

MINERS' & FARMERS' JOURNAL.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED EVERY SATURDAY, BY THOMAS J. HOLTON, CHARLOTTE, MECKLENBURG COUNTY, NORTH-CAROLINA.

I WILL TEACH YOU TO PIERCE THE BOWELS OF THE EARTH AND BRING OUT FROM THE CAVERNS OF THE MOUNTAINS, METALS WHICH WILL GIVE STRENGTH TO OUR HANDS AND SUBJECT ALL NATURE TO OUR USE AND PLEASURE.—DR. JOHNSON.

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All communications to the Editor must come free of postage, or they may not be attended to.

CHARLESTON, MARCH 25, 1833.

Cotton, Sea Island, 18 a 30; upland, new, 10 a 12; Rice, prime, 2 a 2½; inferior to good, 2 a 2½; Flour, superfine, 6 a 6½; Corn, 62 a 65; Oats, 48 a 50; Whiskey, 33 a 34; N. E. Rum, good, 37 a 38; Apple Brandy, 40 a 42; Beeswax, 17 a 18; Tallow, 11 a 12; Mackerel, No. 1, 7; No. 2, 6; Bacon, 6 a 7; Ham, 10 a 11; Lard, 8 a 9; Nails, cut, 5 a 6 cents lb.; Bagging, 13 a 16; Bale Rope, 6 a 10 cents lb.; Cognac Brandy, 150 a 200; Holland Gin, 100 a 125; Iron, Russia and Sweden, 44 a 46 per lb.; Salt, Liverpool, in bags of 4 bush, 1½ a 1½; in bulk, 33 a 36; T. Island, 45 a 50; Sugar, Havana, 10 a 11; brown, 7 a 8; St. Croix and Java, 7 a 9; New Orleans, 6 a 8; Molasses, Cuba, 25 a 30; N. Orleans, 26 a 28; Coffee, prime green, 14 a 15; inferior to good, 12 a 13; Hyson Tea, 77 a 90 cts lb.; North-Carolina "money," 1 a 1½ per cent. discount; Savannah Bank Bills 1 per cent. discount; All other Georgia Bank Bills 1 and 1½ per cent.

CAMDEN, MARCH 23.

Country Produce.—Cotton, 9 a 10; Corn 50 a 55; Wheat, 80 a 85; Flour, country, 4½ a 4½; Bacon, 7 a 10; Whiskey, 35 a 40; Brandy, Apple, 20 a 45; Peach, 40 a 62.

DEBATE

In the Senate of the United States on the bill further to provide for the collection of duties on imports.

[MR. CALHOUN'S SPEECH CONCLUDED.]

On the next day, Mr. Calhoun proceeded by remarking that he had omitted at their proper place, in the course of his observations yesterday, two or three points to which he would now advert, before he resumed the discussion where he had left off. He had stated that the ordinance and acts of South Carolina were directed, not against the revenue, but against the system of protection. But it might be asked, if such was her object, how happens it that she has declared the whole system void, revenue as well as protection, without discrimination? It is this question which he proposed to answer. Her justification would be found in the necessity of the case; and, if there be any blame, it could not attach to her. The two were so blended, throughout the whole, as to make the entire revenue system subordinate to the protection, so as to constitute a complete system of protection, in which it was impossible to discriminate the two elements of which it is composed. South-Carolina at least could not make the discrimination, and she was reduced to the alternative of acquiescing in a system which she believed to be unconstitutional, and which she felt to be oppressive and ruinous, or, to consider the whole as one, equally contaminated through all its parts, by the unconstitutionality of the protective portion; and, as such, to be repealed by the act of the State. He maintained that the State had a right to regard it in the latter character, and that if a loss of revenue followed, the fault was not hers, but of this Government, which had improperly blended together, in a manner not to be separated by the State, two systems wholly dissimilar. If the sincerity of the State be doubted; if it be supposed that her action is against revenue as well as protection, let the two be separated; let so much of the duties as are intended for revenue, be put in one bill, and the residue intended for protection be put in another, and he pledged himself that the ordinance and the acts of the State would cease as to the former, and be directed exclusively against the latter.

He stated, in the course of his remarks yesterday, and trusted he had conclusively shown that the act of 1816, with the exception of a single item, to which he had alluded, was, in reality a revenue measure, and that Carolina, and the other States, in supporting it had not incurred the slightest responsibility in relation to the system of protection, which had since grown up, and which now distresses the country. Sir, said Mr. C. I am willing as one of the representatives of Carolina, and, I believe, I speak the sentiment of the State, to take that act as the basis of a permanent adjustment of the tariff, simply reducing the duties, in an average proportion, on all the items, to the average point. I make that offer now to the advocates of the protective system; but I must, in candor, inform them, that such an adjustment would distribute the revenue between the protected and unprotected articles more favorably to the States and to the South, and less so to the manufacturing interests, than an average uniform ad valorem, and, accordingly, more so than that now proposed by Carolina through her Convention. After such an offer, no man who valued his candor, will dare accuse

the State, or those who have represented her here, with inconsistency in reference to the point under consideration.

He omitted, also, on yesterday, to notice a remark of the Senator from Virginia, (Mr. Rives,) that the only difficulty in adjusting the tariff, grew out of the ordinance and the acts of South-Carolina. He must attribute an assertion, so inconsistent with the facts, to an ignorance of the occurrences of the last few years, in reference to this subject, occasioned by the absence of the gentleman from the United States, to which he himself has alluded in his remarks. If the Senator will take pains to inform himself, he will find that this protective system advanced with a continued and rapid step, in spite of petitions, remonstrances, and protests, of not only Carolina, but also of Virginia and of all the Southern States, until 1821; when Carolina, for the first time, changed the character of her resistance, by holding up her reserved rights as the shield of her defence against further encroachment.—This attitude alone, unaided by a single State, arrested the further progress of the system, so that the question from that period to this, on the part of the manufacturers, has been, not how to acquire more, but to retain that which they have acquired. He would inform the gentleman that if this attitude had not been taken on the part of the State, the question would not now be, how duties ought to be repealed, but a question as to the protected articles, between prohibition on one side, and the duties established by the act of 1828, on the other. But a single remark will be sufficient in reply to what he must consider the invidious remark of the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Rives.] The act of 1832, which has not yet gone into operation, and which was passed but a few months since, was declared by the supporters of the system to be a permanent adjustment, and the bill proposed by the Treasury Department, not essentially different from the act itself, was in like manner declared to be intended, by the administration, as a permanent arrangement. What has occurred since, except this ordinance, and these abused acts of the calumniated State, to produce this mighty revolution in reference to this odious system? Unless the Senator from Virginia can assign some other cause, he is bound, upon every principle of fairness, to retract this unjust aspersion upon the acts of South-Carolina.

After noticing, said Mr. C. another omission, he would proceed with his remarks. The Senator from Delaware, [Mr. CLAYTON,] as others, had relied with great emphasis on the fact, that we are citizens of the U. S.—I, said Mr. C. do not object to the expression, nor shall I detract from the proud and elevated feelings with which it is associated; but he trusted that he might be permitted to raise the inquiry, in what manner we are citizens of the U. States, without weakening the patriotic feeling with which he trusted it would ever be uttered. If by citizen of the U. States, he meant a citizen at large, one whose citizenship extended to the entire geographical limits of the country, without having a local citizenship in some State or Territory, a sort of citizen of the world, all he had to say was, that such a citizen would be a perfect non-descript; that not a single individual of this description could be found in the entire mass of our population. Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every citizen is a citizen of some State or Territory, and, as such, under an express provision of the Constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and it is in this, and in no other sense, that we are citizens of the U. States. The Senator from Pennsylvania, (Mr. DALLAS,) indeed, relies upon that provision in the Constitution which gives Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the operation of the rule actually established under this authority, to prove that naturalized citizens are citizens at large, without being citizens of any of the States. He did not deem it necessary to examine the law of Congress upon this subject, or to reply to the argument of the Senator, though he could not doubt that he [Mr. D.] had taken an entirely erroneous view of the subject. It was sufficient that the power of Congress extended simply to the establishment of a uniform rule, by which foreigners might be naturalized in the several States or Territories, without infringing, in any other respect, in reference to naturalization, the rights of the States, as they existed before the adoption of the Constitution.

Having supplied the omissions of yesterday, Mr. C. resumed the subject at the point where his remarks then terminated. The Senate would remember that he stated, at their close, that the great question at issue was, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated system of government; a system in which the parts, to use the emphatic language of Mr. Palgrave, are the integers, and the whole the multiple, or in which the whole is a unit, and the parts the fractions: that he had stated that on

the decision of this question, he believed, depends not only the liberty and prosperity of this country, but the place which we are destined to hold in the intellectual and moral scale of nations. He had stated, also, in his remarks on this point, that there was a striking analogy between this and the great struggle between Persia and Greece, which had been decided by the battles of Marathon, Plataea, and Salamis, and which had immortalized the names of Miltiades and Themistocles. He had illustrated this analogy by showing that centralism, or consolidation, with the exception of a few nations along the eastern border of the Mediterranean, had been the prevailing principle in the Asiatic Governments, while the federal principle, or, what is the same in principle, that system which organizes a community in reference to its parts, had prevailed in Europe.

Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the Government of the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, was the most striking. The government, at first, was a mere confederation, without any central power, till a military chieftain, with the title of King, was placed at its head, without, however, merging the original organization of the twelve distinct tribes.—This was the commencement of that central action among that peculiar people, which, in three generations, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It is impossible even for a careless reader to peruse the history of that event without being forcibly struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separation, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the establishment of the central power in the King, commenced a system of taxation, which, under King Solomon, was greatly increased, to defray the expense of rearing the temple, of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnificent reign. Increased taxation was followed by its natural consequences—discontent and complaint; which before his death began to excite resistance. On the succession of his son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a reduction of the taxes; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jerusalem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being no longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a reduction of the duties—a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under consideration, and after consulting the old men, the counsellors of 98, who advised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who had since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers, he hearkened unto their counsel, and refused to make the reduction, and the secession of the ten tribes, under Jeroboam, followed. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin, which had received the disbursements, alone remained to the house of David.

But, to return to the point immediately under consideration. He knew that it was not only the opinion of a large majority of our country, but it might be said to be the opinion of the age, that the very beau ideal of a perfect government was the government of a majority, acting through a representative body, without check or limitation in its power; yet, if we may test this theory by experience and reason, we will find that, so far from being perfect, the necessary tendency of all governments based upon the will of an absolute majority, without constitutional check or limitation of power, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism; and this, whether the will of the majority be expressed directly through an assembly of the people themselves, or by their representatives I know (said Mr. C.) that in venturing this assertion I utter that which is unpopular, both within and without these walls; but where truth and liberty are concerned, such considerations should not be regarded. He would place the decision of this point on the fact, that no government of the kind, among the many attempts which had been made, had ever endured for a single generation; but, on the contrary, had invariably experienced the fate which he had assigned to them.—Let a single instance be pointed out, and he would surrender his opinion. But, if we had not the aid of experience to direct our judgment, reason itself would be a certain guide. The view which considers the community as a unit, and all its parts as having a similar interest, is radically erroneous. However homogeneous its interests, the moment that government is put into operation, as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to make appropriations, the different portions of community must, of necessity, bear different and opposing relations in reference to the action of the government. There must inevitably spring up two interests; a direction and a stockholder interest; an interest profiting by the action of the government, and interested in increasing its powers and action; and another at whose expense the political ma-

chine is kept in motion. He knew how difficult it was to communicate distinct ideas on such a subject, through the medium of general propositions, without particular illustration; and, in order that he might be distinctly understood, though at the hazard of being tedious, he would illustrate the important principle which he had ventured to advance, by examples.

Let us then suppose a small community of five persons, separated from the rest of the world; and, to make the example strong let us suppose them all to be engaged in the same pursuit, and to be of equal wealth. Let us further suppose, that they determine to govern the community by the will of a majority; and, to make the case as strong as possible, let us suppose that the majority, in order to meet the expenses of the Government, lay an equal tax, say of \$100 on each individual of this little community. Their treasury would contain five hundred dollars. Three are a majority; and they, by supposition, have contributed three hundred as their portion, and the other two, (the minority,) two hundred. The three have the right to make the appropriation as they may think proper. The question is, how would the principle of the absolute and unchecked majority operate, under these circumstances, in this little community? If the three be governed by a sense of justice—if they should appropriate the money to the objects for which it was raised, the common and equal benefit of the five, then the object of the association would be fairly and honestly effected, and each would have a common interest in the government. But, should the majority pursue an opposite course; should they appropriate the money in a manner to benefit their own particular interest, without regard to the interest of the two, (and that they will so act, unless there be some efficient check, he who best knows human nature will least doubt,) who does not see that the three and the two would have directly opposite interests, in reference to the action of the government? The three who contribute to the common treasury but three hundred dollars, could, in fact, by appropriating the five hundred to their own use, convert the action of the government into the means of making money; and, of consequence, would have a direct interest in increasing the taxes. They put in three hundred and take out five; that is, they take back to themselves all that they had put in; and, in addition, that which was put in by their associates; or, in other words, taking taxation and appropriation together, they have gained, and their associates have lost, two hundred dollars by the fiscal action of the government. And opposite interests, in reference to the action of the government, is thus created between them; the one having an interest in favor and the other against the taxes; the one to increase, and the other to decrease the taxes; the one to retain the taxes when the money is no longer wanted, and the other to repeal them when the objects for which they were levied have been executed.

Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised to twenty-four individuals, to be governed in like manner by the will of a majority; it is obvious that the same principle would divide them into two interests—into a majority and a minority, thirteen against eleven, or in some other proportion; and that all the consequences which he had shown to be applicable to the small community of five, would be equally applicable to the greater—the cause not depending upon the number, but resulting necessarily from the action of the government itself. Let us now suppose that, instead of governing themselves directly in an assembly of the whole, without the intervention of agents, they should adopt the representative principle, and that, instead of being governed by a majority of themselves, they should be governed by a majority of their representatives. It is obvious that the operation of the system would not be effected by the change, the representatives being responsible to those who chose them, will conform to the will of their constituents, and would act as they would do, were they present, and acting for themselves; and the same conflict of interest which we have shown would exist in one case, would equally exist in the other. In either case, the inevitable result would be a system of hostile legislation on the part of the majority, or the stronger interest, against the minority, or the weaker interest; the object of which, on the part of the former, would be to exact as much as possible from the latter, which would necessarily be resisted by all the means in their power. Warfare, by legislation, would thus be commenced between the parties, with the same object, and not less hostile than that which is carried on between distinct and rival nations—the only distinction would be in the instruments and the mode. Enactments, in the one case, would supply what could only be effected by arms in the other; and the inevitable operation would be to engender the most hostile feelings between the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism—that feeling which embraces the whole, and sub-

stitute in its place the most violent party attachment; and, instead of having one common centre of attachment, around which the affections of the community might rally, there would, in fact, be two—the interests of the majority, to which those who constitute that majority would be more attached, than they would be to the whole, and that of the minority, to which they in like manner would also be more attached than to the interests of the whole. Faction would thus take the place of patriotism, and, with the loss of patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow; and, in its train, anarchy; and, finally, despotism, or the establishment of absolute power in a single individual, as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile interests; on the principle that it is better to submit to the will of a single individual, who, by being made lord and master of the whole community, would have an equal interest in the protection of all the parts.

Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calamitous train of consequences, this little community should adopt a written constitution with limitations restricting the will of the majority, in order to protect the minority against the oppressions which he had shown would necessarily result without such restrictions. It is obvious that the case would not be in the slightest degree varied, if the majority be left in possession of the right of judging exclusively of the extent of its powers, without any right on the part of the minority to enforce the restrictions imposed by the constitution on the will of the majority. The point is almost too clear for illustration. Nothing can be more certain than that when a constitution grants power, and imposes limitations on the exercise of that power, whatever interests may obtain possession of the Government will be in favor of extending the power at the expense of the limitation; and that, unless those in whose behalf the limitations were imposed, have, in some form or mode, the right of enforcing them, the power will ultimately supersede the limitation, and the Government must operate precisely in the same manner as if the will of the majority governed without constitution or limitation of power.

He had thus presented all possible modes, in which a Government, bound upon the will of an absolute majority, would be modified, and had demonstrated that, in all its forms, whether in a majority of a People, as in a mere democracy, or in a majority of their representatives, without a constitution, or with a constitution, to be interpreted as the will of the majority, the result would be the same; two hostile interests would inevitably be created by the action of the Government, to be followed by hostile legislation, and that by faction, corruption, anarchy, and despotism.

The great and solemn question here presented itself—Is there any remedy for these evils, on the decision of which depends the question, whether the People can govern themselves, which has been so often asked with so much scepticism and doubt? There is a remedy, and but one, the effects of which, whatever may be the form, is to organize society in reference to this conflict of interests, which springs out of the action of government; and which can only be done by giving each part the right of self-protection; which, in a word, instead of considering the community of twenty-four as a single community, having a common interest, and to be governed by the single will of an entire majority, shall, upon all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen against the eleven, take the will, not of the twenty-four as a unit, but that of the thirteen and that of the eleven separately, the majority of each governing the parts, and, where they concur, governing the whole, and where they disagree, arresting the action of Government. This, he would call the concurring, as distinct from the absolute majority. It would not be, as was generally supposed, a minority governing a majority. In either way, the number would be the same, whether taken as the absolute, or as the concurring majority. Thus, the majority of the thirteen is seven, and of the eleven six, and the two together make thirteen, which is the majority of twenty-four. But though the number is the same, the mode of counting is essentially different; the one representing the strongest interest, and the other, the weaker interests of the community. The first mistake was, in supposing that the government of the absolute majority is the government of this People—that beau ideal of a perfect government, which had been so enthusiastically entertained in every age, by the generous and patriotic, where civilization and liberty had made the smallest progress. There could be no greater error: the government of the People is the government of the whole community—of the twenty-four—the self-government of all the parts—too perfect to be reduced to practice in the present, or any past stage of human society. The government of the absolute majority, instead of the government of the People, is but the government of the strongest interests, and,