

The Raleigh Minerva.

FRIDAY, MARCH 20, 1849.

No. 10.

Vol. 1.

RALEIGH, (N. C.)
PRINTED, WEEKLY, BY HARVEY AND OASSO,
EDITED BY A. LUCAS.
Three dollars per year, one half
paid in advance. No paper to be continued longer
than three months after a year's subscription be-
comes due, and notice thereof shall have been given.
Advertisements, not exceeding 14 lines, are inserted
for one dollar; for twenty five cents each sub-
sequent insertion; and in like proportion where there
is a greater number of lines than fourteen. The cash
must accompany those from persons unknown to the
editor.
No subscription can in any case be received without
payment of at least \$1.50 in advance; and no discoun-
tance without payment of arrears, unless at the
option of the editor.

POLITICAL.

FROM THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.
Articles on Mr. Lacoek's Report on the Se-
minole War.

The author of this article has had access
to documents, the perusal of which convinced
him that the report of the select committee of
the Senate, on the Seminole War, is alike un-
justifiable in temper, argument, and state-
ments. Its temper is harsh and vindictive,
its arguments are childish weak, and its
statements are, in many instances, grossly and
unaccountably erroneous.

The report has been read with astonish-
ment and regret—regret, that such a docu-
ment should go before the world unanswered
in senatorial discussion—and astonishment,
as well as the institution of such an enquiry
into the conduct of Gen. Jackson, as at the
anomalous and unfair manner in which the
investigation has been conducted.

But independently of the peculiar hue of
this instrument, it is also objectionable—1st,
because it is designed to impute the cause of
the war to our own officers, and the Executive
laying aside all provocation and aggression on
the part of the Indians; 2d, because it directly
implicates the President and Secretary of
War; for although they were not, in the
first instance, guilty of what the committee
calls "a gross violation of the constitution,"
yet they made the act theirs by adoption;
and, if this implied accusation is just, those
officers ought to be impeached; and, 3d, be-
cause the Senate should not provide a case
which they may be required to examine judi-
cially; and on which this anticipation of cen-
sure would disqualify them to act.

This subject was, on the 18th November,
referred, by the House, to two committees, the military and foreign;
and, one month after, on the 18th December,
Mr. Lacoek moved, in the Senate, for a com-
mittee on the same subject. He appears to
have been the moving principle throughout
the whole investigation in the Senate. To
his exertions are the public indebted for the
commencement of the business, its peculiar
character of violence, and the singular docu-
ment by which it is terminated.*

The Seminole war was discussed in the
lower house for more than three weeks, and
yet not a single member suggested the slight-
est censure either on General Jackson for the
employment of volunteers, or on General
Gaines for the unauthorized call on the Creek
nation. It was reserved for Mr. Lacoek to
make the discovery of a violation of the con-
stitution in these acts; and the honesty of
his views, in advancing such a charge, is to be
found in the time at which he made his report
—when the Senate had but six days to sit,
and it could not be discussed; and in declin-
ing to annex the customary resolution, so as
to admit of discussion and afford the friends
of General Jackson an opportunity for de-
fence. To me, it was obviously intended to
counteract the effects apprehended from the
vote of the House and the force of public
opinion; and was, incontestably, designed to
inflict a violent blow on the feelings and char-
acter of General Jackson, under the impos-
ing sanction of a regard for public duty.

It is needless to consume time in an ex-
position of reasons for thinking such a trial of
any man's motives and conduct unfair and
unconstitutional. It is enough to remark,
that justice consists not merely in awarding
punishment for crime, but in giving to indi-
viduals accused of misconduct a full and im-
partial hearing, and an opportunity of advan-
cing all accessible testimony for the elucidation
of their acts and the uprightness and in-
sincerity of their intentions. This justice has
been denied to General Jackson. His public
acts and private character have both been
made the subjects of systematic investigation;
and without a hearing he has been pronounced
guilty of the awful crime of striking at the
liberties of his country, by an infraction of its
constitution; and has received, in a sentence
of censure; the cruellest punishment that can
be inflicted on a soldier.

And what is the motive to which all the
general's acts in Florida have been attributed?
His operations, say the committee, were con-
ducted "on reasons of his own, unconnected
with his military functions;" and these reasons
were "merely views and speculations, which

the occupancy of the Spanish territory would
and facilitate mature! It is to be hoped that
Gen. Jackson will never degrade himself by
answering a charge as foul as it is ridiculous,
a charge totally unsupported by any of the
documents, and abundantly refuted both by
them and by his character. No man in pub-
lic life who marches steady and erect along
the path of duty, can fail to awaken enmity
among those who envy his reputation, with-
out ability to emulate his virtues. But, sure-
ly, the deadliest foe of General Jackson can-
not, for a moment, credit such a charge as
this. I dare venture to assert, that not a sin-
gle member of the select committee, malign-
ant as appears to be the hostility of some of
them to the general, believes that he led an
army to the field, and jeopardized the lives of
valuable citizens, in order to speculate with
security in Spanish lands; or that he risked
the ruin both of health and reputation and
prostrated the constitution, to secure the paltry
advantage of buying a few acres in Flor-
ida. We read of men whose dangerous po-
litical ambition prompted to the commission
of awful crimes towards their country; but
the monstrous act of overturning a free con-
stitution and making unauthorized war, with
the despicable view of trifling pecuniary gain,
and unrecorded. If that committee do not
believe the charge they have advanced, what
can be their views, and how will they explain
their motives to their country? It would be
both indecorous and useless to indulge in the
language of resentment and recrimination;
but it would be injustice to the country to
withhold the expression of a deep conviction,
that this most unjust and illegal trial origi-
nating in dishonest motives—from feelings of
personal hostility in one of the members, and,
in others, of a disposition to gratify a junta.
It is right to state, that two members of the
committee were opposed to the report. One
of those, who was not personally acquainted
with the general who sat in the convention
which framed the constitution, was too well
acquainted with the principles of that sacred
instrument to sanction any proceeding calcu-
lated to do it vital injury; and the other had
too long known General Jackson to entertain
any doubt of his purity. When the course
of these gentlemen is contrasted with that of
the majority in the committee, the people will
have no difficulty in conceiving the impure
motives by which that majority were govern-
ed.

The principles which guided the com-
mander in chief, in the movements of the Semi-
nole campaign, have been so ably developed
and supported by men of integrity and talents,
that it is deemed unnecessary now to review
them. The orders which governed him are
before the world. The selection and use of
the means for their complete execution are
well known. He left any thing undone
which was necessary to give peace and secu-
rity to the southern frontier; or if he un-
necessarily superadded to sufficient means
of effecting this object any act injurious to
the country and destructive of the constitution,
the grounds for a fair judgment are with the
nation, and its award, either of blame or ap-
probation, will doubtless be just. This article
shall be confined to the elucidation of some
obscurities, and the correction of several mis-
statements of facts in the narrative of the re-
port. The argumentative part shall only be
touched incidentally.

It is stated in the first page of the report,
"that, in the spring or summer of 1817, the
regular troops were withdrawn from the posts
on the Georgia frontier, and concentrated at
Fort Montgomery, on the Alabama river, a
considerable distance west of the Georgia
line." This is calculated to create an impres-
sion, that General Jackson issued the order
for evacuating the posts south of Georgia,
and thereby jeopardized that frontier, by
opening the way for savage incursion. But,
in the commission of this military error, he
was no way instrumental. The order for
the movement of the troops to the Alabama
was issued from the War Department, by
Mr. Crawford, contrary to the General's opi-
nion, who considered the movement both dan-
gerous and impolitic.

In page 2, it is stated, that General Gaines
ordered Maj. Twiggs "to surround and take
an Indian village, called Fowl Town about
fourteen miles from Fort Scott, and near the
Florida line." The order to Maj. Twiggs
was to bring to Fort Scott the Chief of Fowl
Town, who had repeatedly been called to an
interview, and as often contumaciously re-
fused to appear. The object of General
Gaines was to have a definitive understanding
with the Chief respecting his hostile or friend-
ly intentions; and the importance of such an
understanding induced the General to order
his forcible capture, if gentle means proved
inefficient.

In the same page, is this remarkable para-
graph: "On the receipt of this order," (the
order under which General Jackson proceed-
ed, on the Seminole campaign,) "General
Jackson, instead of observing the orders of
the Department of War by calling on the

Governor of Tennessee, then in Nashville
near the place of his residence, chose the ap-
peal (to use his own expressions) to the pa-
triotism of the West Tennesseans; who had
served under him in the last war. One thou-
sand mounted gunmen and two companies of
what were called life-guards, with the utmost
alacrity volunteered their services, from the
states of Tennessee and Kentucky, and re-
paired to his standard. Officers were ap-
pointed to command this corps by the General
himself, or other persons acting under his au-
thority. Thus organized, they were mustered
into the service of the United States."

At the time this order was received the
Governor of Tennessee was either in Knox-
ville or the Cherokee nation; and to have
waited the result of the usual process of draft-
ing, would have produced the two evils, of
much loss of valuable time, and the raising of
a force reluctant in disposition and inefficient
in character and equipment. General Jack-
son immediately dispatched a letter to Gov-
ernor McMinn, apprising him of the call for
volunteers, and informing him, that in case
the call should not be promptly and effectual-
ly answered, he should require of him one
thousand drafted militia (b.). The Govern-
or warmly approved the step the General had
taken and added to his force one company of
mounted volunteers who joined the army at
Fort Gadsden. Gen. Jackson's letter of the
12th January, apprised the Department of
the measure, and the Secretary approved and
sanctioned it. (c.)

Corps of the same character with the Ten-
nessee volunteers were raised in other parts
of the country, and under different officers,
during the late war with Great Britain. In
the northwestern campaign General Harrison
was joined by a body of volunteers, led by
Colonel Johnson—and Governor Shelby au-
thorized the General to form them into corps,
and appoint such officers as the men might
elect. Another body of men, from Ohio,
joined the army on the march of General
Harrison for the relief of Fort Wayne, with-
out any authority, and uncommissioned by
the state Executive. These organized them-
selves and appointed their officers. Their
services were accepted for ten days, and they
received pay for that period.

It is well known that exactly the same
kind of troops followed General Jackson into
the Creek nation, and achieved the victories
of Talladega, Eufaula, and the Horse Shoe
Creek. They were organized by the same
Florida, covered Mobile from British visita-
tion; and the same troops, officers and men,
(d.) defeated Wellington's veterans on the
shore of the Mississippi, & saved New-Orleans
from incendiary pollution. Did Congress,
then, adopt the act of raising them "uncon-
stitutional," or did they approve the measure
and make appropriation for paying them? I
will not say that the sanctioning an act by
one Congress obliges every succeeding
Congress to approve all similar proceedings.
But, where a measure of importance, neces-
sity is adopted on personal responsibility, and
approved by the government or the nation, it
must be some motive, different from a regard
for principle, that could prompt a committee
of Congress, at another period, to censure a
similar measure, urged by similar necessity,
and productive of similar benefit.

It is thought unnecessary to enter minutely
into an enquiry on the powers of either the
War Department or a Major General Com-
manding, to raise, on emergency, a body of
mounted volunteers. We shall leave this
discussion to those who are fond of cavilling at
forms, and raising technical objections to the
most important and necessary measures. Suffice
it to say, that General Jackson had to
choose between two modes of raising the re-
quisite force: the one productive of pernicious de-
lay, (e.) and calculated to ensure ultimate de-
feat—the other, more simple, less extensive,
and creative of an army, fraught with ardent
enterprise, and willing to endure every privation
in giving safety to their brethren of the South.
To select was not difficult. It was a choice between defeat and victory; the
full performance of an urgent duty, or the
disgrace, of the General and the destruction
of his army.

The committee are grossly erroneous in as-
serting that General Jackson appointed the
officers of the volunteer corps. (f.) He did
not appoint one of them. It is true that he
appealed to the officers who had gallantly
fought with him in the wilderness of the Creek
nation, and on the plains of New-Orleans, and
again roused them to the defence of their
frontiers. (g.) But their appointments to

(b) See Doc. B. (c) See Docs C. D. L. K. I.
(d) It is worthy of remark, that the same regiments,
similarly officered, and nearly the same men who were
at New-Orleans, were in the Seminole campaign. They
assembled in 1814, at the call for volunteers, chose their
officers, and cheerfully obeyed them, although none
were commissioned. They followed the same course
exactly in 1817—18, and, in both cases, victory followed
their march.
(e) The muster rolls of the volunteers, in 1814 and 1818,
now on file in the War office, established this fact.
(f) See Doc. A. (g) See Doc. M.
(h) The importance of rapid movements, at that time
is best proved by a reference to Doc. F. containing an ex-
cerpt of a letter to Colonel Arbuckle, then at Fort Scott,
in an extremely difficult situation.

command, were in all cases made by the
choice of the men they brought into the field;
and many of the officers, high in rank, accept-
ed subordinate commissions. Colonel Hayne
was ordered to take command of the volun-
teers, to organize, muster and march them to
the frontier.

It may be well to remark, before quitting
this subject, that the field officers of the
Georgia troops were appointed by choice of
the men, after the concentration of the militia
on the west bank of Ockmulgee, and beyond
the civil jurisdiction of Georgia.

In page 5, the committee remark, that the
whole strength of the Seminoles when com-
bined did not exceed one thousand men, op-
posed to whom, under General Gaines, were
"1800 regulars and militia, besides 1500 In-
dians illegally subsidized by the last men-
tioned general. What, then, in this state of
case, becomes of the plea of necessity?"
I will ask, if the committee did not know, that
correct information of the numbers and posi-
tions of the Indians was only obtained after the
termination of the campaign. General Gaines
was led to believe, from his enquiries on this
subject, that the number of the Seminoles ex-
ceeded 2,500 warriors. Would, it have been
prudent to march half this number of men to
the frontier, had the General even this num-
ber of men to the frontier, had the General
even believed the numbers of the enemy to be
exaggerated? The strength of the Seminole
might easily have been augmented by auxil-
iary hands from the more easterly parts of
the Florida, and it became General Jackson's
duty, under this consideration, to raise such a
force as would ensure success in every emer-
gency. Can it be wrong to act against an
enemy, with a larger force than his own; or
is it impolitic and unamilitary to use that
superiority which will ensure success? Such a
principle may govern those who lead men to
battle to gratify ambition, and weave barren
laurels for their brows. But such battles Gen-
eral Jackson never has fought, and never
will fight. He has too dear a regard for the
character of his country and the lives of her
citizens, to endanger either in useless contests,
and far may it ever be from him, to draw ei-
ther on the purse or the blood of the republic,
to purchase the wreath of unprofitable glory.

It is said, that the Indians were illegally
subsidized by General Gaines. General Mitch-
ell's letter of the 14th December, 1817, to the
Secretary of war, apprises the Department
that the friendly Indians should be employed;
and General Gaines, in a letter of the 23d De-
cember, also informs the Secretary of the con-
templated employment of Indians; which com-
munication was received at Washington on the
26th December. If, then, the Executive were
early apprized of General Gaines' intention,
the Secretary, by not disapproving the mea-
sure, adopted it; and the committee knowing
this fact, in attributing improper and illegal
views to General Jackson, only offered an ad-
ditional display of spiteful hostility to the ar-
my, and the most wanton and studied disre-
gard of truth.

The committee accuse the General of dis-
obedience of orders in as much as he disregard-
ed the injunction to General Gaines, to ab-
stain from attacking Spanish garrisons, with-
out special instructions from the Department.

It is a clear principle that no order given to
one officer can be made part of an order sub-
sequently given to another officer, for the per-
formance of the same duty, without a special
reference to the first, and an express direction
to be governed by it. Jackson's orders were
general; he was told to terminate the conflict,
and give tranquility to the frontier; and in
these orders, no instructions can be found for
his government by the orders previously given
to General Gaines. In selecting the means of
accomplishing the objects of the campaign,
the commanding general's powers were dis-
cretionary, and for his judgment in using those
powers, was he alone responsible. The only
mode in which he could have disobeyed the or-
der, was either to have remained inactive at
Nashville, or to have adopted such measures
as would have been more pernicious than in-
activity. In either case, his conduct would
have been justly reprehensible.

But admit the orders of General Gaines to
be obligatory on General Jackson—the case
contemplated by these orders never occurred.
The Indians were not found under the guns of
a Spanish fort, but were sheltered within it.
It was their depot, from whence they drew
their public stores, both of ammunition and
provision. Spanish officers escorted parties
of Indians to place them in security from our
attacks. The war was planned in St. Marks.
The Indian power of attorney was executed
there, and countersigned by F. C. Luengo,
the commandant; and the councils for the ar-
rangement to every warlike movement were
held in the quarters of that officer.

If these facts had been known at the War
Office, it is not to be doubted, that an order
would have been issued for the seizure of St.
Marks. For when they, and the facts of the
General induced by them, were known, the
President approved the measure. It had not
been conceivable that the Spanish officers had
(See fourth page.)