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Political.

FROM THE LEXINGTON (KEN.) STATESMAN.

TO THE PEOPLE.

The late Fayette election and its incidents must be my apology for once more obtruding myself upon your notice. I shall be content with very concise statement.—I entered on the theatre of public life with a warm attachment to free government, which remains unshaken.—I never had much respect for party names, or epithets, distinct from principles.—my objects have been to understand and uphold the true principles and genius of our constitution, and that system of policy which was best calculated to secure on a durable basis, the public liberty and public happiness. During my senatorial term, the administration and their party furnished the texts which have regulated my conduct. To the principles which they avowed I have adhered. In making this assertion I stand supported by their public and official acts and declarations. I make it however, not to reproach them, but to justify myself; and after I separated from them on the war question, I did nothing to annoy or embarrass; indeed, the administration are much indebted to me with regard to several important measures. I determined not to avail myself of the last session of my term to oppose them, but really acquiesced in some acts of a very questionable character. To dissipate some prejudices which have been excited against me by means not very honorable, I beg leave to say a few words on the war subject in addition to what I have already laid before the public. In the views I have presented, I have had reference to the public proceedings of the government, nor did I consider any thing else proper for public discussion. To correct, however, erroneous impressions is the chief object of this address. It will be recollected that the first embargo was announced to be a measure of impartiality in relation to both belligerents, which was followed by a non-intercourse against both. On the first day of May, 1810 Congress permitted all the restrictive measures to expire, and seemed determined not to enter into the war, unless one of the belligerents would observe towards us a fair and just policy. It may here be proper to remark, that after we had repealed the first embargo my views were much less favorable to the war policy than before. From the best consideration I had been able to bestow on the subject, I was convinced that from the nature of the contest between France and England, and the policy adopted to distress each other, it was the interest of this government to maintain their neutral attitude, leaving the merchants who had a right to arm to reap the best harvest they could, during the troubled state of Europe. Having taken this view, and the administration having assumed a ground in unison with it, it will not appear strange that I should be very averse to see my country maneuvered from it by any artifice of a foreign minister. A few months after the arrangement with France was made, about which so much has been said, we began to suspect very strongly that all was not fair, and I urged, when the law of March 1811 was before the Senate, to several friends of the administration in whom I had confidence, the propriety and necessity of taking a ground which would rid us of the arrangement in case it turned out, as we expected, to be a deception—and a motion was then proposed, in substance authorising and requiring the President to revoke it, unless the conduct of the French government should meet his just expectations—for which I voted, as the journals of the senate will shew. I state the fact, to prove that my impression from the beginning was, that we owed it to our own honor to rescind the arrangement if France did not act with good faith. At the next session, the war session, after the war spirit had been kindled by the news papers and the president's message, I would have repealed the non-intercourse and have taken a decided ground against Great Britain. My opinion was that such a course would have prevented war. A repeal of the arrangement would have furnished Great Britain with an apology, and the certainty of war with a motive to rescind her orders in council. Otherwise we could as a measure to our own honor have renewed the non-intercourse. The object I had most at heart was to prevent the war, without sacrificing my popularity or the honor of the country—and I would not have countenanced war upon principles the most honorable, but from a respect for public feeling. This plan of revoking the arrangements with France before we commenced hostilities, I pressed on the President verbally, and in writing, many months before the declaration of war, and ultimately on the Senate. This project failed. It will be recollected that on the 23d day of May, a few days before the war message was sent to Congress, the vessel Hornet which had been sent after the meeting of Congress, arrived from France with the result so far of Mr. Barlow's mission. Barlow after near twelve months' negotiation had not been able to get a single article of a treaty signed; and while the French government were amusing him with the prospect of treaties, they sent out a squadron of public armed ships, which were burning our vessels for several months before the declaration of war. Upon the whole it was very evident that we had been tricked and trifled with. A day or two, I think before the President's war message was communicated, a leading friend of the administration, of the senate,

asked me my opinion as to the course to be pursued. I answered him, that the only honorable course left us was to authorise hostilities with both, to commence with marque and reprisal, and that ground I maintained to the last; nor did I give nor intend to give an assurance or pledge to any man that I would vote for it.—Some may have supposed that I would, though unwillingly, vote for it; that is, that I would not hazard a vote against it, and I am ready to confess that I was very reluctant to differ with some men of the majority on the question.—I did think that we owed it to our own honor to manifest our indignation in some way at the conduct of France. Such a course would have rendered the war less popular in England, and have produced more confidence and union at home.—Nothing but notions of honor should have induced us to go to war without a change in the policy of France we had no motive of interest to resist the British orders in council, to prove which I appeal to no less authority than the instructions of our government to Barlow, a few months before the declaration of war.—On the subject of impressment, it must be evident to every man who understands the subject, that a proper law on our part for the surrender of British deserters, and for regulating the employment of foreign seamen in our service, would have led to an honorable and satisfactory arrangement of the practice. In support of which I refer to the letters of the present secretary of state and attorney general, Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney.

The political men who support the war, act under the influence of very different motives and objects.—Many, and the most sincere advocates of the war, think, perhaps, that we ought to make common cause with France, to compel G. Britain to recognize the principles of the treaty of Utrecht; substantially the same contended for by the armed neutrality of 1780, the establishment of which Bonaparte declares to be necessary to the freedom of the seas. Others are for it, because it is supposed to be popular, and will be for it no longer than it is so. A third class probably think it is necessary to have the nation scourged awhile with war, and taxes, to reconcile them to a reasonable treaty with Great Britain. Whether it is the interest or policy of this nation to contend for the principles which appear to constitute the avowed basis of the war on the part of France and her allies, or upon what terms our government ought to make peace, are questions upon which I should not, if sufficiently informed, presume at present to give any opinion.—I do not, indeed, suppose that it would have much influence with the public. My object, however, in this address, is not to discuss, or provoke the discussion, of any political topics. My intention was not even to examine the correctness of my own course, but merely to correct erroneous impressions with regard to it. I do not expect to address the public in a political way shortly: I can never cease to feel a warm solicitude for the welfare of the country; but my attention, for some time to come, will be chiefly directed to my private and professional business. Success in the late election would have gratified me as an evidence of the good opinion of my countrymen. I did suppose, too, that a seat in the legislature might afford me an opportunity of rendering you service. While no man can dislike more the course pursued since the arrangement with France, or view with less respect or approbation the declaration of war under these circumstances, because, however just, we appeared to be shuffled into it by the artful maneuvering policy of a foreign nation; I certainly had no design to embarrass the constitutional, legitimate operations of government. I did intend to enter my protest against the interference of the state legislature in the management of the war. To Congress has the constitution confided the power of declaring war and carry it on; and it is their duty to equalize its burdens among the people of the U. States; and any attempt of any man, or set of men, to give themselves consequence, or their friends offices, by levying contributions or drafts of militia beyond our fair proportion, is unjust and improper: Nor have I been able to ascertain by what authority a draft of 3 000 militia was made last spring, for the service of the United States. Such proceedings are despotic and oppressive, and ought to be disapproved by every friend to the constitution of the country. Let Congress impose on us our proportion of the public burthens, and I shall be one of the last to oppose, or countenance any opposition to the laws, but this lawless system of raising armies, appointing officers, &c. is productive of the worst effects. It not only occasions much useless waste of the public treasure, but creates much unauthorised patronage—affords to individuals numerous opportunities of speculating, and speculating upon the public—and tends to prove that our government, as constituted, is incompetent to carry on a war. It produces, besides, confusion in our military arrangements and uncertainty with regard to the ways and means necessary to meet the expenses of the war; and what is more, it tends to lessen among the people that sacred regard for the constitution—the majesty and supremacy of the laws, which is essential to the preservation of freedom. I am a friend to an administration of the government, according to the spirit and principles of our constitutions. I certainly have no anti-republican feelings or sentiments, if I understand the meaning of the term. But when I see members of Congress raising armies and appointing officers, without legal authority; drawing money to pay them, without any appropriation by law,

and themselves becoming the paymasters; when I see patronage extended to an enormous degree, without necessity; and, worse than all, when I observe the best men in the country afraid to question the propriety of these things, for fear of having the epithet tory, or something else applied, by some impudent scoundrel, I am constrained to suspect that the manly genuine spirit of republicanism has fled; and that the fashionable republicanism is but a name used by many to cover the worst designs. But I will no longer indulge myself on these topics. I will hope that I am under some unaccountable delusion. I am restrained by another and most painful consideration, that in exposing errors, I may only make enemies without rendering the country any service. Altho' I do not take leave of you without regret, for public life is very disagreeable to me, yet I shall find it no difficult task to reconcile myself to it. My principles and views of the public interest I cannot sacrifice in any material degree, to gratify the pride or policy of any party. In my state of political depression, I am consoled by a perfect consciousness that the cardinal object, at least of my political course, has been the good of my country—and that I have never planned or meditated the political destruction of any man to preserve my elevation.

JOHN POPE.

P. S. Many well disposed persons have supposed, that after failing to carry the measure I deemed best, it would have been right to have gone with the majority. To this I answer, if my course was correct, the other must have been wrong. My vote would have been in direct contradiction to the ground I had taken with the President many months before, and a resolution I had previously moved in the Senate. I was not in a temper to make great sacrifices to go with the party. Most of the abuse I had received was from the democratic party. Had it been from the opposition, I should have considered it in some degree a matter of course; but to be vilified and harassed without provocation by the friends and pretended friends of administration; and unaccustomed to reproach, to have suspicion and distrust diffused throughout the country, and particularly in Kentucky, by those who pretended to be the supporters of administration; conscious that I neither had done any thing or contemplated any thing against the party or administration; that no man would have hazarded his popularity sooner in support of their measures if tolerably right, and that, if, as far as my efforts were influenced by a party feeling, in relation to the renewal of the bank charter, it was with a view to support the administration, had an effect on my feelings and dispositions towards the party which I have never recovered. I was disqualified from being very hearty with them afterwards, and nothing but my attachment to a few individuals kept me with them as a party. Some circumstances connected with the President, which occurred after I had been so severely assailed in Kentucky about the bank charter and instructions, had no tendency to reconcile me; altho' I do not believe they proceeded from any unfriendly disposition in the President towards me; and under that impression I gave him, during the war session, my views very fully and candidly about our public affairs; and whether right or wrong, I never addressed a man with more zeal and sincerity, both as regarded himself and the public welfare. There seemed to be a systematic effort to proscriber me, or at least to excite suspicion, and under the influence of considerations entirely distinct from any regard to principle.—These things have to be sure very little to do with my public conduct, because the correctness of that must depend on facts and principles known to the public; but as my political career has ended, at least for a time, I did not think it amiss to mention them. I had supposed that if France had been faithful we should have gone to war with Great Britain: with both if she was not; and this was certainly in unison with the ground the government had occupied. I should, however, been content to yield the project of going to war with both if the government had revoked what we had done on French account—and then taken our own course and of our own accord, against both or either. I did believe that it would have prevented war, and that if it did not, that manifesting our indignation in any way at the faithless conduct of France, would have inspired more confidence, and produced more union without which this government should never hazard a war. On Mr. Webster's late resolutions in Congress much able and ingenious argument has been exhibited with regard to the effect of the French repealing decree on the conduct of Great Britain. This has appeared to me a very immaterial question, because we never demanded a repeal on the ground that such repeal was necessary to justify resistance to the British orders: so far from it, this government had expressly denied that the orders could be supported on the principle of retaliation; and therefore, as respected the dispute between us and Great Britain, there was no difficulty: But we demanded a repeal as a condition upon which we would depart from our neutrality on our own account, to make it consistent with our own honor and interest to select an enemy; otherwise we might appear to be driven into it, or to submit to the dictation of the power benefited by our interference. The French decree of 1811, published in 1812, brought here after the declaration of war, establishes the fact beyond contradiction, that the

French government neither had or intended to abandon their hostile edicts, until they had involved us with England. My public situation has certainly added nothing to my private fortune; and I must be permitted to say, that few men have acted with more disinterested views. About the mere party contests for power and place, I have little concern; indeed, I rather feel contempt. I am content to be a minority man; and in the character, at present, if I had an opportunity, might render the country most service. I do not intend to relinquish my principles or views of national policy, to oblige any man or set of men. My votes, which have been censured, were; I am confident, consistent with the best interests of the people represented, and therefore I cannot repent of them. J. P.

Fayette County, Aug. 18. 1813.

From the United States Gazette.

THE DEFENCE.

TO JAMES MADISON, ESQ.

SIR—It is the fate of great men, said I to my wife a few days ago—it is the fate of great men to be assailed by the ignorant, the malicious, and the narrow minded. For instance—see the great Madison attacked by all the political mosquitos in the country.—“Great Madison!” How is he great! in body or mind? Wife, answered I, rather testily, you will be so good, in future, as not to take the liberty to think every thing, and say every thing, about his excellency. You ought to know how I came by my office, and that any thing like independence and reasoning, at this time, does not suit the meridian of Washington. Indeed, answered she somewhat harshly, I know too well how you obtained your office—Would to God it were a secret. Come come, my dear, I thought you promised to say nothing more about it—Democracy could not live without these—these—but let us change the subject. Indeed, continued she, it is a fine thing, if there is no saying a word about men and measures. Why boast of freedom, and of the only enlightened nation on the globe? Hush, hush, my dear, he has been a fine man, ever since I obtained my office—I am now fully persuaded of it. Do remember which side our bread is buttered.—The moment I use your independent and uncourtly language, away goes the office to more kneeling slaves. Say he is great, patriotic, independent—every thing that he is not, for the sake of office. Huzza for office holders! cried she, waxing very wroth—Huzza for trimming office holders! Go on, my dear, go on. You have no character to lose, if you can thus call black white. Trim, crouch, flatter, and keep your office, if you please—but ask not me to approve what I cannot like.—And if I must * * * Here a neighbour entered, and my wife had sufficient command of herself to drop the conversation, and salute him.

Your excellency knows how fond the women are of wearing the pantaloons. On the subject of politics my wife and I cannot harmonise. As long as you continue me in office, I will stick to your excellency through thick and thin, to use a very classical phrase. You want such men now.—It is impossible to do without them.—It is of no importance that we act contrary to our former professions and practice. We can say in three words—circumstances alter cases. This is a sufficient answer for any thing when the lie direct will not do. I hope your excellency will excuse me, while I read a letter just received from the western part of Pennsylvania. I'll proceed in a few minutes. These letters are always in the way whenever I attempt to address your excellency.

PITTSBURGH, Aug. 10th, 1813.

Friend Lucian—As you are in office, and have nothing to trouble you, excepting how to get one more lucrative, or keep where you are, I have taken the liberty of laying my case before you. You must know how to manage things better than I do, and I wish your advice. I, like Rome, may be purchased. I have bawled out tory and all the democratic phrases for no purpose. Much of the best part of my life has been spent in seeking for an office. I approve of all that is past in Mr. Madison's conduct, and now promise, if I can get an office, to approve of all that may be done hereafter. I must now come to some conclusion as to my fate. There is no halting between two opinions. My patriotism may be secured by an office.—You may think me desperate, “but I would set my life on any chance, to mend it, or be rid on't.” If nothing else can be obtained, endeavor to have me made a collector of taxes. I was one of the leaders of the western insurrection, and, therefore, I have no small claims to the attention of all good democrats. I think I shall have no difficulty in swearing roundly that this war is righteous, just, and necessary, beyond any war that ever existed. I will tell our good whiskey democrats, that government are managing all things well; that Canada will soon be ours; that we have taken York, &c. &c. Should they complain about the tax on whiskey, when nothing else will do, I will swear that the federalists laid the taxes, but that they had better submit to them. To cut the matter short, I'll stick at nothing, give me but the office of collector of taxes.

Your's with esteem,

DAVID DESPERATE.

“Pon my soul this David is good stuff. Mr. Madison wants patriotism of this stamp. David sticks at nothing—good, David, I'll attend to you in due time.

Your excellency will perceive, the senate