Newspapers / The Raleigh Minerva (Raleigh, … / June 21, 1816, edition 1 / Page 1
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.m. -. - . - v v s ,s a. r yj- ijf jess's? mm HALfiiUHv;.C.) ! SCOTT '"""'"rirrU U,IUr. oer year, one half LxrinHmpnn' - - .- : paki ia advance. No paper to be conunueaion- .fr mr1! subscription be- to be paklie .1 . . Km SV umw )ipwnf ihull have been riven 4tTl?Sui. tl f twSnty-fiTe cent. ech.ibe - ZTSertia nd in l,he proportion where there TTLlw Camber of line thin fourteen. Foreign. LOUD CATU5UKAUH'S SPEECH, i u '':kii'li&tMfiBltlAtif-tIifr:-rftr Utld C prove ft! lo lht bodyjalthough might bo rtstortd yet ibW be r?tored r.i- r. .k.rt myriad, and Mrould nreently ter- . f hoiiUitiei. He would not roll Ur Ibo roholioa or nai nou rtiroo Lieb d been purioed, if howcnot A.t s- ii.. fUd W the LroTerv onXokilr With Lie U t bod be en eneoontered. But after Hhat iruJ Jtfc&t on&c rrencn o,rmy,inB wWUu Loio bee. jootlr ehargeoblff wtb theif ur rrrtioo iftlrj Ud not followed op the blow, d eitiaeibed,M fir it wr possible, the Mrr mm Janrrrooo to all. titill, however, it m AreeVtorj to be vigilenujlf tlio govero- uofs or Karope were to auow inemr 10 A. lulled lata iMiiritv Sv oopOvstoS that the Yrmmh arai LaJ ecutil to exist beeiose it had cce4 to appear oa the parade, tby would ooou oiioeM a revival or thai aeoorge which had so lug drttolated the worlds He had wo hesita tia therefore, iy, ho prided hiotoelf iu avow, in; thai it a dietfoelly deelared to Louis Hi. that if he did not duiolve the French ara, the allitk ntuat charge themselves with iUt iadiipeUMble task, la order to give effect if iha reorrocatatioB. three hundred thousand sua Wre assembled pa tbft Loire with the in MCtu .f denouncing the armistice ou a partt- ular 4ay, ir arrangements were not maue y tit eal authorities of France to dissolve that arwy, the ctiateueo of which was incompatible aith the geaeral repose. ' ' Under these cireumstaneei, be put it to the rcelioes of every Uoelishman. whether our fur ther interference was not only natural and just bat whether it was ,aot imperiously demanded by tb atateia which this requisition left the Kin. What ritht had we to call in the King to natiod, whatever levity they might have exhibi ted, With whatever faeilitj they might have lht themielvea to'differeat usurpations, atwas th anxiona deaira of the allied powers npt to pursue' towards them a resentful or revengeful policy, but if possible to combine the system of seeuniy ior Europe wnu iucu w mark this eat distinguishing charieter of their proceedings, namefv, that their hostility was directed not against France as a nation, not against France in a royal sense, but against F ranee in a revolutionary sense, and most essen tially against France as the coneentration of military jacobinism. IN or did tne allies proceeu on this principle alone. They aeted ou a very broad policy, If they had epoifed the game luey nau ueen piayiug wy 0111115 n-u wu uj ordinary question between state and state-if iriatead of endeaTorine to re-iuclude Frdnce in dearorine the pare of oeiat nations they had attempted to deerade her-they would have Combined all Frauee aeainst them, instead of having the rat mass of the Deoole on their side. There were some, people .whA might have supposed that thi was aJadiablfl moment fot Jeprivr iDgJtjtno ot no eaereaenmcBta wiuu puo made underXouls XlVtfi, and making Jer re turn to heftd limits. - , But ho wever specious this suppositioft the" reasoning on which it was founded appeared to him to be extremely falla cious . It France had grown since the period alluded tovother states had also risen The power of the British empire, for instance, had increased so much or late years, as 10 reuuer the reduction of France less necessary. The power of Russia also had increased so much, that with every confidence in its moderate ex ercise, it rendered impolitic a reduction of that of France. And above all, nothing ould have been more fatal to the policy and object of the great -confederacy, which was to keep their general principle distinct from auy petty ar rangements between state and state. Having embarked with every thing wise and loyal iu France, against a danger eommon to all Europe, it would have been most injurious had they made an indirect advantage of existing circumstanc es, and failed to preserve to France her char acter as a nation. From the King to 'the mean est peasant iu the country, not a man but would have united against them had they pursued any other policy. What the confederates were es pecially charged with was, to tranquilize the worldnot to carve out tho different states ac cording to their owil notions ; which, although they might be abstractly right, would, if iudulg- 'a a a n . u . I l . ml t . a. eu, ieaa tnem irom tnai wnicp was ineir grcai and important obiect. Comius to the conside- dusolvo what was called the Koyal Army, iff ration of the subjeet with this view of it, vari- aftrr haviog done so wo meant to leave him to tbeir mercy ? v ere we not bouud to aetena bioi trmm thwsa a thoir diabaaded a well as in their collected r.tate in their eharactt. of eon spiratoro as well at is their character of sol diera? ' He for one, had never been disposed to depreciate tho abilities of Bonaparte: but tke eosnparisoB of the danger arising to society fraot the talents of that individual, and from the ditpaoitioB of the French army itself, was at tho coaiparitoB between a drop of water and ciplo woven into tut constitution of the t rencb artsy, had beta soflVred to exist, the confine- . anal of Bonaparte in the place to which he had beta teat was almost an nuimportant conside ration. fr, saeh an army would not find it di&ealt to discover tome man capable of lead- - iaj it iih eottrage and ability. The simple ftcttioB for the allies to consider was whether BMral and civil principle should, govern the wtrtd, or whether it should be ruled by a mili tary drtpotUat- interweaving itself by degrees late all the statts of Europe. Let those who were for poshing ta an extreme the opinion of papaior authority, reoeet on what this military dtftpetitai had btea founded. It had grown out ' of that state of social disorganization which tdcra philosophy and modern Whiggism ten ded Ur produce. It had been the sad refuge truss tho evils of anarchy. Fortunately the ruhaesa aod intemperance by which it was characterised had prevented nits perpetuation. 1 Every effort to that effect, however, had been - taade kj its great leader In Frauee, under - lUaaparte, every t bio e had been rendered aub- : onlioats to tho army. Due of the last acts of fiaaaparta was to call, on Hue Prefects of Frauco to deliver to him descriptive lists jbf the feaiilea, their properly, &e. in their respective dialriela, jnrideMtly intending to sacrifice them to the lust and rapidity of that army by w hich, is. m . . ' r - 1 . . i.t. .craitu hjim vy av pgweriui a-'Siiniuius, ue vaialy Loped to maintain himself on the throne of France and to carry" desolation into the sur raadiug Stales. 80 far, was the' interference afthe Allied Fowers" to put down the French arsy frouji being Unpopular in Franee,' that he had never talked with a single well-informed maa ia t&at eouutry w ho had not spoken of the tjraaay, f the military despotism as that from btcu it was desirablo to escape. Even those ke had run through the whole course of the rcvalutioa denounced the "mflilary system as a aaster io governmeut which triumphed over tie law, aad which rendered the state a mere : truiuent for the gratification of it oWn detes- Ublotaubes. Not only were the steps taken J,11" gard against the return of this ' ditaryJespotism gratefully acknowledged in rranee,- bota strooc and verv ereneral aolici- l"d WM showy that fhey would take into . tbtir protection, the civil constitution of that 1 i yT "leP which, according to jho estab - j-hd relation between nations, it was impossi :U UeU take. , . y - With respect to the great body at the French ous liuet of policy offered themselves for their adoption. There was the course of Calling on France for a serero eoatribuuim 01 money, aau there was the course of calling on her for an ex tensive dismemberment of territory. A false impression was, he believed, very prevalent on this part of the question-uJU wa supposed by some that it would be more wise to1 have made a substantial demand on r ranee tor terri tory, leaving the French government in posses sion of all their resources, and it was imagined that of all cessions a pecuniary cessiou, was mosFMvoifing " to" the' f eelingTSTlfilfFf t Wfc He could assure the House that nothing could be less true than this proposition. With the exception of the natural repugnance w hich all men had to part with their money, there was hardly any indisposition in France to this mea- sure, indeed tne state 01 tne .r rencu nnanees admitted it. Out of ' the nature of its situation and the profligacy of its conduct, had grown this advantage, i While all the rest of the world were stainiug their exertions, France had scarcely a burden ; for as soon as they had created armies they turned Ihem loose to prey on mankind. He believed, therefore, that France was in a state of greater financial afflu- enee than any other country 111 Europe j and more especially with refereuce to. the two neighbouring states, Prussia and Austrian He would take this opportunity of saying, that under the existing circumstance of those two countries, it had uot been deems prudent or wise by .the British government to press the repayment of the Imperial loan. They really were not in a state at present to make the exer tion which that repayment would require. Iu the last two campaigns , Prussia had expended 12C0 millions of livres, or fifty millions sterling; and the ex pence oi Austria had beeu still grea ter. In consequence the finances of those t wo countries had been so reduced that had his Ma jesty's government insisted on payment of the Imperial loan, they would actually have been unable to have put their armies ou the peace establishmeuet, and would have been put to oth er iueoLvenieuces, which in every point ofview it was most desirable that we should,, if possi ble, prevent them irom enduring. As to the Cession of territory by Trance, instead ot tlx; contribution of money, there was not a man in the kingdom, from the monarch to the ' low est individual who did not entertain for such a prop osition that which might justly be called a na tional repugnance. So abhorrent was it to the feelings of the w hole French people, that he really believed it would not have been in the power of the allies to persuade his most Christian Majesty to accede to such a stipulation. .Be sides, it ought to be considered that unless the demand for a cession ot territory went far, it would be much wiser not to make it at all. On some parts of the multifarious questions before them there had of course been strong differences of opinion among the allied powers, but on that ofthecession of French territory none. They all disavowed the right of treating France as a eonq&ered nation in that re"speet,r ofdismem- afraneement mad fnr iK.f..,.1. ' 1 ,- beriu it with a view to alter its military chaK rope stopped hereif he: should have thouehHt 4 acter andl resourcet as a nation. All tha they meowpleteIa4Msopioioa ,v' -v with those 1 to . which ho had just referred, would place the balance bf power iaurope on 4 bet- ' - or Joseptt the Seeond, France Wa.:opay"o . the aniesteTet . hundred milliont of liVrei. Out; 'i ol tb. sumi three hundred tmnilon w to be : fY thZ ertcUott of 'trong plaeet to".. ' ' defe9d the Low Cooutries. h;,h ,,1 ItZ Iz , placed in a bettef state than they had been in T ' '' x the last fiftyarsj .nd iAZ 1 v 1 i 5Y " ' mucn fetter game for j Netherlands, jn bis own iarrit . 1. .,T f held themselves, entitled, to consider was, the more or lest the modification of thefrontier but ' hot ' one of the confederated powers, ima gined that it was within thefunctions of the Confederacy to dismemberFr'ance itself. It should be considered that what was taken from France must have been giveu to some other ua tion. ? There was the two-fold danger of taking L-i - 1 .L. OD wu one power, auu oi raising up auuiiier. severed from France, no effect oould have been produced. And did the house calculate on the wounded pride and honor that such a dismem berinent would necessarily excite? Where was flie Eufflishman who would not fischt for any i me uneieni possesions .01 our' . yrpwB.r And fce must say that he should not respect that'vFrenchman who did not feel that tbf slate of hit country beore tbeKevoIutionwas thatio wbiorhis honour was .bound -np and , that he aonhlabt allow the state to he diminished with our j degradation worso thaa deat hs lie, there fore begged -leave to coutend, thaUiq point 0J1 1: I.., : . ij justice do prucecuing 01 uisiuciHMcifiicii uuuiu take place : and that in point 01 policy .thejrery nature of (the contest which was for the esikahlish- ment ot a general principle 01 security, Tender ed such a step unwise ; and the last remedy to which. Europe oiiffht to look as a defence a- gainst the Jfjil that surrounded her. There . A" 0 1. r. 1 -. - ij was anoiner principle or action w iuen snouia not pass unnoticed. Whatever it was wise to do at all, it was vmportant should be done, not by any particular stile, but by Europe as a whole. It was highly important that Europe, in its pres- em aiuea siaie, snouiu act . as a oouy ; anu uiai nothing should occur to reduce that body to its origiual element. If a fragment only had been taken from France, and if that fragment had beeu-delivered over to 'the power to whom from local circumstances, it would have proved the greatest advantage, the maiutainance aud defence of the acquisition would have necessa rily devolved on that single power, and that at a period of the greatest agitation ahd difficulty. It was a fundamental maxim of France to be involved in War with the Low Countries, and whenever this was the case, the burden always fell upon the shoulders of tins country. We bad therefore taken care to secure the domini ons of the King of the Netherlands as much us possible against any attack from France. By the precautionary measures, however, that were adopted there was every reason to hope and be lieve that France would not make any hostile attempt. We had 130,000 of the best troops in the world, under a man who was justly and universally admitted to be the great est general loathe world ; and as France had created the danger, it was but right that she should pay the price for watching over her tranquility. On the whole.iie. had good reason to believe that the peace would prove secure, even though some shew of hostilities might .be made by France in so long a space of the life of man as five years. It would by no means have been wise to have taken the line of fortresses from France, and annexed them to the countries towliieh they WereeoftflglSQir9u been of no advantage to those countries might have been resisted by the French govern ment, and might have created more danger of a new war than the leaving 01 them in the pos session of Frauee, after, the Allied troops should be w ithdrawn. It was the general opi nion in France, that she nev er erred more than in extending her territory. The future state of Europe depended on kings being permanent ly settled in Frauee, and they would be so by not suffering her government to be thrown back wards and forwards as it had been. The allies had preferred the government of. the King, be cause it seemed to offer nothing that was likely to shake the peace of Europe.- It was therefore a deliberate purpose of -the allies, when t hey concluded the treaty of the 20th of November, to do away all cause for jealousy, and they boujid themselves to restore the fortresses, with the few exceptions specified in the treaty, at the end of five year , But they did not bind themselves-to restore them In any but the King's lawful heirs and suceessorrf, -so that 4f the pre sent dynasty should by any means be subverted, we did not pledge ourselves to the folly and ah surditycjf giving them up to any person who might be at the head of the government at that time, but to look at w hat might take place, aud judge whether it would be- necessary to impose some new restrictions. -Wo were pledged to support the king of Frauee, hut not to sup'port any new revolutionary government. He was satisfied that greater securities for the durabilt ity of the peace had been obtained by the course pursued ini the late negotiations, than could have beeu obtained if France-had" pushed into concessions w ith a mure violent hand. If the King had not ascended the throne on the prin ciple that the virtual uitegnty ol r ranee should be preserved; he (lord Castlereagh) would have had the most serious doubts of the continuance of peace. He felt that in that case it would have been much endangered by the irritated feelinsrs of the French nation. But while due attention had been paid to' this consideration, the allies had not failed to require! what they thought adequate securities lor the future re pose ot Europe. ihese, 11a, trusted, it wouiu be the opinion of the house .they had obtained, when It was recollected that. five fortresses of considerable local importance had been ceded by France to the King of the Netherlands, and that the destruction of one w hich was ot tome importance had beeu insisted upon. Had the would be to maintaia authority in places ta- f , -ken, from Francewb Hthai datioi mighi S- -claim whenever she fell her mlliii. ? .Vt.u ..MHHB.nf ewasarixiottaihatthe , quettioii thOfld reuton (hisprineiplerthatEn! ' glaudiihoiild rather liUternhrA.Z?: AWiiHdaat ,-.r-M . .u...uf uu iome (Ual forin- 1 ;!IfZiLiJ MJftB 10 every person who -looked u their military sijuation, would be ftt-' ' theraa incumbrance thau advantage, ii'' i V ' , He would uowtayifeyy wordtdnthMttbjeck, of the taerifaces of a pecuniary hature imposed IT lu-ranC V fortim rof thetvlewt' if, 'C the allies. ; Lookinsr at tlfe nniri:- , 'J tiese would have upon the French Government. v he certainly eonsidered what "had been done ia J 1 this respect was politically the mettMdira TT- course to neutralise, in the first iustance; and' miimiciy i'i remeay mat military spirit which had proved so fatal to , the repose of Euroi. . : If wu drew from the 4-rench those; resourcea ' t which, might sustain a military force, Tand Bp- ' r plied it to the support of Iheir own, kept ther6 . for the purposes uf surveillance, we tnnkthM' ' - best means for preventing iht recurrence of - muse cjih agaiusi vf iiicn jii was thR object Of - -the allies to guard. This he thought the wis -est policy that could be pursued to accomnli.h - the end in view, and that which would be the -l least onensive, as it would be the least injuri ous to France herself. This persevered in for five years, he entertained sanguine hopes would ' establish the tranquility of France, and with it that of the rest of Europe. But he was aware that it was common for gentlemen to toy the contributions which had been imposed, France could hot and would nor pay.- In answer to this he had in the first place to state, that she had already made very considerable payments, and these under circumstances of peculiar dif ficulty And embarrassment j in the second, he would observe, she must pay them, or become babkrupt in national credit; aud thirdlv.it was to be remembered, that if she failed to da thU, we should then stand in the same situation in wliich w e had stood when in the opinion of some gentlemen w e ought to, have insisted upon other terms, founded upon permanent cessiors of ter ritory to be made by l'raoce. . It was now to be considered how the' pay ments could be made by France, and what would tlM..lt!tSUti ces? Inppeakingof (lie arrangements which had been made, he wished ft to be distinctly, understood,, that when he spoke of them as being wise, he did not give them that character, because he Umught them ruinous to France. -He -protested against this doctrine allocefher. as i he was satisfied "up arrangement Could be wi.e, mat carried ruin Jto one of the countries, ' ' between which ft was eoncIuded.V,He believed' that if both parties had not an interest in carry- . ing any treaty negociated, into effect, it must eventually fail. In misealculating the point on which it could be acted . upon with mutual be nefit, the advantages contended for on either ' side were lost, lie believed France could pay the contributions wbieb had been demanded, and that she intended paying them. France, he ' maintained, was at greatly interested m seeing that military spirit subside i which had prevail ed within her territories so long, as it was pos sible, the resfof Europe could be.., If, at .tlie ' end of five years she should find" this to have , Leen,inaterially abated, and her sivij; energies- -increased in proportion, the change 'hm pro duced would be liot less beneficial to her than it ' ( would prove to hr nieghbour8. ..Theeontribu- tions demanded could be met by the revenuet of -thai country by the sale of Crown lands, by . " the augmentation of her ; national "debt, the'- might be enabled honorably to fulfil her ensatre- ments without bringing on the . State any extra ordinary calamity France.it had been stipu lated should pay as an indemnify to the allies the sum of 700,000,000 livres (23 or 29,000,- 000. steilinsr,) but this was comparatiTelv speaking a very inconsiderable payment, when put by the side of the qther expellees whieb the' late war bad thrown upon her. . la addition to this 29,ooo,coo:. France had engaged to main tain au army of 130,000 "men belonging to the allies for five years.' The xpenco of e&cb thousand mn eould not be estimated at less than 1,080,000 of livres pe ann; this array there-'; fore would cost Jfraneo , yearly the sum of 100,000000. From.this.it wooid be seen, the sums which France would have to pay iu five years, for. the maintenance of this army,'woold be 730,000,000 of livres, making, with the 700,000,000 given 0 the allies as an indemnity,. a total of 1,450,000 ofjivres. - By a convention concluded, the French, gov- eminent bad.,engaged to pay .120 livres a" man. about Bl.) on the whole foreo of 1,040,000 men, which had marched into France to conquer - r -I i 4,
The Raleigh Minerva (Raleigh, N.C.)
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June 21, 1816, edition 1
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