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reality the mag.
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injury of many
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both, to ena-
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and it is tVi
oposjcj to bo
leir promises
eated failure
leave to say,
ts they have
c they have
^orthern and
hat with the
f the South,
COR.V will l)C
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make it hia
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The pri**^
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GE,
ROIJ
i
JOSEPH W, I1A3IPTON,-
.“The powers granted under the Constitution, being derived ,*'om the People of the United States, may be resumed by them, whenever perverted to their injury or oppression.”—^ladison-
-Editor and FuW Ulier
VOLUME 2, \
CHARLOTTE, N. C-, JULY 12, 1842.
\ NUMBER 70.
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SPEECH OF
MR. CALHOUX.
OF SOITH CAROLINA,
Delivered in the United States Senate, February ‘2^, 1841
The proposition of iMr. Clay, to abolish from tlje Constitu
tion t!ie Veto power, bein-i under cousidcration,
]\Ir. Calhoun said : The Senator from Kentucky
in support ot his amendment, maintained that the
people of these States constitute a nation ; that
the nation has a will of its own; that the numerical
majority of the whole was the appropriate organ of
its voice: and that whatever derogated trom it, to
that extent departed from the genius of the Govern
ment, and set up the will of the minority against the
majority. We have thus presented at the very
threshold of the discussion, a question of the deep
est import, not only as it regards the subject under
consideration, but the nature and character ofour Go
vernment; and that question is, are these proposi
tions of the Senator true?* If they be, then he
admitted the argument against the veto would be
conclusive; not liowever, ibr the reason assigned
by him, that it would make the voice of a single
functionary of the Government, (the President,)
equivalent to that of some six Senators and Ibrty
mend)ers of the other House; but for the far more
decisive reason, according to his theory, tliat the
President is not chosen by the voice of the immeri-
cal majority, and does not iheretbre, according to
his principle, represent truly the will of the nation.
it is a great mistake lo suppose that he is elected
simply on the principle of luunbers. They consti
tute, It is true, the principal element in his election ;
but not the exclusive. Each State is entitled to as
many votes in his election, as it is to representatives
in the other House, that is, to its Federal popula
tion ; but to these, two others are added, having no
regard to numbers of their representation in the
Senate, which greatly increases the relative inllu-
ence of the small States, co'npareil lo the large, in
the Presidental election. Wiiat eilect this latter el
ement may have on the numbers necessary to elect
a President, may be made apparent by a very short
and simple calculation.
Tlie population of the United States, in Federal
numbers, by the last census, is l5,9US,37t}. Assu
ming that s'lxty-eight thousand, the number report
ed by the coiumitiee of the other House, will be lix-
ed on for the ratio of representation there, it will
irive, according lo the calculation of the committee,
uvo hundred and twenty-lbur members lo the other
House. Add lilty-lwo, the number of the Senators,
and the electoral college will be Ibund to consist of
two hundred and seventy-six. of which one hundred
and thirty-nine is a majority. It nineteen ot the
smaller fetates, excluding Maryland, be taken, be
ginning with Deloware and ending with Kentucky
inclusive, they will be found to be enlilled to one-
hundred and ibrty votes, one more than a majority,
with a Federal population ot’ only 7,227,8(31); while
the seven other States, with a population of 8,680,-
507, would bo entitled to but one hundred and ihir-
ty-«ix votes, three le.ss than a majority, with a pop
ulation ot almost a million and a half greater than
the others. Of the one hundred and forty electoral
votes of the smaller States, thirty-eight would b,»
on account of the addition of two to each State for
their representation in this body., while of the larger
there wouhl be but Iburteen on that account; ma
king a dillerence of twenty-lbur voles on that ac
count, being two more than the electoral votes ol
Ohio, the third State in point of numbers in the
Cnion.
The Senator from Kentucky, with these ficts, but
acts in strict conibrimty lo his theory ot the Gov
ernment, in proposing the limitation he has on the
veto power; but as much cannot be said in favor ol
th; substitute he has otfered. The argument is as
conclusive against the one, or any other moditica
lion of the veto that could possibly be devised. It
goes tarther, and is conclusive against the Execu-
five department itself, as elected; tor there can be
no good reason otl'ei jd why the will ol the nation,
il there be one, should not be as fully and perl'ectly
represented in that department ad m the Legisla
tive.
]>ut it docs not stop there. It would be still more
conclusive, if possible, against this branch of the
Government. In constituting the Senate, numbers
arc totally disregarded. Tlie smallest State standtj
on a pertect equality with the largest; Delaware,
witli her seventy-seven thousand, with New York
with her two millions and a half. Here a majority
of States control, without regard to population ; and
fourteen of the smallest States, with a federal popu
lation of but 4,06'1,457, litile less than a Iburth of ihe
whole, can, if they unite, overrule the twelve oth
ers, with a population of 11,814,919. Nay, more;
they could virtually destroy the Government, and
pu?-'a veto on the whole system, by refusing lo elect
►Senators; anil yet this equality among States, with
out regard to numbers, including the branch where
it prevails, would seem to be the favorite with the
Constitution. Ii is its provision that cannot be alter
ed without the consent of every Siate, and this
branch of the Government where it prevails, is the
only one that participates in the powers of all the
others. As a part ot' the Legislative Uepariment,
it has full participation with the other, in all matters
of legislation, except originating money bills, while
it participates with the Executive in two of its high
est llniciions, that of appointing to oflice and ma
king treaties, and in that the Judiciary, in being the
high court before which all inipeacnments are tried.
But we have not yet got to the end of the conse
quences. The argument would be as conclusive
an-ainst the Judiciary as against the Senate, or the
Kxecuiive and his veto. The judges receive their
appointments from the Executive and the Senate;
the one nominating, and the other consenting to and
advising tiic appointment; neither of which depart
ments, as h.is been shown, is chosen by the numeri
cal majority. In addition, they hofd their oflice
durino- good behavior, and can only be turned out
by im^pSichment, and yet they have the power, in
nil cases in law and equity brought before them, in
which an act of Con-tess' is invuived, to decide o.i
its constitutionality—that is in eftect, to pronounce
an absolute veto.
If then, the Senator’s theory be correct, its clear
and certain result, if carried out in practice, would
be to sweep away, not only the Executive, the Sen
ate and the Judiciary, as now constituted, and to
leave nothino- standing in the midst of the rums but
the House o°f Representatives, where only, in the
whole rano-eof the Government, numbers exclusive-
i ly prevail.” But as desolating as would be its sweep,
*xi> Clay here interrupted Sir. Calhoun, and said that he
^ !t a nviioritv accorduig to the forms of the Constitution.
""Mr CaThS in return, said he had taken down the words
of the Senator at the time, and would vouch for the correct-
Sms of hS statement. The Senator not only laid down^the
in passing over the Government, it would be far
more destructive in its vvhirl over the Constitution.
There It would not leave a fragment standing amidst
the ruin in its rear.
In approaching this topic, let me premise, what
ail w'ill readily admit, that if the voice of the people
may be sought for any where with confidence, it
may be in the Constitution, which is conceded by
all to be the fundamental and paramount law of the
land. If, then, the people of these States do really
constitute a nation, as the Senator supposes; if the
nation has a will of its own, an! if the numerical
majority of the whole is the only appropriate and
true organ of that will, we may fairly expect to
find that will, pronounced through the absolute ma
jority, pervading every part of that instrument, and
stamping its authority on the whole. Is such the
fact % The very reverse. Throughout the whole
from first to last—from beginning to the end—in its
formation, adoption, and amendment, there is not the
slightest evidence, trace, or vestige of the existence
of the facts on which the Senator’s theory rests; nei-
liiec of the nation, nor its will, nor of the numerical
majority of the whole, as its organ, as I shall next
proceed to show.
The convention which formed it was called by a
portion of the States; its members wore all appoin
ted by the Slates ; received iheir authority from their
separate States; voted by States in forming the Con
stitution ; agreed to it, when formed, by Stales; trans-
miftod it r!nnrrri*«:c tr» hf
mitted it to Congress to be submitted to the Stales
lor their ratification: it was ratified by the people of
each Slate in convention, each ratifying b\’ itself, for
Itself, and bound e.xclusively by its own ratification,
and by express provision it was not to go into ope
ration, unless nine out of the twelve States should
ratify, and then to be binding only between the
Stales ratifying. It was thus put in the power of
any four Slates, large or small, without regard to
numbers, to defeat its adoption, which might have
been done by a very small proportion of the whole,
as will appear by reference to the first census,
'riuil census was taken very shortly after the adop
tion of the Constiiulion, at which time the Federal
population of the then twelve Stales was 3,40-2,279.
of which the four smallest, Delaware, Ilhode Island,
Georgia, and New Hampshire, with a population
of only 241,400, something more than the four
teenth part of the whole, could have defeated the
ratification. Such was the total disregard of popu
lation in the adoption and formation of the Constitu
tion.
It may, however, be said, it i, trie, that the Con
stitution is the work of the Stales, and that there
was no nation prior to its adoption ; but that its adop
tion fused the people ol the States into one, so as to
make a nation of what before constituted separate
and mdependonl sovereignties. Such an assertion
would be directly in the teeth of the Constitution,
ivhich says that, when ratified, “it should be bind
ing, (not oytriheStales ratifying, for that would im
ply that it was imposed by some higher authority,
nor between the individuals composing the States,
for that would imply that they were all merged in
one, but) beticeen the States ratifying the same;”
and thus by the strongest implication, recognising
tiiem as the parties to the instrument, and as main
taining their separate and independent existence as
Slates, after its adoption. But let that pass. I need
It not lo rebut the Senator’s theory lo test the truth
of the assertion, that the Constitution has formed a
nation of the people of these Stales. 1 go back lo
the grounds already taken, that if such be the fact
—if they really form a nation, since the adoption of
the Constitution, and the nation has a will, and the
numerical majority is its only proper organ, in that
case, the mode prescribed for the amendiHcnt of the
ing a Federal Republic, with the same equality of
rights among the States composing the Union, as
among the citizens composing the Slates themselves.
Instead of a nation, we arc in reality an assemblage
of nations, or peoples, (if the plural noun may be
used where the language affords none.) united in
their sovereign character, immediately and directly
by their own act but v/ithout losing their separate
and independent existence.
It results from all that has been stated, that either
the theory of the Senator i.i wrong, or that our po
litical system is throughout a profound and radical
error. If the latter be the case, then that complex
system of ours, consisting of so many parts, but
blended, as was supposed, into one harmonious and
sublime whole, raising its t'ront on high and chal
lenging the admiration of the world, is but a mis
shapen and disproportionate structure that ought to
be demolished to the ground, with the single excep
tion of the appartment allotted lo the House of Re
presentatives. Is the Senator prepared to com
mence the work of demolition ? Does he believe
that all other parts of this complex structure are ir
regular and deformed appendages ; and that if they
were taken down, and the Government erected ex
clusively on the will of the numerical majority,
v.'ould eflect as well, or better, the great objects for
which it was instituted; to establish justice; en
sure domestic tranquillity ; provide for the common
defence ; promote the general welfare ; and secure
the blessings of liberty lo ourselves and our posteri
ty.” Will the Senator—will any one—can any
one—venture to assert that ? And if not, why not?
There i§ the question, on the proper solutioti of
which hangs not only the explanation of the veto,
but that ot the real nature and character of our
complex, but beautiful and harmonious system ol
Government. To give a full and systematic solu
tion, it would be necessary to descend lo the ele
ments of political science, and discuss principles lit
tle suited lo a discussion in a deliberative assembly.
I waive the attempt, and shall content myself with
giving a much more matter of fact solution.
It is sufficient, for that purpose, to point to the
actual operation of the Government, through all the
stages of its existence, and the many and important
measures which have agitated it from tiie bfgin-
O O
ning; the success of which one portion of the
people regarded as essential to their prosperity and
happiness, while other portions have viewed them
as destructive of both. What does this imply, but
a deep conflict of interests, real or supposed, bciween
the dilferent portions of the community, on subjects :
of the first magnitude—the currency, the liiiances
including taxation and disbursements; the BaiJc,
the protective tariff, distribution, and many others;
on all of which the most opposite and conllicting
views have prevailed ? And what would be the
effect of placing the powers of the Government un
der the exclusive control of the numerical majority
—of 8.000,000 over 7,900,000; of six States over
all the rest—but to give the; dominant interest, or
combination of interests, an unlimited and despotic
control ov’er all others r \Vhat, but to vest it with
the power to administer the Government for its ex-
cldsive benefit, regardless of all others, and indiffer
ent to their oppression and wretchedness? And
what, in a country of such vast extent and diversity
of condition, institutions, inclustry, and productions,
would that be, but to subject the rest to the most
grinding despotism and oppression? But what is
the remedy? It would be but to increase the evil,
to transfer the power to a minority, to abolish the
House of Representatives, and place the control ex
clusively in the hands of the Senate—in that of the
four millions, instead of the eight. If one must be
sacrificed to the other, it is better that the few should
Constitution would furnish abundant and conclu- be to the many, than the many lo the few.
sive evidence of the fact. But here agauj, as in its What then is to be done ? If neither the majority,
formation and adootion, there is not the slightest | nor the minority, the grater nor less part, can be
trace ov evidence, that such is the fact; on the con- ■; safely trusted with the exclusive control? What
trary, most conclusive to sustain the very opposite , but to vest the powers of the (.io\Lininent in the
opinion. * | whole—the entire people—to make it in truth and
There are two modes in which amendments to the j reality the Government of the people, instead of the
Constitution may be proposed. The one, such as | Government of a dominant over a subject part, be
that now proposed, by a resolution to be passed by i it greater oi less of the w’hol''people—seif-go’. ein-
, but he drew conclusions from them
SrPresident’s’ veto, which could only be sustained
on the principle of the numerical majority. In fact his course
P JJra sUsion, and the grounds assumed both by him
and his colleague in this discussion, had their origin in the
doctrines cjnbiftced in that proposition.
two-thirds of both houses; and the other by a call
of a convention, by Congress, to propose amend
ments, on the application of two-ihirds of the States;
neither of which give the least countenance lo tiie
theory of the Senator. In both cases the mode ol
modilication, which is the material point, is
the same, and requires the concurring assent
of three-four ihs of the States, regardless of pop
ulation, to ratify an amendment. Let us now
pause for a moment to trace the effects of this
provision.
There arc now twenty-six States, and the con
curring assents, of course, of twenty Stales, is sufti-
cent to ratify an amendment. It then results that
twenty of the smaller Ptate"', of which Kentucky
would be the largest, are sufficient for that purpose,
with a population in federal numbers of only 7,652,-
097. less by several hundred thousand than the nu
merical majority of the whole, against the united
voice of the other six, with a population of 8,219,-
279, exceeding the former by more than half a mil
lion. And yet this minority under the amending
power, may change, alter, modify or destroy every
part of the Constitution, except that which provides
for an equality of representation of the States in the
Senate, while, as if in mockery and derision of the
Senator’s theory, nineteen of the larger Sta^es,^ vvith
a population, in federal numbers, of 14,520,073,
cannot, even if united to a man, alter a letter in the
Constitution, against the seven others, with a popu
lation of only 1,382,303; and this, too, under the
existing Constitution, which is supposed to form the
people of these States into a nation. Finaffy, De
laware, with a population of little more than 77,000,
can put her veto on all the other Slates, on a propo
sition to destroy the equality of the States in the
Senate. Can facts more clearly illustrate the total
disregard of the numerical majority, as w’ell in the
process of amending, as in that of forming and
adopting the Constitution ?
All this must appear anomalous, strange and un
accountable, on the theory of the Senator, but har
monious and easily explain^ on the opposite; that
ours is an union, not of individuals, united by what
is called a social compact, for that would make it a
nation * nor of Governments, for that would have
formed a mere Confederacy, like the one supersed
ed by the present Constitution; but an union of
States, founded on a written positive cotnpact, form-
ment; and if this should prove impossible in pract'ce,
then to make the nearest approach to it, by requir
ing the concurrencc in the action of the government
of the greatest possible number consistent with the
great ends for which Government was instituted—
justice and security, v.’ithin and without? But how
is that to be effected ? Not certainly by considering
the whole community as one, and taking its sense
as a whole by a single process, which, instead of
giving the voice of all, can but give that of a part.
There is but one way by which it can possibly be
accomplished ; and that is by a judicious and wise
division and organization of the Government and
community, with reference to its different and con-
fficting interests, and by taking the sense of each
separately, and the concurrence of all as the voice of
the whole. Each may be imperfect of itself, but it
the construction be good and all the keys skilfully
touched, there will be given out in one blended and
harmonious wholCj the true and perfect voicc of the
people.
But on what principle is such div^ion and or
ganization to be made to effect this great object,
without which it is impossible to preserve free and
popular institutions? To this no general answer
can be given, it is the word of the wise and experi
enced, having full and perfect knowledge of the
country and the people in every particular for whom
the Government is intended. It must be made to
tit, and when it does, it will fit no other, and will be
incapable of being imitated or borrowed. Without,
then, attempting to do what cannot be done, I pro
pose to point out how that which 1 have slated has
been accoir.plished in our system of Government,
and the agency the veto is intended lo have in effecl-
mg it.
1 begin with the House of Representatives.—
There each State has a Representative according to
its federal numbers, and when met, a majority ol the
whole number of members controls its proceedings
thus giving to the numerical majority the exclusive
control throughout. The effect is to place its pro
ceedings in the power of eight millions of people
over all the rest, and six of the largest Stales, if uni
ted, over the other twenty; and the consequence, if
the House was the exclusive organ of the people,
w’ould be the domination of the stronger over the
weaker interests of the community, and the establish
ment of an intolerable and oppressive despotism.—
To find the remedy against what would be so great
an evii, we must turn to this body. Here an entire
ly different process is adopted to take the sense of
the community. Population is entirely disregarded,
and States, without reference to the number of peo
ple, are made the basis of representation; the effect
of which is to place the control here in a majority
of the States, w'hich, had they the exclusive power,
would exercise it as despotically and opressively as
w’ould the House of Representatives.
Regarded, then, separately, neither truly repre
sents the sense of the community, and each is imper
fect of itself; but when united, and the concurring
voice of each is made necessary to enact laws, the
one corrects the defects of the other ; and, instead
of the less popular derogating from the more popu
lar, as is supposed by the Senator, the two together
give a more full and perfect utterance to the voicc
of the people than either could separately. Taken
separately, six States might control the House, and
a little upwards of four millions might control the
Senate, by a combination of the fourteen smaller
States; but by requiring the concurrent voles of the
two, the six largest Slates must add eight others to
have the control in both bodies. Suppose, for illus
tration, they should unite w'ith the eight smallest,
which would give the least number by which an
act can pass both Houses, if the members should be
true to those they represent, would be 9.788,570
against a minority of 6,110,796, instead of 8,000,000
against 7,900,000, if the assent of the most popular
branch alone was required.
This more full and perfect expression of the voicc
of the people by the concurrence of the two, compa
red to either separately, is a great advance towards
a full and perfect expression of their voice; but
great as it is, it falls short, and the framers of the
Constitution were accordingly not satisfied with it.
To render it siiil more perfect, their next step was
to iT'juire the assent of the President, before an act
of Congress could become a law, and, if he disap
proved, to require two thirds of both Houses to
overrule his veto. We are thus brought to the
point immediately under discussion, and which, on
that account, claims a full and careful examination.
One of the leading motives for vesting the Presi
dent with this high power, was, undoubtedh”, to
give him the means of protecting the portion of the
powers allotted to him by the Constitution, against
the encroachment of Congress. To make a divi
sion r.f a veto form cr an
other is indispensable. The right of each, to judge
or itself of the extent of the power allotted lo its
I'iharo. and to protect itself in its exorcise, is what in
realit}' is meant by a division of pou'cr. Without it,
the allotment to each department would be a mere
partition, and no division at all. Acting under this
impression, the framers of the Constitution have
carelully provided that this approval should be ne
cessary, not only to the acts of Congress, but to ev
ery resolution, vote or order, requiring the cunseiU
of the two Houses, so as to render it iinpos';;Lle to
elude it by any conceivable device, 'i'hir o: itself
was an adcrpiate motive for the provision, and were
there no other, ought to be a suflicient reason for
the rejection of this resolution. Wi(hout it, the di
vision of power between the legislative and Execu
tive'departments, would have been merely nominal.
But it is not the only motive. There is another
and deeper, to which the division itself of the Gov
ernment into departments is subordinate; to enlarge
the popular ba.^is, by increasing the number of voi
ces necessary lo its action. As numerous as are the
voices required to obtain the assent of the people
through the Senate and the House to an act, it was
not thought b}' the framers of the Constitution suf
licient for the action of the Goverment in all cases,
?>ine thousand eight hundred, as large as is the
number, were regarded as still too few, and siv
thousand one hundred too many to remove all mo-
lives for oppression ; the latter being not too few to
be plundered, and the former not too large to divide
the spoils of plunder among. Till the increase of
numbers on one side, and the decrease on the other
reaches that point, there is no security for the weak
er against the the stronger, especially in so exten
sive a country as ours. Acting in the spirit of these
remarks, the authors of the Constitution, although
they dtjemed the concurrence of the Senate and the
House as sufficient, with the approval of the Presi
dent, to the enactment of laws in ordinary cases, yet,
when he dissented, they deemed it a sufficient pre
sumption against the measure to require a still grea
ter cnla!*gementofthe popular basis for its enactrncnt.
With this view, the assent of two-thirds of both Hou
ses were required to overrule his veto, that eighteen
States in the Senate, and a constituency of ten mil
lions six hundred thousand in the other House.
But it may be said that nothing is gained towards
enlarging the popular basis of the Government by
the veto power; because the number necessary to
elect a majority to the two Houses, without which
the act could not |>ass, w’ould be sufficient to elect
him. That is true. But he n^ay have been elect
ed by a diffcreiit portion of the people, or if not,
great changes may take place during his four years,
both in the Senate and the House, which may
change the majority that brought him into power,
and with it tho measures and policy lo be pursued.
In either case he might find it necessary to inter-
})Ose his veto to maintain his views of the Constitu
tion, or the polic)' of the party of which he is the
.head, and which elevated liiin to power.
B.it a still stronger consideration lor vesting him
wiih the power may be found i.n the difference of
the manner of his election, compared with that of
the members of either House, The Senators are
elected by the votes of the Legislatures of the re
spective Stales, and the members of the House by
the people, who. in almost all the States, elect by
districts. In either is there the least responsibility
of the members of any one State, to the Legislature
or people of any other Stale? They arc, as far as
their -'esponsibility may be concerned, solely and
exclusively under the influence of ihe States and
people, W'ho respectively elect them. Not so the
President. The votes of the whole are counted in
his election, which makes him more or less respon
sible to every part—to those who voted against him,
as well as to those whom he owes his election,
which he must feel sensibly. If he should be an
aspirant for a re-election, he will desire to gain the
favorable opinion of States that opposed him, as
well as to retain that of those which voted for h"”-
Even if i;eshoiUd not be a craiididate jor