North Carolina Newspapers

it The lendtnrtj of Oemocraet it loicard the titration oftht Industrious clat;tht lertt of t .tiir'eomforl, thariion oflhtir dignity, IK ef a&t juxcnf of thtir potcrrl BY ROBERT WILLIAM SOX, Jr. lilXCOIiNTOX, IS. C, OCTOBER 27, 1841. VOLUME V, NO. 22. 1'tt- K NEW TERMS OF THE LIXCOLN REPUBLIC AN TERMS OF PUBLICATION. Tub Lixcolw Repuhlicax is published every Wednesday at S2 50, if paid in advance, or $3 if payment bq delayed three months. No subscription received for a less term than twelve months. No paper will be discontinued but at the optiuo efthe Editor, until all arrearages are paid. A failure to OFder a discontinuance, will be con sidered a new engagement. TERMS OF ADVERTISING. !y for $1 00 per square for the first in.scition, and t25 cents for each continuance. Court and Judicial advertisements will be charged 25 per cent, more than the above prices. A deduction of 33J per cent, from the regular prices will be made to yearly advertisers. The number of insertions must be noted on the manuscript, or they will be chaiged until a discon tinuance is ordered. TO CORRESPONDENTS. To insure prompt attention to Letters addressed the Editor, the postage should in all cases be paid. Twenty-seventh Congress. SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN, or SOUTH CAROLINA. In Senate of the U. S. August 24.1841 On the Distribution MIL ( Concluded.) But its mischievous effacts on the exter ior relations of the country would not be limited to its indirect consequences There it would strike a direct and deadly blow, by withdrawing entirely from the defences of the country one of the only two sources of our revenue, and that much the most permanent and growing. It is now in the power of Congress to pledge permanently this great and increasing fund to thai important object to completing the system of fortifications and building, equip ing, and maintaining a gallant navy. It was proposed to strike out the whole bill ; to expunge the detestable project of distri bution; and to substitute in its place the revenue from the public lands as a perman ent fund, sacred to the defence of the coun try. And from what quarter did this patri otic and truly , statesmanlike proposition come? From the far and gallant west; from, a senator (Mr. Linn) of a State the ...v.rt ..pmc ri win me ueean, and secure from danger. And by whom was it vo ted down? Strange to tell, by Senators from maritime States States most expos ed, and having deepest interest in the mea sure, defeated by their representatives on this floor. Wonderful as it may seem, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and South Carolina, each gave a vote against it. North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Dela ware, and New Jersey, gave eacli two votes, against if New York gave one ; and every vote from New England, but two from New Hampshire and one from Maine, was cast against it. lie it remem bered in all after limes, that these votes from ts tales so exposed, and having so deep a stake in the defence of the country, were cast in favor of distribution of giving grat uitously a large portion of the fund from the public domain to wealthy British capi talists, and against the proposition for ap plying it permanently to the sacred pur pose of defending their own shores from insult and danger. How strange that New York and New England, with their hun dred millions of property, and so many thousands of hardy and enterprising sailors annually afloat, should give so largo a vote for a measure above all others best calcula ted to withdraw protection from both, and bo 6mall a vote for one best calculated to af ford them protection? But strange as that may be, it is still more strange that the staple Slates, the States' that will receive co little from distribution, and which must pay so much to make up the deficiency it will cause Slates so defenceless on their maritime frontier should cast so large a vote for their own oppression, and against their own defence ! Can folly, can party infatuation, be the cause one or both, go further. Let me say to the Senators from com mercial and navigating States, in all sober ness, that there is now a warm and gener ous feeling diffused throughout the entire Union in favor of the arm of defence with which your interest and glory are so close ly identified. Is it wise by any act of yours, to weaken or alienate such feelings? And could you d an act more directly cal culated to do so ? Remember, it is a deep principle of our nature not to regard the safety of those who do not regard their own. If you are indifferent to your own safely, you must not be surprised if those less interested should uctome 6tiu more so. But a3.much as the defences of the coun try would be weakened directly by the withdrawal of so large a fund, the blow would be by no means so heavy as that which, in its consequences, would fall on them. That would paralyse the right arm of our power. To understand fully how it would have that effect, we must look not only to the amount of the sum to bo withdrawn, but also on what the bur den would full to make up the deficiency. It would fall on the commerce of the'eoun try, exactly where it would do most to crip ple the means of defence. To illustrate the truth of what I state, it will be neces sary to inquire what would be our best sys tem of defence. And what would involve the prior question, from what oarter are we mosf exposed to danger ? With that, I 6hall accordingly begin. 1 here is but one nation on the globe from which we have any thing serious to apprehend; but that is the most powerful that now exists, or evcrdtd exist. 1 refer to Great Britain. She is in effect our near neighbor, liiniirrh ih cri-eat Ailnnlif. dividps o" - n - o us. -tier cuIoii'ar'rn?sesntjns exreml along the whole extent of our eastern and western borders, - from the atlantic to the Pacific ocean. Her power and influence extend over the numerous Indian tribes scattered along our western border, from our nor thern boundary to the infant republic of Texss. But it is on our maritime frontier, extending from the mouth of the Sabine to that of St. Croix a distance, with the un dulations of the coast, of thousands of miles, deeply indented with bays and navigable rivers, and studded with four great commer cial emporiums; it is there, on the long lins of frontier, that she is the most power ful, and we the weakest and most vulner able. It is there she stands ready, with her powerful navy, sheltered in the com manding positions of Halifax, Bermuda, and the Bahamas, to strike a blow at any point she may select on this long line of coast. She is the quarter from which on ly we have danger to apprehend; and" the important inquiry which next presents it self is, how can we best defend ourselves against a power so formidable, thus touch ing us On all points, excepting the small portion of onr boundary along which Tex as joins us ? Every portion of our extended frontier demands attention, inland as well as mari time; but with this striking difference: that on the former, our power is as much greater than hers, as hers is greater than ours on the maritime. There we would be the assailant, and whatever works may be erected there, ought to have reference to that fact, and look mainly lo protecting im portant points from sudden seizure and de vastation, rather than to guard sigainst any permanent lodgment of a force within our borders. 'Vt- JifTi problem if tho defence of' our maritime frontier. That, of course, must consist of fortifications and a navy ; but the question is, which ought to be mainly relied on, and to what extent the one may be considered as superseding the oilier. On both points I propose to make a few remarks. - Fortifications, as the means of defence, are liable lo two formidable objections, ei ther of which is decisive against them as an exclusive system of defence. The fir-t is, that they are purely defensive. Let the system be ever so perfect, the works loca ted to the greatest advantage, and planned and constructed in the best manner, and all they can do is to repel attacks. They are like a shield without a sword. If they should be regarded as sufficient to defend our maritime cities, still they cannot com mand respect, or give security to our wide ly spread and important commercial and navigating interests. But regarded simply as the mear.s of de fence, they are defective. - Fortifications are nothing without men to garrison them; and if we should have no other means of defence. Great Britain could compel us, with a moderate fleet stationed a; the points above enumerated, and with but a small portion of her large military establishment, to keep up on onr part, to guard our coast, ten times the force, at many times the cost, to garrison our numerous forts. Aided by the swiftness of steam, she could menace at the same time every point of our coasts, while we, ignorant of the time or point where the blow might fall, would have to stand pre pared at every moment and at every point, to repel her attack. A hundred thousand men constantly under arms would be insuf ficient for the purpose; and we would bo compelled to yield, in the end, ingloriously, without striking a blow, simply from the j exhaustion of our means. Some other mode of defence, then, must be sought. There is none oilier but a na vy. 1, of course, include steam as well as sails. If we want to defend our coast and protect our rights abroad, it is absolutely necessary. The only questions are, how far our naval force ouht to be carried; and to what extent it would supersede the sys tem of fortification ? Before I enter on the consideration of this important point, I owe it to myself and I the subject to premise, that my policy is peace, and that I look to the navy but as the right arm of defence, not as an instru ment of conquest or aggrandizement. Our road to greatness, as I said on a late occas ion, lies not over the ruins of others. Pro vidence has bestowed on us a new'and vast region, abounding in resources beyond any country of the same extent on the globe.- Ours is a peaceful task to improve this rich inheritance; to level its forests ; culti vate its fertile soil; devslope its vast miner al resources; give the greatest rapidity and facility of intercourse between its widely extended parts; stud its w ide surface with flourishing cities, towns and villages; and spread over it richly cultivated fields. So vast is our country, that generations af ter generations may pass away in executing this task, during the whole of which time we would be rising more surely and rapid ly in numbers, wealth, greatness, and in fluence, than any other people have ever done by arms. But, to carry out success fully this, our irue plan of acquiring great ness and happiness, it is not of itself suffi cient to have peace and tranquility within. These are indeed necessary, in order to leave the States and their citizens in the full and anflls;urbeij possession of their re sources and energy, by which lo work out, in general rivalry, the' high destiny which certainly awaits our couutry if we should be but tn.e to ourselves. But, as impor tant as they may be, it is not much leas so to have safety against external danger, and the influence and respectability abroad ne cessary to secure onr exterior interests and rights (; important to our prosperity) a gainst aggression. I look to a navy for these objects; and it is wilhin the limits they assign I would confine its growth. To what extent, then, with these views, ought our navy to be carried? In my opin ion, any navy less tiian that which would give us the habitual command of our own coast and seas, would be little short of use less. One that could be driven from sea and kept in harbor by ihe force which Great Britian could safely and constantly allot to our coast, would be of little more service than an auxiliary aid to our fortifi cations in defending our harbors and mari time cities. It whold be almost as passive as they are, aud would do nothing to diminish the expense, which 1 have shown would be so exhausting to defend the coast exclusively by fortifications. Bui the difficult question still remains to be solved What naval force would be sufficient for that purpose ? It will not be expected that I should give more than a conjectural answer to such a question. I have neither the data nor the knowledge of naval warfare to spesk with any thing like precision; but I feel assured that the force required would be far less than whai would be thought when the question is first propounded. The very idea of de fending ourselves on the ocean against the immeyse power of Great Britain -on that element, has something startling at the first blush. But, as greatly as she outnum bers us in ships' and m al resources, we have advantages that countervail that, in reference to the subject in hand. If she has manyships, she has sJso many point guard, and these as widely separated as are the parts of her widely extended em pire. She is forced to keep a home rlcet in the channel another in the Baltic- another in the Mediterranean, one beyond ids CapdofGond Hope, to guard her im portant pos-essions in the east, and ano ther in the Pacific. Our situation is the reverse. We have no foreign possessions, and not a oint to guard beyond our own maritimt r mtier. There our whole fores may be concentrated, ready to strike when a vulnerable point is exposed. If to these advantages be added, that both France and Russia have large naval forces ; that be tween us ai.d them there is no point of conflict; that they both watch the naval supremacj' of Great Britain with jealousy; and that nothing is more easy than for us to keep on good terms with both powers, especially with a respectable naval force at our command, -it will be rea'dily per ceived that a force, far short of that of Great Britain .would effect what I contemplate. I would say a force equal to one-third of hers would suffice; but if not, certainly less than one-half would. And if so, a naval force of that size would enable us to dis pense with all fortifications, except at im portant points, and such as might be ne cessary in reference to the navy itself, to the great relief of the Treasury, and sav ing the means lo be applied to the navy, wiiere it would be far more efficient The less considerable points might be safely left to the defence of cheap works, sufficient to repel plundering attacks; as no large Heel, sucn as would be able to meet us, with such a naval force as that propo sed, would ever think of disgracing it self by attacking place3 so inconsidera ble. Assuming, then, that a navy is indis pensable to our defence, and that one less than that supposed would be in a great measure useless, we are naturally led- to look into the sources of our naval power preparatory to the consideration of the question, how they will be affected by imposing on commerce the additional burden this bill would make necessa rv. Two elements are necessary to naval nower sailors and money. A navy is an expensive force, and is only formidable when manned wun regularly bred sailors. In onr case, both of these denend on com mcrce. Commerce is ind:snensable to form a commercial marine, aud that to form a naval marine; while commerce is with If kic kill u'lniilit il.n xnlo crtlirPf of revenue. A flourishing, commerce is, then, in every respect, the basts of our naval po.cr; and to cripple' commerce is to cripple , that power lo paralyze the right arm of our defence. . But the impo sition of onerous duties on commerce is ihe most certain way to cripple it. Hence this detestable and mischievous measure, which surrenders the only oilier source of revenue, and throws the whole burden of supporting the Government exclusively on commerce, aims a deadly blow at the vitals of our power. The fatal effect of high duties on com merce, is no longer a matter of speculation. The country has passed recently through two periods one of protective tariffs and high (JimJos, ami the oilier of a reduction of duti ; und we have the effects of each in our ofiicid tabies, both as regards our ton nage and commerce. They speak a lan guage not to be mistaken, and far stronger than any one could anticipate, who has not looked into the tables, or made himself acquainted with the powerful operation of low duties in extending navigation and commerce. As much as I bad anticipated from their effects, the reduction of the duties the lightening of the burdens of commerce -have greatly exceeded my most sanguine expectations. I shall begin with the tonnage, as more immediately connected with naval power; and, in order to show the relaiive effects of high duties and low on navigation, I shall conpare the period from 1821, when the first great increase of protective duties took place, to 1830, inclusive, when the firM reduction duties commenced. During these seven years, which include the ope ration of the two protective tariffs of 1821 and 1828 that is the reign of the high protective tariff system, our foreign tonnage fell off from 039,972 tons lo 577,475, equal to 04,497; our coasting tonnage from 719,100 to 615,310, equal to 103,883 tons making tlie falling off in both equal to 165,370 tons. Yes; to that extent )103, 830) did our coasting tonnage decline; the very tonnage, the increase of which, 'it was confidently predicted by the protec tive parly, would make up for every pos sible loss in oir foreign tonnage from their miserable qu:ck system. Instead of that, the falling of in the coasting trade is even greater than ii the foreign; proving clearly that high duties are not less injurious lo the home than to the foreign trade. I pass npw to the period ( 1 will not 6ay of free rade it is far short of that,) of reduction . jf high protective Juiie; .--nad now mark the contrast between the two. I begin with the year 1831, the first after the reduction was made on a few articles, (principally coffee and tea,) and will take in the entire period down to the last returns that in 1840 making a period of ten years. This period includes the great re duction under the compromise act, which is not yet completed, and which, in its further progiess, would add greatly to the increase, if permitted to go through undis turbed. The tmnage m the foreign trade increased during that period from 576,475 tons, to 899,761, equal to 323,283 tons not much less than two-thirds of the whole amount at the commencement of ihe period; and the coasting for the same period in creased from G15.310 to 1,230,999, equal to 065,699 tons more than double; and this, too, when, according to the high tariff doctrine, our coast ig trade ought to have fallen off, instead of increasing in conse quence of the reduction of the duties and Ihus incontsstibly proving, that low duties are not less favorable to our domestic than to our foreign trade. The aggregate tonnage from the period has increased from 1,191,776 to 2,180,763 nearly doubled. Such, and so favorable lo low duties in reference to tonnage is the result of the comparison between the two periods. The comparison in reference to com merce will prove not less so. Li making the comparison, I shall confine myself to the export trade, not because it gives the results more favorable for the reverse is the fact but because the heavy loans contracted by the Slates during the latter period between 1830 and 1841 gave a factitious increase to the imports, which would make the comparison appear more favorable than it ought in reality to be. Their effects were different on the exports. They tended to decrease rather than in crease their amount. Of the exports, I shall select domestic articles only, because they only are affected by the rale of the duties, as ihe duties on foreign articles, paid or secured by bond on their impona--lion, are returned on reshipment. With these explanatory remarks, I shall now proceed to the comparison. The amount in value of domestic arti rles exported for 1825 was S65.94f.745, and in the year 1830 S59,4G2,029; making a failing off, under the high tariff system, during- that period, of 7,182,718. Di vide the period into two equal parts, of three years each, and it will be found that the falling off in the aggregrte of the latter part, con-pared to the former, is $13, 030,255; showing an average annual de crease of $1,962,418 during the latter part, compared with the former. The result will be f.und very different on turning to the period from 1830, when the reduction of the duties commenced, lo 1840, during the whole of which the re duction has been going un. The value of domestic expons for 1S31 was 61,277, G57, and for 1S40 113,895,631, making a difference of 852,018,577, equal to eighty three per cent, omitting fractions, for the ten years. If the period be divided into two tqual p;m, of live years each, the in crease of the latter compared to the former, will be found tobe 6139,089,371; making an annual average increase for the latter period from 1835 lo 1340 of $27,817, 654. Tlie rapid increase began with iht great reduction under the compromise acl of 1832. The very next year after it passed the domestic exports rose from S8 1,034. -162 to 8101,189,032 just like ihe ree, ' which takes plsce when the weight is re moved from the spring. x But my friends from the manufacturing Slates will doubtless say thai this vast in crease of exports from reduction of duties was confined to the yreat agricullural sta ples, and that the effects were the reverse as to the export of domestic manufactures. With their notion of protection, they cannot be prepared to believe that low duties are favorable to them. I ask them lo give me their attention, while I show how great their error is. So far from not partaking of this mighty impulse from the reduction, they felt it more powerfully than other ar ticles cf domestic exports, as I shall now proceed to show from the tables. The exports of domestic 'manufactures during the period from 1824 to 1832, in clusive that is the period of the high protective duties under the tariffs of 1824 and 182S full from 5,729,797 to $5. 050,633, making a decline of $678,133 during that period. The decline was pro gressive, and nearly uniform, from year lo year, through the whole period, In 1833 the compromise acl was passed, which reduced the duties at once nearly half, and has since made very considerable pro gressive reduction. The exports of do mestic manufactures suddenly, as if by magic, sprung forward, and have been ra pidly and uniformly increasing ever since; having risen, in the eight years, from 1832 to 1840, from $5,050,633 to $12, 108,533 a third more than double in that short period, and that immediately fol lowing a great decline in" the preced ing period of eight years, under high duties. Such were the blighting effects of high duties on the tonnage and the commerce of the country, and such the invigorating effects of. their .Jiluetiou-lJ Xlire an bo no mistake. The documents from which the statements are taken are among the public records, and open to the inspection of all. The results are based on the opera tions of a series of years, showing them to be the consequences of fixed aud steady causew, and not accidental circumstances; while the immediate and progressive de crease and increase of tonnage, both coast wise and f ireign and of exports, including manufactured as well as other articles, with tiie laying on of high duties, and the commencement and progress of their reduc tion, point out, beyond all controversy, high duties to be the cause of one, aud reduction low duties that of ihe oilier. It wiil be vain for the advocates of high duties to seek for a different explanation of the cause of these striking and convin cing facts in the history of the two peri ods. The first of ihese, from 1824 to 1832, is the very period when the late Bank of the United States was in the fullest and most successful operation ; when exchanges, according to their own show ing, were the lowest and most steady, and the currency the most uniform and sound; and yet, with all these favorably circumstances, which they estimate so highly and with no hostile cane operating from abroad, our tonnage and commerce, in every branch on which the duties could operaie, fell off; on the contrary, during the latter period, when all the hostile causes which they are in the habit of daily denoun cing on ihis floor, and of whose disastrous consequences we Ii3ve heard -so many elo quent lamentations; yes, in spite of con tractions and expansion?; in spite cf tam pering with the currency and lh removal of the depositee; in spite of ihe disordered stale of the whole machinery of commerce; the deranged state f the currency, both at home and abroad; in spite of the stato- cf the exchanges, and of what we are con stantly told of the agony of the country; both have increased, rapidly increased increased beyond all former example! Such is the overpowering effect of remov ing weights from ihe sp 4 .tjs of industry, and striking off shackles from the free' ex changes of products, as to overcome all ad verse causes. Let me add, Mr. President, that of this highly prosperous period to industry, (how ever disastrous to those who have over speculated, or invested their fnuds in rot ten and swindling institutions the most prosperous of the whole, as the lables wiil show, is that during the operation of the sub-treasury a period when sonic progress was made towards the restoration of the currency of the Constitution. In spite of the many difficulties and embarrassments of the trying period, the progressive re duction of the duties, and the gradual intro duction of a sounder corrency, caye so vigorous a spring to our industry as to over come them ill; showing clearly, if the country was blcssd with the full and steady operation of the two, under favorable cir cumstances, that it would enjoy a degree of prosperity exceeding what even the friends of r:at measure anticipated. Having now shown that tUe navy is the right arm of our defence ; that it depends on commerce for its resources, both as to men and to means ; and that high duties destroy the growth of our commerce, in cluding navigation and tonnage; 1 have, I trust, satisfactorily established the position which I laid down that this . measure, which would place the entire burden of supporting the Government on commerce, would paralyse the right arm of our power. Vote it down ard leave commerce as free as possible ; and it will furnish ample re sources, skilful and gall.-nt sailors, and an overflowing treasury, to repel danger far from our shores, and maintain our rights and dignity in our external relations. With the aid of the revenue from land, and proper economy, we might soon hare ample means to enlarge our navy to that of a third of the British, with duties below the limits of 20 per cent, prescribed by the compromise act. The annual appropria tion, or cost of the British navy, is about $39,000,000. Ours, with the addition of the appropriation for the home squadron made this session, is Csay $6,000,000 ; requiring only the addition of four millions to make it equal to a third of that of Great Britain, provided thai we can build, equip, man and maintain ours as cheaply as she can hers. That we can, wiih proper man agement, can scarcelsy be doubted, when , we reflect that our navigation, which in volves almost all the elements of expense that a navy docs, successfully competes with hers all over the world. . Nor are we deficient in men gallant and hardy sailors to man a navy on as large a scale as is sug gested. Already our tonnage is two-thirds of that of Great Britain, and will in a short time approach an equality with hers, if our commerce should be fairly treated. Leave, then, in the Treasury, the funds proposed to be withdrawn by this detestable bill ; apply it to the navy and defences of the country; and even at its present amount, with small additional aid from the impost, it will give the means of raising it, with the existing appropriation, to the point sugges ted ; and with the steady increase of the fund from the increased sales of lands, keep ing pace with l!io mcreasa of luiuuicuo under a system of light and equal duties. hwe may, with proper economy in ihe col lection and disbursements of the revenue, raise our navy stead:!)', without feeling the burden, to half the size of the British or more, if more be needed for defence and the maintenance of our rights. Beyond that, we ought never to aim. I have (said Mr. C.) concluded what I proposed to say. I have passed over many and weighty objections to this measure which I could not bring within the scope of my remarks, without exhausting ihe pati ence of this body. And now, Senators, in conclusion, let me entreat you, in the name of your common country, and the immor tal fathers of our Revolution and founders of fur Government to reject this danger ous bill. I implore you to pause and pon der before you give your final vote for a measure which, if it should pass and be come a peimanent law, would do more lo defeal the ends for which this Government was instituted, and to subvert the Consti tution and destroy the liberty of the coun try, than any which has ever been proposed. " Circumstances oiler Cases." The banks refuse to pay their debts, and ihe Le- ; Ulatures grant them all the indulgence they ask. The States find it inconvenient to pay their debts, and taxes are laid to provide the moans. Is it not as honest for a Slate to suspend payment as a bank ? When the banks suspend payment, the people are cheated. To prevent the States suspending pay msnt, the people are taxod. W'hy is this difference I That speculators may not be obliged to sell their property at low prices and pay their debts, the banks suspend payment and ihe people are cheatad. That speculators and banks may not lose upon State stocks held by them, the Stales are loudly called on to preserve their faith, and the people are taxed. In one respect, the principle i the same. The people are both cheated and . taxed to save the speculators from loss. But what hypocrisy it is, for men who sustain banks in the violation of all faith, to declaim so zealously about the impor tance of preserving the faith- of the States ! Democracy goes for good faith on all side9. Lei ihe Stales pay; let the banks pay; let the speculators pay; let every body pay that can; let there bo eticli indul gence as banks and other creditors can grant without injustice to their own credi tors; but no violation of faith, public or private, sanctioned by law or countenanced by authority. All such acts are blows aimed at the pil lars which sustain society itself. KendaWs Expositor.