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Foreign.

GHENT, MAY 23.

The king of France has finished collecting around him all the foreign ministers who composed the diplomatic body at Paris. Baron Vincent, minister plenipotentiary of Austria, Baron Waltersdorff, minister of Denmark, and M. de Signeul, Swedish charge d'affaires, have recently arrived and had audiences of his majesty.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

Extract from Minutes of Conferences of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris.

Conference of May 12, 1815.

The committee appointed on the 9th inst. and charged to examine, whether, after the events which have passed since the return of Napoleon Bonaparte to France, and in consequence of the documents published at Paris on the declaration which the powers issued against him on the 13th March last, it would be necessary to proceed to a new declaration, presented at the sitting of this day the following report:

Report of the Committee.—The declaration published on the 13th March last against Napoleon Bonaparte and his adherents, by the powers who signed the treaty of Paris, having, since his return to Paris, been discussed in various shapes by those whom he has employed for that purpose; these discussions having acquired great publicity, and a letter addressed by him to all the sovereigns, as well as a note addressed by the duke of Vicenza to the heads of the cabinets of Europe, having been also published by him with the manifest intention of influencing and misleading public opinion, the committee appointed in the sitting of the 9th inst. was charged to present a report on these topics: and considering that in the above-mentioned publications, it has been attempted to invalidate the declaration of the 13th of March, by laying it down,

1. That the declaration, decreed against Bonaparte... of the period of his landing on the coast of France, was without application, now that he has laid hold of the reins of government without opposition; and that this fact sufficiently proving the wishes of the nation, he had not only re-entered into possession of his old rights in regard to France, but that the question even of the legitimacy of his government had ceased to be within the jurisdiction of the powers:

2. That by offering to ratify the treaty of Paris, he removed every ground of war against him:

The committee has been specially charged to take into consideration—

1. Whether the position of Bonaparte in regard to the powers of Europe has changed by the fact of his arrival in Paris, and by the circumstances that accompanied the first success of his attempt on the throne of France?

2. Whether the offer to sanction the treaty of Paris, on the 31st of May, 1814, can determine the powers to adopt a system different from that which they announced in the declaration of the 13th of March?

3. Whether it be necessary or proper to publish a new declaration to confirm or modify that of the 13th of March?

The committee having maturely examined these questions, submits to the assembly of plenipotentiaries the following account of the result of its deliberations:

FIRST QUESTION.

Is the position of Bonaparte in regard to the powers of Europe altered by the first success of his enterprise, or by the events which have passed since his arrival in Paris?

The powers, informed of the landing of Bonaparte in France, could see in him only a man who, by advancing on the French territory, with force and arms, and with the avowed project of overturning the established government, by exciting the people and the army to revolt against their lawful sovereign, and by usurping the title of emperor of the French, (1) had incurred the penalties which all legislations pronounce against such outrages—a man who, by abusing the good faith of the sovereigns, had broken a solemn treaty—a man, in fine, who, by recalling upon France, happy and tranquil, all the scourges of internal and external war, and upon Europe, at a moment when the blessings of peace must have consoled her for her long sufferings, the sad necessity of a new general armament, was justly regarded as the implacable enemy of public welfare. Such was the origin, such were the grounds of the declaration of the 13th of March; a declaration, of which the justice and necessity have been universally acknowledged, and which general opinion has sanctioned.

The events which conducted Bonaparte to

(1) The first article of the convention of the 11th of April, 1814, is as follows.—“The emperor Napoleon renounces, for himself, his successors, and descendants, as well as for all the members of his family, all rights of sovereignty and of power, not only over the French empire and kingdom of Italy, but also over every other country.” Notwithstanding this formal renunciation, Bonaparte, in his different proclamations from the Gulf of Juan, from Cap. Grenoble, and Lyons, entitled himself, “by the grace of God and the constitutions of the empire, Emperor of the French, &c. &c. &c.—See *Moniteur* of March 21, 1815.

Paris, and restored to him for the moment the exercise of supreme power, have, doubtless, in fact, altered the position in which he was at the period of his entering France; but these events, brought on by criminal collusion, by military conspiracies, by revolting treasons, can create no right; they are absolutely null in a legal point of view; and in order to the position of Bonaparte being essentially and legitimately altered, it would be necessary that the steps which he has taken to establish himself on the ruins of the government overturned by him, should have been confirmed by some legal title.

Bonaparte lays it down in his publications, that the wishes of the French nation in favor of his re-establishment on the throne suffice to constitute this legal title.

The question for the powers to examine may be stated as follows: Can the consent, real or factitious, explicit or tacit, of the French nation, to the re-establishment of Bonaparte's power, operate a legal change in the position of the latter, in regard to foreign powers, and form a title obligatory on these powers?

The committee are of opinion that such cannot by any means be the effect of such consent; and the following are their reasons:

The powers know too well the principles which ought to guide them in their relations with an independent country, to attempt (as it is endeavored to accuse them) “to impose upon it laws, to interfere in its internal affairs, to prescribe to it a form of government, to give it masters according to the interests or passions of its neighbors.” (2) But they also know that the liberty of a nation to change its system of government must have its just limits, and that if foreign powers have no right to prescribe to it the exercise which it shall make of that liberty, they have at least indubitably the right of protesting against the abuse which it may make of it at their expense. Impressed with this principle, the powers do not deem themselves authorized to impose a government on France; but they will never renounce the right of preventing the establishment in France of a focus of disorders and of subversions to other states, under the title of a government. They will respect the liberty of France in every way in which it shall not be incompatible with their own security and the general tranquility of Europe.

In the existing case, the right of the allied sovereigns to interfere in the question of internal government of France is the more incontestable inasmuch as the abolition of the power which now claims to be re-established there, was the fundamental condition of the treaty of peace, on which rested all the relations which, up to the return of Bonaparte to Paris, subsisted between France and the rest of Europe.—On the day of their entrance into Paris, the sovereigns declared that they would never treat of peace with Bonaparte. (3) This declaration, loudly applauded by France and by Europe, produced the abdication of Napoleon, & the convention of the 11th of April; it formed the principal basis of the negotiation; it was explicitly pronounced in the preamble of the treaty of Paris. The French nation, even supposing it perfectly free and united, cannot withdraw itself from this fundamental condition, without abrogating the treaty of Paris and all its existing relations with the European system. The allied powers, on the other hand, by insisting on this very condition, only exercise a right which it is impossible to contest to them, unless it be maintained that the most sacred compacts can be perverted, as suits the convenience of either of the contracting parties.

It hence follows, that the will of the people of France is by no means sufficient to re-establish, in a legal sense, a government proscribed by solemn engagements, which that very people entered into with all the powers of Europe; and that they cannot, under any pretext, give validity as against these powers to the right of recalling to the throne him whose exclusion was a condition preliminary to every pacific arrangement with France; the wish of the French people, even if it were fully ascertained, would not be the less null and of no effect in regard to Europe, towards re-establishing a power, against which all Europe has been in a state of permanent protest from the 31st of March, 1814, up to the 13th of March, 1815; and in this view the position of Bonaparte is precisely at this day what it was at the last mentioned periods.

SECOND QUESTION.

Should the offer to sanction the Treaty of Paris change the disposition of the Powers?

France has had no reason to complain of the treaty of Paris. This treaty reconciled France with Europe; it satisfied all her true interests, secured all her real advantages, all the elements of prosperity and glory, which a people called to one of the first places in the European system, could reasonably desire, and only took from her that which was to her, under the deceitful exterior of great national eclair, an inexhaustible source of sufferings, of ruin, and of misery. This treaty was even an immense benefit for a country, reduced by the madness of its chief to the most disastrous situation. (4)

The allied powers would have betrayed their interests and their duties, if, as the price of so much moderation and generosity, they had not,

(2) It is thus that Bonaparte's council of state express themselves in their report on the intentions of the Powers.—See *Moniteur* of the 13th of April.

(3) Declaration of the 31st of March, 1814.

(4) The emperor, convinced of the critical situation in which he had placed France, and of the impossibility of saving it himself, appeared to resign himself and consent to an entire and unconditional abdication. Letter of Marshal Ney to the Prince of Benevento.

on signing the treaty, obtained some solid advantage; but the sole object of their ambition was the peace of Europe and the happiness of France. Never in treating with Bonaparte, would they have consented to the conditions which they granted to a government, which, “while offering to Europe a pledge of security and stability, relieved them from requiring from France the guarantees which they had demanded under its former government.” (5) This clause is inseparable from the treaty of Paris; to abolish it, is to break this treaty. The formal consent of the French nation to the return of Bonaparte to the throne would be equivalent to a declaration of war against Europe; for the state of peace did not exist between Europe and France, except by the treaty of Paris, and the treaty of Paris is incompatible with the power of Bonaparte.

If this offering had need of further support, it might be found in the very offer of Bonaparte to ratify the treaty of Paris. His treaty, if it had been scrupulously observed and executed: the transactions of the congress of Vienna were only its supplements and developments; and without the new attempt of Bonaparte, it would have been for a long series of years one of the bases of the public right of Europe: but this order of things has given place to a new revolution; and the agents of this revolution, although they proclaim incessantly “that (6) nothing has been changed,” conceive and feel themselves that all is changed around them. The question is no longer the maintenance of the treaty of Paris, but the making of it afresh. The powers find themselves, with respect to France, in the condition in which they were on the 31st of March, 1814. It is not to prevent war, for France has in fact rekindled it, it is to terminate it that there now offers itself to Europe a state of things essentially different from that on which the peace of 1814 was founded. The question, then, has ceased to be a question of right; it is no more than a question of political calculation and foresight in which the powers have only to consult the real interests of their people and the common interest of Europe.

The committee thinks it may dispense with entering here into an exposition of the considerations which, under this last view, have directed the measures of the governments. It will be sufficient to recall to notice, that the man who, now offering to sanction the treaty of Paris, pretends to substitute his guarantee for that of a sovereign, whose loyalty was without stain, and benevolence without measure, is the same who during 15 years ravaged and laid waste the earth, to find means of satisfying his ambition, who sacrificed millions of victims, and the happiness of an entire generation, to a system of conquests; whom truces, little worthy of the name of peace, have only rendered more oppressive and more odious; (7) who after having by mad enterprises, tired fortune, armed all Europe against him, and exhausted all the means of France, was forced to abandon his projects, and abdicated power to save some relics of existence; who at the moment when the nations of Europe were giving themselves up to the hope of a durable tranquility, meditated new catastrophes, and by a double perfidy, towards the powers who had too generously spared him, and towards government which he could not attack without the blackest treason, usurped a throne which he had renounced, and which he never occupied except for the misery of France and the world. This man has no other guarantee to propose to Europe than his word. After the cruel experience of fifteen years, who would have the courage to accept this guarantee; and if the French nation has really embraced his cause, who could any longer respect the security which it could offer?

Peace with a government placed in such hands, and composed of such elements, would only be a perpetual state of uncertainty, anxiety and danger. No power being able effectually to disarm, the people would enjoy none of the advantages of a true peace; they would be overwhelmed with expenses of all kinds; confidence not being able to establish itself anywhere, industry and commerce would every where languish; nothing would be stable in political relations; a sullen discontent would spread over all countries; and from day to day, Europe in alarm would expect a new explosion. The sovereigns have certainly not misunderstood the interests of their people, in judging that an open war, with all its inconveniences and all its sacrifices, is preferable to such a state of things, and the measures which they have adopted have met the general approbation.

The opinion of Europe on this great occasion is pronounced in a manner very positive and very solemn; never could the real sentiments of nations have been more accurately known and more faithfully interpreted than at a moment when the representatives of all the powers

(5) Preamble of the treaty of Paris.

(6) This idea recurs perpetually in the report of the council of state of Bonaparte, published in the *Moniteur*, April 13, 1815.

(7) The committee here think it right to add the important observation, that the greater part of the invasions, and forced unions, of which Bonaparte formed successively what he called the great empire, took place during those perfidious intervals of peace, more destructive to Europe than even the wars with which it was tormented. It was thus that he took possession of Piedmont, Parma, Genoa, Lucca, of the states of Rome, of Holland, of the countries composing the 32d military division. It was thus at a period of peace (at least with all the continent,) that he struck the first blow against Portugal and Spain, and he thought to have finished the conquest of those countries by cunning and audacity when the patriotism and energy of the people of the Peninsula drew him into a sanguinary war, the commencement of his downfall, and of the salvation of Europe.

were assembled to consolidate the peace of the world.

THIRD QUESTION.

Is it necessary to publish a new declaration? The observations which the committee have just presented furnish the answer to the last question which remains to be examined. It considers,

1. That the declaration of the 13th of March was dictated to the powers by reasons of such evident justice and such decisive weight, that none of the sophistries by which it is pretended to be attacked can at all affect it:

2. That these reasons remain in all their force and that the changes which have in fact occurred since the Declaration of the 13th of March, have produced no alteration in the position of Bonaparte and of France with regard to the Allies.

3. That the offer to ratify the Treaty of Paris cannot in any manner change the disposition of the Allies.

Therefore, the Committee is of opinion that it would be useless to publish a fresh declaration.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, and who as such are responsible for its execution with regard to the acceding Powers, having taking into consideration, and sanctioned by their approbation the preceding report, have resolved, that there shall be made to the Plenipotentiaries of the other royal courts a communication of the minutes of this day. They have further ordered, that an extract of the said minutes shall be made public.

Here follow the signatures in the alphabetical order of the courts.

AUSTRIA. Prince METTERNICH. Baron WESSENBERG, SPAIN (Espagne). P. GOMES LABRADOR. FRANCE. Prince TALLEYRAND, Duke of DALBERG, Count A. d'NOAILLES. GREAT BRITAIN. CLANCARTY, CATHCART, STEWART. PORTUGAL. The Count de PALMELLA, SALDANHA, LOBO. PRUSSIA. Prince HADENBERG, Baron HUMBOLDT. RUSSIA. Count RASOUMOUSKY, Count ST. AKELBERG, Count NESSELRODE. SWEDEN. Count LOSWENHELM. SARDINIA. The Mar. de ST. MARSAU, Count ROSSI. SAXONY. Count SCHULEMBURG. TWO SICILIES. The Com. of the Sicily. WURTEMBERG. Count WINZINBURG, Baron LINDEN.

From the London Sign of May 22.

We this day present our readers with extracts of two very important documents—the manifesto of the King of France, drawn up by the celebrated M. Lally Tollendal—and the report of the state of France, which comes from the pen of M. De Chateaubriand. It is to be believed that the eloquent and powerful arguments of men so famous for their talents, and so much respected for their virtues, will weigh greatly with all the reflecting part of the French nation.

EXTRACTS FROM THE MANIFESTO OF THE KING OF FRANCE,

Addressed to the French Nation.

It begins with stating, that it has been the first care of the King to instruct his ambassadors to represent to foreign courts the real course of events, and condition of things in France, that “France might not be calumniated, dishonored, exposed to unjust contempt, and unmerited indignation.”

“This first care has been fulfilled. All the powers of Europe now know, that the king of France and the French nation, more than ever united by all that can draw closer the ties between a good king and a good people, were suddenly betrayed by an army unfaithful to the prince and its country, to honor and its oaths: that however, among the first generals of that army, those whose names constituted its glory, either rallied under the colors of the king, or at least abandoned those of the usurper; that chiefs of corps and officers of all ranks daily follow this example; that among the multitude of soldiers drawn into a defection unexampled in military annals, there are many of those whom inexperience had delivered up to seduction, who have been led to repentance by reflection, and whose misleading must be entirely laid to the charge of their seducers. Europe knows, in fine, that with the exception of that portion of the army become unworthy of its past glory, and which has ceased to belong to the French army; with the exception of a handful of voluntary accomplices, who have furnished the usurper with men ambitious without means, and criminal without remorse, the whole French nation, the good citizens of the towns, the good inhabitants of the country, corps and individuals, of both sexes and of all ages, have followed and recalled the king with all their wishes, have imprinted on all his footsteps a new homage of gratitude and a new oath of fidelity. Europe knows that in Paris, in Beauvais, in Abbeville, in that great and glorious city of Lille, of which treason occupied the gates, and threatened to ensanguine the walls, in the face and under the very sword of traitors, all arms were extended towards the king, all eyes offered him the tribute of their tears, all voices cried out to him, “return to us; return to deliver your subjects.” Europe