

The latter it seems was the General's choice; but necessity compelled him to do otherwise. He accordingly orders an attack by detachments, about 1500 to go on shore and take 2100 of the enemy. This was a good one; after about 2 hours hard fighting, and the contest doubtful, Colonel Upham was sent with about 600 men, who got there just in time to see their fellows retreating, leaving their dead and wounded on the field of battle. Yet notwithstanding all this the Gen. asserts that the American army were victorious. Let us see how he proves it—first, the object of the British and American commanders were precisely opposed, or to make plain English of it, two armies fought in opposition to each other; and these are the reasons which the Gen. gives you why they fought—1st, the British attacked the Americans because they were on their way to Montreal, and meant to impede their passage; and the Americans reluctantly defended themselves, I say reluctantly for this reason, that the Gen. was in great haste to advance and did not like this un-civil "teazing" and "scratching"—these are the General's premises; now for his deductions; our men that were able to run jumped into the boats leaving their dead and wounded on the field of battle, with one piece of artillery, and by the force of oars were able to gain the American shore. Hence you are compelled to adopt this ridiculous conclusion, that because those that were not killed or wounded were able to run to their boats it necessarily follows that the Americans obtained a victory. I wish here to be expressly understood that I mean no censure upon American troops, for I verily believe that with skillful generals they will do honor to their country.

Being unacquainted with military tactics and feeling no confidence in my opinion, it is with some diffidence that I ask the question why Gen. Wilkinson did not send a force that would ensure the capture of this "teazing" and "scratching" party, and particularly after he found that he must fight them, why, as he was in great haste, did he not despatch a force sufficient in number to ensure speed as well as success to the enterprise? I admit that these are points that ought to be discussed and decided by those skilled in military science; and I shall not on this occasion undertake to comment upon them; but shall proceed to follow the General in his governmental expedition. This battle being ended, his troops collected, he proceeded down the river, and the next day (the 12th) joined the detachment under Gen. Brown, having sustained a loss of not more than 350 men. Here after mature deliberation he determines to go into winter quarters, not for want of provision, he says expressly, but because he was disappointed in not meeting General Hampton on the opposite shore, as he was ordered—how ordered, I would ask, let us examine his letter to General Hampton of the 6th November. After stating a number of reasons why he submits the points of junction to Gen. Hampton's "own judgment," but intimates that if Gen. Hampton is not strong enough to face the enemy, then he must meet him at St. Regis, or its vicinity—hence, the junction at St. Regis was to depend in the first place upon the weakness of General Hampton's force, & on this point, Gen. Hampton must exercise his discretion; and it would have been the height of injustice not only to himself, but to the troops under his command, had he decided that he was too weak to face the enemy; what then was this disappointment? had he met Hampton on the opposite shore, it would have been evidence of his weakness; and as Gen. Wilkinson did not have that evidence of his weakness, this "government expedition" was given up—Let it be remarked, that this circumstance, says Gen. Wilkinson, "weakened my force too sensibly to hazard the attempt;" and yet, in his letter to the secretary of war written the day before, he rotundly asserts, that the enemy's force at Montreal was 600. In the first place, I say, Gen. Wilkinson had no right to expect that Gen. Hampton would have met him at St. Regis, because he had put it upon the contingency of Gen. Hampton's inability to face the enemy. Again, he had no right to expect him on another ground; the secretary of war had informed Gen. Wilkinson, that the provisions were on Lake Champlain; and when he directed Gen. Hampton to provide both armies with provisions, he must have known, that it would have taken at least twenty days to have earned them at that season of the year from Lake Champlain to St. Regis; the distance is greater, and for the most part of the way, the road infinitely worse than the direct route to Montreal or Cognawaga—hence, I assert, that Gen. Wilkinson was not, or at least he ought not to have been disappointed in not meeting Gen. Hampton at St. Regis. When I wrote the communication that was published in the Register of the 23d inst, I had not seen any of the correspondence between the two generals; and it gives me much pleasure that the statement which were mostly conjectural and founded upon an assemblage of circumstances, bear a precise correspondence with the facts since disclosed. I would now ask, how long is the patience of Americans to be trifled with?—When are our injuries to be redressed? Is it not enough that our national rights are violated with impunity?—That our commerce is destroyed? Our country invaded? Our cities and towns burnt? Taxes overwhelping us? Must we then be branded with disgrace? Come forth ye cabinet secret-keepers, let us know the causes of all these shameful disasters! Are you afraid to take Canada lest it might create a preponderating influence against the Virginia dynasty? Is there a secret understanding between you and the commander of our armies on that subject? If you have not love of country enough, to tell the truth, permit me to appeal to the general's Truth and frankness are the distinguishing traits in the character of a soldier; tell us I beseech you, ye guardians of our lives, rights and liberties, why and wherefore have not our wrongs been redressed? Why has not the enemy been made to feel the energy of American valor? If you have cowardice among you, point

them out, expose them to the vengeance of honest indignation; in so doing, you will receive the thanks of a grateful people, and much oblige
A MILITIA SOLDIER.

On the 15th of November, Gen. Wilkinson asserts upon the most unquestionable authority, that Montreal was guarded by only 6000 men. Alas! did you ever see a whale.

Sketches of Debate.

DEBATE

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LATE ADDRESS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

In Senate, Tuesday, Nov. 26.

Mr. Clark moved that the report, (heretofore inserted as amended) be indefinitely postponed. Should this motion be agreed to, he said he was prepared to hand in an address, to the President, in room of the one now on the table.

Mr. Murphy hoped the gentleman from Edgecombe would state to the house the reasons upon which he founded his motion.

Mr. Clark said he would do so if the gentleman would give him the floor. He had hoped not to have been compelled to enter into an exposition of the report and address of the committee; but as he was thus called upon he would not shrink from the task. Gentlemen had heretofore asked for a recommitment, that they might present to the house such a report as should contain the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. But now that they had again brought forward this ranting, (though from the length of time it had been in the nursery it scarcely deserved the denomination) he would ask the senate if it appeared in that perfect and correct shape which might have been expected? He thought it did not.

The first position assumed by the committee in their report was "that the constitution, having vested in the general government the right to declare war, had imposed it as a solemn duty upon that government to provide for the general defence of the union." The correctness of this he very cheerfully admitted, and would proceed to the next assertion in the report.

"North-Carolina being an important member of the confederacy, with a sea-coast presenting but few vulnerable points, and those capable of being placed at little expense in a state of safety against the enemy, confidently expected that no time would be lost by the general government in giving to these vulnerable points an efficient defence. In this expectation we continued until the enemy invaded our territory. At that period of danger and alarm the state had to depend upon her own efforts." Mr. C. would call the attention of gentlemen to the words "her own efforts," and he would then ask, Is this "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?" During the invasion was there not one company of regular troops stationed at Fort Hampton and another at Fort Johnston? There certainly was. He himself saw, after the British had left our waters, one of those companies on their march to the frontiers. They had been in the performance of garrison duty, and were forced to remain at the fort until relieved by a company of militia, subsequent to the time of the invasion.—The complaint, then, that "during the period of the invasion we were left to our own efforts," was unfounded, and did not contain the truth.

The next assertion was that "the general government had provided no adequate means either of protection or defence, and had withdrawn most of those which were found upon our coast at the first moment of danger." How ever much it may be regretted it is certainly undeniable, that in a great confederacy, like that of the United States, it must be impossible for the general government to extend adequate means of protection to every point. At the commencement of a contest with any nation we must always have some parts more exposed than others; and however much it might be wished, that we might be every where prepared, it could not be the case even if we held back for years. To defend the whole coast of N. Carolina would require fortifications for at least one hundred miles in extent. For instance, Albemarle sound is separated from the ocean by narrow strips of sand; but there are various inlets through which the barges of the enemy might enter; and this, too, although every point mentioned in the governor's message should be defended. No, sir, said Mr. Clark, if you had waited until you were every where in a complete state of preparation, you would have waited until the cup of humiliation and bitterness was drunk to the very dregs. He thought it unjust and ungenerous to complain of the general government for not doing what was not in her power to do. Particularly as it was well known to be the duty of the government first to provide for the defence of those states which were the most exposed. It certainly was not for us, who were the least exposed, to be the first to complain.

The next assertion was "that the gun boats which were in commission when the war was declared were laid up in ordinary." This, not being in possession of the facts, he would not deny; but the committee went on to assert that "a company of regulars, that garrisoned Fort Hampton had been sent beyond the limits of the state." The impression which appeared to be conveyed, here, although not in terms, was that the garrison of Fort Hampton had been sent just beyond the borders of this state for the purpose of being employed in the defence of some one adjacent. Now why not state the whole truth? The fact was those very men were under General Hampton, in Canada, fighting the battles of their country. He would ask what were the 100,000 militia called into the service of the United States, to do, if they could not be employed in the performance of garrison duty. They had been tried, and refused to cross the lines. They were therefore useless on the frontiers; except indeed the western militia who had fought like heroes and set an eminent example, worthy of being followed.

We have it next asserted, "that the repre-

sentations of his excellency the governor have been treated with indifference and neglect." He could not undertake to say that this was not the whole truth, because he had not been able to find time for the examination of all the documents connected with the subject. It had been asserted on the floor that the communications of his excellency were suffered to remain a long time in the war office without reply, and that the answers which at length arrived were written by a sub-clerk in the department. There was certainly a great disparity between the two officers; but if he was not mistaken, at the time the correspondence took place, the head of the department was at the frontiers. If that were the case; it was not astonishing that a sub-clerk should answer his excellency's communications; nor could it be fairly construed into a mark of indifference or neglect.

The committee then state "that no forts have been erected." This he would not deny; but were there not gentlemen within the hearing of his voice who knew that a fortification had been commenced at Beacon Island, under the administration of Mr. Adams; and that it had been discontinued from the representations of persons who were supposed to have weight with the administration. It was then said that a fort at that spot, which is now so highly recommended, could only protect Shell-Castle, and that it was not therefore intended to defend Newbern, Edenton, Washington &c. but to benefit an individual. Upon these suggestions it had been abandoned. So that if no fortifications had been erected, the fault was in a great measure to be attributed to our own citizens.

The next position assumed was, "that no vessels of war had been stationed in our waters." What did gentlemen mean by this? Did they mean 20-gun ships, frigates, or 74's? If these could get into our waters any where it was only at Wilmington; and he much doubted whether they could be even there employed with advantage. He could hardly suppose that common revenue cutters or tenders were meant; because government had very few of them. He must suppose, then, that those ever disposed things, those floating batteries, the so much ridiculed gun-boats, were meant. When there was no prospect of their being wanted, these vessels were generally laid up in ordinary; and when the moment they promised to be of service arrived, unfortunately the enemy had a superior force, and government had not the power to despatch them to our assistance. It might be asked, however, why had they not been sent before the blockade? He would merely rejoin that it became the duty of government to give its first attention to places of the greatest importance. It was certainly more important to defend Philadelphia and New-York, than Newbern and Wilmington; and it was proper that Norfolk should receive greater attention than Ocracoke. But it has been said that these vessels might have been constructed here, that they might have been built within our own waters. True. But the resources of government were inadequate, to meet all these demands upon the public purse. Their task at this time is not an easy one, said Mr. Clark; more especially as they have to tug against a powerful opposition in New-England and elsewhere. Too much ought not to be expected from them; for being neither omnipresent nor omnipotent, they cannot be expected to see every thing and control every thing.

The next complaint was, that "no regular troops had been stationed upon our coast; except one company of artillery at Fort Johnston." Had such an assertion been made by men who were ignorant of common occurrences, it would not have been matter of surprize. But when it came from the able committee, who had made the report, he was perfectly astonished. Able, he very freely acknowledged them to be; nor did he believe that another committee of equal talents could be selected from the two houses. He would ask, then, if this assertion contained "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;" and if no regular troops except one company of artillery had been found stationed upon our sea-coast? Had there not been a company stationed at Fort Hampton for nearly nine months? And did not Captain Copeland's company of infantry remain the same length of time at Fort Johnston? They certainly did; and when they were ordered away, the company of artillery now there, arrived to supply their place. Thus instead of only one company, it could not be denied that since the war three companies exclusive of small detachments had been stationed on our coast. The assertion, therefore of the committee could not be taken for "the whole truth."

The report then goes on to state that "the detached militia called into the service of the United States, have been much neglected. They have been furnished with but few tents to protect them from the inclemencies of the weather; many of them have perished; from the want of medical and hospital stores to resist the diseases of a sickly climate, and the survivors of them have been required to perform ordinary garrison duty." That the militia had to perform ordinary garrison duty, and that they were ill provided with tents and hospital stores, Mr. Clarke said he should not deny, but if it were meant to impeach the disposition of the general government to make the necessary provision for the men called into its service, he must give it a positive contradiction. Was the circumstance to be accounted for in no other way? It unfortunately was the case, that the President of the United States, was generally compelled to trust to the recommendations of others in favor of those appointed to offices in the army. This he did not mention to reproach any one; or to derogate from the merits of deserving men. The result, however, was, that many had obtained commissions in the army who might much better have been left at home. He would ask if it was to be supposed, that officers, whatever might be their military capacities, could at first understand all the complicated duties of a camp? Many of them he was convinced could neither make out a pay roll, a muster roll, nor an inspection return, much less

would they be able immediately to ascertain the various channels thro which applications were to be made for articles of primary importance. One fact which had come within his own knowledge, he would relate to the senate. When lately in Newbern he had become acquainted with an officer of the army, (Major W.) holding, as Mr. Clark believed, the office of Assistant Inspector General, who was on his way to inspect the troops stationed at Fort Hampton. A Lieutenant there had made great complaints, that the men had received no pay, and were in a distressed situation for want of clothes. The blame was attributed to the general government, and many people were loud in their censure. He at first fell into the same train of reasoning, and thought there must be some strange neglect some where. On more minute enquiry into the fact, Major W. informed him that the delay was occasioned solely by the officer commanding having made his returns, not to Major General Pinkney as he ought to have done, but to General Jones of this city. Mr. Clark said that from this, and other circumstances which had come to his knowledge, he could undertake to assert as a fact, that the reason many of the troops had not been paid off, was because the proper returns and timely requisitions had not been made to the regular officers for receiving them. In how many instances this was the case, he could not undertake to say; but he had under his eye gentlemen who could bear him out in the assertion, that many returns, instead of being forwarded to the proper United States' officer, were made to the Adjutant General of this State. The governor himself had informed him of this fact. Hence he could not but believe, and he thought the senate would be impressed with the correctness of the opinion, that the delay in the payment of the troops and the furnishing of the necessary stores and supplies was chiefly to be attributed to the ignorance of the officers, commanding detachments of militia, as to the proper places where application was to be made for them. He had every reason to believe, that whenever application was made in the right quarter, it was properly attended to. It would therefore be extremely improper to censure the General Government, on account of charges which were evidently exaggerated, if not entirely unfounded.

We are next told, said Mr. Clarke, "that many hundreds of regular troops have been voluntarily enlisted in this state, and that, instead of sending those troops or a part thereof, to the defence of our sea coast or the relief of our militia in service, the general government has sent them elsewhere. Was this the truth, and nothing but the truth?" Were there not regular troops enlisted in this state, employed in the defence of the coast? Where had Capt. Bryan's company been raised. In Halifax, Edgecombe and the adjoining counties. Where did Capt. Copeland recruit his men? In Pasquotank, Perquimons, Chowan, &c. These troops had been sent to the coast; and some of them had remained there to his knowledge about nine months. Capt. Copeland's men had not been removed until another regular company had arrived to supply their place; and had the other been marched, until their station was supplied by the militia ordered into the service of the United States. Was it proper, then, was it candid or generous for gentlemen to come forward and palm upon the senate, as facts, things which were really not facts, and which were unsupported by any chain of evidence? He would not undertake to say that the general government had exerted itself greatly in our behalf, or that it had sent us such assistance, but let not gentlemen assert that which had no foundation in truth.

The report next stated, "that at the moment when the Secretary of State for the United States was appraising General Pinkney of the sailing of the enemy's armament from Halifax, and that its probable destination was to the southern States, the regular troops which had been in cantonment at Salisbury were under marching orders, and have since marched beyond the limits of the state." He saw in this nothing to prove that the President had been negligent of his duty. He had it from authority on which he could fully rely, that these troops had been under marching orders ever since August last. Was it then to have been presumed that these troops, which had been under marching orders in August, were still, so late as the last of October, in their cantonment at Salisbury? It was not. Having mentioned this circumstance to an officer of the third regiment, he expressed his surprize, and observed, that on a late occasion, when that regiment received orders to proceed from New-Orleans, they were in three days, with arms and ammunition and baggage, plying in their boats along the Mississippi.—The calculation of the general government then must have been, that in October the troops which had been at Salisbury were on their road to the northern frontier.

Another assertion contained in the report was, that "although North-Carolina had furnished almost as many regular troops to the U. States as any other state in the union, none of them had been employed in her defence." He did not know how the first of these positions was to be established. No calculation or documents were adduced to support it; and as to the other, that none of the troops raised in the state had been employed in its defence, he thought he had shewn it to be a most unfortunate position, which could not be substantiated. It had, however, been dwelt upon with great emphasis, that our troops were compelled to perform garrison duty. He was really astonished to hear language of this kind. What duty were they to perform, if they were not to be employed within the limits of their own state? They had been tried and would not cross the lines. If, then, they could not be taken out of our limits; if they were not to perform garrison duty; and if the interior of the country never was invaded, how, he demanded, could the militia ever be brought within reach of the enemy?—They were certainly called into the