

The North Carolinian.

"CHARACTER IS AS IMPORTANT TO STATES AS IT IS TO INDIVIDUALS; AND THE GLORY OF THE STATE IS THE COMMON PROPERTY OF ITS CITIZENS."

H. L. HOLMES, Editor and Proprietor.

FAYETTEVILLE, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1840.

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TERMS.
\$2 50 per annum, if paid in advance; \$3 if paid at the end of six months; or \$3 50 at the expiration of the year. Advertisements inserted at the rate of fifty cents per square, for the first, and thirty cents for each subsequent insertion.
No paper discontinued until arrearages are paid, except at the option of the Editor.
No subscription received for less than twelve months.
Court advertisements and Sheriff's sales, will be charged 25 per cent. higher than the usual rates.
All advertisements sent for publication should have the number of insertions intended marked upon them, otherwise they will be inserted until forbid, and charged accordingly.
Letters on business connected with this establishment, must be addressed—H. L. HOLMES, Editor of the North-Carolinian, and in all cases post-paid.
Subscribers wishing to make remittances by mail, will remember that they can do so free of postage, as Postmasters are authorized by law to frank letters enclosing remittances, if written by themselves, or the contents known to them.

PIANO FORTES.
NOW opening, and for SALE, at the Female Seminary.
One Extra, Grand Action Piano Forte, elegant Crotch Mahogany, Gothic Architecture, with every modern improvement, manufactured by Wake and Glenn, \$470
One ditto, Rose Wood, 61 Octaves, by Wake and Glenn, \$385
One ditto, Mahogany, by Wake & Glenn, \$340
One ditto, by Geb and Walker, \$350
One ditto, Common Action, by Dubois, Bacon & Chambers, \$200
These Piano Fortes have been selected carefully, by the best masters in New York, and will be held at a liberal discount from the regular prices, and a credit on good paper, to suit the times.
—A. L. S. O.—
Several PIANO FORTES, which have been in use in the Seminary, are offered at great bargains.
R. W. BAILEY, 69-4f.
Fayetteville, June 13, 1840.

Fayetteville FEMALE SEMINARY.
HAVING declined further supervision of the FEMALE SEMINARY, it is but just that I should express to its former patrons and friends my confidence, that in the hands of Mr. Spencer, it will be conducted with ability and faithfulness, on the general plan heretofore pursued. Mr. Spencer, as a teacher, is laborious, accurate and persevering.
R. W. BAILEY.

The Subscriber will open the Seminary on the 15th of October next, and hopes by giving his entire and exclusive attention to the business—FEMALE TEACHERS—to merit the patronage heretofore bestowed. In regard to the plan he intends to pursue, he has only to say, at present, that he is DETERMINED to give a course of instruction in each department as THOROUGH as possible. The Academic year will be the same as before, commencing on the 15th of October, and closing on the 15th of July, and divided into two sessions. Pupils charged from time of entrance to close of session, and no deduction made for absence, except in cases of sickness.

TERMS—In Advance.
Elementary Department, or Second Class, \$8 00 per session
First Class, 16 00 "
French Language, 10 00 "
Drawing and Painting, 10 00 "
Music on the Piano Forte accompanied by the Voice, 25 00 "
Music on Guitar, 25 00 "
Use of Piano, 3 00 "
Incidentals, 50 "
G. SPENCER, 75-1f
August 1, 1840.

NOTICE.
LAND FOR SALE.
THE Subscriber wishing to move to the West, month, my plantation, on the 27th of this month, has for sale, on both sides of the Turnpike and Chicken Roads, SEVEN MILES West of Fayetteville, and runs across Beaver Creek on the East side, with an excellent MILL SITE thereon. The above lands are as will timbered as any lands within the same distance of Fayetteville, with pine and oak.
—ALSO—
AT the same time and place, I will offer my stock of Cattle, Hogs and Sheep, together with Household and Kitchen Furniture, Farming Utensils, &c. The lands will be sold to suit purchasers, in separate tracts if requested—the terms will be made easy, and known on the day of sale.
DUNCAN BUIE, 76-3f
Fayetteville, Aug. 8, 1840.

H. ERAMBERT,
TAILOR,
Respectfully informs his friends and the public generally, that he has re-commenced the Tailoring Business in the house next door to John Hinkle & Son, on Green Street 6 doors above the Market House, where he will thankfully receive all orders in his line for cash only, finding the credit system a bad one. All orders from the country for work must in all cases have the cash enclosed, otherwise they will not be attended to. He begs leave to assure those who may favor him with their orders, that no pains shall be spared on his part to give general satisfaction.
HE HAS ON HAND
An assortment of Shirts, Bosoms, Collars, Stocks, Suspenders, and Drawers, of the best quality.
WANTED.
Three or four Journeymen Tailors, none need apply but good workmen, and of steady habits. ALSO, Two Boys wanted to find the credit system a bad one. All orders from the country for work must in all cases have the cash enclosed, otherwise they will not be attended to. He begs leave to assure those who may favor him with their orders, that no pains shall be spared on his part to give general satisfaction.
Fayetteville, April 25, 1840. 61-3m.

Political.

From the Globe.
Jealousy, Ingratitude, and Treachery of General Harrison.

The instance of cruel injustice committed by Harrison in throwing the pall of his report over the name of Col. John Miller, who led, what Harrison and his friends now call the most brilliant sortie in our military annals, was noticed in a recent number of our paper. Harrison, but a few days before, had quarrelled with Col. Miller, and his yet unexpressed resentment was supposed by Col. Miller and his friends to have induced the General to omit, in the first recital of the names of the gallant officers who performed the glorious achievement, that of the leader of the forlorn hope, to whose personal courage and skilful and judicious conduct of the action left entirely to his discretion, its success is attributable. But the case of deliberate perfidy, to which we would now invite attention, blighting the laurels won by a stripling in his army, no temporary excitement can be even supposed to lend the slightest mitigation. Cold selfishness, enduring for twenty-six years, characterizes the yet unrepaid wrong. The injured officer was one who volunteered before he reached manhood, to serve Harrison in his Tippecanoe campaign. On the bloody night of the surprise, he acted as the aid of Boyd the Commander of the fourth regiment, and all know and admit, that to the admirable skill and firmness with which this body of men were made like a rampart to cover the camp, and the broken militia, Harrison and his army owe their deliverance from total destruction. The same young hero, whose voice and bearing, amidst the darkness and dismay at Tippecanoe, inspired with invincible courage, veterans to whom he bore orders of their Colonel, was conspicuous again in that glorious sortie at Fort Meigs, which gave some light to the day which the butchery or captivity of the whole corps of Kentuckians under Colonel Dudley had concluded with disaster. Under Miller, he led a company of forty men to the assault of the batteries, which were carried. And there he left his whole command, but fourteen men, who alone survived to return with him to the fort. But his greatest service was that at Sandusky; and it was for this that the General requited him with the artfully practised wrong, which from the noble nature of the injured party, and the insidious hypocrisy of his cunning adversary, has up to this hour, been shrouded in mystery. It is our purpose now to dissipate the obscurity by authentic and long suppressed documents.

It is proper to give a brief view of the state of things, out of which the secret history which we propose to open up, grew, that the partially known and concealed facts may shed their light on each other.
The reader should look to the map, and take a comprehensive view (with a knowledge of the designs on both sides) of the scene of action of the whole campaign, which the victory obtained by Croghan at Sandusky so gloriously opened, and which the battle fought by Col. Johnson on the Thames as brilliantly closed.

Armstrong, the Secretary of War, had over-ruled Harrison's idea of carrying the invasion of Canada round the head of the lakes. His plan was to obtain the command of the lake by a naval victory and carry our army into Canada by transports built for the purpose. The fleet to contend for the mastery with the English, was prepared near Erie, under Perry. The transports were built by Jesup, at Cleveland, and Harrison, whose duty it was to cover, with his force, these preparations, took post at Seneca. The lake heads like a bow into Ohio, from Erie, in Pennsylvania, to Sandusky bay. Sandusky is at the western end of the arch—Erie, at the eastern extremity—Cleveland is on the arch between the two. The British force was on the opposite side from the Sandusky bay. Harrison and his army, was at a considerable distance from the bay, on the Sandusky river—Croghan at the post of Lower Sandusky, being about nine miles nearer the bay. The object of the British was to destroy the preparations for invasion on the lake shores, and open the whole sweep of its arch in Ohio to the depredations of the Indians supported by the British fleet and sustained by the land forces as a rallying point in their incursions. To relieve himself from Harrison's force, which he did not doubt would be employed to cover Cleveland, Proctor made a feint of besieging Fort Meigs a second time. This, he supposed, would withdraw Harrison from Seneca westward, to succor Fort Meigs, and leave his designs upon the boats and stores at Cleveland and the fleet at Erie unobstructed. Harrison did not march to the relief of Fort Meigs. Proctor then came down the bay to Sandusky in the prosecution of his real object. Harrison no sooner heard of his approach, than he ordered Croghan to burn his fort and retreat and he had all his own provisions and preparations for the Canada campaign piled for a conflagration, and a retreat into the interior as soon as Croghan joined him. Proctor would thus have obtained, from the fears of Harrison what his feint on Fort Meigs was intended to effect, by provoking his valor, had not Croghan's courage disappointed Proctor and saved Harrison. Armstrong, then Secretary, thus sums up, in his notices of the war the conduct of Harrison at this point of time:

"Having on the 29th, sufficiently assured himself with regard to the number and equipment of Proctor's force, and suspecting that this formidable array might be directed against his own entrenched camp at Seneca, he at once determined to collect and destroy his surplus stores, abandon his present position

and make good a retreat to Upper Sandusky—leaving to the fate that might await them, the settlements that were on the Southern shores of the lake; the boats built and stores collected at Cleveland; and Perry's fleet, then fitting out, and nearly ready for service, at Presque Isle. But though willing and prepared to make these sacrifices, he could not but perceive that a mere presumption of danger to his own camp, would not justify the abandonment of Croghan's detachment, without some effort on his part to extend to it the eventual security he sought for himself. On this point, however, the General's sense of duty was soon satisfied; forgetting alike the admonition contained in his first order to Croghan, "not to hazard a retreat in the face of an Indian investment," and the fact now perfectly known to himself that such investment did exist, he despatched to that officer a second order, for "an immediate retreat" at all hazards; indicating the route by which he was to make it, but taking no step by which he was to cover, or otherwise sustain the movement. And, as if the task thus imposed was not in itself sufficiently perilous, he farther prescribed, that the garrison, instead of employing all proper means to mask the operation, should begin "by setting fire to their stores and barracks," and thus virtually announce their intention to the surrounding enemy.

"Fortunately, the great disposer of the events of this world, not unfrequently converts evil into good, and folly into wisdom. On the present occasion, we have seen, that by the first order given to Croghan he was assigned to the defence of a post which, in the General's opinion, 'could not be saved,' and at the same time forbidden to retreat, in the face of an Indian investment, and that by a second, he was ordered to abandon this untenable post, and make good a retreat of nine miles through a continuous forest filled with savages, without aid or support of any kind."

"The circumstances connected with Croghan's refusal to obey the order to burn and retreat, are told for the first time truly in his letter, which we now publish. The result is forcibly told by the Secretary, Armstrong, in the following passage:

"In making this selection, the young and gallant Croghan did not hesitate; and to the demand of a surrender, enforced by the usual menace of indiscriminate slaughter in case of refusal, he answered substantially that the defence of his post was a point of honor which could only be satisfied by an actual experiment of the relative force and fortune of his antagonist and himself.
"While this negotiation was in progress, Proctor was employed in landing his artillery and giving it a position in aid of his gunboats, from which on the delivery of Croghan's answer, a heavy fire was opened and continued on the fort, with little if any intermission during the night. At day-break a second battery of three six pounders was established within two hundred and fifty yards of the pickets; and about four o'clock P. M. was found that the whole fire of the British cannon, was concentrated on the northwest corner of the fort—a circumstance sufficiently indicating the point and species of attack meditated upon it. Major Croghan, accordingly hastened to employ such means as he possessed to strengthen the menaced angle, and had barely executed his purpose, when the enemy (covering himself with smoke), was seen rapidly advancing and but a few paces distant from the pickets. A general and well-directed fire of musketry from the garrison, which immediately followed this discovery, had the effect of checking his progress and considerably disturbing his order; but the latter being speedily restored, the movement was resumed, and the ditch reached and occupied by the head of the column. It was at this critical moment that Croghan's single piece of artillery, charged with grape-shot, and so placed as to enfilade the assailants, opened its fire, and with such effect, that in a few minutes the combat was virtually ended and the battle won. Most of the enemy who entered the ditch were killed or wounded, and such of them as were less advanced and able to fly, sought safety in the neighbouring woods—carrying with them no disposition to renew the attack, and strongly impressing their Indian allies with their own panic. Proctor now saw, that all attempts to rally the fugitives were hopeless, and that to avoid a greater calamity, his most prudent course would be, to re-embark what could be collected of his force, red and white, and return immediately to Malden."

We now come to the unpublished history connected with this event. It will explain why the results of this victory were carefully kept out of view at the time—why Croghan consented to have his motives for disobeying his orders misrepresented, and Harrison's conduct in giving them vindication—and why Harrison so perseveringly falsified the truth of history in the accounts given by him of this particular transaction, in the two works prepared under his own eye; the first published by McAfee, the second by Dawson.

In bringing forward Colonel Croghan's letters upon this subject, it is proper to state that they were given to us by a gentleman of high standing in Ohio, who, without any communication with Colonel Croghan upon the

subject, submitted them to us for the press. The facts that these letters were called for by a committee of gentlemen at Wheeling, the friends of Harrison—that Colonel Croghan expressed his willingness to give them to the public by referring the committee to General Harrison for the correspondence—that this committee, after having had time to communicate with General Harrison, published a letter as Croghan's, which the late correspondence between Harrison and Croghan shows was not his, but one which his self-sacrificing patriotism permitted Harrison to shape, to suit the exigencies of the time at which it was published—that Harrison's aid Col. Todd, now conducting a press notoriously set up as the immediate organ of Harrison, declared, in reference to the call by the committee for the correspondence in regard to the contested question of the defence of Fort Stephenson, that there was no "such contested question"—that history and Col. Croghan's own letter at the day, have placed the subject beyond the necessity of further elucidation—all these facts, connected with the consideration that if what is said in behalf of Harrison in regard to the call of his own friends for the correspondence, be true, the correspondence itself must be false, render it proper, in justice to the parties and to the public, that the issue made by Colonel Todd's declaration should be tested. We do not publish what purports to be the replies of Harrison, in the copies which we have in our hands, because the history referred to by Col. Todd, as true, is condemned, in the letters purporting to be Harrison's, as erroneous. Harrison must therefore deny the authenticity of these letters, or the authority of his friend, Col. Todd, to make the statement on his behalf.

We shall await, then, some intimation on the part of General Harrison or his friends, touching this subject—some recognition of the letters imputed to him, coupled with an expression of a willingness that they may meet "the public eye." In that contingency we shall with alacrity present them in the columns of the Globe, in their proper connection.
From the contents of Col. Croghan's letters, it will be perceived that not a fact stated by him is controverted. It was alone upon the admission of the truth of his statements that the mode of correcting the original misrepresentations was referred to the decision of mutual friends.

COLONEL CROGHAN'S LETTERS TO GENERAL HARRISON.

RED HOOK, 1st July, 1818.

SIR: Could I calculate on seeing you within any reasonable time, this letter would not be written; but as there is no prospect of this, I deem it, therefore, most proper in this way to state to you with candor, that reports, or rather statements, have been made to me of such a nature, and from sources so direct and apparently so authentic, as to cause me to hesitate in the language I should bear towards you; and which will, unless positively denied by you, call from me such contradiction as would be extremely unpleasant to me, and, perhaps, mortifying to you.

It is stated that you revised and corrected the work entitled "War in the West," (of which McAfee is the ostensible author,) preparatory to its going to press, thus giving your sanction and authority to the publication of a statement in relation to the defence of Lower Sandusky, most positively incorrect, and which you at the time knew to be in direct contradiction of the language which you held in the Camp of Seneca during the bombardment of Sandusky by the enemy. "General Harrison," says the author, "discovering from the fire of the enemy that he had nothing but light artillery, which could make no impression on the works, felt no apprehension for the safety of the garrison, well knowing that a breach could not be effected, and that without forming a breach, every attempt at escalade could be successfully repelled by the garrison;" or words to this amount—a statement as void of truth as possible, as you very well know, recollecting as you must your uneasiness, during the whole continuance of the cannonade, for the safety of the garrison, and which more than once wrung from you this strong language of censure of my conduct: "I wash my hands of it—the blood be on his own head"—language which you had no right to use, and which would have damned my reputation as an officer had I fallen on that occasion.

I am informed that very lately, at a dinner in Philadelphia, when the subject of the defence of Sandusky was brought up, you expressed yourself in substance thus: The officers and soldiers of that garrison are not so deserving of distinction for its defence as it is generally thought: to the blindness and folly of the enemy, more than to any extraordinary exertions or skill of theirs, is to be ascribed his defeat and their safety; it is true they did very well, but not better than any other like number of troops from my army would have done, &c., thus continuing on in such an exposition of the affair, as made me, says my informant and others at the table, express an astonishment that the merits of the defence of the Sandusky had been so far overrated, and that the commanding officer had received for such service such applause. Did such conversation ever take place? or have you ever expressed yourself in such manner of the defence of Sandusky, as to induce the belief in any one that its garrison received warmer plaudits than it was deserving of? And in asking this, may I at the same time require of you an equally candid denial or admission of the statement of your

having revised the work of which McAfee is the ostensible author? If it is made to appear from your answer that my informants have reported falsely, they shall know it to their confusion and cost; but if on the other hand there is an affirmation on your part of the truth of their statement, I will immediately take it upon myself to correct the false impression you may have created. I will be in New York until the 1st of October next, to which place I beg that your answer may be directed.

I have the honor to be,
Your obedient servant,
G. CROGHAN.
To Gen. W. H. Harrison,
Cincinnati, Ohio.

NEW YORK, Aug. 13, 1818.

DEAR SIR: The language of my letter, although warm, was but the expression of my feelings at the time; for I had then scarce a doubt of your hostility towards me, by such an extraordinary chain of co-incident circumstances were the reports in proof thereof brought before me. With every desire to address you as from the long friendship that has existed between us you had a right to expect, I was unable to express myself as I wished, for at each attempt at more passionate manner, I became yet more warm at the idea of having so mistaken your character. Nor will you be surprised at this, when informed of the manner in which it was produced. In the first place, I was never satisfied with your report of the affair of Sandusky. You eulogized individual gallantry alone, without any attempt at placing the facts before the Government in the important light they merited—thus doing an injury to myself and to others concerned. However, this neglect I found an excuse for at the time; the exasperated state of public feeling, unjustly directed against yourself, rendering it more proper, for a time at least, such facts should be withheld as would tend the further to increase the reputation of the affair. Secondly, when I heard for more than two years, officers declare that you were inimical to me, (at the same time giving instances in proof,) a book appeared in Kentucky, highly corroborative of these declarations, for in this book (on which it is said you had passed your approbation whilst yet in manuscript) a statement is given of the affair of Sandusky, calculated most completely to lessen its reputation in the opinion of the public. Lastly, when in a degree exasperated at the false coloring given to the affair of Sandusky in the book above referred to, while revolving in my mind a conjecture of the real state of your feelings towards me, I accidentally met with a stranger who recited to me a conversation he had recently held with you, that places the fact of your hostility beyond a question. The conversation here alluded to was expressed at length in my last letter, and to it I might have added another fact which had its place in the chain of connection that you presented to this stranger—McAfee's History; and I may say vouched for its correctness, as it was given to him after he had avowed his intention of writing an account of the war. I might here relate many other facts of like importance in this chain of singular coincidences; but I deem it will readily appear from those I have already stated, that I was slow to believe you capable of improper feeling, and that the warmth of which you complain was the consequence of unwillingness on my part to trouble you with a recital of the various reports I had heard, until at last they assumed so positive a character as to impress me with almost an entire conviction of their truth.

I may offer these particulars in excuse for the tone and language of my letter; but they do not cause me the less to regret having betrayed such warmth. You had a right to expect other treatment; and I do not hesitate to say that I have wronged your friendship.
Your letter bears with it all the satisfaction that you could give, or that I can ask. You have denied, in emphatic terms, the truth of the statements that have been made to me, and of course stand acquitted of every charge of improper feelings towards me. The subject, I hope, may stand at rest forever, at least so far as relates to yourself. Should a second edition, of McAfee's book be published, I will offer to the publisher an impartial detail of facts in relation to the affair of Sandusky, as a duty which I owe to those brave men who are injured in the statement now before the world; but, in whatever I may say, no personal allusions shall be made to yourself, if they can be avoided. Although I no longer harbor a thought of your having ever wilfully injured us, of your having at any time stated anything with a view to detract from the merits of the defence of Sandusky, I am very far, at the same time, from placing, as I used to do, the strongest reliance on the activity of your friendship for me. I once thought you anxious to seek an occasion to speak in praise of my services. I since find my mistake, and that your neglect of me has gone so far as to cause you to pass from under your eyes a work containing an incorrect account of an affair on which my reputation as a soldier greatly depended, when it was fully in your power to have given it the necessary corrections. Feelings as I do, that I have striven a great deal in your behalf, and aware that you were conscious of my having at one time rendered you a very signal service, I am surprised, perhaps mortified, that you should have neglected the very favorable opportunity that was offered to you of acknowledging the obligation by generously publishing to the world a full account of every transaction in relation to the defence of Sandusky. Such a

course would not have left me among the number of those who have given proof of more personal courage, but would have ranked me on the roll of those who have rendered their country signal services, while it would have exalted you as one superior to all selfish considerations, more anxious to render justice to others than to claim it for yourself. I have been educated in the belief that candor was a virtue; I therefore address you in its utmost sincerity. I do not wish to hurt your feelings, but to show you what my own are. I harbor not against you the most remote resentment. I am as willing now as I have ever been to speak in your favor, nor will I ever neglect an opportunity of doing justice to your military worth and services.

I am, very respectfully, yours,
G. CROGHAN.
Gen. Harrison, Cincinnati.

NEW ORLEANS, May 24, 1825.

SIR: I unwillingly renew our correspondence, which I had thought finally closed with my letter on the 13th August, 1818, and that I do so will be received by you as an evidence that my feelings towards you are at least not hostile. You will call to mind the particulars of our recent conversation at Washington City, and cannot therefore be surprised at my entering, without circumspection, upon the subject which then occupied us. Strict justice has never yet been done to the brave men who served with me at Lower Sandusky, and I require it for them at your hands. It would be needless for me to point out in what particulars they have suffered; to you, at least, it should be enough to be referred to McAfee's History of the War in the West, and your own biography, recently published in Cincinnati. What is said in either of these books, calculated to place the transactions at Lower Sandusky in a higher point of view before the world than is claimed for the most insignificant affairs of that day? Your answer must be that of every other reader—nothing. I ask no more for myself, General Harrison, than I have a right to claim for every soldier who served under me. But might I not ask for more at your hand! If you have one spark of grateful recollection, you will answer, yes—more, much more. Did I not literally sacrifice myself to save you? Did I not, at a moment when the excitement against you throughout the whole State of Ohio, amounting to general clamor, when there was almost mutiny in your very camp at Seneca, do every thing that you and your friends required of me as necessary to reinstate you in the good opinion of the people and of the army? The success of our army required that you, the general-in-chief, should have the confidence of all; and to insure that, I signed addresses, without reading them, because I was told that it was necessary; wrote letters approving throughout, your conduct, and subject to your corrections, without asking what they might be, because I was assured by members of your family that you yourself believed that on my expressions in relation to you much depended. But of what I did for you enough—of what you have done for me there is nothing to be told. You have personally pledged yourself to correct any false impressions that may have been created by the publication of the two works above mentioned; in a word, to speak of all things in relation to the transactions in Sandusky as they deserve.

We are told in McAfee's History, "General Harrison, discovering from the fire of the enemy that he had nothing but light artillery, which could make no impression upon the work, felt not a moment alarmed for the safety of the garrison, well knowing that a breach could not be effected, and that without effecting a breach, every attempt at escalade could be successfully repelled." General Harrison, is this the fact? Did you not, during the whole of the bombardment of thirty-six hours, evince more emotion than could have been induced by a belief that the garrison was not endangered? Did you not, in the extremity of your apprehensions, more than once cry out, "The blood be on his own head—I wash my hands of it?" And was there one man of all your camp at Seneca (the gallant Wood excepted) who believed that, without the most desperate resistance, the garrison could prevail against the attacks of the enemy? Answer these queries, and fairly. I demand it of you as a right. If the statement in McAfee's book be correct, then where is the merit of the defence of Sandusky? State candidly the facts without eulogium on any of us; for each one who served there would be judged by his works. Tell to the world, that when you fell back on Seneca, leaving as a garrison for Sandusky, but 150 men, the works of the place were measurably defenceless—that the pickets which connected the block houses were so loosely planted, that the efforts of a single man could pull many of them up—that there was no ditch about the work, nor any outward defence to oppose to an assaulting force—that but few entrenching tools were left behind, and those unwillingly—and to all this, that there was spared to us scarce 40 rounds of musket cartridges per man, without a single prepared cartridge or one ounce of powder for the only piece of artillery in the place. Then state the appearance of the defences, on your coming down immediately after the defeat and flight of the enemy. The brave men who toiled there during ten days and nights to put themselves in a posture of defence, are as much entitled to credit for it, as they are deserving of praise for their gallantry after the coming of the enemy.

Having enlarged on these points as far as may be due to the truth, I would then have you speak of every other circumstance in re-