

# The Raleigh Minerva.

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## RALEIGH (N. C.)

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## Domestic.

### OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

Copy of a letter from Mr. Monroe to Sir Alex. Cochrane, Vice Admiral, &c. &c.

Department of State, Sept. 6, 1814.

SIR—I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th of August, stating, that having been called on by the Governor General of Canada, to aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation against the inhabitants of the United States, for the wanton desolation committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has become your duty, conformably with the nature of the Governor General's application, to issue to the naval force under your command, in order to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found available.

It is seen with the greatest surprise, that this system of devastation which has been practised by the British forces, so manifestly contrary to the usage of civilized warfare, is placed by you on the ground of retaliation. No sooner were the United States compelled to resort to war against Great Britain, than they resolved to wage it in a manner most consonant to the principles of humanity, and to those friendly relations which it was desirable to preserve between the two nations, after the restoration of peace. They perceived however with the deepest regret that a spirit alike just and humane was neither cherished nor acted on by your Government. Such an assertion would not be hazardous, if it was not supported by facts, the proof of which has perhaps already carried the same conviction to other nations that it has to the people of these states. Without dwelling on the deplorable cruelties committed by the Savages in the British ranks, and in British pay, on American prisoners at the River Raisin, which to this day have never been disavowed or atoned, I refer, as more immediately connected with the subject of your letter, to the wanton desolation that was committed at Havre-de-Grace, and at George Town, early in the Spring 1813. These villages were burnt and ravaged by the naval forces of Great Britain, to the ruin of their unarmed inhabitants, who saw with astonishment that they derived no protection to their property from the laws of war. During the same season, scenes of invasion and pillage, carried on under the same authority, were witnessed all along the waters of the Chesapeake, to an extent inflicting the most serious private distress, and under circumstances, that justified the suspicion, that revenge and cupidity, rather than the manly motives that should dictate the hostility of a high minded foe, led to their perpetration. The late destruction of the Houses of the Government in this City is another act which comes necessarily into view. In the wars of modern Europe, no examples, of the kind, even among nations the most hostile to each other, can be traced. In the course of ten years past, the Capitals of the principal powers of the Continent of Europe have been conquered, and occupied alternately by the victorious armies of each other, and no instance of such wanton and unjustifiable destruction has been seen. We must go back to distant and barbarous ages, to find a parallel for the acts of which I complain.

Altho' these acts of desolation invited, if they did not impose on the Government, the necessity of retaliation, yet in no instance has it been authorised. The burning of Newark in Upper Canada, posterior to the early outrages above enumerated, was not executed on that principle. The burning of Newark adjoining Fort George, and its destruction, was justified by the officer who ordered it, on the ground that it became necessary in the military operations there. The act however was disavowed by the Government. The burning which took place at Long Point was unauthorised by the Government, and the conduct of the officer subjected to the investigation of a military tribunal. For the burning at St. David's, committed by stragglers, the officer who commanded in that quarter was dismissed without a trial, for not preventing it.

I am commanded by the President distinctly to state, that it is little comports with any orders which have been issued to the military and naval commanders of the United States, as it does with the established and known humanity of the American nation, to pursue a system which it appears you have adopted. This Government owes it to itself, to the principles which it has ever held sacred, to disavow, as justly chargeable to it, any such wanton, cruel and unjustifiable warfare.

Whatever unauthorised irregularity may have been committed by any of its troops, it would have been ready, acting on these principles of sacred and eternal obligation, to disavow, and, as far as might be practicable, to repair. But in the plan of desolating warfare which your letter so explicitly makes known, and which is attempted to be excused on a plea so utterly groundless, the President perceives a spirit of deep rooted hostility, which, without the evidence of such facts, he could not have believed existed, or would have been carried to such an extremity.

For the reparation of injuries, of whatever nature they may be, not sanctioned by the law of nations, which the military or naval force of either power may have committed, against the other, this government will always be ready to make reciprocal arrangements. It is presumed that your government will neither expect nor propose any which are not reciprocal.

Should your government adhere to a system of desolation, so contrary to the views and practice of the United States, so revolting to humanity, and repugnant to the sentiments and usages of the civilized world, whilst it will be seen with the deepest regret, it must and will be met with a determination and constancy becoming a free people, contending in a just cause for their essential rights, and their dearest interests.

I have the honor to be, with great consideration, sir, your most obedient humble servant,  
(Signed) JAS. MONROE

Vice-Adm. Sir Alex. Cochrane,  
Commander in Chief of H. B.  
Majesty's ships and vessels, &c.

### ADM. TINGEY'S REPORT.

Extract of a letter from Com. Tingey to the Secretary of the Navy, dated

Navy-Yard, Washington, 27th Aug. 1814.

SIR—After receiving your order of the 24th, directing the public shipping, stores, &c. at this establishment, to be destroyed, in case of the defeat of our Army—no time was lost in making the necessary arrangements for firing the whole, and preparing boats for departing from the yard, as you had suggested.

About 4 P. M. I received a message by an officer from the Secretary of War, with information that he "could protect me no longer." Soon after this I was informed that the conflagration of the Eastern Branch bridge had commenced—and, in a few minutes, the explosion announced the blowing up of that part, near the "draw," as had been arranged in the morning.

The intended fate of the Yard had before been publicly announced to the neighbors, in order that they might take every possible precaution for the safety of themselves, families and property.

Immediately several individuals came in succession, endeavoring to prevail on me to deviate from my instruction—which they were invariably informed was unavailing unless they could bring me your instructions in writing, countermanding those previously given.

A deputation also of the most respectable women came on the same errand—when I found myself painfully necessitated to inform them, that, any farther importunities would cause the matches to be instantly applied to the trains—with assurance however that, if left at peace, I would delay the execution of the orders as long as I could feel the least shadow of justification. Captain Creighton's arrival at the Yard with the men who had been with him at the bridge, (probably about 5 o'clock) would have justified me in instant operation—but he also was strenuous in the desire to obviate the intended destruction; and volunteered to ride out, and gain me positive information as to the position of the enemy under the hope that our army might have rallied and repulsed them. I was myself indeed desirous of delay, for reason that the wind was then blowing fresh from the S. W. which would most probably have caused the destruction of all the private property north and east of the yard, in its neighborhood, being of opinion also, that the close of the evening would bring with it a calm, in which happily we were not disappointed. Other gentlemen, well mounted, volunteered, as Capt. Creighton had done, to go out and bring me positive intelligence of the enemy's situation, if possible to obtain it.

The evening came, and I waited with much anxiety the return of Capt. C. having almost continual information, that the enemy were in the neighborhood of the Marine Barracks—at the Capitol Hill—and that their "advance" was near George Town; and I therefore determined to wait only until 1-2 past 8 o'clock, to commence the execution of my orders, becoming apprehensive that Capt. C. had, from his long stay, fallen into the hands of the enemy. During this delay, I ordered a few Marines, and other persons who were then near me, to go off in one of the small galleys, which was done, and that boat is saved. Col. Wharton had been furnished with a light boat, with which he left the yard probably between 7 and 8 o'clock.

At 10 minutes past 8 Capt. Creighton returned, he was still extremely averse to the destruction of the property, but having informed him that your orders to me were imperative; the proper disposition of the boats being made, the matches were applied, and in a few moments the whole was in a state of irretrievable conflagration.

When about leaving the wharf, I observed the fire had also commenced at the works at Greenleaf's Point, and in the way out of the Branch, we observed the Capitol on fire.

It had been my intention, not to leave the vicinity of the yard with my boat, during the night, but having Capt. Creighton and other gentlemen with me, she was too much incumbered and over-laden, to render that determination proper. We therefore proceeded to Alexandria, in the vicinity of which I rested till the morning of the 25th, when we left Alexandria at 1-2 past 7 o'clock, and proceeded again up to the yard, where I landed unmolested about a quarter before nine.

The schooner Lynx had laid along side the burning wharf, still unhurt—hoping therefore to save her, we hauled her to the quarter of the hulk of the New-York, which had also escaped the ravages of the flames.

The detail issuing store, of the Navy store keeper, had remained safe from the fire during the night, which the enemy (being in force in the yard) about 8 o'clock set fire to, and it was speedily consumed. It appeared that they had left the yard about half an hour when we arrived.

From the number and movements of the enemy, it would have appeared rash temerity, to have attempted returning again that day—though my inclination strongly urged it; therefore reconnoitering their motions, as well as could be effected at a convenient distance in the gig, until evening, I again proceeded to Alexandria for the night.

Yesterday morning the 26th it was impossible to form (from the various and contradictory reports at Alexandria) any sort of probable conjecture, either of the proceedings and situation of our army; or that of the enemy. Determining therefore to have a positive knowledge of some part thereof, from ocular demonstration, I again embarked in the gig, proceeding with due caution to the yard, where I learned with exultation that devastation & pillage had commenced—and found also to my surprise that the old Gun-boat, which had been loaded with provisions, and had grounded in endeavoring to get out of the Branch, on the evening of the 24th, was nearly discharged of her cargo, by a number of our people, without connexion with each other.

Having landed in the yard, I soon ascertained that the enemy had left the city—excepting only a sergeant's guard, for the security of the sick and wounded. Finding it impracticable to stop the scene of plunder that had commenced, I determined instantly on repossessing the yard, with all the force at my command; repairing therefore immediately to Alexandria, Lieut. Haraden, the ordinary men and the few marines there were—ordered directly up, following myself, and got full possession again at evening.

I am now collecting the scattered pilloined provisions ready for your orders, presuming they will now become very scarce indeed—the quantity saved you shall be informed of when known to me.

The Lynx is safe, except her foremast being carried away in the storm of the 25th, about 4 P. M. We have also another of the Gunboats with about 100 barrels of powder; and one of the large yard-cutters, nearly full with the filled cylinders, for our different guns previously mounted—the powder of these however is probably much wetted by the storm.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,  
sir, your obt. servant. T. TINGEY.

Hon. Wm. Jones,  
Secretary of the Navy.

### INTERCEPTED LETTERS.

WASHINGTON, SEPT. 15.

The following letters were intercepted on their way from Montreal to Niagara, by a detachment of our army.

Copy of a letter from Sir George Prevost to Lieut. General Drummond.

HEAD-QUARTERS, MONTREAL,

August 26th, 1814.

Dear Sir—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your official letters of the 15th and 16th, with their enclosures, and a private one of the 17th inst.

I do most deeply regret the sequel of the gallant enterprise which put into your possession two of the enemy's schooners. You appear to have been induced to precipitate the attack of Fort Erie by a desire to reap the full benefit of the spirit of emulation produced by that daring achievement. If the object had been accomplished, a scrutiny of the operations to attain it would have been equally excited, and it is not in reproach of its failure, that I observe to you, that night attacks made with heavy troops, are in my opinion very objectionable, principally because chance and not skill too frequently decide the contest, and that at night difficulties and dangers are ever magnified, particularly when they present themselves unexpected, and in the latter case the best disciplined corps are placed only on a level with raw and unformed soldiers.

It is to be inferred from Lieut. Col. Fisher's report and your statement, that the right column was not sufficiently prepared for the obstacles it had to surmount in attaining the point of attack, otherwise neither hesitation nor consternation would have resulted when they presented themselves.

I acknowledge that I feel apprehensive you have rather yielded to than approved the eagerness of the right division to increase its fame before you were sufficiently prepared and sufficiently strong. Your skill and excellent judgment will profit by experience in your future operations by guarding you against public opinion, however clamorous, when it would sacrifice your well earned reputation and the honor and safety of the army placed under your command.

I sincerely hope the candour with which I have disclosed my sentiments on your last operation will be to you their best apology. They flow from a source unpolluted by any invidious feelings.

The 37th is ordered to Kingston, from whence General Steven is desired to send you the 97th or any other corps you may have demanded. Major Gen. Kempt with the remainder of the reserve will soon follow. My views in sending that officer to Kingston will be developed to you by the Adjutant General.

I have the honor to be, dear sir, your faithful humble servant,

GEORGE PREVOST.

Lieutenant General Drummond.

Copy of an intercepted letter from Adjutant General Baynes to Lieut. Gen. Drummond.

(SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.)

HEAD-QUARTERS, MONTREAL,

August 26th, 1814.

Sir—I am commanded by his excellency the Commander of the forces, to inform you the 37th regiment will commence its march to-morrow morning for Kingston: on which point, it is his excellency's intention to direct the other corps composing the composing the Brigade under the orders of Maj. Gen. Kempt.

If the Naval equipment is in that state of forwardness to sanction the undertaking the attack, and if necessary, Lieut. Gen. Drummond, the siege of Sackett's Harbor, in which the squadron must be prepared fully to co-operate before the advanced state of the season renders such an operation hazardous and difficult, it is his excellency's wish to avail himself of the local information and talents of Maj. Gen. Kempt, by employing him as the senior Major General on that service and with that view his Excellency would approve of Maj. Gen. Steven's proceeding to the Right Division, when relieved and leaving to Gen. Kempt to make the necessary preparatory arrangements for this arduous and important service. Should, however, as his Excellency is apprehensive, it prove to be the case, that the delay in the Naval preparations may frustrate his views on Sackett's Harbor: he still trusts our squadron will be able to take the Lake with a superiority that will enable him completely to relieve all the wants of the Right Division, and not only to secure effectually our own frontier, but to scour that of the enemy, destroying his depots and means of annoyance, and on this service he would propose to employ the force to be collected at Kingston.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

ED. BAYNES.

Adj. Genl. Forces.

Copy of an intercepted letter from Sir George Prevost to Lieut. Gen. Drummond.

(PRIVATE.)

Head-Quarters, Montreal,

August 26, 1814.

DEAR SIR—Major Coore has this moment delivered to me your letter of the 16th. I view with pain, the agony of mind you experienced from the unfortunate termination of the night attack you had been induced to make on the 15th, and would gladly soothe your feelings on the occasion, by any thing I could offer in addition to the sentiments you will find expressed in a letter I addressed to you this morning, but all I have heard since has confirmed my prejudices to highly important operations being performed in the dark. Too much was required from D. Watteville's regt. so situated, and deprived as I am told they were of their flints. The attempt has proved a costly experiment, and its result will be severely felt. As you have fixed on the 90th, orders shall be given for that regt. to proceed to you without delay. I had intended the 97th for that service, as being men of a hardier description, but the numbers of the 90th will probably make them equally useful to you. When this regt. together with the 6th and 82nd shall have joined you, you will I have no doubt be enabled to effect the recollection of your late disaster and to effect the expulsion of the enemy from the Province. The information brought to me by Major Coore of the state of forwardness of the marine preparations at Kingston, is not flattering to my expectations of regaining the naval ascendancy on Lake Ontario in time for ulterior operations during this session. They do not even promise to be so far advanced as to enable the squadron to afford relief to the right Division by the transport of troops, stores and provisions before the beginning of October. Vacillating communications on the subject which I have received from Sir James Yeo, are calculated to confirm Maj. Coore's report; it is therefore a matter of serious consideration how the right Division is to be fed, without resorting to extraordinary measures. After correctly ascertaining the extent of your resources for that object, you will consider the subject well, and propose what you think will procure the required relief—in affording it you may rely upon the incessant exertions of every department of the army, to perform whatever is practicable. In allotting Major Gen. Kempt to the command at Kingston, I have given you an able assistant in an officer of excellent judgment, and much experience. On his arrival there Major Gen. Steven will join the right division—if it is practicable to send down your disabled men from York, it would greatly relieve you, and they could be taken better care of in the Lower Province.

I am, dear sir, very faithfully, your obt. servant,

GEORGE PREVOST.

Copy of a letter from Captain C. Morris to the Secretary of the Navy, dated

FORTLAND, SEPT. 8, 1814.

SIR—It is with regret that I inform you we were compelled to destroy the Adams, at Hampden, on the morning of the 3d inst. to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy.

All the officers effected their escape, and I believe the crew, with the exception of very few, who were unable to travel. Their precise number cannot yet be ascertained, as we were obliged to pursue different routes, for the purpose of obtaining provisions through the woods between the Penobscot and Kenneback.

I am now engaged collecting and forwarding the men with the utmost dispatch to Portsmouth, from which place I hope soon to forward a detailed account of our proceedings.

In the mean time, I request you to believe