

# PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

SENT TO THE AMERICAN CONGRESS.

HOPE FOR CUBAN PATRIOTS DOOMED.

Interference in Name of Humanity Must Await Developments.

WANTS HAWAII ANNEXED

Only the Action of the Senate is Necessary to Complete It.

THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM

Bouquet of Beautiful Paper Flowers Thrown at Bimetallism—Paper Money Redeemed in Gold Should Not Be Released Except for Gold—The Indians—Alaska—The Pacific Railroad and Other Matters Considered.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

It gives me pleasure to extend greeting to the Fifty-fifth congress, assembled in regular session at the seat of government, with many of whose senators I have been associated in the legislative service. Their meeting occurs under felicitous conditions, justifying sincere congratulations and calling for our grateful acknowledgments to a beneficent Providence, which has so signally blessed and prospered us as a nation. Peace and good will with all the nations of the earth continue unbroken.

A matter of genuine satisfaction is the growing feeling of fraternal regard and unification of all sections of our country, the incompetencies of which has too long delayed realization of the highest blessing of the union. The spirit of patriotism is universal and is ever increasing in fervor. The public questions which now most engross us are lifted far above either partisanship or prejudices of former sectional differences. They affect every part of our common country alike and permit of no division on ancient lines. Questions of foreign policy, of revenue, the soundness of the currency, the inviolability of national obligations, the improvement of the public service, appeal to the individual conscience of every earnest citizen, to whatever party he belongs or in whatever section of the country he may reside.

The extra session of this congress, which closed in July last, enacted important legislation, and while its full effect has not been realized, what it has already accomplished assures us of its timeliness and wisdom. To test its permanent value further, time will be required, and the people, satisfied with its operation and results thus far, are in no mind to withhold from it a fair trial.

Tariff legislation having been settled by the extra session of congress, the question next pressing for consideration is that of currency.

### THE FINANCES FIRST.

The work of putting our finances upon a sound basis, difficult as it may seem, will appear easier when we recall the financial operations of the government since 1866. On the thirtieth day of June of that year we had outstanding demand liabilities in the sum of \$728,868,474. On the first of January, 1870, the liabilities had been reduced to \$443,889.88. Of our interest-bearing obligations the figures are even more striking. On July 1, 1866, the principal of the interest-bearing debt of the government was \$2,232,821,206. On the first of July, 1893, this sum had been reduced to \$586,097,100, or an aggregate reduction of \$1,747,724,106. The interest-bearing debt of the United States on the first day of December, 1897, was \$447,366,620. The government money now outstanding (December 1) consists of \$346,681,016 of U. S. notes, \$107,739,280 of treasury notes issued by authority of the law of 1890, \$384,928,804 of silver certificates, and \$61,280,761 of standard silver dollars.

With the great resources of the government and with the honorable example of the past before us, we ought not to hesitate upon a currency revision which will make our demand obligations less onerous to the government and relieve our financial laws from ambiguity and doubt.

The brief review of what was accomplished from the close of the war to 1893 make unreasonable and groundless any distrust either of our financial ability or soundness; while the situation from 1893 to 1897 must admonish congress of the immediate necessity of so legislating us to make the return of the conditions then prevailing impossible.

There are many plans proposed as a remedy for the evil. Before we can find the true remedy we must appreciate the real evil. It is not that our currency of every kind is not good; good because the government's pledge is out to keep it so, and that pledge will be best shown by advancing toward its fulfillment.

ferent forms of money, that is, keeping all of them at par with gold. We surely cannot be longer heedless of the burden this imposes upon the people, even under fairly prosperous conditions, while the past four years have demonstrated that it is not only an expensive charge upon the government but a dangerous menace to the national credit.

It is manifest that we must devise some plan to protect the government against bond issues for repeated redemptions. We must either curtail the opportunity for speculation, made easy by the multiplied redemptions of our demand obligations, or increase the gold reserve for their redemption. We have \$900,000,000 of currency, which the government by solemn enactment has undertaken to keep at par with gold. Nobody is obliged to redeem in gold but the government. The banks are not required to redeem in gold. The government is obliged to keep even with gold all its outstanding currency and coin obligations, while its receipts are not required to be paid in gold.

They are paid in every kind of money but gold, and the only means by which the government can, with certainty, get gold is by borrowing. It can get it in no other way when it most needs it. The government, without any fixed gold revenue, is pledged to maintain gold redemption, which it has steadily and faithfully done, and which, under the authority now given it, will continue to do. The law which requires the government, after having redeemed its United States notes, to pay them out again as current funds, demands a constant replenishment of the gold reserve.

This is equally so in times of business panic and when the revenues are insufficient to meet the expenses of the government. At such times the government has no other way to supply its deficit and maintain redemption but through the increase of its bonded debt, as during the administration of my predecessor, when \$262,315,400 of four and a half per cent bonds were issued and sold and the proceeds used to pay the expenses of the government in excess of the revenues and sustain the gold reserve. While it is true that the greater part of the proceeds of these bonds were required to supply deficient revenues, a considerable portion was required to maintain the gold reserve. With our revenues equal to our expenditures, there would be no deficit requiring the issuance of bonds. But if the gold reserve falls below \$100,000,000, how will it be replenished except by selling more bonds? Is there any other way practicable under existing law? The serious question, then, is, shall we continue the policy that has been pursued in the past; that, when the gold reserve reaches the point of danger, issue more bonds and supply the needed gold, or shall we provide other means to prevent the recurring drains upon the gold reserve? If no further legislation is had, and the policy of selling bonds is to be continued, then congress should give the secretary of the treasury authority to sell bonds at long or short periods, bearing a less rate of interest than is now authorized by law.

### The Gold Drain.

I earnestly recommend as soon as the receipts of the government are quite sufficient to pay all the expenses of the government, that when any of the United States notes are presented for redemption in gold and are redeemed in gold, such notes shall be kept and set apart and only paid out in exchange for gold. This is an obvious duty. If the holder of the United States note prefers the gold and gets it from the government, he should not receive back from the government a United States note without paying gold in exchange for it. The reason for this is made all the more apparent when the government issues an interest-bearing debt to provide gold for the redemption of United States notes—a non-interest bearing debt. Surely it should not pay them out again except on demand and for gold. If they are put out in any other way, they return again, to be followed by another bond issue to redeem them—another interest-bearing debt to redeem a non-interest bearing debt. In my view it is of utmost importance that the government should be relieved from the burden of providing all the gold required for exchanges and export. This responsibility is alone borne by the government without any of the usual and necessary banking powers to help itself. The banks do not feel the strain of the gold redemption. The whole strain rests upon the government and the size of the gold reserve in the treasury has come to be, with or without reason, the signal of danger or of security. This ought to be stopped if we are to have an era of prosperity in the country. With sufficient receipts for the expenses of the government we may feel no immediate embarrassment from our present currency; but the danger still exists, and will be ever present menacing us so long as the existing system continues.

And besides, it is in time of adequate revenues and business tranquility that the government should prepare for the worst. We cannot avoid, without serious consequences, the wise consideration and prompt solution of this question.

### Endorses Gage's Plan.

The secretary of the treasury has outlined a plan in great detail for the purpose of removing the threatened recurrence of a depleted gold reserve and save us from future embarrassment on that account. To this plan I invite your careful consideration.

I concur with the secretary of the treasury in his recommendation, that national banks be allowed to issue notes to the face value of the bonds which they have deposited for circulation and that the tax on circulating notes secured by deposit of such bonds be reduced to one-half of 1 per cent, per annum. I also join him in recommending that authority be given for the establishment of national banks with a minimum capital of \$25,000. This will enable the smaller villages and agricultural regions of the country to be supplied with currency to meet their needs.

I recommend that the issue of national bank notes be restricted to the denomination of \$10 and upwards. If the suggestions I have herein made shall have the approval of congress, then I would recommend that national banks be required to redeem their notes in gold.

### FOREIGN RELATIONS

He Reviews the History of 'Down-Trodden Cuba.'

The most important problem with which this government is now called

upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less in common with those now existing have confronted this government at various times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest, growing discontent, and an effort toward a larger enjoyment of liberty and self control; or organized resistance to the mother country; or deep depression after distress and warfare and of ineffectual settlement to be followed by renewed revolt. For no enduring period since the enfranchisement of the continental possessions of Spain in the western continent has the condition of Cuba or the policy of Spain toward Cuba not caused concern to the United States.

The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon the island and the political vicissitude and embarrassments of the home government might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power called forth between 1823 and 1860 various emphatic declarations of the policy of the United States to permit no disturbance of Cuba's connection with Spain unless in the direction of independence or acquisition by us through purchase; nor has there been any change of this declared policy since upon the part of the government.

The revolution which began in 1868 lasted for ten years, despite the strenuous efforts of the successive peninsular government to suppress it. Then, as now, the government of the United States testified its grave concern and offered its aid to put an end to the bloodshed in Cuba. The overtures made by Gen. Grant were refused and the war dragged on, entailing great loss of life and treasure and increased injury to American interests, besides throwing enhanced burdens of neutrality upon this government. In 1878 peace was brought about by the truce of Zanjón, obtained by negotiations between the Spanish commander, Martinez de Campos and the insurgent leaders.

### The Present Revolution.

The present insurrection broke out in February, 1895. It is not my purpose at this time to recall its remarkable increase or to characterize its tenacious resistance against the enormous forces massed against it by Spain. The revolt and the efforts to subdue it carried destruction to every quarter of the island, developing wide proportions and defying the efforts of Spain for its suppression.

The civilized code of war has been discarded all too soon by the Spaniards than by the Cubans. The existing conditions cannot but fill this government and the American people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the part of our people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of self control which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country.

The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tending the friendly offices of this government, failed. Any mediation on our part was not accepted. In brief, the answer read: "There is no effectual way to pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country."

Then only could Spain act in the promised direction of her own motion and after her own plans. The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896.

### Distress and Desolation.

The productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy of the late cabinet of Spain was justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermination.

Against this abuse of the rights of war I have constrained on repeated occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this government. There was much of public condemnation of the treatment of American citizens by alleged illegal arrests and long imprisonment awaiting trial or pending protracted judicial proceedings. I felt it my first duty to make instant demand for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest. Before the change of the Spanish cabinet in October last, twenty-two prisoners of citizens of the United States, had been given their freedom.

For the relief of our own citizens, suffering because of the conflict, the aid of congress was sought in a special message, and under the appropriation of April 4, 1897, effective aid has been given to American citizens in Cuba, many of them at their own request having been returned to the United States.

The instructions given to our new minister to Spain, before his departure for his post directed him to impress upon that body the sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the war in Cuba by reaching a peaceful and lasting result, just and honorable alike to Spain and to the Cuban people.

### Woodford's Instructions.

These instructions recited the character and duration of the contest, the widespread losses it entails, the burdens and restraints it imposes upon us, with constant disturbance of national interests and the injury resulting from an

indefinite continuance of this state of things. It was stated that at this juncture our government was constrained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when Spain, of her own volition, and in her own interests and every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destructive war and make proposals of a settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony. It was urged that as a neighbor of the nation, with large interests in Cuba, we could be required to wait only a reasonable time for the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an indefinite period for the accomplishment of this result. No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to Spain could attach, and indeed precise proposals were withheld to avoid embarrassment to that government. All that was asked or expected was that some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored. It so chanced that consideration of this offer, addressed to the same Spanish administration which had declined the tenders of my predecessor and which for more than two years had forced men and treasure into Cuba, in the fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell to others. Between the departure of Gen. Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival in Spain, the statesman who had shaped the policy of his country fell by the hand of an assassin, and although the cabinet of the premier still held office and received from our envoy the proposals he bore, that cabinet gave place within a few days thereafter to a new administration, under the leadership of Sagasta.

### Spain's Reply Satisfactory.

The reply to our note was received on Oct. 23. It is in the direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly purposes of this government. It admits that our country is deeply affected by the war in Cuba and that its desires for peace are just. It declares that the present Spanish government is bound by every consideration to a change of policy that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time. To this end Spain has decided to put into effect the political reforms heretofore advocated by the present premier without halting for any consideration in the path which in its judgment leads to peace. The military operations, it is said, will continue, but will be humane and conducted with all regard for private rights, being accompanied by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba, while guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it is claimed, will result in investing Cuba with a distinct personality; the island to be governed by an executive and by a local council or chamber, reserving to Spain the control of the foreign relations, the army and navy and the judicial administration. To accomplish this, the present government proposes to modify existing legislation by decree leaving the Spanish cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators and deputies, to solve the economic problem and properly distribute the existing debt.

### LET THE WAR GO ON.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION OF THE MEASURES THAT THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSES TO TAKE IN CARRYING OUT ITS PROFFER OF GOOD OFFICES, IT SUGGESTS THAT SPAIN BE LEFT FREE TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AND GREAT POLITICAL REFORMS WHILE THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS PART SHALL ENFORCE ITS NEUTRAL OBLIGATIONS AND CUT OFF THE ASSISTANCE WHICH IT IS ASSERTED THE INSURGENTS RECEIVE FROM THIS COUNTRY. THE SUPPOSITION OF AN INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF WAR IS DENIED. IT IS ASSERTED THAT THE WESTERN PROVINCES ARE ALREADY WELL NIGH RECLAIMED; THAT PLANTING OF CANE AND TOBACCO THEREIN HAS BEEN RESUMED AND THAT BY FORCE OF ARMS AND NEW AND AMPLE REFORMS VERY EARLY AND COMPLETE PACIFICATION IS HOPED FOR.

THE IMMEDIATE AMELIORATION OF EXISTING CONDITIONS UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OF CUBAN AFFAIRS IS PREDICTED AND THERewith ALL THE DISTURBANCE AND ALL OCCASION FOR ANY CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES.

Discussion of international duties and responsibilities of the United States, as Spain understands them, is presented with an apparent disposition to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact; it could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this government has made at the cost of millions and by the employment of the administrative machinery of the nation at command to perform its full duty under the laws of nations. That it has successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But of this aspect of the Spanish note, it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly performed obligation due response to this charge has been made in diplomatic course.

Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace, this government has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and consonance with the clearest interests and convictions of our own people should the prolongation of the strife so demand.

### Annexation Not Thought Of.

OF THE UNTRIED MEASURES THERE REMAINS ONLY RECOGNITION OF THE INSURGENTS AS BELLIGERENTS; RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CUBA; NEUTRAL INTERVENTION TO END THE WAR BY IMPOSING A RATIONAL COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE CONTENTANTS; AND INTERVENTION IN FAVOR OF ONE OR THE OTHER PARTY. I SPEAK NOT OF FORCIBLE ANNEXATION FOR THAT BY OUR CODE OF MORALITY WOULD BE CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.

### Belligerent Rights.

Recognition of the belligerency of

Cuban insurgents has often been canvassed as a possible, if not an inevitable step, both in regard to the previous ten years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful that two houses of congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed requiring or justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba and during the extra session, the senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought to a vote in the house.

In the presence of these significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch, it behooves the executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of a state, which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, in short, is the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents and the insurgents and the conduct of war by them, according to the received code of war are no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of belligerency than the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the international policy of recognizing state. The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba and it may be wholesome now to recall them.

At that time a ruinous conflict had for seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity, which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued unabated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but that of the United States more than any other by reason of proximity and larger trade and intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these words, which now, as then, sum up the elements of the problem:

"A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion impracticable and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that of recognition of belligerent rights in the parties of the contest. In a former message to congress I had occasion to consider this question, and reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war."

It is possible that the acts of foreign powers and even acts of Spain herself of this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such recognition.

"But now, as in its past history, the United States should avoid the false lights which might lead it into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere rigidly and steadily to the rule which has been its guide of doing that which is right and honest and of good report. The question of according or withholding rights of belligerency must be judged in every case, in view of the particular attending facts. Unless justified by necessity, it is always and justly regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary and it is required when the interests and rights of the government or of its people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the sense of international law of war."

"Belligerency, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending bodies and their occasional conflicts do not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers of international law and which have been observed by nations of dignity, honesty and power, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization, real palpable and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of forces, such material, such occupation of territory as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would elevate it."

### Owens No Navy.

"The contest, moreover, is solely on land, the insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport, whence it may set forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers, except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those whose sudden and difficult complications, which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national and upon the consular officers of other powers calls for the definition of belligerency to the parties of the contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard it to be at present indefensible, as a measure of right."

"Such recognition entails upon the country, according to the rights which flow from it, difficult and complicated duties and requires the exacting observance of their rights and obligations."

"It confers the right of search upon the high seas of vessels of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption, in vessels of the United States to detention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the Atlantic and the gulf states and between all of them and the states on the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two states. There can be little doubt as to what result



such supervision would, before long, draw this nation. It would be unworthy of the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such result by measures of questionable right or expediency, or by any indirection."

### Practical Aspect.

Turning to the practical aspect of a recognition of belligerency, and reviewing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further and pertinent considerations appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency unaccompanied by the assumption of international neutrality. Such recognition, without more, will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not heretofore actually possessed or affect the relation of either party to other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the defacto condition of belligerency as its motives. It announces a domestic law of neutrality in the declaring states. It assumes the international obligation of neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the proclaimer that they violate those rigorous obligations at their own peril and cannot expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty law, must under international law, be admitted as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. While according equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each party in our ports, disputes would be imposed on both, which, while nominally equal, would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain. Hereby possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba, her maritime rights could be asserted not only for the military investment of the island, but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things would exist for which the Cubans, within their own domain, could not hope to create a parallel; while its creation, through aid or sympathy within our domain, would be even more impossible than now, with the additional obligations of international neutrality we would, per force, assume.

The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and applicable by our own instrumentalities. It could impair to the United States no jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents; it would give the United States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the paramount authority of Spain according to the international code of war.

### For Humanity's Sake.

Intervention upon the grounds of humanity has been frequently suggested and has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration. But should such a step be now taken, when it is apparent that a hopeful change has supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba, and a new government has taken office in the mother country; it is pledged in advance to the declaration that all the effort in the world cannot suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform, after subjugation, affords no solution of the insular problem, that with a substitution of commanders, must come a change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy which shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to the horrible alternative of taking to the thicket or succumbing in misery; that reforms must be instituted in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the time, and these reforms, while designed to give full autonomy to the colony and to create a virtual entity and self-controlled administration, shall yet conserve and affirm the sovereignty of Spain by a just distribution of powers and burdens upon a basis of mutual interest untainted by methods of selfish expediency.

The first acts of the new government lie in these honorable paths. The policy of cruel rapine and extermination that so long shocked the universal sentiment of humanity has been reversed. Under the new military commander, a broad clemency is proffered. Measures have already been set on foot to relieve the horrors of starvation. The power of the Spanish armies, it is asserted, is to be used not to spread ruin and desolation; but to protect the resumption of peaceful agricultural pursuits and productive industries. That past methods are futile to force a peaceable peace by subjugation is freely admitted and that ruin without reconciliation must inevitably fall to win for Spain the fidelity of a contented dependency.

### Scheme of Autonomy.

Decrees in application of the fore-shadowed reforms have already been promulgated. The full text of these decrees has not been received, but as furnished in a telegraphic summary from our minister here: All civil and electoral rights of peninsular Spaniards in virtue of existing constitutional authority forthwith extended to colonial Spaniards. A scheme of autonomy has been proclaimed by decree to become effective upon ratification by the cortes.

### Scheme of Autonomy.

(Continued on Page 7.)