Twenty-seventh Congress.

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CONGRESSIONAL ANALYSIS.

SENATE.

To-day the consideration of Mr. Wright's amendment, which was taken up at the close of the session of yesterday, was resumed. This amendment is in effect the application of the law of New York in regard to Banks failing to redeem their notes in specie, to the national institution. Mr. Wright exhibited perspicuously the operation of the proposed amendment in the experiment of the system as adopted in regard to the banks of a State which is justly regarded the greatest commercial one in the Union, and, therefore, most deeply interested in the sound condition of banking institutions. He showed that of all measures, that prepared by him had been most effectual in securing specie payments, and preserving the multitude of banks, great and small, which are scattered throughout the Commonwealth, from the ruin in which similar institutions had involved themselves and those dependent upon them in other quarters.

Mr. Berrien of Georgia thought there was ample provision made against a suspension of specie payments, in the power to issue a *scire facias*, and the penalty of twelve per cent. allowed to all unpaid demands during a suspension of specie payments.

Mr. Wright referred to the fact that these guards had been introduced in a great variety of Bank charters, and among the rest, of the former Bank of the United States, and had always proved ineffectual. On the other hand, his remedy, which placed the assets of the Bank instantly in the hands of trustees on a suspension, and which gave to the judiciary, in the execution of the law, power to make such disposition, as in case of continued insolvency for the time specified in the charter, had answered well. It would secure the creditors of the Bank and the parties interested in the Bank, with the least possible loss to any, while forfeiture of the charter, which was made the final penalty of the gross mismanagement which incapacitated the institution for the duties appertaining to it, would be found effective as a preventive of the abuse of privileges by bankers, and the best remedy for the mischiefs which grow out of such abuses. Mr. Wright urged that the notes of a bank in suspension ought not to be received for public dues. The Bank, then, is not in a condition to receive the public money. Its affairs, if taken into the hands of the Judiciary, are then placed under the control of law, and so are the funds of the United States, which the Constitution says must be under the control of law.

A bank that refuses payment is not more likely to pay public than private claims.—If you make yourselves partners with such an institution, you must take the consequences fairly.

The whole object of the amendment is to take the affairs, and put them under the control of law. Why should they be left with those who mismanage? When has any remedy against banks proved effectual? There was no other way but to wind them up by a law they cannot evade.

Mr. Wright repelled the idea that the stockholders would be injured; they would be injured more by letting the directors who manage their stock go on. All the sympathy is for banks and stockholders; none for the poor and oppressed creditors.

Mr. Buchanan came into the debate in support of Mr. Wright's amendment. He asserted that the principal object of granting privileges, so far as the public were concerned, was to secure to the people, at all times, a paper currency convertible into specie. That the most effectual security which could be given to insure this, was to subject the Bank, at the time of its creation, to an irrevocable decree that, upon a suspension of specie payments, it must cease to exist. Then the instinct of self-preservation would induce it to conduct its affairs in such a manner as to avoid self-destruction. This provision was not an untried experiment. It had succeeded admirably in preserving specie payments in New York. He contended that the provisions in the charter authorizing Congress to pass future laws upon the subject, or authorizing a scire facias to issue by order of either House, would not produce the effect; because the Bank would believe that Congress would never act upon this power.—They would indulge the Bank as all State Legislatures had done. The provision to be effectual, must be a self-operating provision, which would at once place the Bank in a state of liquidation after having suspended specie payments for sixty or ninety days. If this amendment should prevail, it would be an example for the States by which they could not fail to be benefitted. It would prevent combinations among the banks, such as that which had existed in Philadelphia, and resulted in a suspension of specie payments through more than half the union. Each one must then stand upon its own independent footing, and act in such a manner as to save itself from destruction. Had not the sound banks of Philadelphia combined to save those that were unsound, this suspension would have been avoided. But these unsound banks had soon afterwards brought the sound ones to their own level.

Mr. Walker followed Mr. Buchanan, and urged the great interest which the Government had in putting an end to a Bank which so far from accomplishing the very objects for which it was chartered, by its suspension gave breadth and depth to the evils which it is assumed such a Bank only can prevent. The suspension of a National Bank rendered the malady universal and of long continuance. If such a Bank could not resume in sixty or ninety days after a suspension, (this being the time to which its loans are limited,) it could never pay. He was willing to give this time to recuperate before the forfeiture should attach. To refuse, then, to provide for the winding up of such a concern, which proved insolvent by being incapable to resume in three months, was to insist that the regulator of the currency should be an insolvent Bank—that an irredeemable currency should be the medium of payment to and from the Government—that all the Government deposites should continue to flow into an institution after it had become notorious as a bankrupt—and that without the possibility of taking any measures to secure its means, in the abuse of Congress, if the mode proposed in the amendment were rejected.

Mr. Clay of Alabama responded to Mr. Berrien's argument of the inequality of applying a bankrupt law to the national institution while it was withheld from those of the States.

Mr. Benton made an elaborate argument, to which we must refer to our regular report.

Mr. Woodbury was willing to trust the judiciary, and the law, and the trustees appointed under it, to manage the concerns of the Bank, after it had become insolvent, rather than the directors who shall have brought it to that condition.

Mr. Woodbury showed that the great oracles of the Bank party, at the time, when in the highest credit with those who now object to the amendment, had severally urged it as the only mode of giving stability to banks and a bank currency. He quoted Mr. Biddle to this point when interrogated by his own friends of the Congress Committee on this subject. He quoted Mr. Appleton and Mr. Gallatin to the same point.

Mr. Woodbury replied in a very decisive argument to Mr. Berrien's protestation against the right of repeal in Congress in regard to the institution now about to be established, to assume the duties of the Treasury Department. He entered into the nature of the Fiscal Agent, and showed that the power it exercised was over the most important of Government concerns; and that it was on the pretext alone that it was necessary and proper as a Government power that the constitutional right to establish it was asserted. Mr. Wright's amendment was lost—ayes 23, noes 25.

When Mr. Walker spoke in the Senate the other day on the subject of repeal, he spoke not of the repeal of the charter, but the repeal of the union between the Bank and the Government. He said, under the express terms of the charter, Congress could, at any time, declare that the bills of the Bank should be no longer receivable for public dues, and the deposites no longer placed in the Bank, that we might re-establish the Sub-Treasury under the control of the heads of Congress, and the Bank would then be a black wreck upon the ocean.

THE HOUSE.

Mr. Wise moved to go into Committee of the Whole on the naval appropriation bill. Mr. Cave Johnson of Tennessee objected. The question was then put to the House, but there being no quorum, Mr. Wise withdrew his motion.

Mr. Adams then called up his resolution offered yesterday, calling upon the Secretary of the Treasury to report to the House the amount due from the several States and Territories to the United States. Mr. Johnson of Tennessee moved to take up his resolution calling upon the Heads of the Departments for a list of the proscribed, and claimed precedence. The Speaker then decided both motions to be out of order, and gave the floor to Bowne of New York upon the resolution in relation to McLeod.

Mr. Bowne made an eloquent defence of his constituents, who had been called lawless banditi on the floor. He said they were animated by that spirit of independence which warmed the breasts of the patriots of seventy-six, and led them on to glory. He said a member from New York had introduced on this floor, to prove the purity of the transaction, (the burning of the Caroline) Sir Allen McNab, the author of this nefarious transaction himself. Mr. B. gave a full account of the transaction at midnight—thirty-three citizens of the United States, unarmed, retired to their rest on board the Caroline, to sleep the sleep of death; a band of British soldiers secretly stepped on board the American vessel—they towed her into the current of Niagara, and sent her over the misty cataract in a winding sheet of fire.—He criticised the acts of Mr. Webster and Mr. Crittenden, and showed them up in an unenviable light. He censured Mr. Linn of New York for calling the people of New York lawless banditti. He said if he could reach the ears of the sons of Schenectady, whose streets had been baptized to battle, blood, and fire; or the ears of the sons of Saratoga, whose eyes looked out upon the plain, bathed in our country's glory, he would say this man is your Representative. He said that Mr. Linn attacked his own people, not because he loved his own country less, but because he loved Daniel Webster more. Mr. B. though brought up a Quaker, loved his country more.

When Mr. Bowne's hour expired, he said the iron finger of time had cut his head off, and sate down.

Mr. Young of New York then obtained the floor, but, as the morning hour had expired,

Mr. Wise moved to go into Committee of the Whole on the navy bill.

Mr. Underwood prevailed upon him to give way to allow him to call up the Lunatic bill which was ready to be passed.

The previous question was then demanded and put, and the bill was passed as amended by—yeas 114, nays 45.

The House then resolved itself into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, Mr. Adams of Massachusetts in the chair. Bill No. 6, to provide for the payment of naval pensions was then taken up and briefly explained by Mr. Wise.

WEDNESDAY, July 14.

SENATE.

The special order—the National Bank—was entered upon.

Mr. Tappan proposed to amend by adding to the bill, that nothing in it should be *construed to take away the power of Congress to alter, modify, or repeal the same.* Mr. Tappan took the ground that this was an inherent principle of legislative power. If a law was unconstitutional it should be repealed—whenever injurious it should be repealed. In a very able and clear argument he illustrated the principles of his proposition. We will soon present it as a whole to our readers.

Mr. Buchanan suggested to Mr. Tappan the propriety of withdrawing his amendment for the present. It was a very important one, and might be offered again after we had gone through the other amendments of minor importance. For his own part he was willing to vote for the amendment; but solely on the ground that this bill would be a transfer of sovereign powers of Government to a corporation, and therefore could be revoked by Congress whenever the public interest demanded it. In this respect it was wholly different from corporations of a private nature, in relation to subjects properly embraced by private contracts. He trusted his friend would withdraw his amendment for the present. Mr. Tappan withdrew it for the present.

Mr. Clay of Alabama moved that in case of suspension, the bills of the Bank should *no longer* be received in payment of public dues.

Mr. Clay of Kentucky objected, and moved that the notes should not be received *during the suspension.*

Mr. Clay of Kentucky said that the friends of the Bank wished to make it a permanent specie paying institution, but it might suspend, and then it would be a great inducement to resumption, if the reception of its notes again were the consequence.

Mr. Clay of Alabama said that to make the Bank a permanent specie paying institution, his amendment held out a stronger guarantee than that of its author, when the consequence was the exclusion of its notes from reception in the business of the Government. This was the strongest motive to make it provide against suspension.

Mr. Benton, Mr. Calhoun, and Mr. Allen, opposed the amendment of Mr. Clay of Kentucky. It recognised suspension as a sort of right in the Bank. It could play *fast* and *loose* with the Government and people; stop five years, and resume for a month, and in the latter event resume the right to pour in on the Treasury any amount of its paper with an intention to fail again, and throw the loss of its irredeemable paper on the Treasury.

The amendment of Mr. Clay of Kentucky prevailed by a vote of 25 to 22.

The amendment, as altered by that of Mr. Clay of Ky. being under consideration, Messrs. Allen, Benton, and Calhoun opposed it, upon the ground that it recognised the right of suspension, and that the penalties consequent on it were wholly inadequate, and were, moreover, as experience proved, never enforced. Mr. Calhoun argued, that it was held by sound lawyers that suspension was a forfeiture of the charter. If this be so, then the provision in this charter for the reception of its notes after suspension, left the inference that this charter was exempt from the forfeiture.

Messrs. Nicholson, Walker, and Sevier looked upon the amendment, as amended as some restriction; and although they preferred it as proposed by Mr. Clay of Alabama, would vote for it in its altered form.

Mr. Clay of Alabama proposed to amend the amendment of Mr. Clay of Kentucky, by adding that a "*suspension shall be held and adjudged a cause of forfeiture of the charter*" It passed—ayes 45, noes none. The amendment as amended then passed.

Mr. Clay of Alabama proposed an amendment directing the removal of the deposites from the Bank in case of a violation of its charter, and the suspension of specie payments was specially named as a cause for the removal. This amendment Mr. Clay of Alabama stated was drawn from the deposite act of 1836.

Mr. Clay of Kentucky objected on the ground that he would not entrust that formidable power to the Secretary of the Treasury, which he said was the parent of all the late misfortunes of the country.

Mr. Clay of Alabama asked the Senator from Kentucky whether he did not vote for a similar provision in regard to the State Banks? He said he had; but it was in consequence of the distribution of the public money connected with that bill—that was his part of the bill. Thus it appears Mr. Clay of Kentucky is willing to vote the tremendous unconstitutional powers which he condemned for years, as fraught with fatal evils to the country, provided there was a distribution of the spoils to purchase his consent.

Mr. Linn asked whether a proposition was not made last year from the same quarter, to repeal and withdraw all deposites from the Sub-Treasury, and put them in possession of the Secretary of the Treasury. This, the public will remember, was the proposition of the author of the present bill, who is now too squeamish to trust the Treasury of the country with the custody of its own treasure, simply because the National Bank, which is now to be entrusted with the public money after suspension, is his Bank.

Mr. Woodbury showed that the Secretary of the Treasury was compelled by the charter to deem the Bank the Treasury, during the suspension, and draw checks on it, in all payments. In this case the anomoly would be presented of rejecting the notes of a Bank, while all the good money received was given to it, and public creditors paid by drawing on the insolvent corporation.

Mr. Sevier pressed the same views, and asked the Senator from Kentucky what he would do under such circumstances. Mr. Clay of Kentucky replied that the Secretary of the Treasury might make an arrangement to put the money in special deposite with the Bank.

Mr. Buchanan asked if the Secretary ought to be bound to put the public money in a Bank, the notes of which he was bound to reject in payments.

Mr. Clay of Kentucky hereupon consented to a modification, giving the Executive discretionary power to take care of the public revenues during the recess of Congress, and in case of the suspension of specie payments. It passed without division.

Mr. Clay of Alabama proposed to amend, by increasing the penalty from twelve to twenty-five per cent. on the failure of the Bank to redeem its obligations in specie: lost, ayes 19, noes 25.

Mr. Benton proposed to strike out the clause which excluded Congress from the right of establishing any other National Bank than that now proposed, and that clause which permitted Congress to make charters for District banks, not exceeding in amount five millions. Mr. Benton read from the charter of the Bank in Queen Anne's time, to show that this exclusive privilege to a bank, maiming the rights of the Legislature, was a high Tory measure, of high Tory times; and to show that it had been rejected as the policy of modern liberal English administrations, he referred to a letter of Lord Liverpool, repudiating such demands on the part of the Bank; and he referred to the recent charters of the Bank, to show that the clause had been rejected from the late charter. Lost ayes 19, noes 25.

Mr. Benton proposed an amendment making the refusal of the Bank to submit to the examination of a committee of Congress, a forfeiture of charter. Lost by strict party vote.

Mr. Benton proposed to reduce the interest allowed to the Bank from six to five per cent.

Mr. Benton referred to the former grants of charters to National Banks, to show that this, so far from presenting the inducements held out in all recent grants of monopolies—which as they were found more and more dangerous to the public, and lucrative to corporators, came forward proposing increased restrictions on them, and greater benefits to the public—came forward proposing new privileges to the monopolies, and fewer advantages to the public. To check this tendency in the present bill was the design of this, among other amendments he should propose.

Mr. Benton then quoted the journal of 1832, to show the terms on which the charter of that Bank era was carried through Congress. It allowed a bonus, which, proportioned to the capital on which privileges are now conferred, would amount to four millions. Then the proposition was made, in lieu of bonus, to reduce the tax on the public—the usury on the Bank issues—to five per cent. This proposition obtained a strong vote. Among them was the vote of Mr. Tyler, the present President, Mr. Mangum, and others of that side—the bonus was then carried as the purchase of the Bank. Now there was no bonus allowed, and the reduction of the interest to the people opposed. And the charter allowed the dividends of the Bank to reach seven per cent. per annum before any surplus could fall to the Government, this makes the stock as profitable as it has ever been in a National Bank monopoly, and yet all former remunerations for this beneficial monopoly on the part of the moneyed aristocracy, are omitted in the present *improved* charter. Mr. Benton's amendment was lost.

THURSDAY, July 15.

SENATE.

Mr. Clay of Kentucky said he would be glad if the Senate would consent to take up the loan bill reported from the other House. The pressing necessity of the Treasury required prompt and speedy action on it—there was no time to be lost.

Mr. Calhoun opposed the motion; but his remarks were too imperfectly heard in the gallery to enable us to state them.

Mr. Clay said he had as much reluctance as any Senator on the other side to impede the progress of the Bank bill; but the Senator from South Carolina would see, if he candidly looked into the matter, that there was an urgent necessity for taking up the loan bill, with a view of providing for the exigencies of the Treasury. He must know that the expenditure for the year is twenty-four millions—that is, two millions per month. He (Mr. Clay) had yesterday learned from the Treasury Department that there was but nine hundred thousand dollars on hand—not more than enough to cover the expenditures of a fortnight.—He would put it to the Senator—he would put it to the Senate—ought there to be any delay—ought not time to be given, after the passage of the loan bill, for selling sufficient of the stock to keep the Treasury in funds? He therefore hoped gentlemen would permit the loan bill to be taken up this morning—he could not anticipate any serious objection—but if there was, he should, of course, submit, and follow the usual mode of giving notice, and fixing a time for taking it up.

Mr. Calhoun, in reply, was very indistinctly heard; but was understood to say, that he thought the Senator's precipitation of his measures was a very extraordinary mode of proceeding. At a moment's warning of an exigency, the Senate was called upon to pass, with haste, a measure of more importance, and of more serious consequences, not only to the country, as a forced measure of an extra session, but to our successors, perhaps, for generations. It is one more of those great and dangerous innovations which call for the utmost caution and deliberation; yet, before the measure in hand is half through its discussion, this loan bill is attempted to be precipitated, and, perhaps, carried, without time for reflection or debate. If the Senator from Kentucky really felt disposed to act up to his own urgent suggestions, put forward a day or two since, to get through his Bank bill without waste of time, he (Mr. Calhoun) would make him a proposition to which he could not in fairness, or with consistency, object. It would obviate the necessity of interrupting the progress of the Bank bill, and, without forcing a discussion of indefinite length on the loan bill, obtruded out of time and place, afford relief to the Treasury in the simplest and most expeditious way practicable, under the circumstances of the case. He would suggest to him a short bill for the issue of Treasury notes to meet the expenditures, to a sufficient amount to afford the necessary relief.

[While Mr. Calhoun was making this proposition, Mr. Clay called to him to speak louder, and he and his friends seemed to be in a particularly jocular humor.]

Mr. Clay had one word to say on the subject of time. When at the early part of the session he had urged upon the Senate the necessity of action, and the example this grave body ought to show of despatch in the public business, he was met by the Opposition with the cry of what is the use of such hurry; the other branch of Congress would be so far behind that it never could catch up. Well, what is now the case?—Has not the other House been treading on the heels of the Senate, and at last got the start of it a long way in advance of the business of the session? The reason was obvious. The majority there is for action and has secured it. Some change was called for in this chamber. The truth is that the minority here control the action of the Senate, and cause all the delay of the public business. They obstruct the majority in the despatch of all business of importance to the country, and particularly those measures which the majority is bound to give to the country without further delay. Did not this reduce the majority to the necessity of adopting some measure which would place the control of the business of the session in their hands? It was impossible to do without it; it must be resorted to.

Now, as to the proposition of the Senator from South Carolina:—could he really be serious? could he imagine for a moment, that after all that had passed about the Treasury note scheme, the present Administration could entertain such a proposition? Mr. Calhoun said he sincerely and candidly believed it was infinitely better than any plan of the Administration party.

Mr. Clay said, no sir, no: he went for the real old fashioned way of borrowing money by a regular loan bill, and not for shifting expedients.

Mr. Calhoun asked why had not the loan bill been taken up in the other House before the land bill? If the exigencies of the Treasury depended for relief on the loan bill, why was it kept in the back ground till the fate of the land bill was known?—As to the sneers at the Treasury note scheme, they were no proof that it was not infinitely better, and if immediate relief were the only consideration, infinitely more expeditious and available than the loan bill. He could assure the Senator he was mistaken if he calculated on being able to obtain immediate relief for the Treasury from the loan bill. The Senate could not be made to pass it in a day, at the word of command. The Senator from Kentucky tells the Senate the other House has got before it. How has the other House got before the Senate? By a despotic exercise of the power of a majority. By destroying the liberties of the people in gagging their Representatives. By preventing the minority from the free exercise of its right of remonstrance. This is the way the House has got before the Senate. And now there was too much evidence to doubt that the Senate was to be made to keep up with the House by the same means.

Mr. Clay said the Senator wanted to know why the House had not taken up the loan bill before the land bill. He really could not tell him why; he must refer him to the House itself for an answer. With regard to the Senator's allusions to the control of the business in another branch of Congress by the majority, he [Mr. Clay] was expecting every moment that the President of the Senate would call him to order, for it surely was not competent in this body to animadvert on the action of the other. But as he had indulged in anticipations, to put the matter beyond doubt, he (Mr. Clay) would have the Senator to know that he would resort to the Constitution and act on the rights insured in it to the majority, by passing a measure that would insure the control of the business of the Senate to the majority. If he did not adopt the same means which had proved so beneficial in the other House, he would have something equally efficient to offer. He had no doubt of the cheerful adoption of such a measure when it should come before the Senate. Here, already three weeks and a half had been spent in amendment after amendment to this bill, being discussed and debated at as full length as if the whole bill was on its final passage.—Yet if a proposition is urged to confine debate to the merits or demerits of each amendment, there is an outcry made about abridging the liberty of speech. Well, now, he knew the people too, and he knew they were not going to complain about the abridgment of long speeches in Congress. They want their business to be done—they want action, and not so much talk about it. The people will be very glad to find they can get the measures they are so impatient for, carried through without the useless delay of waiting for long speeches to be delivered. He recollected once meeting with one of the most intelligent and truly sensible men it had ever been his good fortune to be acquainted with, and he was struck with a remarkable saying of his; it was, that he considered it utterly impossible for any man, he did not care what his genius was, to speak sensibly or usefully on any topic for more than a quarter of an hour. What, then, he (Mr. Clay) would say, was the use of such speeches as are here made? There were two hundred and forty members in the other House; if each was to consume an hour, when would a session terminate, and yet the restriction would be complained of. The greatest grievance complained of by the people with regard to Congress, is the delay of public business by long speeches.

Mr. King said the Senator complained of three weeks and a half having been lost in amending his bill. Was not the Senator aware that it was himself and his friends had consumed most of that time? But now that the minority had to take it up, the Senate is told there must be a gag law. Did he understand that it was the intention of the Senator to introduce that measure?

Mr. Clay. I will, sir; I will.

Mr. King. I tell the Senator, then, that he may make his arrangements at his boarding house for the winter.

Mr. Clay. Very well, sir.

Mr. King. Did not the Senator, in the beginning of the session, press forward his favorite measure, the Bank bill, by "removing the rubbish," as he called the Sub-Treasury, declaring that it could not be delayed a moment, in order to give to the people this Bank bill? If there was any real necessity for it then, it existed still.—He (Mr. King) to test that point, was ready, and he would undertake to make the proposition for his friends, to get through with their amendmentes to-day and to-morrow, and let the bill go to the vote to-morrow, or Monday at farthest. No, no: that would not do. The Senator did not now want to risk that. Some of his friends were absent; they must be waited for.—With whom then was the delay?

He (Mr. King) was truly sorry to see the honorable Senator so far forgetting what is due to the Senate as to talk of coercing it by any possible abridgment of its free action. The freedom of debate had never yet been a bridged in that body since the foundation of this Government. Was it fit or becoming, after fifty years of unrestrained liberty, to threaten it with a gag law? He could tell the Senator that, peaceable a man as he (Mr. King) was, whenever it was attempted to violate that sanctuary, he, for one, would resist that attempt even unto the death. Perhaps all this was uncalled for; but the occasion would be some excuse. He was for testing the question of the Senator's power to carry his Bank bill. Let it be called up now, and let the country judge between the Senator and the Opposition, whose was the fault of delay. He (Mr. King) would undertake to say that there should be no delay on the part of his friends. Let this Bank bill be disposed of at once, and then the Senator can take up his other measures in their due order.

Mr. Benton said he was ready to take the question at any time; but thought there ought to be no difficulty about it to-morrow afternoon, or on Monday at farthest. He was willing to sit till 4 o'clock to-day and to-morrow, to get through with it. One word about this thing called freedom of debate. He was ready to admit that the liberty of speech had been greatly abused in this chamber. He could not think otherwise when he recollected the proceedings of the last Congress. The forbearance of the majority then in power was severely tested. But it never thought of resorting to gag-laws, though there would have been some show of virtue in stemming the licentious abuse of the liberty of speech which was daily practised by the then minority. He was opposed to all restrictions of debate. In committee of the whole it was particularly requisite in perfecting a bill, to scrutinize every word. The omission of a single word in a bill passed at one session had cost upwards of a million of money.

He understood it was in contemplation to introduce the previous question into the Senate, not only in its ordinary proceedings, but in Committee of the Whole. It was easy to see how a bill would be amended then. He would consider an attempt to rule the Senate, by the despotism of the gag, as bad as introducing a band of soldiers into it to force measures though, by pitching opposing Senators out of the windows. He would consider his political life extinct, if such a measure was carried. Lewis the XIV, once finding it difficult to carry the registration of an edict in one of