrages or disowns the rights claimed; while it injures (offense) France, whose measures have for their object the re-establishment and the guaranty of these rights.

Thus, your preceding administration, (for it is of that, & that only that I pretended to speak) placed itself by its political movement (marche) in manifest contradiction with its own principles. It has done more, and notwithstanding my representations, it persisted (obstinee) to consider the two powers as doing equal wrong to the government of the Union, and to apply to them the effect of its negative measures, while the outrages of England seemed to require from their dignity the most energetic measures of repression against that power: But in short, (en fin) sir, it is time to come to an explanation on the pretended wrongs of France towards the United States, and at least oppose to them the injuries (les offenses) done by the federal government.

However severe the decree of Berlin might seem, in its application to the United States, it was demonstrated that its consequences would be ultimately (en definitive analyse) favorable to their commercial pretensions, since its object was to reach (atteindre) a power who had proclaimed its contempt for the rights of nations; and with out doubt the Americans were the people the most interested in the success of that political act.

—There are however American merchants, who, by all the means of the most shameful deception, have endeavoured to elude the measures of France, and to second the efforts of the common enemy to escape them, and have at length by their multiplied and proven frauds provoked the more severe dispositions of the decree of Milan. Thus, not only were the measures of France justified as measures of retaliation, but they were indispensable to free the American commerce from the yoke which Great Britain had placed on it, to cause to be respected in future the flag of neutrals, and to force that power to acknowledge the common right of nations and the dominion of the seas; the confiscation, the sale, and burning of some American merchant vessels, having false papers, and navigating in contempt of the prohibitions of their own government to favor the enemies of France, have been legal measures conformable to the rights of war, and which the force of circumstances and the interest of all imperiously required.—But I appeal to you, sir, the council of Washington, of which you were then also a member—has it given all the necessary attention to the representations made on this subject by Mr. Champagny to Mr. Armstrong, as well as to those which I considered it my duty to address to the Secretary of State? Has it been possible to make known through the United States, all the advantages which the American people ought to find in the accomplishment of the designs of France—to discuss its projects in the calm of impartiality—to cause the voice of reason and of principles to be heard, when the declamations of error or of bad faith, (when) the influence of prepossessions and the clamours of party spirit preserved their empire over the public opinion, or rather, received a new force from the incertitude (incertitude) or the silence of the [former] ancient Executive Council?—That disposition almost general to attribute (a supposer) wrongs to France, by way of weakening (pour attenuer) the outrages of England—was it foreign to the administration of which I speak? and that administration has it always been willing to hear me, while I made it perceive the consequences of the conduct of the federal government in regard to the French government? Was this administration well convinced that all governments are not disposed to forget, or to suffer injuries (les offenses) with impunity.

In recalling to your recollection, sir, the wrongs of the federal government towards France, I only mention notorious acts, which my former correspondence has established—observing to you, at the same time, that I understand according to their class* (je comprends dans leur categorie) the particular offences of your citizens; for every government is bound (est solidaire) in regard to other powers for the acts of its subjects; or otherwise it would not be a government, and could not offer either security or guarantee for the execution of its agreements. Complaints were for a long time made to the U. S. of the delays which some American citizens had experienced in receiving the indemnities which were due to them, and of which the reimbursement was made from a part of the funds destined for the acquisition of Louisiana; but the affair of the heirs of Beaumarchais, who have in vain claimed for 28 years a debt made sacred by his motives, proven to the last degree of evidence, and on which the declared interest of the French government does not admit of a put-off—is it finished?

Captain Moussant, the bearer of a letter of marque, and commandant of an armed schooner, followed an English convoy, and was on the

* Better.—That I comprehend with them;

point of taking several merchant vessels, when two American armed brigs, and armed to protect the infamous commerce with St. Domingo, attacked him under the English flag, and not only added treachery to superiority of force to get possession of the vessel of Moussant; but after having pillaged it, massacred a part of the crew an hour after they had struck—and this crime which remains unpunished, is so much the less forgotten, as capt. Moussant never let go (quitte) his flag.

But it would be too tedious to relate to you all the particular acts in relation solely to French citizens; it will be sufficient for me to say to you, that every where, where there are Frenchmen, (I don't speak of the small number who have injured their country) these Frenchmen will have a right to the protection of the government, and will be every where assured (assures) of obtaining indemnity for the damage done to their persons or to their property.

There are other grievances (griefs) yet more serious, and from which France has a right to believe that the U. States has a project of giving her iniquitude for her distant possessions, and for those of her allies. This has reference to the free commerce between the Americans and the revolted Blacks of St. Domingo, the affair of Mi Pinda, and to the meditated attack on Spaniards on the Sabine—an enterprise which would not have been given up (n'a echoue) but for the necessity under which your government found itself of causing its troops to fall back to guard New-Orleans against an invasion by internal enemies.

I was far from thinking, sir, that the offence (scandale) of the commerce with the slaves in the revolted part of St. Domingo—the law of the embargo confirming the prohibitory law passed by Congress in 1806—I could not presume that the embargo would be raised, and that the law against this commerce would not be continued. What, sir, the intercourse is prohibited between the U. States and all the dependencies of the Empire, under circumstances, when the commercial relations would be the most advantageous to the two states, and you tolerate them only with that one of our possessions, where we have the greatest interest to proscriber them! and it is to be remarked, that it is always (moreover) when France has to combat new coalitions on the other continent, that it would seem that efforts are made to form enterprises against its possessions, or those of its allies in this one. It is also proper to place among the number of grievances with which France has to charge the U. States, the want of opposition, or rather the useless opposition, which the federal government has made to the imprisonment of its sailors, seized in contempt of its flag, and with whom the English arm their vessels against us. I have often, sir, and often in vain, protested against this outrage of Great Britain towards your government, and which has become a serious injury (offence) on the part of your government towards France. You furnish personal aid (secours personnels) to our enemies—What could you do more if you were at war with us? Without doubt, it will not escape the present executive, that an amendment is absolutely necessary to render uniform the treatment which our sailors and soldiers meet in this country, and that which your sailors and soldiers meet with in France.

I have not suffered my court to be ignorant of the abuses, without number, and extremely prejudicial to its interests, daily resulting from a want of a police in the United States, in regard to this affair. I am very far, sir, from charging your government with the means the most shameful of seduction which are employed, to induce our sailors and our soldiers to desert, but has it done all that it ought to have done to prevent it? and that extreme facility with which, when they wish it (au besoin) men drawn off from their country and their sovereign are naturalized, does it accord with the incontestable right of governments to recover even without DEMANDING THEM* their subjects whom artifice or force has drawn off from their service; and France, sir, has it not given on this subject, as on many others, an example of the reciprocal respect which governments owe to each other, and which they observe in Europe even in the midst of the horrors of war? and have I not already warned the executive council to put an end to these abuses? Have I not warned them that the indemnity due for the loss of the French ship the Impetuous, burnt by the enemy within a cable's length of your coast, ought to be decreed, (statue) and paid without delay—and the subterfuges (permit me to use the expression, I know no other to convey my idea) and the subterfuges I say, which have been employed to delay (a journey) that indemnity, have made of that act of violence on the part of our enemies, a direct offence of the U. States against France. What more could you do, what more could you leave undone, sir, if you had a treaty of alliance with our enemies?

You will find it convenient, sir, that I abridge the enumeration of all the subjects of complaint, which the federal government has given to France, since my residence in the U. States, and that I refer to my correspondence with the department of state.

I confine myself here to calling the attention, and the attention the most serious of the executive council, to another grievance of the most serious kind—I know not what could more sensibly offend (offenser) the French Empire.

* This justification of the attack of the Chesapeake, and the whole passage supports the pretension to consider as null the naturalization of foreign seamen.

I commence, sir, by agreeing, that no government has a right to interfere with the particular or municipal laws of other countries, because it is supposed with reason, that every government will so far respect itself, as to circumscribe the effect of these local institutions, and to stop the licentiousness which the feebleness of laws always gives birth to, and the digressions (les écarts) of which may offend foreign powers. Can one suppose that it was easy to avoid the just reproaches of sovereigns for offences of this kind, where the weakness [a vice] of the institutions, and the want of action or of power in the depositaries of political authority, render useless a trial of the means of repression? You have foreseen, sir, that I am about to address you, on the indefinite liberty of saying every thing, of writing every thing, and of printing every thing.

I am very far from believing that the excesses of your press have occupied for an instant the thoughts of the Emperor King, my master—but as it respects this subject, [a cet egard] I am here as the organ of the whole French Empire, and, if I do not see without pain, the ravages (ravages) which the delirium of the insolence of the greater part of your periodical writers, occasions amongst yourselves, you will judge, that I do not hear without indignation, all that people permit themselves to say or to write against France, her institutions, and the sacred person of her august representative.

You will see, sir, that on this subject, as on all others, the redress of grievances is an indispensable prerequisite to the formation of a new treaty between the two powers.

It was sufficiently painful to me to address you [entretenir] on the complaints of France against the United States, without laying them open to you, in the form of an official note.—I have thought that a simple letter, the tone of which would approach nearer to that of our conferences, would produce the same effect with you, sir, whose liberal principles and loyal character, are known to me. I have thought that you would be afflicted, as I am, at the obstacles (intraves) which the preceding administration has been able to place in the way of a hearty reconciliation [a un rapprochement plus en time] between our governments, and which their mutual interest renders more necessary than ever.

I have thought also, that I could even on a subject so serious, [grave] and without deviating from, or with propriety [sans blamer les convenances] adopt a mode of communication more analogous to the conformity of our views and our efforts to maintain harmony between France and the U. States; and have found here too the satisfaction of being able to offer to your sentiments a new tribute of respect.

Receive, sir, the homage of my high consideration,

[Signed] TURREAU.

INTERESTING TOPOGRAPHY.

Translated for the Freeman's Journal.
From the Portuguese Telegraph, Saturday, 26th June, 1813.

Since the victorious army of the Great Lord continues to drive the French from the banks of the Douro by the spurs of the Pyrenees, we think it will be proper to give a topographical description of the road from Burgos to Bayonne. From Burgos to Bayonne is 162 English miles or 52 Portuguese leagues, a little more or less. The route is as follows: from Bayonne to St. John de Luz 15 miles; thence to the banks of the Bidasoa, which separates France from Spain, and the Pyrenees of Biscay, 15 miles; to Hernani 6; to Tolosa 22; to Vergera 12; to Mondragon 8; to Vitoria 20; to Miranda of the Ebro 20; to Bribiesca 20; to Monasterio, 9; and to Burgos 15.

Leaving Bayonne, the road for the first 12 miles crosses a craggy and mountainous country, which commences the Pyrenees. This road leads to St. John de Luz, a little town; leaving which, you meet with a small arm of the sea, which you pass on a bridge, 4 miles further is the river Bidasoa; after which you enter Biscay. The first settlement afterwards is Irun, a village badly built, two miles from Bidasoa, then Hernani, a considerable town, surrounded with mountains, separated from each other by vallies covered with verdure, watered by a river, which, by the various turns it makes, is repeatedly seen by the traveller until he reaches Vitoria. Over this river there exists several small bridges well built with cut stone. This road is very favourable to any army retreating towards France, because in every mile you meet positions well fortified by nature. It ought to be remarked that at Hernani the road gives a branch to the right or west, which is the way from St. Sebastians and Bilbao, in manner following: From Hernani to Fontarabia, are 20 miles; thence to St. Sebastians, 10; thence to Bilbao, 50. Fontarabia is a town, well fortified, and considered one of the keys of Spain: it is situated on a small Peninsula, on the borders of the sea, occupying a position strong both by nature and art, seeing that it is covered on the side of the land by great mountains, and on the sea side by an excellent fort. The French have often besieged it in former wars, but always with ill success. Turning to the royal road, from Hernani is 22 miles; the first 12 it crosses various mountains, and then descends to a beautiful and shady valley; here the view of the traveller is delighted with a great variety of agreeable objects; every habitation of the labourer is surrounded with trees in such a man-