


Mecklenburg



Jeffersonian.

"The powers granted under the Constitution, being derived from the People of the United States, may be resumed by them, whenever perverted to their injury or oppression."—Madison.

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EDITED AND PUBLISHED WEEKLY, BY
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TERMS:

The "Mecklenburg Jeffersonian" is published weekly at Two Dollars a year, payable in advance. Advertisements will be conspicuously and correctly inserted at One Dollar per square for the first insertion, and Two Cents for each continuation—except Court and other judicial advertisements, which will be charged twenty-five per cent. higher than the above rates, (owing to the delay, generally attendant upon collections). A liberal discount will be made to those who advertise by the year. Advertisements sent in for publication, must be marked with the number of insertions desired, or they will be published until ordered and charged accordingly.

Letters to the Editor, unless containing money in sums of Five Dollars or over, must come free of postage, or the amount paid at the office here will be charged to the writer in every instance, and collected as other accounts.

"Circulate the Documents."

CHEAP CASH PAPER:

The MECKLENBURG JEFFERSONIAN, a weekly paper, published at Charlotte, North Carolina, will in future be furnished to subscribers at TWO DOLLARS a year, payable in advance. No paper will be sent to any subscriber without the money being paid in advance. The size of the paper, and the great amount of reading matter contained in it, makes the JEFFERSONIAN, at the price now proposed, the cheapest paper in the southern country, and affords to every one desirous of reading the current news of the day, an opportunity to do so, at a very trifling cost.

In politics, the JEFFERSONIAN is radically democratic, and will support with zeal and industry the nominee of the Baltimore National Convention for the Presidency, whether that nominee be Van Buren, Calhoun, or any other orthodox democrat. Ardently attached to the principles of the democratic party, the editor of the JEFFERSONIAN will spare no exertions to promote the triumph of those principles in the ensuing contest in the State and Nation. And he calls upon his political friends to come forth and aid him in the good work with their patronage and influence.

In addition to political articles, the JEFFERSONIAN will contain selections on the subjects of agriculture, the arts and sciences, general literature, and the news of the day, together with a due proportion of miscellaneous reading.

EXTRA OFFERS TO CLUBS!

As the approaching political contest will be one of absorbing interest to every citizen, we propose to furnish the JEFFERSONIAN seven months, (from 1st May to 1st December) to clubs of subscribers on extremely low terms—as follows: To every new subscriber, ONE DOLLAR; to a club of 20 new subscribers, \$17; to a club of 50, at \$37, and a club of 100, at \$50—only FIFTY CENTS for the paper seven months! The money to be paid before the papers are sent. This will enable every man to have a paper of his own to read, and become conversant with the politics and news of the day. We intend to expend our utmost energies to make our paper both interesting and useful; and we hope our friends will not suffer us to labor without an adequate reward. Address

SAMUEL C. CRAWFORD,
Charlotte, N. C.

March, 1844.

THE PLEBEIAN.

The largest Dollar Weekly.

A WORD TO DEMOCRATS EVERYWHERE

We would impress upon the Democracy that IT IS THEIR DUTY AT THIS CRISIS to assemble forthwith by towns, villages, or districts and make arrangements for subscribing for 10, 20, or 50 papers for DISTRIBUTION AMONG THE PEOPLE till after the Presidential Election. The WEEKLY PLEBEIAN, containing all the matter of the Daily, (THE ONLY DEMOCRATIC MORNING PAPER PUBLISHED IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK) can be had at the low price of ONE DOLLAR PER ANNUM, in advance, or TWENTY COPIES will be sent one year for the sum of SIXTEEN DOLLARS, or five for four dollars. By a frank letter written by themselves containing money for subscriptions, NOW is the time to commence the work. DELAYS ARE DANGEROUS, AND THE ENEMY ACTIVE AND VIGILANT. EVERY COUNTRY STORE, EVERY VILLAGE TAVERN SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH A DEMOCRATIC PAPER. The Whigs, with an untold cause to support, are circulating their tracts and newspapers by thousands and tens of thousands. We with a righteous Cause, should be on the alert in season in disseminating our principles among the people. The public mind must be aroused—the ignorant Enlightened—the cold-hearted warmed into life, and the weak but willing encouraged by the co-operation of those who are able to contribute by example and by furnishing the means to carry on the contest to a Successful Termination. So far as the PLEBEIAN is concerned, the fight on Federalism and Clay shall be conducted with a warmth increased and increasing, until the battle is over and the victory is won. Pass the word round—SUBSCRIBE FOR THE DOLLAR PLEBEIAN!"

The Plebeian Tracts.

Notice to Democratic Associations, Clubs, and Committees.—In consequence of the increased demand for these popular Tracts, we have reduced the price from \$2.50 to \$2 per 100, and \$20 per 1000.—They are ably written, and completely explode the sophisms of the modern "Junius." They should be largely ordered by our Democratic friends throughout the country. No Democrat should be without them. All orders sent to the Plebeian Office. Remittances in bills of specie-paying banks, accompanying the orders will be received.

No. 1.—The Injustice of the Tariff on Revenue Principles.

No. 2.—The Injustice of the Tariff on Protective Principles.

LEVI D. SLAMM, Publisher.

New York City, 1844.

Political.

LETTER FROM A. H. CHAPPELL, ESQ.
(Continued)

The next measure to which I shall advert is also exclusively pecuniary in its avowed aims and character—I mean a National Bank, which you evidently treat, in your letter to me, as being still a leading and cherished object with the Whig party—though I confess my own observations have caused me to doubt whether there is not, among the more enlightened and judicious of the party, now that the country has got a sound and uniform currency without the help of Congress a strong disposition to let the subject alone. What was the great objection to C. J. Jackson in connection with this matter? Why, that when, under the auspices of National and State Banks, every thing was sound and doing well, he commenced warring upon the Bank and experimenting on the currency and kept up his war and experiments until every thing was in a state of confusion and anarchy. Such was the "head and front" of C. J. Jackson's offending. As I thought and said on all occasions, from the first faint, foreboding sound of his insidious bugle in 1829 and 1830 down to the time when, in 1832, amidst the exulting shouts of many hundred editors of the then State rights (now Whig) party of Georgia, he crushed what they delighted to call the "monster," with one Herculean blow of the veto power. And for years afterwards my political friends (with a few scattering exceptions) continued to laud the old hero for the deed, and to think the better of themselves for having backed and sustained him in it. During all this time, my views and language were in a very different tone. I held that Gen. Jackson, and all who co-operated with him in that part of his career, had taken on themselves a fearful and culpable responsibility; that stability, above all other things, was indispensable to a sound system of money and currency; that it was a salutary reference to which it was impossible to calculate the consequences which any great shock or revolution might, and probably would, engender—consequences carrying disaster and dismay into all the walks of business, into all the "plans and alleys of life," the humblest as well as the proudest. From considerations of this kind, gentlemen, I have always regarded all party tampering and experimenting with the currency, when it is already in a sound state, as little short of a crime against the masses and property of the people.

Is not the currency now in a sound state? Are not exchanges, also, between different commercial points, sound and right? In answer to these questions, the actual state of things will fully justify me in making a remark, which I used to consider applicable to the demand for a "better currency," in the days of the successful operation of the late National Bank to wit: that politicians who are not willing to put up with as good a state of the currency as existed then, and now exists again, but who insist on changing and revolutionizing the whole system, and incurring the great and various hazards attendant on such change, for the mere chance of an infinitely small improvement, deserve not themselves the blessing of good money, and ought to be held bound to indemnify the people for all the losses they sustain by bad money.

So strong and self-evident is this view, that it would be strange if the Northern Whig party, when so unsparringly censured Gen. Jackson for refusing to let alone a currency that was already good enough, should now be found following in his footsteps, as schemers and experimenters for a "better currency," when a sound and good one actually exists.

Mr. Webster, the great exponent of Whig principles at the North, has, you know, in a speech made a year or two ago, pronounced a National Bank an obsolete idea; and, in his late speech at Trenton in which he extols the Southern Whigs so highly for having taken so manly a stand for the "free system," he goes into a most staccato-like examination of the subject of the currency, and handles it in a manner clearly showing that, in his opinion, it needs not the help of a National Bank. It is my confident belief, that the mass of the intelligence of the Whig party at the North is with Mr. Webster in this opinion; however they may remain silent, or even give color for the benefit of the party in those sections of the country where the bank question can still be made available as a political stalking horse. Not does the manner in which the Whigs in the House voted on Saturday last, on certain resolutions unexpectedly sprung on the House from the Committee on Elections, weaken or alter my belief. Those resolutions are so framed, that to vote against them, amounts not even to an imputation in favor of the establishment of a Bank; though, to vote for them, is a very strong expression against such an institution.

These resolutions were unexpectedly introduced at the opening of the session in the morning; and it so happened that I was absent from my seat, having remained in my room an hour or two, engaged in writing this letter. I am, therefore, particularly rejoiced at the opportunity your call gives me to express my views more explicitly than could have been done by a vote on those resolutions.

Gentlemen, with the profound conviction I entertain of the want of even the semblance of necessity for the creation of a National Bank on account of the present or probable state of the currency, believing also that such is the sentiment of most considerate and enlightened men, even among the Whigs, who are not willing to make such a question a party football,—I am satisfied that, if a bank shall be established during the coming administration, it will be done as a mere party measure, and the interests of the party will of which it will be the object throughout its existence, will be without example. If the General Government desires to provoke the States of this Union to nullification and every species of dangerous extremity, let it, as now proposed, establish a National Bank as a mere party measure—a party engine—as a vast money power for strengthening the hands of the Government. For, gentlemen, if this thing shall be done, is it not clear that it must be done with the sword at least with this effect? For to ask for a bank for the sake of a sound currency, after the currency has worked itself sound, is quite as preposterous as it would be to subject a man to a strong course of medicine after he had recovered from a severe malady by the mere

powers of nature, without the help of medicine.—Surely, a constitution that can get well without the aid of physic, may be properly trusted to keep well without it. At all events, it is certainly entitled to a respite from the doctor's hands until it shall begin to show some symptoms of returning disease. I tell you, gentlemen, that for any party to lay its strong hand on this now healthy country, and force a National Bank down its throat, as a mere party measure, will be the most fearful currency experiment that ever was practised in the tide of time. I trust that that portion of the Whigs of the South who signalized themselves by being against a Bank, at a time when they should have been for it, will weigh the matter well before they signalize themselves again by being for it, when they should be against it. For, in connection with the arguments against such an institution, founded on the absence of any necessity for it in the currency, present or prospective, Southern men are bound to look at it in another view, which ought to be decisive with them against it. Such an institution, if established, will add another, and the most powerful of all, to that list of money-engines which I have enumerated, as constituting a policy going to strengthen the Government unduly, and to secure and consolidate its powers and management in the hands of the Northern sectional majority. For, in regard to a Bank, no man can doubt that the control over it will be where the commerce and moneyed capital of the country are mainly located—and that is in the North. Well, the weight of population and of control over the Government lies and will forever lie, there also; hence, the Bank and the Government will both be extremely certain to imbibe the spirit, and to obey the influence and impulse of the interest and views of that quarter of the country. This, alone, would naturally lead to a general alliance and co-operation between them. But when we bear in mind that the Government is not only to be the creator, but also the largest stockholder and customer of the Bank, and that the Bank will come into existence, forewarned by the fate of its predecessor, not to be guilty of the futile madness of setting itself in opposition to the Government, can we doubt that the relations between them will be those of entire subservency of the Bank to the Government, or rather that that powerful sectional majority in the Government, which is its natural ally and supporter?

Gentlemen, when I survey the four great positive measures of Whig policy, which I have now brought in review, and pour upon their tendency to strengthen and aggrandize the Federal Government to the most fearful extent; and when I remember that this Government, thus fearfully strengthened and aggrandized, will always be a machine, controlled by a section of the Confederacy, distinct from that in which our best interests and more widely distinct from us in views, interests, and policy, than even in local position, I confess my heart sickly oppressed with despondent forebodings. And when I see the South herself co-operating headlong in all these things, and raising, in addition, her suicidal hand to aid the stronger section in tearing from the Constitution the only check it has interposed between the rights and interests of the weaker section, and the overmastering legislative power of the stronger, I am ready to bow my head to the dust, and lift up my voice and weep aloud at the heavy and dismal doom which obviously overhangs the land of my birth and of my soul's deep and undying allegiance. For, gentlemen, you have but to succeed in one other measure, which you indicate to me as a leading point of Whig policy—the destruction of the veto power—and the will of the sectional majority of the North, animated and guided by Northern interests, views, and prejudices, will reign, unchecked and unembarrassed, at all times, over the whole legislation of the country, and the condition of Ireland at this day, as a minor member of the British Empire represented in the Imperial Parliament, will be a true, though faint picture of what will be the permanent condition of the South, as represented in, and governed by, the Federal Congress. Take notice, I pray you, that it is the sectional legislative majority in Congress, which we have no hand in electing, from which we have everything to fear. They remember, further, that the veto power is but a negative—a restraint on the will of that majority—and you will perceive at once the sectional bearing against the South of the proposition to destroy the power. And it will be destroyed with equal certainty by allowing the majority of the two Houses to override the veto, whether it be required to be done at the same session at which a bill is passed, or at a subsequent one—the only propositions, I believe, which have been made on the subject.

Take notice, also, that the same sectional majority which frets under the Presidential veto, and demands its removal from the Constitution, does, at the same time deny and scold that right of State veto, or State interposition, for which we have been wont so strongly to contend in Georgia. Bear in mind, moreover, that as part and parcel of the same system of politics, supremacy is asserted by the General Government and its Departments, over the State Governments and their departments.

Gentlemen, we are solemnly bound—as Southern men and Southern patriots, charged by a favoring Heaven with the care of the latest and feeblest portion of this great Confederacy—to look at all these things together, and explore the sources from which they have sprung, and scrutinize their concatenation and tendency. And if any man who will do so, shall fail to perceive that the inevitable effect of this whole system of politics is to subvert the majority power of the Northern or non-slaveholding section of the Union, and to give it full sweep and unobstructed sway over all the interests and affairs of the country of every sort and character, there must, it seems to me, be something very unfortunate in the intellectual medium through which such a man looks at things. But this is not all. Nothing can be more evident than that the possession of such power by the Northern or stronger section, is subjugation and enslavement to the Southern or weaker section. And what they desire to hold us in subjugation for, is glaringly discovered by the character of the objects for which they are so eager to exercise the taxing power and by the region of country in which they have ever taken care to concentrate an overwhelming proportion of the public expenditures. Why, gentlemen, despoils want provinces mainly for the sake

of the tribute they may be made to pay to the rich and grandeur of the governing country. And what greater subservency to these objects could even a despot ask of his provinces, than to submit patiently to be taxed to the extent of his pleasure, for the benefit of such branches of industry as he may choose to favor, and such objects of expenditure as may please him to select? And it is on just such a control of the taxing power and the public expenditures, that the majority despotism of the North has set its heart and laid its hand in this country.—And that it is the profound study and anxiety of that majority to maintain and strengthen its hold on power, is manifested as well by the war it is waging against the annexation of Texas, as by the hostility it shows to the veto power.

Gentlemen, the question of the annexation of Texas is the last battle-field of the South against the majority despotism of the North. If it be lost it will be the field of Waterloo to us. All hope of that equality and balance of power in the Legislature of the Union, which is indispensable to our safety and self-protection will be extinguished; and we must thereafter apply ourselves to the task of reconciliation to our chains forever. If you want proof of this, beyond what the case carries on its face, you have but to look to the leading ground on which opposition to annexation is based at the North. That ground is that annexation would extend the slaveholding region of the South, and augment its power, and consequently endanger or lessen the future preponderance of the North. Yes; sooner than put that preponderance in hazard—sooner than risk the loss of the power of ruling and taxing—as I have, according to their own will and interests—the whole Whig and part of the Democratic party of the North, have taken an immovable stand, not against immediate annexation merely—not against annexation under existing circumstances merely—but against annexation now and forever, under all and any circumstances. The hostility to annexation of Texas into the Union, springing from this main and leading ground, is heightened by a religious sentiment very prevalent at the North against slavery, and by an apprehension of an armed interference from Great Britain. You will at once perceive, that these are not in their nature transient and controllable, but permanent and irremovable objections to the measure in the portion of the Northern mind by which they are entertained. And it was with a full knowledge of the unyielding character of the feeling to which they have given rise, and with a politic eye to it, that Mr. Clay penned his article against annexation, and put the following sentence in it: "I do not think that Texas ought to be admitted into the Union as an integral part of it, in decided opposition to the wishes of a considerable and respectable portion of the confederacy."

He knew when he penned these lines, two things: 1st. That there was a considerable and respectable portion of the confederacy embracing the body of the Whig party, and a fraction of the Democracy of the North, that never would consent to Texas coming into the Union as an integral part of it, and 2d. He knew, further, that Texas never would consent to annexation or any other terms. I invite you, gentlemen, to review Mr. Clay's letter. You will perceive that it amounts to an unqualified declaration that there ought to be no attempt to acquire Texas—at least for a long time to come, if ever; or rather the construction which forces itself on my mind is, that the attempt ought never to be made at all.

What a spectacle have we here! A man illustrious by the long celebrity of his talents, by the high stations he has filled, and by the brilliant figure he has made in his country's eye for the full third of a century—a man ambitious of glory in the service of his country, and occupying a most commanding and influential position—such a man, in the very act of aspiring to the pre-eminently highest post in the public service, with millions backing his pretensions and laboring for his elevation—such a man, under such circumstances, has consented to do what? Why, to tie up his own hands, in advance, against even making an effort, no matter how honorably or successfully it might be made, for the recovery of what he himself admits to have been the formerly owned and most unalienable territory of the republic. Yes! H. Clay binds himself in advance, and in view of his election to the presidency, to make no effort, to embrace no opportunity, of reinstating his country in the possession of the boundaries which the immortal Jefferson gave it. One would have thought that the rich blaze of glory, which the splendid acquisition would shed around his name and administration through future ages, rivaling that of Mr. Jefferson himself, would have been irresistible to such a mind as Mr. Clay's. Why did that, and every other consideration, fail of effect upon him? Has it come to light, in the slow made revelation of time, that Mr. Jefferson was guilty of a blunder—of a misstep—in the purchase of Louisiana, and that Texas as a part of it? Nobody thought so at the time, or has thought so since—except that intensely selfish and sectional party at the North, with which now, as then, northern ascendancy in the councils of the nation was and is the uppermost and all-absorbing object. They will know that, with the Rio Grande for our boundary, the equilibrium of the Union would be indestructible, and the South forever safe against Northern domination. Hence the tears they shed, and the constitutional scruples they muttered, over Mr. Jefferson's vast acquisition of territory in the West and South. The feeble, compromising, short-sighted administration of Mr. Monroe, was a God send to this band of politicians. It added firmly upon the county their darling systems of a protective tariff and internal improvements. It involved us, by a treaty with Great Britain for joint occupation, in difficulties about the Oregon Territory, which everybody now sees are likely to force upon us war, or the surrender of our rights to a vast domain. Would to God this had been all! But, no! A deadly blow must be let fall most bludgeoning on the equilibrium of the Confederacy, and on the self-protecting capabilities of the South in all future time. At a moment when Mexico, and all the continental American dominions of Old Spain in that quarter, were dropping from her hands by the irresistible process of war and revolution—when, consequently, our relinquishment of our undoubted right to Texas in favor of Spain's mere shred of a claim, was tantamount to making

her merely the conduit of passing the title from us to the then revolted, and soon to be independent, Government of Mexico—at that moment it was, when it had become broadly apparent that, within a few years at most, Spain would be as glad to quit-claim Texas to us, in order to thwart her rebel Mexican dependency, as France had been, in 1803, to sell us Louisiana, lest the British should conquer it from her—such a moment it was, I say, that Mr. Monroe's administration selected for swapping of Texas for Florida. Is it not manifested, by the after course of events, that a little of that wisdom which waits upon time to work out her designs in our favor, would have enabled us to get clear of the Spanish claim to Texas, by only giving a very small additional price for Florida? But the Administration lacked that kind of wisdom; or, in its eagerness to put an end to difficulties with Spain, growing out of our Indian encroachments, and their instigators finding a refuge in Florida did not exercise it. The result was, that we got Florida, and threw away Texas.

The deed was no sooner done, than it was denounced by Henry Clay. Opposed as he then was to the severance of Texas from our country, it is not strange that he should now be unqualifiedly opposed to a re-union? What things have changed since, to produce such a change in him? No such change had come over him as late as 1817; for, in that year, he himself tells us he made an effort, as Secretary of State, to open a negotiation with Mexico for its retrocession to us. Ay, with Mexico!—although Spain did not, for years afterwards, give up her claim, or recognize the independence of Mexico. What things, I ask again, have changed since that time, to make Mr. Clay's views so different now from what they were then?

The answer to this question presents matter of the most solemn import to the South. I have already adverted to the hostility which exists at the North against Mr. Jefferson's purchase of Louisiana—a hostility emanating from the first statesman of that quarter of the country, and based exclusively on the fear of the effect of the measure in causing the eventual and perpetual loss of Northern ascendancy in the Union. They were not willing there should be an equilibrium—a happily adjusted balance of power between the North and South.—What they wanted was preponderance and supremacy permanently secured to their side. This object they saw was defeated by the acquisition of such a vast and fertile Southern territory as that which stretched from the Perdido to the Rio Grande del Norte. But they took heart, and became reassured after the cession of Texas to Spain by us in 1819. They surveyed the wide expanse of all the States and remaining national domains of the Union; and were satisfied that the decrees of Nature had placed the North in a perpetual supremacy, provided the prohibition of slavery could be effected within a certain line of latitude. Hence the Missouri Compromise, and the fearful struggle between the North and South by which it was preceded. It was a struggle for political power solely. Abolition had not then reared its snaky crest in the land.

Well, gentlemen, that compromise was a great thing, and even greater as a sign than as an event. It proved, beyond all possibility of doubt, that, both in the North and South, slavery, or the slaveholding institution, was felt as the great political tie, paramount to all others, among those States in which it existed. It proved that it was a tie so strong as to bind together the States in which it existed, on one side, and those in which it did not exist, on the other; and to array them as two great sections of country in an attitude of permanent opposition and contest for power in the Confederacy. And if any man will just take up the map, and compare the number of the States and the extent and character of the territory on the North side of the line of the compromise, with the same things on the South side, a still further truth will burst upon him, with overwhelming self-evidence, to wit: that from the moment of the loss of Texas by Mr. Monroe's treaty, in February, 1819, the doom of the South, as the weaker, subject-section of the Confederacy, became as firmly fixed as the boundaries of the country themselves.

The map will also show him how widely different her fate and relative strength would have permanently been, but for the loss of Texas. Yes; it will tell him that, but for that loss, the South, in the Federal Legislature, would always have been strong—not, indeed, to be an oppressor, but full strong enough for self-protection against the wrongful and oppressive legislation of the North.

So far, then, as the balance of power between the two great sections is involved in the question of Texas annexation, all that the South asks is, that the Government shall not let slip the present transitory opportunity of reinstating us in those boundaries which Mr. Jefferson gave, which Monroe lost, and which Adams and Clay sought to restore. To this most reasonable and just demand of the South, the North—particularly the Whig Party of the North—has answered peremptorily No! And so peremptory was the temper in which the answer was given, that Mr. Clay who had thrown himself into the arms of that party for his election, found himself obliged to echo the response, or compromise all his prospects for the Presidency; for, bear in mind, Mr. Clay had no hand in forming or directing Northern Whig sentiment on the subject of annexation. It was perfectly formed, and immovably settled, as it now stands, a long time in advance of the publication of his sentiments.