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- s " 77i tendency of Jitmocracy it toward the titration of the induttriou ctaaae,tht inert of their comfort, thexnxtrlion oflhttr dignity, the ttfabUultment of their poorer." BY; ROBERT WILLIAMSOX, Jr. UKCOLtf TOR, X. C, OCTOBER 20, 1841. VOLUME V, NO. 21. N E W T E 11 M S OF THE LINCOLN REPUBLICAN TERMS OF PUBLICATION. The Lnrcor Republican is published every Wedoesday at $2 50, if paid in advance, or $3 if payment be delayed three months. No subscription received for a less term than twelve months. No paper will be discontinued but at the optiuo of the Editor, until all arrearages are paid. A failure to order a discontinuance, will be con sidered a new engagement. ' TERMS OF ADVERTISING. An vk rtisehssts will be inserted conspicuous ly for 1 00 per square for the first insertion, and 2-5 cents for each continuance. Court and Judicial advertisements will be charged 25 per cent, more than the above prices. A deduction of '13 per cent, from the regular prices will be made toycarly advertisers. The number of insertions must be noted on the manuscript, or they will be charged until a discon tinuance is ordered. - TO CORRESPONDENTS. To insure prompt attention to Letters addressed to the Editor, the postage should in all cases be paid. Twciily-seTcnlh Congress. SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN, OF SOUTH CAROLINA. In Senate of the fX & August 24.1841 On the Distri'xxtion Bill. Mr. CALHOUN said If this bill should become a law it wxrold make a whler breach in the Constitution, and be followed by changes more disastrous, than any one measure which has ever been adopted. It would, in its violation of the Constitution, go far beyond the general welfare doctrine of former days, which stretched the power of the Government as far as it was then supposed was possible by construction, however bold. Bat, as wide as were the limits which it assigned to the powers of the Government, it admit ted by implication that there were limits while this bill, as I shall show, rests on principles, which, if admitted, would su persede ail limits. According to the general-welfare doctrine, Congress had power to raise money, and appropriate it to all objects which it might deem calculated to promote the general welfare thatis, the posperity of the States, regarded in their aggregate character as members of the Union ; or, to express it .more briefly, and in language once so com mon, to national objects; thus excluding, by necessary implication, all that were not national, as falling within the spheres of the separate States. As wide as are these lim its, they are loo narrow for this bill. It takes in what is excluded under the general-welfare doctrine, and assumes for Con gress the right to raise money, to give by distribution to the States; that is to be ap plied by them to those very local State ob jects to which that doctrine, by necessary implication, denied that Congress had a right to appropriate money ; and thus su perseding all the limits of the Constitution as far, at least, as the money power is con cerned. The advocates of this extraordin ary doctrine have, indeed, attempted to re strict it, in their argument, to revenue de rived from the public lands; but facts speak louder than words. To test the sincerity of their argument, amendments after a mendmcnts have been offered to limit the operation of the bill exclusively to the rev enue derived from that source, but which, na often as oflered. have been steadily vo ted down by their united votes. Hat I take higher grounds. The aid of those test votes, as strong as they are, is not needed to make good the assumption, that Con gress has the right to lay and and collect taxes for the separate use ot the "Mates. The circumstances under which it is at tempted to force this bill through, speak of themselves a language loo distinct to be mis understood. The Treasury is exhausted the reven ues from the public lands cannot be spared they are needed for the pressing and ne cessary wants of the Government. For every dollar withdrawn from the Treasury, and given to the States, a dollar roust be raised from the customs to supply its place: that is admitted Now, I put it to the ad vocates of this bill, is there, can there be, any real difference, either in principle or effect,' between raising money from cus toms, to be divided among the Slates, and raising the same amount from them to sup ply the place of an equal sum withdrawn from the Treasury to be divided among the States?. If there be a difference, my fac ulties are not acute enough to perceive it; and I would thank any one who can to point it out. But, if this difficulty could be surmounted, it would avail nothing, un less another, not inferior, can also be got over. The land from which the revenue, proposed to be divided, is derived, was pur chased, (with the exception of the small portion, comparatively, lying between the . Ohio and Mississippi rivers,) out of the common funds of the Union,, and with : money derived, for the most part, from cus toms. I do not exempt the portion acquir ed from Georgia, which was purchased at jts jul value and cosl much, in propor tion, as Florida purchased from Spain, or Louisiana from France. - - If money cannot be raised from customs or other sources for distribution. I ask, how can money derived from the sales of land purchased with money raised from the cus toms or other sources be distributed among the States? If the money could not be dis tributed before it was vested in land, on what principle can it be when it is conver ted back again into money by the sales of the land? If prior to the purchase it was subject, in making appropriations, to the limits prescribed by the Constitution, how can it, after having been converted back a gain into money by the sale of the land, be freed from those limits? By what art, what political alchymy, could the mere passage of the money through the lands free it from ihe constitutional shackles to which it was previously subject? But if this difficulty also could be stir mouuled, there is another, not less formida ble and more comprehensive, still to be overcome. If the lands belong to the States at all, they must belong to them in one of two capacities, either in their federative character, as members of a common Un ion; or in their separate, us distinct and in dependent communities. If the former, this government, which was created as a common agent to carry into effect the ob jects for which the -Union was formed, holds the lands, as it does all its other del egated powers, as a trustee for the States in their federal character, for the execution of those objects and no other purpose whatever; and can, of course, under the grant of the Constitution "to dispose of the territories or other property belonging to the U. S.'" dispose of the lands only under its trust powers, and in execution of the ob jects for which they were granted by the Constitution. When then the lands, or other property of the U. S.. are disposed of by sale that is, converted into money, the trust, with all its limitations, attaches as fully to the money, as it did to the lands or property of which it is the proceeds. Nor would the Government have any more right to divide the land or the money a mong the States that is, to surrender it to them than it would have to surrender any other of its delegated powers. If it may surrender either to the Slates, it may also surrender the power of declaring war, laying duties, or coining money They are all delegated by the -same parties, held under the same instrument, .and in trust. for the execution of the sanre objects. The assumption of such a right is neither more nor less lhan the assumption of a right paramount to the Constitution itself the right on' the part of the Government to de stroy the instrument, and dissolve the Un ion, from which it derives its existence. I'o such monstrous results must the prin ciple on which tnis bill rests lead, on the supposition that the lands (that is, the ter ritories belong to the U. as they are expressly declared to do by the Constitu tion. Bui the difficulty would iiot be less if they should be considered as belonging to the States, in their individual and separate character. So considered, what right can this Government possibly have over them? It is the agent, or trustee, for the U. S ; the Stales as members of a common Union, and not of the States individually, each of which has a separate Government of its own to represent it in lhat capacity. For this Government to assume to represent i hem in both capacities) would be to assume all power to centralize the whole system in itself But, admitting this bold assump tion; on whal principle of right.or justice, il the lands realty belong to the otaies or, which is the same thing, if the revenue from tire lands helong to them cpn this Government impose the various limitations prescribed in the bill? What right hns it, on that supposition, to appropriate fund. belonging to the Stales separately, to the use ot Ihe Union, in the event of war, or in case the price of the lands should be in creased above a dollar and a quarter an acre, on any article of ihe tariff above twen ty pci centum ad valorem. Such, and so overwhelming, are the con stitutional difficulties which beset this inea sure. No one who can overcome them who can bring himsell to vote for this bill- need trouble himself about constitutional scruples hereafter. lie may swallow without hesitation, Bank, lanff, and eve ry other unconstitutional measure which has ever been adopted or proposed. Yes it would be easier to make a plausible ar gument for the constitutionality of the mos monstrous of the measures proposed by the Abolitionists for Abolition itself than for this detestable bill and yet we find Se nalors irom siaveriolumg states, the very safely of whose constituents depends on a strict construction of the Constitution, recor ding their names in favor of a measure from which they have nothing to hope, and eve ry itnng to lear. J o what is a course so blind to be attributed, but to thai Fanaii cism of party zeal, openly avowed on this floor, which regards the preservation of ihe power of the hig parly as the paramount consideration I It has staked its existence on the pages of this and the other meas tires for which this extraordinary session was calltd; and whtn it is brought to the alternative of their defeat or success, in the anxiety to avoid the one and secure the oth er, constituents. Constitution, duty, and country, al! are forgotten. A measure which would make so wide and fatal a breach in the Constitution, could not but involve in its consequents many and disastrous changes in our political sys tem, too numerous to be traced in a speech. It would require a volume to do them jus tice. As many as may fall, within the scope of my remarks, I shall touch in their proper place. Suffice it for the present to say, thai such and so great would they be, as to disturb and confound the relations of all the constituent part of our beautiful but complex system of lhat between this and the co ordinate Governments of the Slates, and between them and their respective con stituency. Let the principle of the distri bution of the revenue, on which this bill rests, be established, and it would follow, as certainly as it is now before us, lhat this Government and those of the Stales would be placed in antagonist relations on all sub jects except the collection and distribution of revenue; which would end, in time, in converting this into a mere machine of col lection and distribution for those of the Slates, to the utter neglect of all the func tions for which it was created. Then the proper responsibility of each of their res pective constituency would be destroyed ; then would succeed a scene of plunder and corruption without parallel, to be followed by dissolution, or an entire change of sys tem. Yes; if any one measure can dissolve this Union, this is that measure. The re venue is the State, said the great British statesman, Burke. With us, to divide the revenue among its members is to divide the Union. This bill proposes to divide that from the lands. Take one step more, to which this will lead if not arrested divide the. revenue from the customs, and what of union would be left? I touched more fully on this, and other important points connected with this detestable mea sure, during the discussions of the last ses sion, and shall not now repeat what I then said. What I now propose is, to trace the change it would make in our financial sys tem, with its bearings on what ought lo be the policy of the Government. 1 have se lected it, not because it is the most impor tant, but because it is that which has here tofore received the least attention This Government has heretofore been supported almost exclusive!' from two sources of revenue the lands and the cus toms; excepting a short period at its com mencement, and during the late war, when t drew a great portion of its means from nternal taxes. Ihe revenue from lands has been constantly and steadily increasing with the increase of population, and may for the next ten years, be safely estimated to yield an anual avenge income of $5, 000,000, if they should be properly admin- slered a sum equal to more than a fourth f what the entire expenditures ol the Go- eminent oujht to be, with due economy. and restricted to the objects for which it was instituted. This bill proposes to withdraw this large, permanent, and growing source of reven ue, from ihe treasury of the Union, and to distribute it among the several States ; and the question is would it be wise to do so, viewed as a financial measure, in re ference to what ought to be the policy of the Government? which brings iip the pre vious question whal that policy ought to be? In the order of things, the question of policy precedes that of finance. The lat ter has refirenc to, ami is dependent on, the former. It must first be determined what ought to be done, before it can be as certained how much revenue will be requir ed, and on whal it ought to bo raised. jo the question, then. What ought lo be the policy of the Government ? the shortest and most comprehensive answer which I can give is thai il ought to be ve ry opposite of that for which this extraor dinary session was called, and of which this measure forms so prominent. a part. The effect of these measures is to divide and distract ihe country within, and to weaken it without; the very reverse of ihe objects for which the Government was msiiluied which was to give peace, tran quillity, and harmony within, and power, security, and respectability without. We lind, according.', thai without, where strength was required, its powers are un divided. In its exterior illations abroad. this Government is the sole and exclusive representative of the united majesty, sover eignty, and power of the States constituting this great and glorious Union. To the rest ol the world, we arc one. Neither State nor Slate Government is known be yond our borders. Within, it is different- There we form twenty-six distinct, inde pendent, and sovereign communities, each with its separate Government whose "pow ers are as exclusive within, as lhat of this Government is without, with the exception ol three classes ol powers which are dele gated to it. The first is those lhat were necessary to the discharge of its exterior functions such as declaring war, raising armies, providing a tiavv, and raising reve uue, l tie. reason lor delegating these re J quires uo explanation. The next class consists of those powers thai were necessa ry to regulate the exterior ot International relations of the Slates among themselves, considered as distinct communities pow ers that could not be exercised by the Slates separately, and the regulation of which was necessary to their peace, tranquillity. and lhat free intercourse, social and com mercial, which ought lo exist between con federated States. Such are those of regu lating commerce between the Stales, coin ing money, and fixing the value thereof, and the standard of weights and measures. The remaining class consists of those pow ers which, though not belonging to the ex terior relations of the States, are of -such nature that they could not be exercised by Slates separately, without one injuring the other such as imposing duties on imports in exercising of which, the maritime States, having the advantage of good ports, would tax those who would have to draw their supply through them. In asserting that, with these exceptions, the powers of the States are exclusive within, I speak in general terms. There are, indeed, others not reducible to either of these classes ; but, they are too few and inconsiderable to be regarded as exceptions. On the moderate and prudent exercise of thtse, its interior powers, the success of tht Goverment, and with it our. entire po licial system, mainly depends. If the Government should be restricted in their ejercise . to the objects for which they were delegated, peace, harmony, and tran quillity would reign within; and the at tention of the Government, unabsorbed by distracting questions within, and its entire resources unwasted by expenditures on ob jects foreign lo its duties, would ' be direc ted with all its energy to guard against daiger from without, lo give security to our vast commercial and navigating inter esii and to acquire that weight and respec talility for our name in the family of na tions which ought to belong to the freest, most enterprising, and most growing peo ple on the globe. If thus restricted in ihe exercise of these, the most delicate of its powers, and in the exercise of which only it can come in conflict with the Govern ments of the Stales, or interfere with ihcir interior policy and interest, this Govern ment, with our whole political system, would work like a charm, and become the admiration of the world. The States, left undisturbed within their separate spheres, aud each in, the fujl. possession of its re sources, would, with that generous rivalry which always takes place between clusters of free States of the same origin and lan guage, and which gives ihe greatest possi ble impulse to improvement, carry excel lence in all thai is desirable beyond any former example. But if, instead of restricting these powers to their proper objects, they should be per verted to those never intended ; if, for ex ample, that of raising revenue should be perverted into that of protecting one branch of industry at the expense of others ; thai of collecting and disbursing ihe revenue, into that of incorporating a great central bank to be located at some lavoreil point and placed under local control; and that of making appropriations for specified ob jects, into, thai of expending money on whatever oonrress should liiinu proper; 11 this would be reversed. Instead of harmony and tranquillity within, there would be discor distraction, and conflict, followed by ihe absorption of the attention of the Government, and exhaustion cf n means and energy on objects never intend ed to be placed under its control, to the neglect of the duties belonging to the ex terior relations of the Government, and which are exclusively confided to its charge. Such has been, and ever must be, the effect of perverting these powers to objects foreign to the constitution. When thus perverted, thev become unequal in their action, operating to the benefit ol one part or class, to ihe injury of another parlor class lo Ihe benehl of the manu facturing against the agricultural and com mercial portions, or ol the non productive against the producing class. The more extensive the country, the greater would be the inequality and oppression. In ours, stretching over two thousand square miles, they become intolerable when pushed be yond moderate limns. It is then conflicts lake place, from the struggle on the pari of those who are benefitted by the operation of an unequal system of legislation tore- tain their advantage, and on the part of the oppressed to resist il. When this state of things occurs, it is neither more nor less than a state of hostility between the op pressor and oppressed war waged not by armies, but by laws ; acts and sections of acts are senl by the stronger party on a plundering expedition, instead of divisions and brigades, which olten return more rich ly laden wiih spoils lhan a plundering ex pedition after the most successful foray. That such must be the effect of ihe sys tem of measures now attempted to be for ced on the Government by the perversion of its interior powers, 1 appeal to the voice of experience in aid of the dictates of rea son. . I go back to the beginning of the Government, and ask. what, at its outset, but this very system of measures, caused the great struggle which continued down, to 1833, when the system reached its full growth in the tariff of that year? Ami what, from that period to the termination of the late election which brought the pre sent party into power, has disturbed ihe harnionj and tranquillity of ihe country, deranged its currency, interrupted its busf ness, endangered its liberty and institutions, but a struggle on one side lo overthrow, and on the other to uphold the system ? In lhat struggle it fe.l posirate ; and what now agitates the country, what causes this extraordinary session, with all its ex citement, but ihe struggle on ihe part of those in power to restore the system ; to incorporate a bank ; to re-enact a protec tive larirT; to distribute the, revenue from the lands ; to originate another debt, anil renew the system of wasteful expenditures; and the resistance on the part of the oppo sition to prevent it? Gentlemen talk of settling these questions; they deceive themselves. They cry Peace ! peace ! when there is no peace. There never can be peace till they are abandoned, or till our free and popular institutions are succeeded by the calm of despotism ; and that not till the spirit of our patriotic and immor tal ancestors, who achieved our indepen dence and established our glorious political system, shall become extinct, and their descendants a base and sordid rabble. Till then, or till our opponents shall be expelled from power, and their hope of restoring and maintaining their system of measures is blasted, the struggle will be continued, the tranquility and harmony of the country be disturbed, and the strength and resour ces of the Government be wasted within, and its duties neglected without. But, of all the measures which consti tute this pernicious system, there is not one more subversive of the objects fur which the Government was instituted, none more destructive of harmony within, and security without, than that now under consideration. Its direct tendency is to universal discord and distraction ; to array the new States against the old, the non indebted against the indebted, the staple against the manufacturing; one class against other; and, finally, the people against the Government. But I pass these. My object is not lo trace political conse quences ; but to discuss the financial bear ings of this measure, regarded in refer ence to what ought to be the policy of ihe (government; which 1 trust 1 have satis factorily shown ought to be, to turn its at tention, energy-, aud lesources, from within to without, to its appropriate and exclu sive sphere, lhat of guarding against dan ger from abroad f, giving free scope and protection to our commerce and navigation, and lhat elevated standing to the country, to which it is so fairly entitled in the family of nations. Il becomes necessary to repeat, preparatory to what I propose, that the object of this measure is to with draw the revenue Irom the public lands from the Treasury of the Union, to be divided among the States ; lhal ihe proba ble annual amount that would be so drawn, would average ihe next ten years not less than live mill. ons ol dollars; and that, to make up the deficit, an equal eiim must be laid on the imports. Such is the measure. regarded as one of finance ; and the ques tion is, would it be just, wise, expedient, considered in its bearings on what ought to be the policy of tire Government? The measure on its face is but a surren der of ouo of the two sources of revenue to the Stales, to be divided among them proportion to their joint delegation in the two Houses of Congress, and to impose a berden to an equal amount on the imports ; that is, on the foreign commerce of the country. In every view I can take, it is preposterous, unequal, and unjust. Re garded in its most favorable aspect ilia is, on the supposition that the people of each Slate would pay bark to the Treasu ry ol ihe Union, through the tax on Ihe imports, in order to make up the deficit, a sum equal lo thai received bv the Slate as its distributive share ; and that each im!i vidual would receive of lhat sum an amouu equal in proportion to whal he paid of the taxes ; what would that be, hut the folly of giving wiih one hand, and taking back with the o;her I It would, in fact, be worse. The expense of giving and taking back must be paid for, which, in this case, would be one not. a little expensive and troublesome The expense of collecting the duties oti imports is known to be about ten per cent. ; to which must he added die expense and trouble ol distribution, with the loss of the use of the money while the process is going on, which may be fairly estimated al two per cent, additional ; mi king, in all. twelve percent, for the cost of the process. It follows that the people of ihe States, in order to return back lo the Treasury of the Union an amount equal to the sum received by distribution, would have each to pay, by the supposition, twelve per cent, more of taxe lhan its chare of the sum distributed. That sum (equal to six hundred thousand dollars on live million) would go to the collectors of the taxes the custom-house officers for their share of the public spoils. But it is still worse. Il is unequal and unjust, as well as foolish and absurd. The case supposed would not b- the reaj elate of the facts. It would be scarcely possi ble so to arrange a system of taxes, under which the people, of each State would pay back a sum just equal to thai received ;' much less that the taxes should fall on each individual in ihe State, in the same pro portion that he would receive of the sum distributed lo the Slate. But, if this be possible, it is certain that no system of taxes on imports especially the bill sent from the other House can make such . equalization. So far from that, I hazard nothing in asserting lhat the staple Slates would pay into the J reasury, unuer us operation, three limes as mucn as tney would receive on an average by the distn- bution, and some of ihem far more; white to the manufacturing States, if we are to mice from iheir zeal in favor or the oui, ihe duties it proposes to impose would be bounties, not taxes. If judged by their acts, both measures the oistrioution ami the duties would favor their pockets. fhey would be gainers, let who may be losers in this financial game- But be the inequality greater or less than my estimate, what could be more unjust than to distribute a common fund in a cer tain proportion among the States, and to compel the people of the States to make up the deficit in a different proportion; so that some shall pay more, and others iesg than what they respectively received?- What is it but a cunningly devised scheme to take from one State.and to give to another to replenish the treasury cf some or the States from the pockets of the people of the others; in reality, to make them support the Governments and pay the debts of oth er States, as well as their own? Such must be the necessary result, as between the States which "may pay more than they receive, and those which may receive mora than they pay. The injustice and inequal ity will increase or decrease, just in pro portion to the respective excess or deficit between receipts and payments, under this flagitious contrivance for plunder. But I have not yet reached the reality of this profligate and wicked scheme. As un equal and unjust as it would be between? Siate and State, it is still more so, regardeu , in its operation between individuals. It is between them its true character and hide ous features fully disclose themselves. The money to be distributed would not go to the people but to the Legislatures or the" States; while that to be paid in taxes to make up the deficiency, would be takeir from- litem individually. A small portion of that which would go to the Legislatures5 would ever reach the people. It would be under tike control and management of tin dominant party in the Legislature, and they under the control and management of the leaders of the party, i hat it would be ad-, ministered to the advantage of themselves, and their friends and partisans, and that they would profit more by their use and management of an irresponsible fund, taken from nobody knows who, lhan ihey would lose as payers of the taxes to supply lis place, will not be doubted by any one who knows how such things are managed. What should be the result? The whole of the revenue from the immense public do-, main would, if this wicked measure should become the settled policy, go to the profit & aggrandizement of lite leaders for the time of the dominant party in the twenty-six State Legislatures, and their partisans and supporters; lhat is, to the most influential, if not the most wealthy clique for the lime in the respective States; while the deficien cy would be supplied from the pockets of ihe great mass of the community, by taxes on tea, coffee, salt, iron, coarse woollen. &i, for the most part other necessaries of life. And what is lhal but taking from the ma ny and giving to the few, from those who look to their own means and indus try for ihe support of themselves and families, and giving to those who look to the Government . for support, lo increase the profit and influence of political mana gers and their partisans, mid diminish that of ihe people? When il is added, that the dominant parly in each State for the lime would have a direct interest in keep ing up aud enlarging this pernicious fiihd, and that their combined influence must for the time be irresistible, it is difficult to see bj" what mean the country can ever extri- 1 cate itself from ibis measure, should it be once established, or what limits can be prescribed to its growth, or ihe extent of the disasters which musi follow. It con lain the germ of iroghiy a"iid fearful chan ges, if it be once penuiite'd to shoot its roots into onr political fabric; unless, in deed, it should be speediiy eradicated. In what manner the . share that would -fall to ths Stales would. Irt: He firsi Irl stance, be applied, may for llje roost part, be anticipated. The indebted States would probably pledge it to the payment of their debts; the effect of which would be, to en- ' hance (heir value in he hands of the hol ders ihe Rothschilds, the Barings, the Hopes, on ihe other side of the Atlantic, with wealthy brokers and stockjobbers on this. Were this done at the expense of the indebted States, none could object. But far different is the case when at the expense of the Union, by the sacrifice of the noble inheritance lefi by our ancestors, and iv Ijeu. the 1q$9 of this great and perau-
The Lincoln Republican (Lincolnton, N.C.)
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Oct. 20, 1841, edition 1
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