

RALEIGH, (N. C.)

PRINTED, WEEKLY, BY ALEX. LUCAS.

Terms of subscription: Three dollars per year, one half to be paid in advance. No paper to be continued longer than three months after a year's subscription becomes due, and notice thereof shall have been given.

Advertisements, not exceeding 14 lines, are inserted three for one dollar, and for twenty-five cents each subsequent insertion; and in like proportion where there is a greater number of lines than fourteen.

American Intelligence.

OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS.

NEW-YORK, NOV. 28.

The following important documents were yesterday received by the Car of Neptune steam-boat.

Gen. Harrison was a passenger in the steam-boat, having left his army in winter quarters at Sackett's Harbor. Gen. Armstrong was a passenger in the steam-boat as far as Red Hook.

Com. Chauncey, with his fleet, having bro't over Gen. Harrison's army, will, it is said, lay up his vessels for the winter at Sackett's Harbor.

ALBANY ARGUS EXTRA.

Saturday morning, Nov. 27.

FROM GEN. WILKINSON TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Head-Quarters, French Mills, adjoining the Province of Lower Canada, November 16, 1813.

Sir—I beg leave to refer you to the journal which accompanies this letter for the particulars of the movements of the corps under my command down the St. Lawrence, and will endeavor to exert my enfeebled mind to detail to you the more striking and important incidents which have ensued my departure from Grenadier Island, at the foot of Lake Ontario, on the 2d inst.

The corps of the enemy from Kingston, which followed me, hung to my rear, and in consequence with a heavy galley and a few gun-boats, seemed determined to retard my progress. I was tempted to halt, turn about and put an end to his towing; but alas! I was confined to my bed: Maj. Gen. Lewis was too ill for any active exertion; and above all, I did not dare suffer myself to be diverted a single day from the prosecution of the views of government. I had written Maj. Gen. Hampton on the 6th inst. by his Adj. Gen. Col. King, and had ordered him to form a junction with me on the St. Lawrence, which I expected would take place on the 9th or 10th. It would have been unpardonable had I lost sight of this object a moment, as I deemed it of vital importance to the issue of the campaign.

The enemy deserve credit for their zeal and intelligence, which the active universal hostility of the male inhabitants of the country enabled them to employ to the greatest advantage. Thus while menaced by a respectable force in rear, the coast was lined by musquetry in front, at every critical pass of the river, which obliged me to march a detachment; and this impeded my progress.

On the evening of the 9th inst. the army halted a few miles from the head of the Longue Saut. In the morning of the 10th, the enclosed order was issued. Gen. Brown marched agreeably to order, and about noon we were apprized, by the report of his artillery, that he was engaged some distance below us. At the same time the enemy were observed in our rear, and their galley and gun-boats approached our flotilla, and opened a fire upon us, which obliged me to order a battery of 48 pounders to be planted, and a shot from it compelled the vessels of the enemy to retire, together with their troops, after some firing between the advanced parties. But by this time, in consequence of disembarking and re-embarking the heavy guns, the day was so far spent, that our pilots did not dare enter the Saut, (eight miles a continued rapid) and therefore we fell down about two miles and came to for the night. Early the next morning every thing was in readiness for motion; but having received no intelligence from General Brown, I was still delayed, as sound caution prescribed I should learn the result of his affair, before I committed the flotilla to the Saut.

At half past ten o'clock, A. M. an officer of dragoons arrived with a letter, in which the Gen. informed me he had forced the enemy, and would reach the foot of the Saut early in the day. Orders were immediately given for the flotilla to sail, at which instant the enemy's gun boats appeared, and began to throw shot among us. Information was brought me at the same time, from Brig. Gen. Boyd, that the enemy's troops were advancing in column. I immediately sent orders to him to attack them; this report was soon contradicted. Their gun-boats however continued to scratch us, and a variety of reports of their movements and counter-movements were brought to me in succession; which convinced me of their determination to hazard an attack, when it could be done to the greatest advantage, and therefore I resolved to anticipate them. Directions were accordingly sent, by that distinguished officer Col. Swift of the engineers, to Brig. Gen. Boyd, to throw the detachments of his command, assigned to him in the order of the preceding day, and composed of men of his own, Covington's and Swartwout's brigades, into three columns, to march upon the enemy, out flank them if possible, and take their artillery. The action soon commenced with the advanced body of the enemy, and became extremely sharp and galling; and with occasional pauses, sustained with great vivacity, in open space and fair combat, upwards of two and a half hours—the ad-

verse lines alternately yielding and advancing. It is impossible to say with accuracy what was our number on the field, because it consisted of indefinite detachments taken from the boats to render safe the passage of the Saut. Gens. Covington and Swartwout voluntarily took part in the action, at the head of detachments from their respective brigades, and exhibited the same courage that was displayed by Brig. Gen. Boyd, who happened to be the senior officer on the ground. Our force engaged might have reached sixteen or seventeen hundred men but actually did not exceed eighteen hundred; that of the enemy was estimated from twelve hundred to two thousand, but did not probably amount to more than fifteen or sixteen hundred—consisting, as I am informed, of detachments from the 49th, 84th and 104th regiments of the line—with three companies of the Voltigeur and Glengary corps, and the militia of the country, who are not included in the estimate.

It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to give you a detailed account of this affair, which certainly reflects high honor on the valor of the American soldier, as no examples can be produced of undisciplined men, with inexperienced officers, braving a fire of two hours and a half, without quitting the field or yielding to their antagonists. But, Sir, the information I now give you, is derived from officers of my confidence, who took active parts in this conflict; for though I was enabled to order the attack, it was my hard fortune not to be able to lead the troops I commanded. The disease with which I was assailed on the 2d of September, on my journey to Fort George, having with a few short intervals of convalescence, preyed on me ever since, and at the moment of this action, I was confined to my bed and emaciated almost to a skeleton, unable to sit on my horse or to move ten paces without assistance.

I must, however, be pardoned for trespassing on your time a few remarks in relation to the affair. The objects of the British and American commanders were precisely opposed—the last being bound by the instructions of his government and the most solemn obligations of duty, to precipitate his descent of the St. Lawrence by every practicable means—because, this being effected, one of the greatest difficulties opposed to the American arms would be surmounted; and the first, by duties equally imperious, to retard and if possible prevent such a descent. He is to be accounted victorious who effected his purpose. The British commander having failed to gain either of his objects, can lay no claim to the honor of the day. The battle fluctuated and triumph seemed, at different times, inclined to the contending corps. The front of the enemy were at first forced back more than a mile, and they never regained the ground they lost, their stand was permanent and their charges resolute. Amidst these charges and near the close of the contest, we lost a field piece by the fall of the officer who was serving it with the same coolness as if he had been at parade or review. This was Lieut. Smith of the Light Artillery, who, in point of merit, stood at the head of his grade. The enemy having halted and our troops being again formed, in battalion front to front, and the firing having ceased on both sides, we resumed our position on the bank of the river, and the infantry being much fatigued, the whole were re-embarked and proceeded down the river without further annoyance from the enemy or their gun-boats, while the dragoons with five pieces of light artillery, marched down the Canada shore without molestation.

It is due to his rank, to his worth and his services, that I should make particular mention of Brigadier General Covington, who received a mortal wound directly through the body, while animating his men and leading them to the charge.—He fell, where he fought, at the head of his men, and survived but two days.

The next morning the flotilla passed through the Saut and joined that excellent officer Brig. Gen. Brown, at Barnhart's near Cornwall, where he had been instructed to take post and wait my arrival, and where I confidently expected to hear of Major General Hampton's arrival on the opposite shore. But immediately after I halted, Colonel Atkinson, the Inspector General of the division under Major General Hampton, waited on me with a letter from that officer, in which, to my unspeakable mortification and surprize, he declined the junction ordered, and informed me he was marching towards Lake Champlain by way of co-operating in the proposed attack on Montreal. This letter, together with a copy of that to which it is an answer, were immediately submitted to a council of war, composed of my general officers and Colonel commanding the Elite, the chief Engineer and the Adjutant General, who unanimously gave it as their opinion, that "the attack on Montreal should be abandoned for the present season and the army near Cornwall should be immediately crossed to the American shore for taking up winter quarters, and that this place afforded an eligible position for such quarters."

I acquiesced in these opinions, not from the shortness of the stock of provisions (which had been reduced by the act of God) because that of our meat had been increased 5 days, and our bread had been reduced only 2 days, and because we could, in case of extremity, have lived on the enemy—but because the loss of the division under Major Gen. Hampton weakened my force too sensibly to justify the attempt. In all my measures and movements of moment, I have taken the opinion of my

general officers, which have been in accord with my own.

I remained on the Canada shore until the next day, without seeing or hearing from the powerful force of the enemy in our neighborhood, and the same day reached this position with the artillery and infantry. The dragoons have been ordered to Utica and its vicinity, and I expect are 50 or 60 miles on the march.

You have under cover a summary abstract of the killed & wounded in the affair of the 11th inst. which shall soon be followed by a particular return, in which a just regard will be paid to individual merits. The dead rest in honor, and the wounded bleed for their country and deserve its gratitude.

With perfect respect, &c.
(Signed) JAMES WILKINSON.

Extract of a Letter of the 15th Nov. from Gen. Wilkinson.

"It is a fact, for which I am authorized to pledge myself on the most confidential authority, that on the 4th of the present month, the British garrison of Montreal consisted solely of 400 marines and 200 sailors, which had been sent up from Quebec. We have, with the provision here and that left at Chateaugay, about 10 day's subsistence, to which I shall add 30 more."

Gen. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.

From Gen. Wilkinson to Gen. Hampton.

Head-Quarters of the army, 7 miles above Ogdensburgh, Nov. 6th. 1813, (on the evening)

Sir—I address you at the special instance of the Secretary of War, who by bad roads, worse weather and ill health, was diverted from meeting me near this place, and determined to tread back his steps to Washington from Antwerp on the 29th inst.

I am destined to and determined on the attack of Montreal, if not prevented by some act of God; and to give security to the enterprise, the division under your command must co-operate with the corps under my immediate orders. The point of rendezvous is a circumstance of the greatest interest to the issue of this operation, and the distance which separates us, and my ignorance of the practicability of the direct or devious roads or routs by which you must march, make it necessary that your own judgment should determine the point. To assist you in making the soundest determination, and to take the most prompt and effectual measures, I can only inform you of my intentions and situation in some respects of the first importance. I shall pass Prescott to night, because the stage of the season will not allow me three days to take it, shall cross the cavalry at Hamilton, which will not require a day. I shall thence press forward and break down every obstruction on this river to Grand river, there to cross the Parrot, and with my scows to bridge the narrow inner channel, and thus obtain foothold on Montreal Island at about 20 miles from the city; after which our artillery, bayonets and swords must secure our triumph or provide us honorable graves.

Inclosed you have a memorandum of field and battering train, pretty well found in fixed ammunition, which may enable you to dismiss your own. But we are deficient in loose powder and musket cartridges, and therefore hope you may be abundantly found.

On the subject of provisions, I wish I could give a favorable information. Our whole stock of bread may be computed at about 15 days, and our meat at twenty. In speaking on this subject to the Secretary of War, he informed me ample magazines were laid up on lake Champlain, and therefore I must request of you to order forward two or three months' supply by the safest route, in a direction to the proposed scene of action. I have submitted the state of our provisions to my general officers, who unanimously agree that it should not prevent the progress of the expedition. And they also agree in opinion that if you are not in force to face the enemy, you should meet us at St. Regis or its vicinity.

I shall expect to hear from if not see you at that place on the 19th.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient humble servant.
(Signed) J. A. WILKINSON.

Major General Hampton.

FROM GEN. HAMPTON TO GEN. WILKINSON.

Head-Quarters, Four Corners, November 8th, 1813.

Sir—I had the honor to receive, at a late hour last evening, by Col. King, your communication of the 6th, and was deeply impressed with the sense of responsibility it imposed of deciding upon the means of co-operation. The idea suggested as the opinion of your officers, of effecting the junction at Saint Regis, was most pleasing, as being most immediate, until I came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provisions. Col. Atkinson will explain the reasons that would have rendered it impossible for me to have brought more than each man could have carried on his back, and when I reflected that in throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, I did not hesitate to adopt the opinion, after consulting the general and principal officers, that by throwing myself back on my main depot, when all the means of transportation had gone and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from Plattsburgh to Coghawa, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success, than by the

junction at St. Regis. The way is in many places blockaded and abated, and the road impracticable for wheel carriages during winter—but by the employment of pack horses, if I am not overpowered, I hope to be able to prevent your starving. I have ascertained and witnessed that the plan of the enemy is to consume every thing in our advance.—My troops and other means will be described to you by Col. Atkinson. Besides the rawness and sickness; they have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign, in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off; but upon this subject I must refer you to Col. Atkinson.

With these means, what can be accomplished by human exertion, I will attempt—with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant.

(Signed) W. HAMPTON.

His Ex. Maj. Gen. James Wilkinson.

GEN. WILKINSON TO GEN. ARMSTRONG.

Head-Quarters, French Mills, Nov. 18, 1813.

Sir—I beg this may be considered as an appendage to my official communication respecting the action of the 11th instant. I last evening received the enclosed information, the result of the examination of sundry prisoners taken on the field of battle, which justifies the opinion of the surviving general officers who were in the engagement.—This goes to prove, that although the imperious obligations of duty did not allow me sufficient time to rout the enemy, they were beaten—the accidental loss of one field piece notwithstanding, after it had been discharged fifteen or twenty times. I have also learned, from what is considered good authority, but I will not vouch for the correctness of it, that the enemy's loss exceeded five hundred killed and wounded. The enclosed report will correct an error in my former communication—as it appears it was the 89th, and not the 84th British regiment which was engaged on the 11th. I beg leave to mention, relative to the action of the 11th, what from my extreme indisposition, I have omitted. Having received information late in the day, that the contest had become somewhat dubious, I ordered up a reserve of six hundred men, whom I had directed to stand by their arms under Lt. Col. Upham, who gallantly led them into the action, which terminated a few minutes after their arrival on the ground.

With much consideration, and respect, I have the honor to be, sir,

Your obt. humble servant,

J. A. WILKINSON.

The Hon. John Armstrong Sec'y at War.

Statement of the strength of the enemy in the action of the 11th Nov. 1813, on Kesler's Field in Williamsborough, in Upper Canada—founded on the separate examination of a number of British prisoners taken on the field of battle.

Of the 89th regt.	760
49th do	450
Voltigeurs	270
Glengary's	80 one company a day
Of the 100th	40 detachment from Prescott
Canadian fencibles	220
Indians	40
Incorporated militia	300
	2170

Four pieces of mounted artillery; and seven gun-boats, one mounting a 24 pounder.

I certify that the above statement is correct, agreeably to the statement of the above mentioned prisoners.

(Signed) J. JOHNSON,

Inspector Gen. 2d Division

Head-Quarters, French Mills, Nov. 16, 1813.

WESTERN FRONTIER.

ST. LOUIS, OCT. 30.

The capture of the British fleet on lake Erie, and the consequent fall of fort Amherstburg, Detroit, &c. &c. are events which will be more appreciated in this territory and Illinois, than at any other point from the Mississippi to the Pennsylvania line.

The trade with the Indians by the rivers and lakes was as undisturbed to the British as if peace existed in that quarter; and such a degree of security had the north west company lulled themselves into, that seven of their boats loaded with merchandize had arrived last July at Prairie du Chem, for the St. Peters, and other waters which empty into the Mississippi; among these was only one small barge on government account which contained a few presents for the Indians.

Gen. Proctor's plan was to make his issues of presents at or near Detroit, so as to be able to command the services of the warriors in that vicinity; he permitted a small portion to be distributed among the savages of Rock river, with the injunction that they should harass the settlements of this territory and Illinois; by this arrangement the Indians of the Illinois were totally neglected.—Main Poque had got all the recruits he could possibly muster on this side lake Michigan; he had embarked his fortune with Proctor, and left Gomo and the lesser chiefs to contend with the settlements on the Mississippi, with what success the events of last year have already shown.

To the neglect of the Mississippi and Illinois Indians by the British we may attribute the safety of these Territories; the few rangers who were spread over a widely extended frontier could not arrest the progress a ferocious