

limits, was attended with evident danger, not only to France, already sinking under the burden of his conquests, but even to his own personal interest. What his authority gained in extent, it necessarily lost in point of security. By an union with the most ancient Imperial Family in Christendom, the edifice of his greatness acquired in the eyes of the French nation and of the world, such an addition of strength and perfection, that any ulterior scheme of aggrandizement must only weaken and destroy its stability. What France, what Europe, what so many oppressed and despairing nations, earnestly demanded of Heaven, a sound policy prescribed to the triumphant ruler as a law of self preservation—and it was allowed to hope, that so many great and united motives would prevail over the ambition of an individual.

If these flattering prospects were destroyed, it is not to be imputed to Austria. After many years fruitless exertions, after boundless sacrifices of every description, there existed sufficient motives for the attempt to procure a better order of things by confidence and concession, when streams of blood had hitherto produced nothing but misery and destruction—nor can his Majesty ever regret that he has been induced to attempt it.

The year 1810 was not yet closed, the war still raged in Spain, the people of Germany had scarce been allowed a sufficient time to recover from the devastation of the two former wars, when, in an evil hour, the emperor Napoleon resolved to unite a considerable portion of the North of Germany with the mass of countries which bore the name of the French Empire, and to rob the ancient free commercial cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubec, first their political, and shortly after their commercial existence, and with that, of their means of subsistence. This violent step was adopted, without any even plausible pretensions, in contempt of every decent form, without any previous declaration, or communication with any other Cabinet, under the arbitrary and futile pretext, that the war with England required it.

This cruel system, which was intended to destroy the commerce of the world, at the expense of the independence, the prosperity, the rights and dignity, and in utter ruin of the public and private property of all the Continental Powers, was pursued with unrelenting severity, in the vain expectation of forcing a result [the subjugation of England] which had it not fortunately proved unattainable, would have plunged Europe for a long time to come into a state of poverty, impotence and barbarity.

The Decree by which a new French dominion was established on the German coasts under the title of the thirty-second military division; was in itself sufficiently calculated to raise the suspicions of the adjoining states, and it was the more alarming to them as the forerunner of future and greater dangers. By this decree it became evident that the system which had been created in France (although previously transgressed, yet still proclaimed to be in existence) the system of the pretended natural limits of the French empire was, without any further justification or explanation, overthrown, and even the emperor's arbitrary acts were in the same arbitrary manner annihilated. Neither the Princes of the Rhenish confederacy nor the kingdom of Westphalia, no territory, great or small, was spared in the accomplishment of this dreadful usurpation. The boundary drawn by blind caprice, without either rule or plan, without any consideration of ancient or more recent political relations, intersected rivers & countries, cut off the middle and southern states of Germany from all connection with the German sea, passed the Elbe, separated Denmark from Germany, laid its pretensions even to the Baltic, and seemed to be rapidly approaching the line of Prussian fortresses still occupied on the Oder, and so little did this act of usurpation (however powerfully it affected all rights and possessions, all geographical, political and military lines of demarcation) carry with it a character of determinate and complete accession of territory, that it was impossible to view it in any other light than as a forerunner of still greater usurpations, by which one half of Germany was to become a French Province, and the emperor Napoleon the absolute ruler of the continent.

To Russia and Prussia this unnatural extension of the French territory could not fail of producing the most serious alarm. The latter surrounded on all sides, no longer capable of free action, deprived of every means of obtaining fresh strength, appeared hastening to its dissolution. Russia, already in fear for her western frontier, by the conversion of the city of Danzig, declared a free city by the treaty of Tilsit, into a French military post, and of a great part of Poland into a French province, could not but see, in the advance of the French dominion along the sea coast, and in the new claims prepared for Prussia, the imminent danger of her German & Polish possessions. From this moment, therefore, the rupture between France and Russia was as good as decided.

Not without deep and just anxiety did Austria observe the storm which was gathering. The scene of hostilities would in every case be contiguous to her provinces, which owing to the financial system which had cramped the restoration of her military means, were in a very defenceless state. In a higher point of view, the struggle which awaited Prussia appeared still more doubtful as it commenced under the same unavoidable conjuncture of affairs, with the same want of co-operation on the part of other powers and with the same disproportion in their relative means, consequently was just as hopeless as all former struggles of the same nature.—His majesty the emperor made every effort in his power by friendly mediation with both parties to avert the impending storm. No human judgment could at that time foresee that the period was so near at hand, when the failure of these friendly attempts should prove more injurious to the emperor Napoleon than to his opponents.—

Thus, however, it was resolved by the wisdom of Providence.

(To be concluded next week.)

RALEIGH:

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1813.

LEGISLATURE OF NORTH-CAROLINA.

On Monday the two houses convened in their respective chambers. Of the Senate, Geo. Outlaw, Esq. was re-appointed speaker; M. Stokes clerk, and Robt Williams assistant.— In the Commons, Wm. Miller, Esq. was re-appointed speaker, P. Henderson Clerk, and Wm. Lockhart assistant. Messrs. Covington and Mordecai were re-elected engrossing clerks.— Messrs. Pounds and Lumsden, door-keepers to the house; and Messrs. Hartsfield and Murphy of the Senate.

Yesterday a message was received from the Governor, communicating a letter of Maj. General Pinckney, relative to the defence of our coast. The letter informs that the general government has received from Halifax information of a contemplated expedition against the southern ports, during the ensuing winter-season; and General Pinckney's intention in consequence to erect a new battery for the defence of Wilmington. The general, also, requests Governor Hawkins, if he may deem it expedient, to order out additional detachments of Militia &c. It is General Pinckney's purpose, if practicable, to visit North Carolina, at the close of the present or early in the ensuing month.

After several ballottings, Mr. William M. White was elected the third engrossing Clerk. Several standing committees have been appointed, and other initial business transacted, of which an account shall be given in our next.

On Wednesday His Excellency the Governor, transmitted to both houses, by Mr. Sneed, his secretary, the following

MESSAGE:

TO THE HONORABLE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA.

Gentlemen,
I should do injustice to my feelings, were I to forbear expressing the high gratification I feel in beholding the General Assembly of this State, convened at a period so important as the present, when, engaged as we are in war, the situation of our country renders it necessary that so many various measures, connected with its security, prosperity and high-standing, should receive their mature and deliberate attention. That the measures adopted by you will be commensurate with the exigencies of our situation, a sure guarantee is to be found in the circumstance of your having been selected as Representatives, by our enlightened fellow-citizens, at a time when they were fully aware of the importance of the trust about to be delegated.

It would have afforded me the highest satisfaction to have had it in my power, at the opening of the present session, to congratulate you upon the restoration of peace. As we were compelled by a long series of unexampled aggressions to resort to arms, its return must be hailed with heart-felt satisfaction by every American, if obtained upon terms compatible with the honour, welfare and security of our country. When it is recollected that our Government, from a firm attachment to peace, the true policy of our country, had forborne beyond justification, to oppose Great-Britain in her unjust and arrogant pretensions, by an appeal to arms, the strongest grounds are afforded for the presumption, that, consulting the same pacific policy, it must look forward with anxious solicitude to that happy period when the war may be terminated with honour and safety. If this presumptive evidence should be rejected, facts might be adduced as conclusive proof of the disposition of our government in relation to that object. It is unnecessary to enumerate them. Suffice it to mention the Russian mediation. The promptitude with which it was accepted and acted upon by the President, is, of itself, incontrovertible evidence of the wish of our government that an accommodation should take place. As, then, the people and the government are in favor of peace, the continuance of the war must depend upon the disposition of the British cabinet. If they will guarantee reparation for past injuries, and respect for our rights as a sovereign and independent nation in future, the objects of the war will be accomplished, and peace will be restored. But until they agree to relinquish what they assumed as a right before the declaration of war, the privilege of committing the most insolent and vexatious outrages upon the rights and liberties of our citizens, we shall be under the indispensable necessity of prosecuting the war. By prosecuting the war with firmness, unanimity and vigor, our objects will be accomplished. The intolerable and inadmissible pretensions of Great-Britain must finally yield to her necessities. Eminently dependant as the manufacturing and commercial interests of that nation have been on the trade with the United States; their acknowledged decline since that trade has been cut off, and, indeed, the fatal effects of the present war upon almost every thing connected with her welfare and prosperity, are circumstances which, combined with our united and vigorous perseverance, will eventually compel her haughty ministry to recede from their arrogant pretensions, and to conclude peace upon fair and honorable terms. But if we weaken ourselves by cherishing internal divisions; if we exhibit ourselves to the enemy as a nation composed of two hostile parties, each endeavoring to destroy the other, we shall place that object at a distance from us. G. Britain, presuming upon our weakness, thus produced, will not only be more obstinate, but encouraged to indulge her ambition and arrogance. Is there an instance recorded, where British rapacity has yielded to the supplications of the weak? We cannot expect that that nation, whose government is so hostile to ours, will ever grant us peace as a boon. Every American citizen, therefore, who is anxious that it should be restored, will deem it his imperative duty to give his support to the vigorous

presentation of the war, as the only effectual mean of obtaining it.

The opinion entertained in relation to, and the feelings produced by the long agitated question as to the policy of the declaration of war, must now yield to considerations all important to the restoration of peace, and to the preservation of our national reputation.—The question now is, shall we by weakening ourselves, by cherishing party animosities, which cannot fail to produce that effect, invite the enemy to an obstinate perseverance; or shall we by abandoning all party animosities, and giving our united support to our country's cause, compel them to do justice and to give us peace? Then, to you, Gentlemen, whom our fellow-citizens have selected for your wisdom and prudence, to devise and adopt such measures as may be necessary to the preservation and promotion of their best interests, and to whom they look for examples of magnanimity, let me in the most earnest manner urge the propriety, nay, the indispensable necessity of sacrificing, at this important period, all party feelings, animosities, prejudices and distinctions, upon the altar of our country; and of giving your prompt and united support to every measure which may seem calculated to strengthen and invigorate the arm of the nation, as the surest means of bringing the war to an honorable conclusion.

Having ever entertained the opinion that there were no grounds for the presumption that this state would be exempt from the incursions of the enemy, and believing, after the wanton destruction of some small towns to the north, that in the event of an attack, either by predatory parties or armaments from the British squadron on the coast upon either of our towns, a similar fate would await them, I deemed it my duty to remind the General Government of their defenceless and unprotected situation: And for that purpose I made a communication to the Secretary for the Department of War, early in the month of May last. In the same month I received an answer from him, wherein he stated that some general measures for the defence of the sea-board would in a few days be submitted to the National Legislature, and that in this arrangement the most vulnerable points of North-Carolina would be considered. Supposing it probable that before Congress would have gone through the discussion of, and adopted this general plan of defence, the injuries apprehended might be committed by the enemy; and moreover, knowing that the United States had gun-boats out of commission in our waters, and men at their command in this state sufficient for the occasion, I thought proper to address a letter to our Senators in Congress jointly, which, together with the papers accompanying it, presented to them a view, almost in detail, of the defenceless situation of our sea-port towns, requesting them to ascertain from the President whether some measures would not promptly be adopted for their protection. One of those gentlemen informed me that the Secretary of the Navy had promised to put five gun-boats in commission on our coast immediately;—that the Secretary at War had promised to order into service four companies of the Militia; and that upon the representation of the inability of the state to furnish ammunition, &c. he signified that it should be furnished by the U. States.

While I was in the daily expectation of receiving a communication from the general government upon this subject, the State was invaded. Information of that event reached me on the 17th of July by the mail and by express from Newbern.—From communications received from the Committee of Safety of that town, Major General Croom and Colonel Tisdale, I learned that the British had taken possession of Ocracock and Portsmouth, had landed and pitched tents for seven hundred men;—that their force consisted of one seventy-four, six frigates, two privateers, two schooners, a number of other smaller vessels, and from sixty to seventy barges, with a disposable force of two thousand five hundred infantry and marines, all under the command of Admiral Cockburn;—that they had captured the shipping in the harbour, among which were two private armed vessels; that they thought the circumstance of their having landed and pitched tents for so large a force as 700 men, indicated an intention of remaining there some time; and that an attack upon Newbern was expected as an event that would certainly take place. That place was represented as being without cannon, powder, and balls, and in short nearly every article and implement of war essential to its safety and protection; and I was requested in the most pressing manner to furnish them that aid which their situation demanded. I had reason to believe that all our towns on the Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and those to the south, were nearly in the same situation. As the State was destitute of munitions of war, and had but a scanty supply of muskets and bayonets, the greater part of which had been so distributed (not having been placed in the hands of the detached militia in many instances) as to render it very questionable whether a useful portion of them could, seasonably, be collected at any given point, I felt myself not a little at a loss to ascertain that course best to be pursued under existing circumstances. The enemy's force being so much larger than was necessary to take possession of Ocracock and Portsmouth, and having brought with them such a large number of small vessels calculated to navigate the Pamlico and Albemarle sounds, seemed to favour the presumption that they had not effected their purpose, but that their intention was either to bring over the Swash to the sound by lightening them, a thing quite practicable, a number of those vessels with troops sufficient to lay waste all our towns situated on the navigable waters which empty themselves into those Sounds, or to reduce Beaufort and Wilmington.—At any event to attempt to repel them without powder, lead and flints, and with a scanty supply of suitable arms even admitting those other articles could be had, would seem to savour of extreme madness: And on the other hand to make no opposition, but to permit them to enter and let loose in our towns their brutal soldiery to perpetrate every species of horrible outrage upon the persons and property of their inhabitants, would be to fix an indelible stigma upon the character of the State.—Under such circumstances I resolved, although the last General Assembly had refused an appropriation for a supply of munitions of war, to purchase all the powder, lead, and flints for sale in this and in the neighbouring towns to be immediately conveyed to the most vulnerable points on

the sea-board.—To draw to those points all the State's arms that could speedily be conveyed to them, to endeavour to obtain the use and immediate distribution of a part of the arms belonging to the United States, which I had been informed were lying in Wilmington; and (relying much upon the exertions that would be made by individuals in procuring the necessary articles for their own defence) to call into service, in pursuance of an arrangement made with Major-General Pinkney in the month of November last, such portion of the militia drafts in the exigency seemed to require, to rendezvous forthwith at each of those vulnerable points. After all the orders necessary to effect those objects had been distributed, and after I had informed the General Government of the event through our Senators in Congress, on the morning of the 19th I left this city for Newbern, preceded by Major-General C. Jones, with a detachment from this city, who had marched the day before, and accompanied by Adjutant-General Williams, Col. Daniel, one of my aides de camp, and the Wake dragoons, under the command of Major Thomas Henderson. On my arrival in that town, I was informed that the enemy's squadron had sailed from Ocracock, though the course it had steered had not been ascertained. Every exertion had been made for the defence of Newbern, by Maj. Gen. Croom & Brigadier-Gen. Harby Smith, aided by the Committee of Safety, who had procured a handsome supply of powder and lead. In a few days after my arrival, a part of the ammunition which had been purchased by my direction, to be sent, and a respectable force of the militia, which had arrived and were organized under the command of Lieut. Col. Simon Bruton of the 2d regiment; some arms were received, and it was expected that Major General Brown, whose Headquarters were at Wilmington, would cause more to be transported from that place as soon as practicable. Those means of defence, strengthened by the local militia, who were held in readiness to march at a moment's warning, placed us in a situation to contend with the enemy, in the event of an attack, surpassing my expectations. I had the happiness to learn, that the greatest activity had been displayed by the militia, in marching to the defence of other points; at all of which, a larger supply of ammunition than was expected, had been obtained by some means or other.

After it was ascertained that the enemy's squadron had left our coast, all the troops were discharged except six companies; four of which were stationed at Deep-Water Point, under the command of Major John A. Cameron of the 4th regiment; an artillery company under the command of Captain Abner Pasteur, was stationed in Fort Hatteras, which had been evacuated by a company of United States Infantry, who acted in obedience to orders; and a company of Infantry in Beaufort. Two of those companies which were stationed at Deep-Water Point have since been discharged and a company of artillery has been ordered to Currituck Inlet.

Conscious of the indispensable necessity which existed, that an adequate defence of a permanent nature should be extended to our sea-board, before I left I visited all the inlets through which vessels of any burthen pass, with a view to place it in my power from actual observation, to form and recommend to the general Government some plan for their protection and defence. These points are Ocracock, Old Topsail, and Bogue inlets, to the north of Cape-Fear; and inlets at the mouth of Cape-Fear, to wit, Main and New Inlets. At Ocracock, on Beacon Island, there is an eligible and commanding site for a fort. Vessels sailing to the south, must approach this site almost in a direct line for more than a mile, and must pass within a few hundred yards of it. If a strong fortification was erected on it, and an adequate force stationed in it, not only the entrance of any number of vessels into the sound could be effectually prevented, but the shipping at anchor in the harbour could be protected. Such a work, the expense of which would be nothing when compared with its immense utility, aided by a few gun-boats or other armed vessels stationed at proper points in the sound, would afford great protection and security to almost the whole of the northern section of the State. Should the war be of long duration, we may reasonably suppose that the enemy will, if this inlet is unprotected, bring into our Sounds a number of small vessels, with a view to harass our towns, to arrest the trade now carrying on through those waters, and more especially, for the purpose of plundering from their abundant stores, the necessary supplies for the support of their fleet stationed on the coast.—A few small armed vessels, permanently stationed in those Sounds, would be adequate for these purposes. Should the probability of a visit of this nature be deemed as being very remote, it is to be presumed that a principle of economy alone, would dictate the propriety of defending this point, thereby, the necessity of calling out troops, which must be attended with considerable inconvenience and expense, to defend Newbern, Washington, and all the other towns on the navigable waters of those Sounds, whenever the enemy may appear off their inlet and threaten an attack, would be obviated. That some adequate measures should be immediately adopted for defence at that point, conceive to be important in every point of view.

At Old Topsail Inlet Fort Hampton is situated, for the defence of the Town and harbor of Beaufort, and on an eligible site to command the entrance up the ship channel. This fort, however, is nothing more than a parapet composed of shells and lime badly cemented, each end of which is connected with the barracks, in the rear by a wall about two feet thick. There are only six long eighteens mounted on a platform at the parapet, to fire en-barbette. Those guns were mounted on very low carriages, and in order that they might fire over the parapet, the platform had been raised within two feet of its top; consequently the men when managing them were exposed from about their knees up. Their situation would have been much more dangerous in an action than if they had been in an open plain, as much destruction might have been produced by the shells which the enemy's fire might scale from the top of the parapet. Conceiving that no time should be lost in making the necessary alterations, I instructed Captain Pasteur to have the carriages of the guns raised and the platform lowered, in such manner as that but few of the men in an engagement should be exposed. This place, with an inconsiderable sum compared with that already expended upon it, might be made a strong fortification. In the