ecutive authority; to the judicial authority; and to the Governments of the several States.

If it be understood that the common law is established by the Constitution, it follows that no part of the law can be altered by the Legislature; such of the statutes already passed as may be repugnant thereto, would be nullified: particularly the "Sedition act" itself, which boasts of being a melioration of the common law; and the whole code, with all its incongruities, barbarisms, and bloody maxims, would be inviolably saddled on the good people of the United States.

Should this consequence be rejected, and the common law be held, like other laws, liable to revision and alteration, by the authority of Congress, it then follows that the authority of Congress is co-extensive with the objects of common law; that is to say, with every object of legislation: for to every such object does some branch or other of the common law extend. The authority of Congress would, therefore, be no longer the limitations marked out in the Constitution. They would be authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever.

In the next place, as the President possesses the executive powers of the Constitution, and is to see that the laws be faithfully executed, his authority also must be co-extensive with every branch of the common law. The additions which this would make to his power, though not readily to be estimated, claim the most serious attention.

This is not all: it will merit the most profound consideration, how far an indefinet admission of the common law, with a latitude in construing it, equal to the construction by which it is deduced from the Constitution, might draw after it the various prerogatives, making part of the unwritten law of England. The English Constitution itself is nothing more than a composition of unwritten laws and maxims.

In the third place, whether the comman law be admitted as of legal or of constitutional obligation, it would confer on the judicial departments a discretion little short of legislative power.

On the supposition of its having a constitutional obligation, this power in the judges would be permanent and irremediable by the legislature. On the other supposition, the power would not expire until the legislature should have introduced a full system of statutory provisions. Let it be observed, too, that besides all the uncertainties above enumerated, and which present an immense field for judicial discretion, it would remain with the same department to decide what parts of the common law would, and what would not, be properly applicable to the circumstances of the United States.

A discretion of this sort has always been lamented as incongruous and dangerous, even in the Colonal and State Courts; although so much narrowed by positive provisions is the local codes on the principal subjects embraced by the common law. Under the United States, where so few laws exist on those subjects, and where so great a lapse of time must happen before the vast chasm could be supplied, it is manifest that the power of the judges over the law would, in fact, erect them into legislators, and that, for a long time, it would be impossible for the citizens to conjecture either what was, or would be law.

In the last place, the consequence of admitting the common law as the law of the United States, on the authority of the individual States, is as obvious as it would be fatal. As this law relates to every subject of legislation, and would be paramount to the constitutions and laws of the States, the admission of it would overwhelm the residuary sovereignty of the States, and by one constructive operation, new-model the whole political fabric of the country.

From the review thus taken of the situation of the American colonies, prior to their independence; of the effect of this event on their situation; of the nature and import the articles of confederation: of the true meaning of the passage in the existing constitution from which the common law has been deduced; of the difficulties and uncertainties incident to the doctrine; and of its vast consequences in extending the powers of the Federal Government, and in superseding the authorities of the State Governments; the committee feel the utmost confidence in concluding, that the common law never was, nor by any fair construction, ever can be deemed a law for the American people as one community; and they indulge the strongest expectation that the same conclusion will be finally drawn by all candid and accurate inquiries into the subject. It is, indeed, distressing to reflect, that it ever should have been made a question, whether the constitution, on the whole face of which is seen so much labor to enumerate and define the several objects of Federal power, could intend to introduce in the lump, in an indirect manner, and by a forced construction of a few phrases, the vast and multifarious jurisdiction involved in the common law; a law filling so many ample volumns; a law overspreading the entire field of legislation; and a law that would sap the foundation of the constitution as a system of limited and specified powers. A severer reproach could not, in the opinion of the committee, be thrown on the constitution, on those who framed, or on those who established it, than such a supposition would throw on them.

The argument then, drawn from the common law, on the ground of its being adopted or recognized by the constitution, being inapplicable to the Sedition act, the committee will proceed to examine the other arguments which have been founded on the constitution.

They will waste but little time on the attempt to cover the act by the preamable to the constitution, it being contrary to every acknowledged rule of construction, to set up this part of an instrument in opposition to the plain meaning, expressed in the body of the instrument. A preamble usually contains the general motives or reasons for the particular regulations or measures which follow it: and is always understood to be explained and limited by them. In the present instance, a contrary interpretation would have the inadmissible effect, of rendering nugatory or improper, every part of the constitution which succeeds the preamble.

The paragraph in Art. 1, Sec. 8, which contains the power to lay and collect taxes, duties imports, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare, having been already examined, will also require no particular attention in this place. It will have been seen that in its fair and consistent meaning, it cannot enlarge the enumerated powers vested in Congress.

The part of the constitution which seems most to be recurred to, in defence of the "Sedition act," is the last clause of the above section, empowering Congress to make "all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or official thereof."

The plain import of this clause is, that Congress shall have all the incidental or instrumental powers, necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the express powers; whether they be vested in the Government of the United States, more collectively, or in the several departments or officers thereof.

It is not a grant of new powers to Congress, but merely a declaration for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution, those otherwise granted, are included in the grant.

Whenever therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the question is, whether the power be expressed in the constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, it may be exercised by Congress. If it be not, Congress cannot exercise it.

Let the question be asked, then, whether the power over the press, exercised in the "Sedition act," be found among the powers expressly vested in the Congress? This is not pretended.

Is there any express power, for executing which, it is a necessary and proper power?

The power which has been selected, at least remote, in answer to this question, is that "of suppressing insurrections;" which is said to imply a power to *prevent* insurrections, by punishing whatever may *lead* or *tend* to them. But it surely cannot, with the least plausibility, be said, that the regulation of the press, and a punishment of libels, are exercises of a power to suppress insurrections. The most that could be said, would be, that the punishment of libels, if it had the tendency ascribed to it, might prevent the occasion of passing or executing laws necessary and proper for the suppression of insurrections.

Has the Federal Government no power then, to prevent as well as to punish resistance to the laws?

They have the power which the constitution deemed most proper in their hands for the purpose. The Congress has power, before it happens, to pass laws for punishing it; and the executive and judiciary have power to inforce those laws when it does happen.

It must be recollected by many, and could be shown to the satisfaction of all, that the construction here put on the terms "necessary and proper," is precisely the construction which prevailed during the discussions and ratifications of the constitution. It may be added, and cannot too often be repeated, that it is a construction absolutely necessary to maintain their consistency with the peculiar character of the Government, as possessed of particular and definite powers only; not of the general and indefinite powers vested in ordinary Governments. For if the power to *suppress insurrections*, includes the power to *punish libels*; or if the power to *punish*, includes a power to *prevent*, by all the means that may have that *tendency*, such is the relation and influence among the most remote subjects of legislation, that a power over a very few, would carry with it a power over all. And it must be wholly immaterial, whether unlimited powers be exercised under the name of unlimited powers, or be exercised under the name of unlimited means of carrying into execution, limited powers.

This branch of the subject will be closed with a reflection which must have weight with all; but especially with those who place peculiar reliance on the judicial exposition of the Constitution, as the bulwark provided against undue extentions of the Legislative power. If it be understood that the powers implied in the specified powers, have an immediate and appropriate relation to them, as means, nessesary and proper for carrying them into execution, questions on the constitutionality of laws passed for this purpose, will be of a nature sufficiently precise and determinate for Judicial cognizance and control! If, on the other hand, Congress are not limited in the choice of means by any such appropriate relation of them to the specified powers; but may employ all such means as they may deem fitted to *prevent*, as well as to *punish*, crimes subjected to their authority; such as may have a *tendency* only to *promote* an object for which they are authorised to provide; every one must perceive, that questions relating to means of this sort must be questions of mere policy and expediency; on which, legislative discretion alone can decide, and from which the Judicial interposition and control are completely excluded.

2. The next point which the resolution requires to be proved, is, that the power over the press exercised by the Sedition Act, is positively forbidden by one of the amendments to the Constitution.

The amendment stands in these words—"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or *abridging the freedom of speech or of the press;* or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

In the attempts to vindicate the "Sedition Act," it has been contended, 1. That the "freedom of the press" is to be determined by the meaning of these terms in the common law. 2. That the article supposes the power over the press to be in Congress, and prohibits them only from *abridging* the freedom allowed to it by the common law.

Although it will be shewn, in examining the second of these positions, that the amendment is a denial to Congress of all power over the press, it may not be useless to make the following observations on the first of them.

It is deemed to be a sound opinion, that the Sedition Act, in its definition of some of the crimes created, is an abridgment of the freedom of publication, recognized by principles of the common law in England.

The freedom of the press under the common law, is, in the defences of the Sedition Act, made to consist in an exemption from all *previous* restraint on printed publications, by persons authorised to inspect and prohibit them. It appears to the Committee, that this idea of the freedom of the press, can never be admitted to be the American idea of it: since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications, would have a similar effect with a law authorising a previous restraint on them. It would seem a mockery to say, that no law should be passed, preventing publications from being made, but laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should be made.

The essential difference between the British Government and the American Constitutions, will place this subject in the clearest light.

In the British Government, the danger of encroachments on the rights of the People, is understood to be confined to the Executive Magistrate. The representatives of the People in the Legislature, are not only exempt themselves, from distrust, but are considered as sufficient guardians of the rights of their constituents against the danger from the Executive. Hence it is a principle, that the Parliament is unlimited in its power; or, in their own language, is omnipotent. Hence too, all the ramparts for protecting the rights of the People, such as their Magna Charta, their Bill of Rights, &c., are not reared against the Parliament, but against the royal prerogative. They are merely Legislative precautions, against Executive usurpations. Under such a government as this, an exemption of the press from previous restraint by licensers appointed by the King, is all the freedom that can be secured to it.

In the United States, the case is altogether different. The People and not the Government, possesses the absoluted sovereignty. The Legislature, no less than the Executive, is under limitations of power. Encroachments are regarded as possible from the one, as well as from the other. Hence in the United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured, against Legislative as well as against Executive ambition. They are secured not by laws paramount to prerogative, but by Constitutions paramount to laws. The security of the freedom of the press requires, that it should be exempt, not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain; but from Legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption, not only from the previous inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of the laws.

The state of the press, therefore, under the common law, cannot in this point of view, be the standard of its freedom in the United States.

But there is another view, under which it may be necessary to consider this subject. It may be alleged, that although the security for the freedom of the press, be different in Great Britain and in this country; being a legal security only in the former, and a constitutional security in the latter; and although there may be a further difference, in an extension of the freedom of the press here, beyond an exemption from previous restraint, to an exemption from subsequent penalties also; yet that the actual legal freedom of the press, under the common law, must determine the degree of freedom, which is meant by the terms, and which is constitutionally secured against both previous and subsequent restraints.

The Committee are not unaware of the difficulty of all general questions, which may turn on the proper boundary between the liberty and licentiousness of the press. They will leave it therefore for consideration only, how far the difference between the nature of the British Government, and the nature of the American Governments, and the practice under the latter, may show the degree of rigor in the former, to be inapplicable to, and not obligatory in the latter.

The nature of Governments elective, limited and responsible, in their branches, may well be supposed to require a greater freedom of animadversion, than might be tolerated by the genius of such a government as that of Great Britain. In the latter, it is a maxim, that the King, an hereditary, not a responsible magistrate can do no wrong; and that the Legislature, which in two-thirds of its composition, is also hereditary, not responsible, can do what it pleases. In the United States, the Executive Magistrates are not held to be infallible, nor the Legislatures to be omnipotent; and both being elective, are both responsible. Is it not natural and necessary, under such different circumstances, that a different degree of freedom, in the use of the press, should be contemplated?

Is not such an inference favored by what is observable in Great Britain itself? Notwithstanding the general doctrine of the common law, on the subject of the press, and the occasional punishment of those, who use it with a freedom offensive to the Government; it is well known, that with respect to the responsible members of the Government, where the reasons operating here, become applicable there, the freedom exercised by the press, and protected by public opinion, far exceeds the limits prescribed by the ordinary rules of law. The Ministry, who are responsible to impeachment, are at all times animadverted on by the press, with peculiar freedom; and during the elections for the House of Commons, the other responsible part of the Government, the press is employed with as little reserve towards the Candidates.

The practice in America must be entitled to much more respect. In every State probably in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every description, which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common law. On this footing the freedom of the press has stood; on this footing it yet stands. And it will not be a breach, either of truth or of candor, to say, that no persons or presses are in the habit of more unrestrained animadversions on the proceedings and functionaries of the State Governments, than the persons and presses most zealous in vindicating the act of Congress for punishing similar animadversions on the Government of the United States.

The last remark will not be understood, as claiming for the State Governments, an immunity greater than they have heretofore enjoyed. Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true, than in that of the press. It has accordingly been decided by the practice of the States, that it is better to have a few of its noxious branches, to their luxurious growth, than by pruning them away, to injure the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits. And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted by any who reflect, that to the press alone, chequered as it is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been gained by reason and humanity, over error and oppression: who reflect, that to the same beneficent source, the United States owe much of the lights which inducted them to the rank of a free and independent nation; and which have improved their political system into a shape so auspicious to their happiness. Had "Sedition Acts," forbidding every publication that might bring the constituted agents into contempt or disrepute, or that might excite the hatred of the people against the authors of unjust or pernicious measures, been uniformly enforced against the press; might not the United States have been languishing at this day, under the infirmities of a sickly confederation? Might they not, possibly, be miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke?

To these observations, one fact will be added, which demonstrates that the common law cannot be admitted as the *universal* expositor of American terms, which may be the same with those contained in that law.—The freedom of conceicince, and of religion, are found in the same instruments, which assert the freedom of the press. It will never be admitted, that the meaning of the former, in the common law of England, is to limit their meaning in the United States.

Whatever weight may be allowed to these considerations, the Committee do not, however, by any means intend to rest the question on them. They contend that the article of the amendment, instead of supposing in Congress a power that might be exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not abridged, was meant as a positive denial to Congress, of any power whatever on the subject.

To demonstrate that this was the true object of the article, it will be sufficient to recall the circumstances which led to it, and to refer to the explanation accompaning the article.

[TO BE CONCLUDED NEXT WEEK.]

Fatal Affray.—An affray of a fatal character occurred, in Lancaster District, at Hill Island, on the Cawtaba river, on Sunday the 14th instant. The parties were *John Sweat* and *Thomas Pickett*, the latter of whom was killed; having been stabbed by the former with a knife. He survived, after having received the wound, until Wedensday last. Sweat was, we understand, arrested on Monday after the affray, and lodged in Lancaster jail to await his trial. We are without the particulars which led to the quarrel, but we learn that both had been drinking, adding another to the long list of crime, chargeable to the prevalence of intemperance.

Camden Journal of March 25.

The following translation of the President's Inaugural Speech, is from the Hartford Times. Whilst it embraces all the topics alluded to in the original, it is much easier to be understood in its present shape:

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

"Vive La Bagatelle."

Called from my splended mansion in Ohio, where I was pining in poverty on six thousand dollars per annum, I appear before the American People as the friend of paper money and hard cider.

It was the remark of a celebrated Roman writer, that "*Quosque tandem abutere,*" &c. Romulus and Remus were suckled by a female wolf. hic, hæc, hoc, and Cæsar was killed by Brutus. History speaks of the Curtii, and the Decii; one Roman Consul made his horse Senator; the elder Brutus and the lesser Asia; Europe, Asia, Africa America, and the polynesian Islands, and Cromwell was the Dictator of England.

I have to inform you, and it is a fact with which few of you are acquainted, that in the United States, the people elect their President, while in England, Victoria is Queen, and in New York, that excellent man, Frederick A. Tallmadge, is Recorder.

Demosthenes addressed the Athenians with an eloquence almost as persuasive as that used by Daniel Webster at Patchogue; in this country the people have the privilege of voting.

The great danger to our institutions is, that some one department may assume to itself too much power; but this charge shall never be made against the Executive while I am President; I shall therefore recommend nothing, do nothing, say nothing about the finances, sign all Bills passed by Congress, let the country take care of itself, and with unflinching patriotism, draw from the public Treasury my salary of twenty-five thousand dollars per annum.

I have no opinion of a metallic currency; if the people could only believe a promise as good as a performance, they would consider pieces of paper with pictures on them a good currency.

The people of the District of Columbia are not slaves—they are not subjects; but they are inhabitants of the District of Columbia.

A man cannot be a citizen of two States at the same time; two is not one, neither is one two; but a citizen of one State may offer advice to the citizens of another State.

The Swiss Cantons get along quite comfortably; forbearance is a good thing. Moses was a great law giver, and Confucius a celebrated Chinese philosopher, to say nothing about the Helvetic confederacy, the Scythians, or the Scandinavians.

There is no use in quarrelling about Territorial lines; if we all do what we ought to do, we will all do right. Bolivar was a tyrant, although he called himself Liberator; and Mark Antony was a demagogue.

It is not to be endured that Democrats should hold office; I shall therefore turn them out; not because they are in favor of Democratic principles, but because they openly supported them; a poor reason is better than none.

All my speech has been about our domestic concerns; having fought at the battle of Tippecanoe, I shall take good care of our Foreign relations; you may reply upon the wisdom of my course, as I shall follow the advice of my Secretary of State, *who distinguished himself during the last war.*

Before I conclude, let me recommend that all party lines be obliterated, and that the whole American people support me. Octavious had a party, and Antony had a party; the warriors of the North overrun the Roman Empire, and Mr. J. N. Reynolds knows all about "Symmes' Hotel."

Let me recommend to all the people to read their Bibles, go to church, and support the new Democratic party, of which I am the head, and Daniel Webster, and Theodore Dwight and others, popular members.

I am now President; go home, good people, and remember what I have said, while I go to enjoy my marble log cabin, and my twenty-five thousand per annum.

The Inaugural.—The Charleston Mercury characterizes the first address of the hard cider President, more perfectly than any of our cotemporaries. Its outside is altogether in the "Tippy" style, but all under the cover is ultra Federalism of the WEBSTER school. We predict, with perfect confidence, that all General HARRISON's clishmaclaver about JEFFERSON and Democracy will turn out rank *black-cockadeism*—that not one Republican measure will have his countenance during his Administration; but that the whole complexion of all hts public acts, like that of his Cabinet, will be at enmity with all the doctrines of the Virginia school, which he professes to follow.

The New York Sun has the following good hit at the United States Bank:

Obituary Extraordinary.—Died on Wednesday last, the Bank of the United States, in the 25th year of her age. She has been in a declining state for several years, and was advised by the celebrated Dr. Jackson to withdraw to retirement, but being of an active disposition, and influenced by Dr. Biddle, was induced to practice extreme exercise, whereby she injured herself in attempting to lift a great quantity of cotton, which induced an over circulation or too great an issue. *Drafts* were applied in rapid succession; but, alas! like contrary poisons, calculated to keep the body alive, they proved too much for her *weak State*, and without a groan she ceased to exist. Her loss will be deeply felt, especially by a few *editors*, who partook largely of her bounty. She took a conspicuous part in the revulsion of '35 and '36, and assisted greatly in the rise of *real* and *unreal* estate to the remotest parts of the Union. May she rest in peace forever.

A rumor is in circulation that the British Minister has received instructions to demand the liberation of *McLeod*, or his passports. We beleive there is no truth in this report; it being circulated by the Federalists, to terrify the people of New York into an acquiescence in the contemplated surrender, without a trial, of a man accused of murder, under the menaces of England, or to make that trial a mockery.—*Raleigh Standard.*

THE LATE DESPATCHES.—Letters from Washington represent that the character of the despatches from England, which came in the President, affords an additional cause for apprehension in respect to the termination of the difficulties between the two countries. We know not what authority the writers have for their assertions, but it is intimated that the British Government demands the release of McLeod. The U. S. Government, will not, of course, interfere in the matter, until the British Government acknowledges that it authorized the outrage, and that acknowledgment will be sufficient cause to demand redress. Turn the subject which ever way it will admit of, and it has a threatening aspect. Our government has, however, taken the proper position, and will be maintained in it by the country. The result of the trial, should it terminate favorably for McLeod, may settle the difficulty without further intervention by either government.

Philad. Spirit of the Times.



MECKLENBURG JEFFERSONIAN:

CHARLOTTE, N. C.,

Tuesday Morning, March 30, 1841

Democratic Republican Nomination for Congress:

GREEN W. CALDWELL,

OF MECKLENBURG.

CANDIDATES FOR CLERKS.

☞ We are requested by a number of citizens from all parts of the County to announce CHARLES T. ALEXANDER, Jr., a candidate at the next August election, for the office of Clerk of Mecklenburg County Court.

We have also been similarly requested to announce JENNINGS B. KERR, Esq., a candidate at the same time for re-election to the office of Clerk of the Superior Court.

We are authorized to announce B. OATS, Esq., as a candidate for re-election to the office of Clerk of Mecklenburg County Court, at the next election.

Charlotte, March 30, 1841. tc

☞ We feel highly flattered by the many kind complimentary notices bestowed upon our paper by our Editorial brethren—both Whig and Democrat. We assure each and all of them, that their kind wishes for our prosperity are most cordially reciprocated. It may not be amiss to state, that our anticipations have been more than realized in the rapid increase of subscribers to the Jeffersonian since the first number was issued. We can, however, and it would please us, to crowd a great many more on our books.

EXTRA SESSION OF CONGRESS.

All doubt is now dissipated;—below will be found the Proclamation of President *Harrison* calling an Extra Session of Congress, to meet on the 31st of May next.

By the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas, sundry important and weighty matters, principally growing out of the condition of the revenue and finances of the country, appear to me to call for the consideration of Congress at an earlier day than its next annual session, and thus form an extraordinary occasion, such as renders necessary, in my judgment, the convention of the two Houses as soon as may be practicible, I do, therefore, by this my Proclamation, convene the two Houses of Congress, to meet in the Capitol at the city of Washington, on the last Monday, being the thirty-first day of May next. And I require the respective Senators and Representatives then and there to assemble, in order to recieve such information respecting the state of the Union as may be given to them, and to devise and adopt such measures as the good of the country may seem to them, in the exercise of their wisdom and discretion, to require.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United Stats to be hereunto affixed, and signed the same with my hand.

Done at the City of Washington, this seventeenth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-one, and [L. S.] of the Independence of the United States the sixty-fifth.

W. H. HARRISON.

By the President:
DANIEL WEBSTER,
Secretary of State.

We are not told in this Proclamation, what the "important and weighty matters" are which require this extraordinary convocation of Congress. The power to call an Extra Session was placed in the hands of the President, to be used only in cases of extreme national importance—such as a threatened rupture with a Foreign nation, or such general national embarrassment and distress, cutting off the revenues of the Government, as induced Mr. Van Buren to call an Extra Session in 1837. It is not pretended by any body, that any such causes as these now exist to require the immediate attention of Congress. Then why put the country to the useless expense of at least *two hundred thousand dollars* to carry out what? Why, disguise it as they may, the sole object of this Extra Session is to provide for a more general and profuse distribution of the "*spoils of office,*" and to saddle upon the country the odious measures so long unsuccessfully contended for by the Federal Party. Now, mark what we predict:—The first thing that will be attempted at the Extra Session will be the repeal of the *Sub-Treasury*, before its operations can satisfy the country of its beneficial tendency to render the business of the country stable and healthy. This done, the next question will be, how are the financial operations of the Government to be managed? Then will come the project of a *National Bank*, the longing for which was so artfully kept out of view by the Federalists in the late contest. After this, the *Assumption of the State Debts*, by a distribution of the proceeds of the public lands will be moved, thus taking away from the revenues of the National Treasury about *three millions of dollars* annually, and thereby create the necessity of burdening the south with a new Tariff to fill the coffers of northern manufacturers. Government being thus completely under Federal rule in all its departments, a general division of the "spoils" will be made among the swarms of office hunters and hungry expectants who have been crowding Washington for a month past.

These are the prime objects of the Extra Session—none others can, in truth, be assigned. Do they justify this extraordinary measure—this enormous expense at a time when the revenues of the country are barely sufficient to defray an economical administration of the ordinary affairs of Government? And is this the way in which the new Administration is to produce "good times," and "make money plenty"—by expending thousands for no useful purpose?

Let the People be awake to these matters; the country may be involved in all the measures of